ABSTRACT Title of disserta,lfon: 'flHIE VIRTUES 017 SHARING Namey J. Matcheli; Doctor oflPhilosophy, 1998 Disserlaifon directed by: Professor J\l!ichael A. Slote, Chair Depalll"hnerit of Philosophy In "The Virh1es of Sharing" I defend two cenll:ral the,;es: that slm1rin1; is mu most overarching ethical ideal, and that v1irtue ethics is !!Me to serve as a comprehensive am:l free--shmding approach to moral theory. My airi~urn,ents for these thesE><s mre inlerlwined, becau1se they are also designed to show how a vfrtue--etbical 1:heory thal: treatll the 11\1\/Hl fo Share" as the basis of moml agency helps to resolve the conlexnlP'ornry Jiustke/Ca1ee Debate. Althm.ngh rooted in the hfatm-y of weste.rn mornl phHosophy, this debate cxystallnzed in response fo Carol Gilligan's dai1m lhat there are two ways of thinking about mo1m1Hy, I contem:l thal. what she pree1ents as a sintt!;lie c1.mbmst between a "justice-oll'ior1tation" and a "cmre--orlientabon" aduaily points to iwo distinct tensions within moral lltought. The first and most i~enornl is a tension in value orientation: some moral m1tfooks mnphasize the separateness of persons, while others id.eali:r..e va.rious forms of 1inlerpersoñJ connedion. I argue !:hat m"ither set of values rnn lie shown to ha 11e absoltlte primacy over the other> but !hat the ideal of shc1r.ing umlerlies. both. 'fhe second i~'nslm1 conce[l'llS whether an adeqt1ate conception of rn1orality mu~t be gnmnded in absfrad and general principles. I arg:m" that foe dghtnE,ss of actions rnn lie tmderstm:id as being enl:frely derivative from, the !~oodness of their motives, mid that agents, need 11ot be "acting 011 prindple 11 in order to be acting mrnrally. I further argue that mrnrally good irr1oti11es rnre best 1imden,tood as expres1;im1s i:if an agent's pracbical desire or VI/ill 1:o Share both ltltings and experiences wHh other people. The formal sl:ruduue of my respom1e to the seco.nd tension is rad icaflly virtue-ethkrnl, amI when cmnbined with the 1110.nnative tbesis that the WiH to Share is a motivatiom1!1. ideal, resuHs in an attradive and tliemetkally satisfying conception of mmalHy and the ethical hfe. To demoinstJratii:(' this, I show how an ethic of sharing explains and justnfie, mu cal11oniin1l moral judgm,ents, whifo rnlso provid1ing us wHh the, concrnte gtlid,mce we seek from 11rnoml theory. THE VIRTUES OF SHARIING by Ni1111cy l Makhelt Disserl:atim1. submiUed fo llhe llilculty of the Graduad:,~ Schoo.I of the UnivnsHy of Maryland in p11rti.rul fulfillrnen,t of the re,1ufremc-mts frnc the degree of Doctor of J-'hHosophy ]998 Advisoiry Commitll:ee: Professor Michael Slo1:e,. Chruimrnn/ Advisor Prnfessor Nancy Shemrnn (Georgetown University) Professor Judith LkMeoberg Assishmt rrofossor Samuel Kerstein © Copyright by Nancy J, Miakhett 1998 TAIBJLJE OF CONTIENTS CHAll"TJlR ONE: GILLIGAN'S '][)\TO MORAL 0!UliNTA1IONS ANID THE CON'rnMPORARY "JusnCJF./CARE" DEHA'IlR ., •• ,, •• ,.,,,.,,,,, •• , •• ,.,,,, •• , •. , ••• ,,,, ..• ,.,!, 1.J Mmal orie1rntatio11s and ethics ...................... ,., ... ,..................... , ............. 9 l.2 Autonomy mnd caring .......... ,.... , ..... , ......... ,,, ..... ,...... , ................. , .. , .. ,. ..... *13 L3 A crnriflalfo,n of two della1k~S, ........... , ...................... , ........ , .... ., ............ 25 The pJlace of moJralll pdnciples ..... , ..... ,.......... , .. , ... ,...... ., ........ , ...... , ......... , .. 2.8 Seprumteness/Connectedness .......... , .................. , .... , .... , ................ , ............. 36 l.4 Towud a more constructive dialog , ............... , ..................................... -4'1 CHAPTER Two: AGENI"*••lBASUD Vllll.TUIE lET!UCS AND THIE IDEAL OIF CARiii ... , ... ,,.1.141• 2.1 Two types of virhie•ethkal 1:hemy ..................... ., ..................... , .. .4!i 2.2 The fo!'m&l stn1d:ure of agent-based views 23 Three irnpm'larnl distJinctiions .... ,, ....................................... , ................. , ... 541 (i) 1nexe impullses vs. motivational states, ..... ,. .... ,. ....................... ,.55 (iii) posse:,sing vs .. nrnnifesting a motilvwtion (W) responsibility ass.,,ssme111ts vs .. motive assessme11t-i1 ............ ,, .... 67 2.A-One central t*einte1*prebtion ................... ,. ..................... ,. ...... , ..... ,., ... 66 Vnvt1.1e .. thical 1rnles .................................................... , ................ ,. ......... , ,.. 68 25 Moral deii.beratnon ....................................... , .............. , ......... ,. .................... '73 The sem,e of duty .... ,.............................. , ............... , ............. , .......... ,....... ,.... , .. 79 .. , 6 '" I * Jk' * *1 t '"' "'* ,)LC g:wK s overs1g , ................................................................................ ,, ....... <>., 'I'he concept of ,1 motivatio.11.al itdeal .......... ,...... , .................................. 90 Justifying moti1mtional idea1fo .......... ,.......... ,. .... , ....................................... 93 2 7 ("O • . ti. ,, . ' . "' I' '" ~*. . .... a rung as a 1no va1t.no,1J1a11 .llt. 4::.,a L•• ,. .............. H.,,, ...... ,, .•••••••• ., .............. .,,. ...... ,, ...... ,, .. :1.1(11 CHI\Ji"I1ER THJRIEE: ''§EPARA7rENIE6o§'*1' AND '''CONNECTEDNESS" IN WESTERN M[ORAL P!UI.OSOl'HY ........ ,. ... ,. .... , .... ..,. ... , ......... """"""***""'""'"""""*"* ... ., .......... , .• ,, l *13 3."I. An a11cientdebate ................... , ................ , .... ,. ............................. ,......... *116 3.2: Modern lneories of separn1:eness ............................. ,....... ,. ...... ,, ..... , ..... *119 3.:3 Modern models of cornt11eded11ess .. , .................. , ................ , ..................... 128 3.4 IirnpHrntions of Hie nwder-11 debate.,,. ....... , ..... , .... ., ..... ,, ........ , ..... , .... *t\9 35 Cool vs .. wmrm11 ideals of drnrnd:er ....................... ,, .... , .............. ,., ... HJ Cool! agent-bmsed ethics ............................................................... , .. , ... ,. .... *144 W anm mge11t-1Jased ethics, ...... ,, ........................................ , ........... , .... , ... 151 3.6 F1"om a11to11omy vs. caring to sharing ..................... , .... , ........................ *157 CHAPTf.lR lFOUR: THF. 'IA/nr,, 7r0 §HARJB ..................................... , .. ,.... .., ......... , .. , ....................... , ... 161! 4.1 Two modes of sl1ared activity ................... , ....................................... 163 Distril:mtive shairing ................................................. , .............................. 16'.I Experiential siim'ing ............................ ,. ................... ,...................... , ....... 168 4.2 The primrncy ol' ll1ce xperiential mode .......................................... ."117? ii 4.3 The significance off the Wlilil ......................................................................... '1'75 4A Sharil[tg ,md nal:mraI sodahilily ......................................................... 178 4.5 Sharing and moml developmenL .............. ,. ................ ,. ................. Ul7 4•.6 The nnoraJ value of muhmlity ........................................................ ,.197 CHAFI1ER lFIVl.l: MORAUTY A§ SHAJRING .............................................................................. 21l11 Sol Shadnp; rnnid imdivicluali chani.der ........................................................ 701 Elements of Hie Willl lo Shmre .................................................................. 2:02: The di11ersily of mm*al character ........................................................ 2J)5 The lone1r allld pure alhmis1: pmblen:rn ............................................. 2:()8 " 2 Cl, . . d . h' 1 • •2*1 '' ,, .• ,,,,anng am Ing,, ac,mn ................................................................................ '"* Can't people shañ in inunoi*al acts?' ........................................................ 2'1:'\. The loner and pure ,illrn.ist problems, n*evisil:\~d ... , ....................... 211l 5 .. 3 Prac1:kal Guidance ............. , .... ,., .................... ,,.. ,......... ,., ....... , .... ,.. ,............... 2:?J M()tivational confl nds ., ....... , ... , ... , .... ,., ........ ,. , ....... , ........... , ................ 221 •. ,.• ,. * ,. * , *1 • t" *2:21• .. 1I,e wrongness o, specm .IIza ton, .... , ... , ................. ,.,., ... , .... , ... , ........ ,,.. ,l' The sinmrn,n-y mies of 1,hadng ..... , ................. , .................. , .... ,,., .... 729 5.4 Dissolving lile Au1tornl'my /Caring Delmte ....... ,........ ,., .. , .. , ..... , ..... 23-'I iii INTRODUCTION The .~uggestion that stmring mii;ht so.rve as our l'.l'lost overn.n:lhinig ,~thkal Jdernl m,ay sm.md almost too good to lie tme, but I beHeve that rt cotJld be h*11e, airnd in "The Vintn1es of Shairing" I endeavor to show lww that ideal cmn help us to 1mdemtand what sorts of m.otives an1d clharaider baits !lire moraiHy vfrtl]ous, and what sods of achons are mornlly 1righl,. rns well ar, wha,t sortn of poliUcail anrange1ments are worthy of mur aHeg,iancc> ,md whal. sorts of institutional stmdures are just My suggestion, iin other words, is llrnt the: ideal of shari11g liies at the core of onu* mom! aware11ess, caphming whrnl. moral adivilty ill both "pdvate" and "pubHc" contexts is most c1cmtn11Iy about MIY title is delibernt.ely am bigtmus behl\leen tlhrt.,,, senses of the tern1 'virtrne .. 1• To begin witJ~, it aHudetl lo what I take to be H1.e primary advantage of b'ealtini~ sharing as a11 eth1ical ideal , .. ,, 1rnamely, thr, way that it 1Jnifies or eve in lTa11scends, a pervasive tensiom that seems to be deeply en1bedided within both ordimuy and philosophical coirnceptions of mrnraHty, This tension is evidenced by Cai'ol Gilligan's disUnction between a "Jusbice .. *orienl:ationi" and a "'can•• owiernta,l:ion,." but as the arguments of my first chapte1r will show, the cuntem* .. porniry Jrnstice/Oue Debate is symptomat.k of a much more genern,11 di:,pute about Ute relative moral slgnifirnnce of "separnteness" and "connectedness"' in lr111man life,. VVhile some moral! outlooks 1ldealize ,rnfonomy,. se1f,-suffic1iency or individual fi'ight~,. 0U1ern idealize commundty, interdependence or !rnrnt.. A, great many moral debafos concern, the proper nmking of these conlrnsti11g vaJLlues and activities,. and the main virtue of an ethic of slhmring is H[(e way H integrates these two,. seemingly disprnrate aspects of moral Iho11ghl: .. My ltille ab:o refers lo the lheoretical strmdur0 of my aicr.omnl, whkh is radically virtm,••eU,irnL In recent years !here has been a fremendmm reviv~l of 1 inteires1: in the "ethks of virtue," and aiHhm11;h then'' is sWI 110 widely a1;reE'd upon view of preciseliy whait this aipproach to ethkail theory entails, lit 1is generally mallrked by two main dhmrad:erJ81jcs. The lilrst is its commilm,ent to mo.rc11 psychology, by which I mea1ri Hie s1mtained phi.losophkaJ inquiry 1into those featmres of Hie iiuman psyche,., induding percepl:km, imagin,a,bon,, emotional sensW.vl1y and motivation, as well as reaison and judgment,,,. that coJJ1dltfon our experience of mora!Hy and (help to) detennine the st1r!'11gth am! puqp,ose of ils requirements within the fJrmu!er cmrl:ext of hum am life as a, wholle. The second g!'neml characteristic of ai vlrtrne--ethirnl app1roadt is ils gmundi111g iir1 areblic rnrncepts mther than deon!k ones. IIem:e, vfrhi,•* ,stlhirn d.iffers from deontology, bemuse while both freat the rightness of any action as having mm'e to do with its nwUvcs than with Us consequences,, dk,on-tofogisl:s insist Hmt in onJe,, to be momJlly good or virhwus, motives 11nm,t always be co11wtn1inecl m* cornlitionecl by tndepemkmtly g1ro111ndc,d principles of right And virh1e eUlics difforn from consequentiaHsm,, beca,use whill' bo11h treat deontk conõpls like righh1ess a1rnd duty as hei11~; dependent on or derivative from ,ueb1k concepts Iilke goodness and vii'twe, com,eqn.mnfo1lisls insist that in iJhe last analysis, both the right111ess of c1dions and Ute virhie of motives is a, hmdio11 of !:he goodn,~ss of the stail:es of rnffairs they (ain• likely to) pmdm:e. Viirbrn--ethidsts,. hy cont:rnst,, i1nsist that moHves rund charracu'r trains can be morailly w11luable in ways thrnt do not depend on either pdndples or consequences. Much of what has been offored under the h,,ading "etfom of virtue" [n recenl y,"ars has l:ake11 the fonn of critiques of both deonfofo,gical a ml cm1,se** que11tialist themies for providing an imulequate and ovemimplified accmn1t of mon.d agency and the ethical Hfo. l\lonethefoss, many con1<-:1mporn1ry 11iirln1e2: ethJidsts proffer thefr views ~1s only 11, complement or supplernw1nt to H1ose other approaches (or occ11sfo11ally as a rejedion of moraI theory alltogether}, and the.re 1rem~1ins a good deiTII of skepticism aboul whelher* virtue eU1irn can serve as a frce .. ,starn:Hng and compreltenstve a1pproach lo moral theory, U is thought, lfrnr example, thait s11ch an approa1ch would be objc,ctionah.ly Pgoir;tk o.r antinomian, mild foil to .make sense of the ways in whkh mm*,1lity se(,ms to involve living up lo some sort of external consl:rnint; ii!.ltcrnativdy, it is thought to be objectio111aibly inva:iive, lelln1rig u1s ''what sorM:1; of pe1rsons to ho'' i11 ways Hmt a:re e,(cessively .meddksome. A lbacl,;15iround rnim of Uris di,sserlati:on fa fo, show Urnt these sortt:s of conceirrn, are 11mwarranted, and that both th<c rightnew, of ructions and the justice of institutions mn he tmderntood as being entirely dependent on the (moral) virtue of the agents wlm p,Jrfonn and es!:ahifah them. Th<' most detailed 11fofonse of such Jn "agenl-ba;;.->d11 form of vi11tm, ethks is given iI1 Chapter Two, Ih11t in many ways this e1111.Jire diss0Fta!fo111 is an argmnent in it" favor, Finally, my tille indicates the crucial task of this dissertation, which is to show that the moral virtrnes mre best mrndersluod as l:hc vfrtues of sharing, SpecificaHy, ll airgue Hmtthe morn! v1irh.1es are con5litutivc, ele1ments and sihmtio1n .. ,specifk expressions of Rll. agent's "Will to Share." This prad:kal d,0:sire to eng,1ge in va:rioirn kinds of shared acl:ivily is distinp;uished lby Hs cmnmitmenl to multuailily, and w1ithin such a Wi.11, concern for selli and concern for other pe()p]e are "fil!eredl thm11gln11 one anotheI' s11d1 Illiwi. lhe at;ent is mow,-d to en1;age in adivil:nes thrnl: exp1mss and fulfill both typ,-s of concmcns at the very same time, I dlcfom:l the prn,sibility tfo1t lnnnan beings possess or ,ue al least caprnble of 1n.uch a \l\lfll, wlhid1 I take to be deeply mol:ed i111 mu m11:m:al sodabiUty, in Chaipt.er ]four. Hut 0111e does 11ot h!wc, lo rngr*e,' iliid the 3 Wil.l to S.lu1re al"ises rna,h!raUy in order l:o view sllmring as an aUiraidive ideal of moral chrnradeir,, aind In Chapter Five, I demorn,trn1:e how an dhkal theory that is brused on tlhe .klernl of sharing c,rn expllain amdl justify our deepest mon1! convidions abm1tvidue and ri1;hi ad:icm. I afao show how ã el.hie ol :,,ha1ri11g provndes us with the corn:rete g11id,mce we have come to expect frrnn a morn] theory (in order to assist us in situaticms where the proper crmrse of action is tmdear), and I argue that it is able fo do so w1ithout x*elying on any adioa guiding principles tliat a,re niot themselves derived from the goodne5s ()f llhe Will to Share (tfmt is, I argue thal such mo ethic is enti.re.ly age1~t*b11sed). The broad scope of this project means that cerlaint thf!mes ., s1u:h as th,~ relations.hip between l:he virtues of sharing a,nd prndical wisdom, the role of foe \l\filll to Share within the overnll str11d:1Jre of an agent's clhan,c1:er, the best 1,vay to, culltiv11te the vil't11es of shmfog, amd tlte extent to which iml1ividm1l a.gents should be prnised or blamed for exhibiting or faihing to exhibit those virh1es -will only be discm;sed ir1. a highly abslnid mmu1eir, .Nonetheless, I believe my accom1rl: is ,mbshmti11e eno11glt to show how these more detailed quee,hons n:rigM: be frnitfoUy expforedL As to whether U1e ethic of ,1h,1ring lco be developed in 1:hc~ follow:ing chapters is in fad too good to be trrne, J ca11 imly point out thatwhifo it do,!s c1llow inhe1re11tly muhml goods, such as lliriendship and love,. to have an 1important pface squarely wtthir1 Hie moral domain, it flfao requires ai hi.gh dlegre!e of respo11si11,oness lo others and can oflen be very hard work. CHAJPTER ONE: GILLIGAN'S ']l'i/\TO JV!0RAL ORUiNTATI0NS AN)[) HIIE C0Nll1lMP0RARY ".]rnHrc:r4(:AR.E" DEl3ATli Carol Gilligan i.s fa111ous for the da.im U11at women la Ilk and think aboul: morality "lin at dHfc~1rent vok, 0: 11 ('1982),, }for asserHon wais based on a 11edo\r, of inh2:1"11iews in! which males aIJd females (both yot1ng childr,m imd adults) were asked to describe theiir conceptionf'l of morality and thefr experfonees of morn] coIJflid,. ats well as to respond rm,raliy to both acl:ual m1d hypotheti«:al dilemmas. ContendiITTg that males l:ypicailly aippeafad to cm1s1ideralfo11s of 1iustic12•, auftonomy ai11d lnd[viduall rights, whereas females were more lilel1y 1to emphrnr,ize crnre for, 1responsiven.ess to amd rellalimisMp with ol:her pernons, Gnligan a.rgued Umt her data lt'evealled the presence of two di§Hnrt m.oral 11cm•,1, ..oirientalim1," res.ped:ively .. And she n11atint:aJned that in addilfon to being the predomim11nt or preferred moral outlook among women, the care .. Oll'ientillfon em1 bodied ideals and rndivities that were very different from the m1er, i1t1cmvorrnled wifhi111 the most influeITTt[atl Hieori.es of moral!i1lly rnnd moral development. GiHigan's views sparked a mntempo.m.rry 11J1.rntice/Care Debafi.e" co111• cermfog; both Hie cogem:y of her d[sti1nction am! its implkalions for dhirnl theory.I Much of the merntmre has foc11rned on whether she has adequal':e empirical e111idence to support a C(lnrel!aUon liellween mom] orientat..io1n and gender, but I shrnll not he parl:icufal"ly nmcf!rned with Umic asp,xt of the dc,hat1: lGi.llftgan was not the first to point oul Uw.l ideals of jus-U:ce and ca:!d:ng n1ight al. k:1:11,\f. so111oti.nw::~ coniflid., and meitl1nr ,-vas sh~: t:hP first to fmg:gosl Htllll wormm. u1ir1d m,m migl1l hav~-: different moral concerns. B-ut her \Alork rorru)lm'> a crudail!. *reforencn po-fnJ for contmnporary Lhinkirig ahout U1.ese 1.S,S\tllf\8. what follows,.2 Part of my reason is that Gill!iga.111 has allwrnys sougi11 to dishmce he1rnellf from the view that there are inherenl:ly "m@scuHne" airnd "fominine"' m*ientaUons fo morality:: her earli.est wnrk emphrn1;1iz:eid tfo1fc the two voices were dfaU1r1guished "not by gender, but by .tlri~~m.<:" (l 982: 2, gny g~rtphasis), and a!thorngh she does say that relfonce on the crnm,ori.e11t:atilrn is "d:iarncteristically rn female phenomenon i11 l:he advrnnl:illgedl populations l:hat have been studied!" (1986: 330), the most detailed c'vidence she mru:l her coJIIeagues have collected suggesl:s tJ1alc meinlJerr-s of both sexes 1m,dernbnd, or al least have some k1lnd of psychologkall access to,, .J~g!h orienfoUons from a very early age (Gilligan et aL,, ] 988: Chs, 3, 4 &.6).3 Perhaps moire impo,n*bmfly, 1.mless thc're is so11r1.e discernible difference in the U11emes of t}w two orienbtions GiHigrnn identified, there could Ile :rm way to determine which orientation any particular individmd was rell,yi.ng on, aml r,.o no way lo sub,:tanliate a correlatio11 between morali orienrlalfon and gender in the first pllace. 4 fo any eveiit, none of the dlaiims to he defended [n ~fas difosertal:ion hiinge on H1," presence OJI' absence of srnch a couefalio11. For what: I find most irrutrigulil'lg about Gi11ig,m's work is the way H illmminates a pervasive tension in value-*mnentatilon lhat fa deepl.y embedded ~fi.t!1in. the western philosophical tmdiUori, as welil as wHhiin more ordinary forrms of m()rn[ 2n,o majoir conbribulions to thie asp,,c:I. or the dobak are rnprinl<:d in l.,arru,boe Cl 99'.1), For in very deta:iled armlysifl and review of the ,:vtdcmcc concerning g,cmfor diffen'.*ncñ; in rnoral mas.on-ing:, sen H(tnagai:in ('199-:1: Pat"!: 1111). 3TJw:re i:s: also some* c.ro,ss-culturaJ ovicfonce tlhat sorrt<-:*thr.ng morn a_ki.in to the: 0;111: oiri.ent:ation is r,redominant tu:n.o:ng, both m.af.es as1d fonHi1fos in non:-\1\n;st.c-irn cuJL11n:s. (t~e,\ Ha1*diug 1990; Holland 1993; and Schwedei~ Mahapatra, a,<1d Miller 'J987), 4 r do not tttke this to sh1ow that th.n dJscovery of a gender c(wrdaU.on 1Nould. not i!sdf Tb,c; s'ignifiet.mL Tlhn point is only t.l-1.at. we rnusL know what the cHffon!l1Cl\f; hdw,-:<>n f11e hvo m(wal o.rin*inlatio.ns tU('O bnfoni nm ra:m:HkaUo:ns (m.on-:tr:I, political[, or oLlwrvviso) of such a corirduUon cou.[d be sc-riollls.ly expfo*md. 6 tho11f;ht..5 I11deed, w,' will see 11:lha I the Justke/CaJre DebalP 1is I.inked to much more geneml di1>pute1; within nwll'~t.l philosophy about lJh1c• idead of ihnpmclfoJ!ily and the irol.e of the emo1:fons in morn l perception, deliberalfon, .motivation, and jm:lgme11t. 6 ]Bern.awe the westem l:mdHion is undeniably tlhe prndud oJ male philosophizing, th1is meaJ11s that any atl.empl to ch,uaderi,,c GilHgan's f:wo n11ornll Oll'ienfolfo11s olely in terms of a conilrast between masn1Jine and feminine mornl outlooks cannot be enbrely accuni,t,;. Nom"l:helless, it could s!ilJ be In,•, case that wo1nen,, "for rn vmdefty of psychological mtd poliHcal r,('&lsons,." mre more likely to ir<'!ly on the care-01rientation than men (Gilliigan *199&: 123). Although I shall take Has at backgrmmrtd asmu11pbon lhc1t no nrcepfo.ble elthkal theory wHl endome or contribute to irexism, l shalJI al.so n:ot be padinnlarly com:,01rned with quesll.iom; about wiieHier an "ethiic of care" would of an ethical 1:lheo.ry b01sed on Hie care--orien1taltion have been fom inist philiosopherrs who n1.aJnlain fhat in addition lo being 11111able lo caph11rf) the corn,plex1lt1ies of mornhty rnnd moml agency, traditional elhkrnl theorieG 1te11d to obsc1.1re, devadue m* simplly ignore the moml: experiences of women 8 Hut 5ci.l.l:igarn h(irsolf frequently &u.ggnsts tha1t. hn:r d-fshncLion T,s ,ym.pf.omatic of a moro end-u:irfng h.f.storical *paUl 1:"1rn., tthough she tendf~ to portray it as ono that t:n-~ats G:ll"r as a non•• mom.I value, (see ,,sprdally 1982: 69ff; [984; m1d "199'.\), 6It is a1so Hn.kc:d lo disputes within 1:;odal and. po.1-ilical. phi.losophy r"egardlng the moral Hignifinrnco off' com111uniity and Che extent lo vvhi.cb ind.ividl-ual ag,1-nh; £lire 0sifJ.1aU~d11-in va:irio!U!s lypt~s of rdailionships o-r 1*1encurnherr.-:*d.n by the o-:ngoing tsadiUons and_ practices of lhe !a:rger sodn-Ly in 1N}lich they I.ivr. For the ñasom~ givnn in ff! .2, .I1owev1-~r!' I: r-;ha[f .not udd.1"($S sodt11l!_ and _polHin:d Jiss11r10N ~ll'i this diHS(~rd:aU.on. '7 For da:r!l':i.cal:ion ab-m:11.t lhiH dlaUnd.].onf aF,: '1⁄4rdi as d.ir,nu;sion of Hie ain'W of fomi.nis.l ,~th.ks .n-torP gemerally, see Card (1991: linlrod.udion), Jagga.r (1992:) and *Mansbridge• (t Okin (1991), 8t1VllP11 sp-en!d1ng of 11cai:ire--el:hiciHL'>/I J b1avo i.n m.ind pdn1arily Airmof.te ]Ra.i<-~r (.1994}, Vfrgjnia Hdd (1987; 1993), Nnl Noddings (1984), Sam Ruddick (1%9), ilnd willhin polifirnl theory, Joa1.1n Tronto (199'.\), A.11.importrrnt philosophin:d JH'li*!dc~cc!RfWr f-o f11c d:hlCs of can.: i~; l!::nis .1Vlm*do<11.1s ('19'71) d<-!fonsn oJ 1'1loving aUentfo:n11 as a orucial moral ca_padty 1 an hfoa whfr:h 7 these l:wo claims al!'e separable, 9 and it shot1.ld be noted frovn the ou1br!t l:hat the Jus,bce/C11rc Deb,itc is as mudh o( a diispule among fe1mirnisft etbkisb;. as between fomllinfat crilics amd defondern of nnon• tmdit:io11al mornll vic1,vs. Fem.i11is!:s Unemselves are deeply divided 1c11s to whether the "differeI1l. voice" Giill1igan heaird is genuinely or only sy11nbolic11Ily fomafo.Hl And whi.le some view the develop1ment of an etl1.k of crnn, ais ii way of p1mmot1i.111g c~steem for the Lnomlly vi:llm1ble ad:nvities that have been tmdit1icmaHy assodaifod wW11 wornen, others maint111illl tlmt this will do little more thar1 encmuaige oul:moded steJreolypes that women, as weH as Imm.an society as a whoie, would he i,eUew of withoul..11 was fit*,c;l articulated by Simo roe W<-dll {:liftld is relied on cxt.e::ns'ivnly by Rud.dick a,nd Tron[.o. And it. sJ11.ou.!d n&:.;o b,e no!:cdl fJmt both .Nodd.ings arid Ruddick semn Lo hav<'. dcvr:loped their id ear:;, in,fopcndn:nll:y of GiHigo:m1f; own. l\1o.rt:* n;i:cently, Bhun (1994: l\url } It) has draw:n expli'i.citly on Gilligan's evidence i.n ordn-.rc Lo explore and do.frnnd the 11car<1.i•-virlu.es/ and Slot.c-: (1997; 1995: §5; cf. 1992: ch. 6) hu,s argued that jwil;ice cm1 he m*1:tforstood as"' form of 11balr:mccid caring 11 w:iit.hin tl1 virtue-ethical approach Lo mrioral. theory. Finally, notn thaL N*nssbau:rnn: (1990) hus: ailso dnfot1.de:d a concri:ption of 1*1Jovi:n.g atfonlionn "''hHc discu.sr:;ing !lw rella!io-rmhip betw{:011 Hkratuñ <~nd philo-sop:1-ty, Advoc:ateEJ of Hm 110H1.ic:s of-jm1-Ucc11 arn so:rn.€iwhal *m_orci d:i.f.ficuJt to idcmti(11, s].111.ce Gilligas1 t.r,i61ls tthis as 1.1. kind! of dt!fau.lt prn,ition a.ssocial~~d wi.fi1 all wes[Qrn. tT1.0ral lhooric:s/' and it ]s nol a.hvays clear1 predm.:ly wtw.lL fr-:atm.*os ofthoso IJwo.rirn:i. shn Tni::w in m.iv1d (Da:ncy '1992). J shalI ln:at. the othks of jus~ir:o as (mcom.pã~s.i.n.g any theory whkh irnplfos thaL it ibim.possible1 aibsent; s.frn'1e k]nd of fundasnc:nta.1 commitment to just-kn rnr impartial J,1:dsiorr procm]u.reN1, for any oLlwr genttiflely n1oral icfouls to hn a1chtmmd, whc*.re lh{$(~ 1\,-Lhm" Ld<:al1,11 m.ay oir .1nn1ay riot be thoug:hU. Lo i.n.d.11.d.o caring, and wb(~re the 1*advocales' 1 of such HH~oric;n may m* mr~ay not be oxplicit]y reading lo o-rc arguir1g aga.Lnsl. t.he ethics of can-:. Yd we will shortly seE! that. nvm1 th.is very h.road dPfiniU.on n."Hlkrn; il dffflcu.[t Lo .i.c.fonUfy lJn-(! dhics of jusUco with U11.P* wostern f.radi.L:ion. moirn generally. 9For an t'.XceHen.t d:iHcussion of Lhis point st!c Calhoun (1988), JOMoody. .. f-\d.anrtB ('l 991.) .mount!:; rt FJustafrwd. attack o:n the icfoa that t.Tn.o earn voin! *i:,; fundat111ml.a![y ur (~ssn.nUal[y fr!l'nininn, a1-, docB Tironlo (1993: 82---94). For Lhe: conlrust*ing vfow1 """ Held (1987: ospeciaily pp. *in-117) and Bai.er (198!:i). 1'! 'T'lrce 11'H:b.fo.r rn.irrist crHk:is.li1!'.1:S of thn-nlhicH of can; can hn founll in Hoag:!nnd (1991); see afoo Card (1990), Da,vion (19%), ]agg11r (1992), 1*101.rnlcn,1 (1987) and J .c,ague (199-'.{) .. Nodd.ings. (1990a, 'J 990b) c:x_plidt-.ly ñspo.nd.s Lo m.ost of those 11•fo:m.inist foars; 11 s,~n n 1'f>o 'l'ro.nl:o (I 993: do .. 3). Having said all this,. H m1ii~lht be womle1red why I ha,ve boH1ered to appe<1l to Gilligan's evidence in the first place. Afier all!,. we h,111e 110 guaramll"' that amy of the people in her surveys live in drcumstancc!s thal: are likely to real:iz,e <c!Vern theil' most autlwnt1k mora.1 d1ispositio111s, lei alrnne I.IK'ir most admirruble mmfll bmits,. and if I am crnnred that the .Jus1Jce/Caiñ Debate i,, rooted firmly within tlhe we~,tem morrnl lxadHion, her!' charge Ornt care and relfltedl adivities ha1ve hee:1n conspic11m1siy absent from the moi,t inilfoentfad ethical theories mm,t al: the very least lbe overntated. Perimps even1 more troubling, as 1m11111y critics have poinh~d out,. GHH1~an's own im\e1rest in tlhe relationship betwe:ein moral orie1ntation aim! gender may tempt her to 11\1alrnriz.e" the c,ue,.01*ienfation in a way l:hat 0.•xaggermtes ilB 11101crm,aU111• ad,~gm1cy,, ils well as to adopt a misllea,dingly "binary" concepl:im1 of rmH*ality tlmt exaggerates whatever cm1Lrasl:s may exist betw,:ert the Iwo mon1Ji onienl:a,tions.l2 Whole I am sympathel:k fo H1ese com:ems, I beliieve there rnre a, m1rn ber of reasons for beginrning a 1noml--philosophical inqunry with i!Jl ana[ysis of Gilligan's views. To 1mdershmd why, we need l:o be somewhaL dearer abcnit th *1* t* '- * lb ,._.. " I * ' 1 * " ! " ti * " ti c-* * 11 * . e re:a 1ons"1JIP .e,,vveen morra m*1en,.ru :tons an, e rues ~,mn ,1 . 1gan hei'self rends to b~\ She refors to justiceand careas 'perspedives,' 'concep•* tions,' 'voices' and 'dhJics' as well ã 'orientations,' and althm.11~h HK*n* is 110 discermibfo pattern in her chokes aliout which of these fonns to r,rne, they are all clearly meant to implly ,11 "way of thinkinp;" about m.1J<ratliity 1in the bmad,,sl sense which indludes tlhe foatun-'s that 111on1,l age11fa consdom,.ly or uncon, 12Crlli.n.d discussions of Gil.ligan's f(-_\twarch i*n_e[J1ods can be found in A1wrhach eL al. (J985),. Hlum (1994: ch. ll), T'larmgm1 and Jackson ('I 988), Jap,gar (1992), League (199:,), Puka (Ji990) and Tronto ("I 987). Soo a,lso Gilligan's "R,*ply" (:1986). 9 sdously take to be (most) monilly significa111t,. a111d agents' 1J1osl irn1mediaile m,ornl responses l.o vartio,1rn 1.ype1; of sihiatiorns, as WE'U as the way agents formulate p!l'emises an,d the• type 1>f informiatton H1,ey look for when adivelly wmkirng thrmugh a corriplex m,oral issue .. In other worrds, her maim aim is simply to pmvide mn accurnte descrjrbrnn of the basic ni,ncic,pils, habits of p,Yrc,>.ption,. smuces of m.otiva.tion, and paUerms of deliibeirntnorn and j11dgmenl that chairnde1ize rund differentia,te people's. day to day moral adi11Hy, iTllnd ii Ji;; v,orlh emphasizing that she does 1101: da.im !:hat eilrhE-Yr mierntatkm correspmufo irn any s1Jrai~;ht-•forward way to a parl:i.ct1lar lype o,f ethical theory (such a,s deonlolog,y, co.rnsequernfo1Hsm, or 11frtu1e dhics), ]For da1dty, theJrdore,. I shalll lllse the t.errn 'odentalirnn' when refonirng to Gi.lliigan's claims 11bo11I difforen,ces in people's more* ordfoary moml outlooks, and reserve the term 'dhk' to refer to relahvely wdl \Norked out moraJ.-phifo,sophkal H11<!ories or views about how our moral rndivily oLJght to be "mien1:ed .. " In other words,. I shall tllke 1nornli orientations to be the sort of thing that mornl philosoplrwrs seek to explicate and refine, ,md 11n idleal ve11I:ion of which tlhefr normative ethics (or morn[ theories) are 1Jltirrnatelly designed to defend. Now,. it 1is ccirt.ainiy tnie that the n01rm!llti11e adequacy ol' 1lho justice .. , and rnre--orionlations cannot simply he "read off" from any oi GHlii?•)n's firndinr;r, .. Hut noitl1,c'r nn peopie's moñ day .. J;o .. --day mornJ rndivHy lbe compfotel:y ignored in the p1:ocess of developing a philosophkally sahslfying ethk, This is not simply lbernmie the resulting theory will be prraclicaliy useless if ii SP!s id,0afo of charader and conidc11d: that turn out l:o be psycln,ologically i.mposs,ible for people to lnvci up to (11lltho11glh Hmt too is a relevaint coI1cem), .. Tile real prolblem is Hmt no philosopher can evern lbegin to demonslrale that rn partkulrnr dhk is inde,•d sidisfoctory unk-ss shE! nm. show tiwl it 1,nl.:'mccis in ]0 som"e w11y wil:11 people's mrnre ordinary nwrnl consdourmess."ll~ And p1recisdy becam;e she is wirling to lrnkf! people's day to (fojl moral! achvity pre Uy 111, llch at face value,. Gilligan's, work ht,)lps to expose tfrnose ha1,eli1me, .intuitive assumptions about moramy and its requirernonl.s I.ha!. all people are 111tlleast implicitly relying Oil in ord<er to iklentify rn1oml situations and determhtP what should be done in them,. rnnd Hi.it phHosophers themselves are at least subtly appe,1lii111g to a,s, they develop <1nd defend their mu11rntive views, 11 U i.s tho1,e baseline assm:npl:ilom, thu1t consUtute the d1iffer*c0 11l them,es of tho l:wo orien** t.altions Glillligan identified, amd biring.ing those differences to light can therefoi*e help to 1*ed1Ke the extent to which ethics that are founded 011 diffoñnfc baselii11e assmrnphons albornt: irnwralJty willl bc> mndr,mm'd fo ,drnply talk pasft one another. Jt rnls.o allows us to slUlbjed those rc1,ss1i1mpl.ions to more nnefoI philrn;ophkal scmtiny Umn they mit;ht otherwfae receive, or at the very least,. enables 1m to ,,ce more ckxudy wlhy certain thco1*1k•r; seem to be locked into int:ermi.rnible disagrecmenls.1 5 hi a,ddilfon,. once we clarify the different themes of Gilli.gan's two moral! orientrntiions, l do 1101: bellieve the overall pid11re will turn out to be olbjedimmlbly bimuy, :For whifo tbe tone of her wriUng sometimes rmggesfo 13A philosopher mi1,)1.t: purporl. lo demone;!rnU.e Lhal nrnsl, if not all, of whaL p<'Ofll" ord:i.n1trily icfonHfy tltS .n'IOl'al activity is :-;im.p[y rrds.tak!n or dec*p*ly conhH;;r~d. Bul ,)vnn lo do !JuaL wm.dd mgufre thn p.hiloso_phnr Lo F~l1ow Ll1at d.iffenmt adJvil:ies vver(: rr1 t~ch !TIOrP con,iie:lnnt wtlh what peoplio (confosodly) thou 1,):il. moimlily requi,re<l of lhom in fJw. fii"sl .. pian.1:. (Ev,m Kan.tr who th might-. n10-raJ.-ity uJtimatdy rested 01:1. a ln:rnscnndo-nLaJ fou.indaUon, neems to hmm believed ti'llal thriB was llrue.) 147,1,,,, poir,L is j,,an Hampton's ('1995), 15similm* po.inl,; haw, been nrndn hy Madnly.rn (1981; 1988), who iH padiculady i.nlcrosted in flm: way d.1ffornnt baseH.ne 1Hmm11,pU.ons are H111knd to rival JdtsLorkal tradition_:;;, For a disco:~ssion of the wa:ys in whid1 nthical [.hoorizi.lr:tg, is enha.m:ed hy a com.mitmnnl Lo "l'rs,ydnologi<:aI realism," seo Flanagan (1.99J: nsp. dis. 1*2). And sno Blum ('1994: ch. 9) for 1:lw vicnl\r LhaL import.ant partsof peoplo 1s day to day moral. Hfo1 espoci.1:11Uty thos,:. G:H!Hgain ;11ssod.atefl with tJw cnre-.. or:ientaJ:io:n, have mistakenly 'ben:n 111:heo.riz<-~d at\Aray"1 hy con.ki*m1Jo,*ary d.hidsLH. 11 that she f1indls the care••orienlalfon preferable, her official posiilfon co111!inues lo be that the hvo mient11tions are simply "diHerc~nt,.11 lJmt fa, Hml both ways of th1inking have considera,ble merit, and !hat neitlh.er can be fully aBsimJilal.ed wHhin lhe other (1993: xiii), And 11Ithm1gii she doe,5 cle;idy helievP tha1 the us to pick mil which way of thinking .is belng 1relied on by a partic11far speak(•r or philosopher, she means to leave room for a good deal of dlisaign*enwnrl m, to whml: each outlook ideally immives or requires,. as wen as tlhe extent to which they crnn be irr1tegmted)6 Even mo:ñ impo1rl:ant]y, al lec1sl: for my purposes frt l:lrtis dfoserlrnlfon, Gilli1i1111' s worr*k helps to identify the theoreticall reso1.1rc'°"$ thrnl: 11rliglht rPnder 1:he Jw,tke/Care DebalP sig11ificainl:ly more l:md:i11ble. Fm dlespHe the fod Hmt wHhir1 prevlio1w philosophicrn[ views, I shaH u.lltirrwtely rnnforrHl that 11oine of those v1iews !is adequate to capt11n! an ethic of nwe as a 1mified whole., To a devroe, lhis vindical:es GW11gan's claim to have hemcd ,11 genuinely d1istiinid. mornl voice., And in any c~1se, clarifyhtg the ways in which an ethic of rnxe d1iffors from previous etfriirnll view1, points the way toward"' much mm*e Sil1tisfoctory integration of Gilligan's two mon1I orieniations, as weH as th,~ 1mm:h mme r;e,r11eml knsi,on in vrnl11e,.,01riie1111tatim1 of whid1 hel" distinction is symptomatic, th,m has thus far been achieved., "i6-1n foct, c;:nmga-n ack:t1owfodges ~l lrlnnsion 11 that; 11re.rnains 1mn->Fmlved11 i,n hrr \i\lOrk: whnth(~r* l.lhere is an 11endless counterpoinllf beLwemt Lh,1: jm;.[Jsce ...and cm"CH)rh:ntaLi.ons, or w]wt.hm* thn Juslice-cwfontr.itfon. r-~lt011]d 1*1g:ive \>\ray 1to11 tl11e G;lro---o:rinntation as an ideal fotJn o( moral Lhou.gh.t (1993: xxvi}. My ovvn view is that.. ho-Ll1 of tl1:nt10 opUomii an;-u nnaUsfodory 1 and ll11t11t we nned a ]non-: 111nifird ethk, l~ut. we vvffl not h*: ah[(i lo sni~ wl1y until llw difforences bet.ween h(ni" lwo moral or:tentaU.011.s havP }Hxm rrwre d(-'.-arly i.d.cuUfiiod. 12 Jl.2 Allltrnm1Jmy mrnd c,IDtlbmg; That bc1ing said, l wanl to suggest Hrnt Gilligan's initial ,1l:l:enn,pt to describe the dlfforent t:hemer,1 of her lwo mmal ori,"nla1:ilons in terms off a distinction bel:ween '.iustice' and 'rnre' does fond to exaggern,te the extent of the cointmst between tlhem, as well as H1e extent to which tlhe can"~01"iental:ion diffr~rn from some of the most influential eHllirnl theories, To !Jegi111 wHlh, it suggestB that care imd Jiustice are m11t1.1ally exd1rnive or incompa!ible moml values, such lhrnt ,1, person who is committed fo eithe1* one oi these values will necesimrily have a fairly mJUgated commitment to the othe11, Yei I.here itl ain, imporhmt ele11se in which Gilligan and otheir advoca,tes of crure a,re ca1tlh1g for f.!1,Q'.lf§'. jm;tice, not less: they arre iwrnis1:ing that peopie (perrhaps more frvgmmHy fomale than male) who exhi.bit caire and I'E!sponsiverniess toward others he ii;iven as nn1d1 mrnml rer;ped ar; people (perlhaps more fre9111.enlly m,tle than fornale) who are prin11mrily ccmcerrned wiHt justice: and ind1i11iduall F1ighi:B. Gm11gan rmmetilnes 1reHes on an analogy with the ambigmrns figm*es of Gestalt psyclhology to argue that "the terms of one perspective d.o not conla1i11 U1e terms of the othor" (1987: 30), .imply1in,g tb,it: while indJviduiil. agents m,ay switch back and fortJh between the tv,m oriontat1lons as often, as th,,y rhoose, i,l is impossnblo for any agent to incorpol!'a1te both cmre and jw;lke within a sfrlgfo moral ouHook Yet it is difficult to see why even this slhould be true. Thei*e may br~ situations in wMch care rnnd justke each prompt a mon1J illgent l.o a,d in dil'forent ways, but this sort of conflict seems to m'ise predsdy because the agent foeh, tlhe puJI of both of lhesc values at lhe s111me tim,o (Flrnn111ga11 'J 991: 22SH).l7 17 A llhou.f1}1: th.e Cesli:J1JL arn1loB,'y ohBcu.ros. tLh.r: ways i.n. w'l"1kh m ora1 pon*c-plion is unlike: vJS1.ml 1'erceplion/' Hwñ iH tt strn l ght .. fo.rward way of undernta nd i ng hov,, ag<\nLI:; cou l.d he pu.Hed i.n two d~red.:i.onG which fr; _pc!r.f<-1.cHy tn kc,epjmg wlth Gilligan 1n hasic *idc~a, For jm:l 1H: 13 I Gilligan does 1ml claim, 1:hat e1ithe1r orienmtfon fo ,mpe1rior, so r;h,0 may simply .mea111 tlrnift ag0nts must often lessen thefr commitnwnt Ito jm,tke bdorc they can follly apprndate Hie 1mornl signifinmce of carre in any g1iven situation, and vic1• vernai.lR But she also tends to e91u~te justke wllh 1rmrn,.[nlederenrn and 1r1~sped for individual dg;hts, and to conc,-!ive of indiv[di.ml righls in 1n1ly a negative form, that is, as rights not l:o be interfored wiith 011* harmed] ifll certain ways. Since mrnny conceptim11s of Jitni,tke incorpon1t:e some number of poerill:ive r1ights, and since the concept of justice is much older than the modern coince:pl of r[ght-.; altogether, this ralher narrow conception ,renders h,,r conl:Jrast much less convinci111g at !he theorel:krn[ level. Moreover, a,s Giiligan hemrdf has incre<11singiy ,?m phrnsized, then,\ is a crud all difforonce betv,reen l:h,1 mienhltflons of cano mul jur,tJice 011 tho one Jlumd, whkh Gillir;an ,foscribes as comprehensive ways of "orgm1iZi11,g tltce brnsk demornts of moll',11 judgment: sel!;. otheirr, and Uie refa1Honship between them,'' and the x~JIR<~§ or jc!c,oa/ls of caire amd justke on the other, which pn"sumably phiy a role wHhin ,my corn,prehensive morad view 0987: 22; J993; 1995)) 9 The conllrast bel:ween1 the H :is 111:D.sUl.k.en to think, o:n Llw bat.ds of one 1s r.nost: .i.mrrn-~diiale vimwJ. pn:roi:pf:io:n, fhuL the umlbig:uouR f•Juck-•rahhit11 drawhng Jis of on]y a rabbit, or oll'll_y e1 duck., ft !i'.na.y be n1isLr.:r:ken Lo think, on t.h,.c~ ba.s.i.s of one 11~ most i.rn1111ed.Jate mon11I. pnrõ_pt"ion, Llml a s:i.Luation n.1J!Tls only f-or _iusHco Ol" on]y ffor caro .. ln tlw visual case, a coherP.nt UJ1.cfo*rstand]ng of ouir pern:pUorm n-~c:R"t~ires us to ad~J'.1.owk;*dfje that t.lw u.nde:rlying j)b1rn1u.m.enon -j,,., comprised of ho-lh nf.emn*nt.r.;; Hind GilligaJ{s rn.11.ggesUon cotild ho th.at rno*ral phenomena follovv u G1.m:ilar puJl.enn .. 18111. a ()f:fferent Voice rRtgg-m;tod that eVl\ry TJetson relics on one orfonf.aUon or the olhe.r"c But. C}illignn :reports a 11vvaton:--;lw.-d11* tn hn*r !J.1lh1king (J98B: xx.U; see also .198/) in mspom.c> l:o 11 sludy by D,. Kay Johnston (1988). Johnston found t;hi,,L althou 1\h adobwcml.s exhilbitod a tendency to nd.,y on only on:c ork~-r1.lntion (either ca.r,-'. orjtrnticc) whnn ankt\d opeinend.ed_ questions ahonf-. 111;_ora.lly -probk*maLic situaUons, most wo,~p able Lo 11sponlarnio1111.r~ly uwit.ch 11 to the oLlrrn,.. orfonLaUo:n when us.ked if there was a d.iffo:rtmt way lo l.hi'nT!s. /;:tboul. lhe IWoh[mn, and all W(H"n a:hle to undersla.nd anJ apply H1e otJ11er way of H1d.n.ki.T1c a Her its 'ilYtain fnatr.1rcm worn IJOJintnd ou li. to them by Hm ]111.t:r:rviewc'.r. -19Spnci.Hcal1y1 Girlig,an tmys that 11aUent:ion t.o women 1s morn:L th.inki.ra.g Jed to the idlentiHcaHon nJ a d.ifforcmt vo:ke and re:i.sed .C.LlU1f~ti~:m,"L?.l_bgq_lJ;}_g-:_JJ:l.fJS.J: 9Jjg~l.i.q:_ ftJ!JL~JlL'1 }'..'Li.lhiTLl}..£<J:!ILt!£el1_011siV(\J110.r1JLlltgm:111'1 (1987: 26, J11J:1~' .. gJJ1.p-_hq:;;_it•). Noti<'c !.hal lh_e sa1me point can be .made us-i.ri.g imort; Rowllsian t.er:--rninology. In A Th.em~// of justice, he dir,,tingu-iNhes l.h(~ 14 two moral rnrie11fattions, in other words, may u]ti1m1['.ely have rm1rnewhat less !:o do with which of these vafoes ,11!11 agent iB most deeply committed to Huu1 with the broa,der evah.mtive framework within which boH~ care and Jm,tice are understood. A r,eccmd difficulty with Gilligan's original contrITT1st is hrnt. it leads lo r;ome confrnsim1 about what d,}main of m.oml activity is under considern!i'on. Contem1ponuy ethicists have focnsed almost exdrnsivel!y on jusH.ce as ,l. virl:m~ cardinal virtrne of individuals, thoui;lhJ that the best way to do this required an efabomte anaiogy with the role of j1istke 111 the sfate. Yet care seem..s 1:o lbe most easily and sl:rnighlforwardly cons!Jmed ais a virtue of i_nicl[vicjl~lrnI morn I agents thal: is exhibited towarrd cm1cxete ol:lher pers,ms. Pedrnp,,, 1msm*• prfaingly, one of the most frequn11t criticisms of the ethics of ca,re sllems from the belief that it i.s Hl--suited to deall wHh the sorts of issues, Hrnt anise iln reh1tilvelly imperi;onal and insll:itt11tional co::ml:ext~. More generally, the dhks ol care i.s somell:imes ,!quated with a way oi t&11inking about imfrviduall moral activity w1ith1ln the "private" or i1n1:erpr~rsonaI realm, 20 where11s 1:h•~ ethics of justice is taken to be the appnipriate way of thfoik1ing about I.he "bask strm:bJre" of socieiy, as well ms about any 1'ndividual ,Kti11Hy Huit takes pJlace f~9}1CQTJ.l of ju.sticn, 11'as rnecu1i-i1.g a prope,r haJ.a:11ce behveo.n corn,pc-Li1:1g da.irr,s 11 from SJH~dhc cortCQ.[1.!fio1ns of justice 11:tdffinLl.fying the n-i[ova-nt conr:iidera:ldons wh:td1 deL(-~irmllne thfs balance 11(1.9'.?l: JO). P*retm.rnn1ably1 nad1 of GiUigari's two 11:roraJ orl(!nLaUorn, i*ncorpor8fos a fipedfic 11conc,-i:pU01n. of JuHU.ce11 in th.iH laUer sense (as woll as a H}'.Hlcifk "coi-1.nipU:on of 011n/1). 20j\]i.LerTw:Uvcly, the (-l•Lhics of care bas sorncltim(m becm _portray,-:tJ as help.in.g ag(!J)l~ 1-<J id,mHfy spodal obligations (l!-fomrnn 19%: ch. 2} or impmfoct duties (l'JunnorWinkfor 1984), an bning concerned w:tLlh thG; ovaluatio:n of per~10ns, m.ohves and ch.arad,-:r traits rathor tlw:n tiw mraluatlion of l!dG (Kohlberg 1984; Pulmar::1.1991), OT as co:nsl:iLuUng ai st1_pere:rwgalory dbic i.n co.ntraf~t to the m.inimalistk 1\:thk of jm•Lice11 (I1iam*.pton l 995; J<.roegor--Miappes *1994). For n much .moni.-md,e.nded dir-wm~fdon of why thrn,w sorts. of portray.aifa. añ .inaJ1equak than I ec1n c,ffor be1C<\ '""' Blum. (1994: ch. 10). wil:11in rm explicitly "puhlk" or "'pol1ibrnl"' JJ'ealim,.21 / .s a res11lt,. tlr1!', Juslice/ Care Dohafte tends to be confla,ted with de*h-ales about whe1r0 (rnr whether), l:o drnw the Hine behNeen "p11blic11 and "pnivil.le" moral contexts, or albotil. which set of co1:1sidendimw ouglht to t,nke px'iorily in an agent's morn.I H1ougll1:. Gilligan, however, seems to lbe prima,rilly concenried wWh qu,cstions of individual! moral ,igem:y. To be sure, she lends to portray both orientations m, applirnblie across the entire nrnge of morall contexts, and urnny of Hie womm1 she 1identi:fies as relying on Uw ca1re .. oricentatioin am ql1ite explicitly conce1med wHh 11Jliorillbiiy wni1: forge: mw reports 1•1a very sfrorng sernse of !being responsiril!e to the world" fl982: 2:1) while another worries about lhe spedfk, large scale social proMems of pov,~rty aind overpopul.al:ion (Ibid.: 99). Shill,. Gilhigan doe1, not portray those womerr1 a1s makling judgmeinb,, alocrnt wlhaJ l'ruws, or instih1tfo11s ought t:o be like. Ral:her, thEiy are cm1.cerned with !:heir own oblLigrutions to strangers am:J di1s1:irnl others ~••olbligations whiclh rnn be dffissified 11nder lhe h,,ading of sodal jusUce,. but r.:t1:n also be viewed as. 1lnstainces of foclividual luunanilariimism .. The best way 1:o keep time debrute s.quarrely focused on questiomi of individuial .moral agency is to describe GiUigain's two morn! orieintatiom; in terms of a contrast between "autornomy" and "cmrnng," whf'Jm these ,ffe understood to l:,e different or competing mornl rnpau:itnes (raitherr tha:n 21.,rhif; lrnndency J.s cmcom~agnd by Lho enormous influence ofRawls 1s Theory (~fj'usli.cc,: CJ9'7l), as wd] as hi.a iuoro recent. m.odificatfons o.f lhaL theory as offminp; ffn explkHiy poli.Hcal concepLi.on of justicn tltaL applies only Lo sodotfs 11bask stn1.cl11:re" (.[993: t-:sp,. §?:., §5 .. ,md Lee. VII). Bul ,we Okin (l989; 1993) who 11,r1,11es Llial. l,.~wls's 1.hw,ry ,mist he md.cndcd Lo f}1.e 11y,m*,vutel'' i~calm of th<-\ fomi'1lny, and TtonLo (1993: Pait 111) v\rho purports to g:ive a polit.i<*al argt.mrn*.nl for i..h<\ ethics of cm"e, 16 I I l clifforenI values).22 And th1is ch,n*aderizal:ion makes sense for two l!"eascms. First, there fo an historical link belwee111 the crnrtcepl of autonmny (in individuals) arnd the concepl off justice (i11 the wider society or stale):: th!' forcnrieir term litendly 1on,ians 11seif•-legislat1lon 11 and was migi.nally used to describe self-gnveming states (as opposed to colonies n11Pd by forPign powe1rs), and thinkers Hke I<.ant and Rawls 11:reat autonomy as an i1foal foahm:c, of persmrs acting in the wole of moral llegislal:or .. 2:, fo this mile, pc•irnons take up ,ur1 .impartfo.l point of view that is tempomrily detlr:dh.ed from their individtlal desires ,md interests, in rnrdler to adjudicate between competing morml principles (Hill 1987: 13lff; cf. 1992}. That is the point of view Gi]Hgan r.eems to identify with the "jusl:iice--orient:atioII/' amd a1s we s,hall see, !hal. fa the poinl of view nue-etliicisls are prurticnfarlly keen to eI*ilidze. And it ailso helps to expllain why, despilP their prnpen,sily fo-eq1.rnte the "dhks, of jt1sticc*" 1Nith the western mr1oral-philosophrkal fradition ,nm:e generally, !the sperifiic critin:sms !:hat contemporary care•-•ethicfals have made against previot1s moml H1eork,s have primarily been 1!irected aga,irrwl lkantic11n and conlTadarian 1noml Secondly, there are a number of reasons to fhink tfod this cm1.trast provides ai more aiccuml:e description of Gilligan's original project The main r:mpetnis 1:o !her work wais L,iwrence Kohllberg's extremely influential "stai;e 22 - **lUs a:IHo worth [1.0IJ11tg that: this ccml:rmst is cll: foast :i.ndireclliy fefott:'(l l:o quc:st.tons of ID:irgn scale social jur::it;ico insofar as. autonomy ~nd caring a:m capadlic:s 1,vr: Jl(-~Qd to rely on "in order to figurr: null. wha:L ll.he 11bask strudun1 1*1 of soc:kiLy ought lo be Hk,\. 2~Given tJnis un*k, 1t is not so s1:.11.rprisi.ng that tho d.ebul;c ln.nds to ti:Up f:wtw~ien inid.i.vidua[ and poliUcal contox1s. 24Gtlb:gan dks adherrince Lo 11tiw: Categorical hnpmmtiven as an el.e.mnr1t of the ji.tsti.n-'.• orfontnlion (1987, 2:{), and Baier explicitly crilid,rn l<anL,. Rvwl:s and Hobbrn, .in her allacks on 'justke,-1J'M.led: v:k!WG (1994: elm. 'Jl, 2 & 11; enc* a]so l987}. Sec also fJn.e in.troduclory chapter in Kltlay and Mil yore (l 987}. WP wiil snon see how tlw ethics of earn differ from utiliLm*ianisrn 11s iN"dt bul Hws,1. diffoirnnccs ar,~ .not quite as great. 17 I I ! theory" of moral develop1ment, atcco.rding to whiclh every personi pmrneds from 1:he ei;ocenibrism of emriy childhood, thxm11gh concern wWh relaJimwhips and obed1ienrn to pa,renml and then more general sodall rnl0-s, l:o tlw higlhesl sfoge in which their moral 1*eascm1ing is governed by a sen: of m1ivey*salnzabfo morml principles (1981; 1984);.2° Koh/berg's frmrnrntivii roscarch was l,,ar;pd on an i1Il-1rm1fo sampk, and lhc had reported that l:eurn.les in i'VC1ry ag.c--hrn,ckd s,cored s1i.gn1ificantly lower than their male mlllnl:erparl:s, dfoplle1yirng a marked tendency to g(:!I: stuck rnt the middle~ stage of n"l.rntiornsMps and 1mciali con** formiily.26 GHHg:an hypothesized that tlh,ese findings wen' due 1:o fomolies' relia11c,? on allh~mative 1111ora1l capadl:i1es not measuired lby :1<ohlbe1rg1s scruk', and she prnposed a11 aJ11:e1rnativP ision of "moral m,1b1rHy11 that was not dependent on the use of abs1:rm:t prindples.2 7 Ca1r.ing, as pwesenled in this 2:SKohlherg frpquenHy appeals to J\.awfa's Thcoty vffu.sLfr:e as an examrnplie of khc hi.glhest stage, in wl11.id1. piffsons no-I; onJiy apply universal pril'1dp.lor:; Lo coric.rclP cases bul also u.nden;land the ju.slifica1lioin of those~ principles,, *lt'or a lnrfof s1Jrnmml!"y of Kohlh<~rg1G 1-d,a!~C!s1 sn(~ the appendix Lo his Vol!mm, l 09!\l: 4()9 .. JZ). 26AJ\though Jiirnilia:lly ndrndant Lo ltCCflpt Gifligtt1111*ri suggestion/' .Kohlherg l:vontually modiG.ed h'Ils _position mo.d dairrn-'.*d 011]!:y to havo .i.dnntifi.nd HKl s.tagm; *[n th,i: developmnnL nf Jgr,ti<J) mm,oni.ng (1984). Mea,nwhilo, slurllos by Lawl"et1rn Wa,lker (11984) indicatr> thilcl onn, v1:11rlou.N biasing facto.rs (fur nxan1.ple1 the suppmdl:ion that vt1,;}m1en come frcn-n the sum<~ dam, a:nd educaiU.ona:.l bac:k.g.1rou.nd cu.i tJn.eir Trrusbandis) and ~~laUslicu.l :i\:inaccu.rmder-, a.rn corr:'.'ed(:d1 rna les a:nd fn1nn1ales score equally wd.1 <m IKohlbn.rg*ian t.oslf-; oJ moral r(~asoning. \A/ a l.kc~r1f~ nnding ha1f; no l;miring: on Lh11:)* qu.nstion of wh~~l:her ther1-'! ir:i an aHorna.l':ive ,,,,.,.l.),y of Oh.inking ab011t mn:o:iraJity. 27c~-llligan origiJ1.1tUy linked this a1lternail-ivn vision t;o, womr:1r11s difh!ren1 d.evelo_pm.e::nlal _pl.)1thr app(~ahng to Chodmto\N1S (1978) D.rgu.1i11rnr1:t that sinco v11cnncm '-tre sta1Usti.caiUy 11r1oñ Hkdy to serve as prdnrnry rni:ire--g]vcrn, fornafo per-sonalif.lfoH rnatun-; by [earning \l..o id.enUfy tn.OJAl~ dmmJ.y with [hQ adul[B who 1-1upfH)rt t.hnm, wh,-irea.s male pnrsonaiitfos n'l'J1ilu1~r: hy I.earning to ,liffo-n:nUafa1 U1.emsnhñs frosn oH1erG. An:ordin1 1Jy,. GHligun arglH-\*d. I hat the can!-orfonJali.on lt:'nfleclnd fonrnfot/ Sc!nBe of Lhn-msel.ves as m:nhc-ddc:J in relaHonships, wherr:aG the jt1.s:Uce ...o:rientuLi.on reffocle:d r.n1:1.fotl scmr,;e of-ind<\-pend.er1,c*e nr1d s0Jf-.sufficierK:y (1981: ch. *.n,. N0Uc0, howevl~r, Uru.it thf:s account grmnts llt:P possihilily of V!.iiSI iy r~pdudng_ r-;iuch. w'!11.dc:r diffri:rcnC(-'.S if mi\n and worn.en cm11*€-\ to sh1.U'.'C: ec.,rm*il chilcJ..-rnn:tAnsponsibflttfos (a ywi1nt Hiait. has sinn-i: bc,en echoed i.1'1. Oki.111f• (1989) cdUquo of F!.n,vls). Me,J1nwhikl, Giliiga.n an.d hor coB<~1:1gucB now c011tnr1d tlwt L}wre ff!"<-~ two !-Y_[WS of' universal, morahty--e-rouY1ding (1:XIJed.en1ce~; 0wf.. arise (n e;ad.y childhood and. JHWrtint lhroUt\hout adult (ifo: thf! innqualiLy and powerfossrr,oss (w-ith re-sped to adults) that grounds a 11r.mnsc of 18 i c1mtext, is "a rnode of thinking thrnt is cm1texluaJ aind ñn*aitive rn,ther* Ornrn formal and rnbsh'act" (]982:: '19), and one* that refuses to 11abslmd the m,ornl problem from l:he hil:erpersonal situati.on" (I.bid,: 32). Ag(.;nh; who exJltillif this capacil:y describe their rm.oral debiberntions as ain effort "to try to he as awaik,, as possibfo, to try fo krnow !he range of whrut you foe[, to fry to cor~mider aJI tl~&t's involved, to be ~,s awaire as yolil can be of whrnt's goin,i; on" (Ibid.: 99)/.8 rnnd they apparently vriew the answers to moirail pmblems as ultimately depending on the concire1:e padiculars of each and every rnse.Z9 To maike this contrast sti.ck, it is importlmt that a11tonm111y be consl:nwd very narrowly as the capaciity for imparl:i<lbit:y in tbe review and applirntion of absh'ad aind genemJ i:noirrnI pdnd,ples. As Thoma,s HH[ poi11ts out, there.• are two forther "sernses"' of autonomy that are releva11t to mon1J th(*!ory: autonmny as a i:*ight th,1t evc~ry individual has to make certain decisions writhout undue interference (1987: §lll), and autonomy m; a gmil for pernomd devellopment, so Hnat one's perceptions ,ue niot dolided by prejudice, sellf-deceptioni, and the• like, and tJiat one's atdions reflect orne's genuine mot1ivalfons, raithel/' l:han dii,torred ideas ahoutwhait one is reatl!ly doing or trully cares rnbor~t (ibid.: §HI). Gilliiga11, of rnL1rse, did not ward: to deny Umt worren W,!n' errd:iUcd to and raprnblle of <1.utonomy in either oi-these further sens.es, and a,Hhough sh,, does ]t1B-Uce11 or denfrn fur (~quaHLy or frfrrrnerm,. and the 011rnoU.onat nttachme:nt Lo nnd depencfono: on pare.111l.s that gives young children at Ieaisl a p1rolo• ..un.dersbmn.ding of lirn r.ir,;kr1 of aha1n.donmont tmd the ne,~d for people to actively Lake care of om-: a1rnothcff (GiJJigan *J 987: 20ff; Gi.11.igan et al, 1988: esp. d1s. 4 & 6). 28ThiN in 30-•year old 1''Shm'ot1.1A11 response t:o questions about 11tho rtght; vvay Lo make nH)raJ decisio.111s-,.11 VY.hes, !:l1sked if thern are principles U:1Iti1t g*nklie 11.c-~r m:oral d~icision-makinp 1, she says 11thert:-1s not just a prindp.l.o that once you talrn h.old of-you r,;d.lle. The prtndpfo rml into pmclic" hern ieJ ;;till going lo lea,1m yon wilh conflicl" (Gilligan 1982: 'J<J-:100). 295.,., Nue;sbaum (1985) and Blum (1994: ells. 2--'.-I} fer o d"fom:s,,, of l:h" sort of moral d.oHhnraUon GJiUtigan t)tw.ms to havn in m,ind. And see Dancy ([992), wb.o arg*upf; thi1:L fhe ca.n:01ri.cmtaU.on am011ul.s l!:.o noLhirng more Llian a co1nm i.Ln.1ent. Lo 11parlicuhrriNm 11 in mror*a1 ju.dg.n1c:*nLf flHll1f~h I Ghi.tU. laler coITTk:nd thal lh1s da.i-rn is incorrect. 19 I bel1ieve thd the prilmary moral•-developm.ontail obstacle forr "caring" 11wn11J agenh, ls leaming lo G111*e forr rnnceseH a.s well as for 0H1ers, w lherear, 01e prrinrn rry obstade fot KoMlb,,ndan rnr "aul:onomous" l!Ynm*al av,*enls is learnivrn,*. lo value (,-* '* 0 the a11to111omy of oitl1ers as weH as orñseJJ, she contends UwJ mahae morall agents evenhrnlly pen:eive all persons as lbeing entitled to a ba,sk: fovel of rnoral concern, :r::~gardlless of the oden\nbion on which tlh(,y rrwsl: freg 1wn1Uy rely (J982: ch .. 6; Gilligan et al, 1988: dis, 41 &:. 6),. And cañ .. etMcist9 have also been keel1! to emphimize that 11110ml agents who possess a highly developed capacity for rnd.ing are not rendered selfless or lacking result n is also important no1: to over exagr;errnh-' tlhe con,tmst between th,;s.e lwo ,,:apadties., As Bl.ill prninfa out, the narrow conwption of aulonrnrny as impaidiality 1in the reviE!W a1nd application of 1or1oral 1princ1iples appc'an; to be rooted in Kant's kleru 1:hait mm agent's 11trrne self' is Hie waiy she is v,,Jhen she is as free a,s possiMe from all of her trnnm'fory concerns and a1tlachme111ts. But tllw fatter idea is not an essenl:Jial part of tJne idea of aukmom.y, and .in Hill's vic1w should probably be rejected (1987: §X).:~o The belief that we ought to be impartial when consideri11g wlhat mrnrai.lity requires of us doe!S l!lot entail tlhat we should sl:rive to free m11rnel1ve11 from personflll attcichmenb; iln ou1r day to day lives, ow that ai lifo of self.-suffide!ncy is momlly beUer than a life of inhmrncy and intex*pnrsmml xdat1ionships. In fad, it is compfoteiy ''neutral" with respect to tlrtnse gtnesUmw (1997: §HI). Nor doc0 s t:hfa sense of rnu1tmwmy entail t!ru:d basic moral principfos Imtrnt ,1dmit of 110 exceplio11, or he diacon• 3-0 A rkher com::cqption o.f autonomy iw a kind of nf;e;lf.-reflex.twi 1:11:01:1!.loring,11 thaf pll:'oo-iedls, as Kant f~uggest.cd, via reJfoctirnrt on p:rrindvlrn-_i and rui.t'.H but doos nol li"equ:ini Lolal ahst:rn.cUon frorrn 0111e1s. e.motioll'.1al U.1:1:dTn1~;-nls, deep--seait.c~d inl.ert~st.s tm.d drn.;in:r,; has rnc(:nHy boon dofond<!d by HilI ('Jt99'1) ancl Hm-man (1993). See al,io Sh<!rman (1990; '1993b), who is som1ewhat 1:nrnn-i criU011li of KonV's position vJG--a--viH the c:rnotfonf.l. neded from aH 01u feelin 1~s and hence independ<~nt of aH "co11tiI1ge11l:" ern:pirical fads a, bout m1r mitLures. All it implies is that when faced with fo11dame11t11l nwrml conflids, we should not 1~ive special stmndiin1~ lo any parlicllllar person or group,, but should view 1:he s:ifo:alion "fmm 11 broader huma,n persped1ive, 11?ll ]\Jo111etl1eler;s, ca1re, ..etfocists find evE;n tlhe very rnodest conception 01 autonomy to lbe problematic, w.hen portrayed as me most ilnportrnnt or 1iupe1rior m.oral rnpa,dl:y, in, two inaiin ways,, llirnt, ii: r;l:ill lTeair,; autonomy as primrnrily an exercise in 1mtiorn1,1Hy,, rnlbeii: one that m.a,y reliy on the emotions as impo,rtant 1,upports to mornl adnvity (e,g;., ar, aJerti11g us to sih:rntions thal: rcq11i1('(i a moral rres,ponse, OJ' as moti\mti'.ng us fo aid onci, w0 lha11e del:erminied what to do)}2 !But care-et:hidslis tend t:o view the enrwtfo11s as a constiluti11e medillm orr morn! reffoctilon, Jinsisling tlhat at Ieast when properly cu1ltii11ated, the enwtions enrnble mrnraI agenl:s lo percdve, understand ain«ll respond to l:he world [in, wayi; that sin1,ply could not be achieved wUhmnl ihem,' 1*1 And 1:hey ;\,1ln HHPs vfow this ca1mcily *ir,; _per.foctly comttJai-Lible with ctnnptisi.,,:ion,. and <:l vr.,:cy sl.111.Har poi'n-t fa 111.ade by P.ipc.r (199'1), . .Nole1 hovitcver, t11al c:ompas~;ion ir-; a m.orP g(\tH:ndi.;;.<:d Olt u.nivmsabzabfo .moral aUilude than caring)' and hence 1:r1.ay br. sm1rtewhal nasJer to recondl.e wilh the tli_:nie HQ:_n8et) of autor10n1y FW.l dfac1.1SH($,. Ott Hu-~ *woyH 1.n vvhid1. 1\J1n-'.*11 d.iffers from rd.ai!.ed altib:uJc-s. Hko co.1Tqpassiion, atnd brm,cvofonce1. Slie Bhm1 (1992). 32This r~tn.ms pairtly fr*on1 H1e m.o:rrc g:E:nera] fominist concer-.n 1Lha1 r1incn* 11rallonal.11 aiu.ton:wrny lms hisl.or-kaUy been vi(-:wod aH a ma1fi-Ctdinn capacity wh.i1u ne11;10-tiona]l1 et1ring ha.r1 bnn11"1:. vlewnd as. a (e*mfr1]rn-~ one, an.y HOit of conbraist hot ween Lh,nn 1tu1y contlihule to ho-Lh t hf: d~nraifoaition of ta.Iring-a.nd the o.nnoing rmbord.fnalion of wo.rnon. For a rmht[e and hir-;.f.orically detailed discussion o[ the ]finks betwenn th0: COl'\.Cepls of arulo*nomy and. rn.ti;sct.dinily, and of lhe c<rnnndicms lw.tvveen fnM:h links and th.e dr:vahrntton of all Hrings 11femalo/ Goe JJoyd (1984), 33can:-•ethidsls 11:re not the 0111y conV~nlporary phHoHop-.h(~rs Lo suggest that r-;011w kind of emolionally- .. ftad.en knov-.rledge, ratlw*r th.an 111rrnre11 prncUcal n:l'limn, fr,;; \"rhat ultimutdy g1*mmds llw moral r;*esponse, See, fnr ,1xampfo, Blum (1980), l\lw,sbmm1 (IY86; 1990; *J99ti), Sherma11 ('1989: ""I'* ch, 2; 1990; 1994,}, Stodwr ('1987a; '1987b) and Oakley (1992), HI/;1.orirnl predlecnsri{>rs of this v:Il(~w in.elude A:ristolJ.'-~, Schopo.n.ha:uer, 11ulcl1.eson amd 1-J.u.m<~. l1or hnrLhc\.r discussion of what 'LL .mC1.tm1.s for lhc nmol:ion.s l:o be 11properly cultivated/ sc~,~* lhrc i.111.lnrch.ange hetwe,m Nussbaum and Sh,n*1,1"an (1994,), 2:1 are fodher convinced thal: casiñ; -- "a f?J\ concern for the gpod of ol:hen; aind for co1nmunitywith them" (Baier '1985: 19,, emphasjsrn_im~) ,, iis a f.iuindanrtental component of genuinely m_ornll (rus opposed to "m,erely" p,•rsomil),34 dldiberal:ion, and crucial to an aigenl:'r, capacity fm-mom] jimlgment, as well as her a,hilil:y to pen:eive and resporid approprfotely to nwrnl situations, Carfog, on this view, 1is not just compal:ible wiU1 U1e "broa,der hum,rn peespediv(~" achieved through 11:he impartial review of moraI pdndpler;, It /s that lormr,der pernpedive. 15 mm-al adivill:y is p1<ima1rily a malfor of 11acti11!~ on primcipfo" or Hnding abstrad and generail remm1rm to justify what one proposes 1:o do. As we have seen, to pol'l:rny 11nmall agency as an exeirci'se in auto111mny fa to s11ggesl, that mrnraJity fa agent's perception of morn! siturut:iomi and are at least imp.JiidHy rnppealed to in 34Notc thali:. (hf\ ca1-x-:--orientatiorr1 dJfferri from. nw npt!rnona] p,oint, of vic;-v,/'1 de.fonded by tl:iir1kers lilrn l'lagel (1986), SchdJlmc {1982) ,,,nd Williams (19n; 1985), Th,,,,o thinkers contend tJ1al th(: P'":,rsona( 1w]nL of view i8 d.isUnct. frorm1 l*he moral point of vfm,v, and ir,; nol alvvayG co11Hlrained by l11e laltcr wlwu. goneK'a:ting h:g;itirn.ate i*ea.:,;on.fii for ud:ion1 but !Jwy othe:rw]sn a1ccc-;pt the idenlifica-U.on of morality a:nd i.rnpartiO:l rationality. Car,,-h ..c,LhiciBtB, by contraHk, ins.1st that t.he o.:.i_n-i,. ... orfomf.aUon fa a (or tl11e) gtinufo_oly moral p,oint ofv.iew:, and onr. H1a1l getru:raLrn:• leg-iU:nin1ato reasm1H for ad.ion '"'ldcb. are d:i~L:i.nd from_ Lh.ose generated by b*oth n1otc: pe1rso.11al nd :morre intparU.al pern,peclivcs. Form.ore d.otaikid diflCU.M\ss*i.orr. o{ Lhis pointr ,;oo Blum (1994: ch. 2). :1-5TI1is may not be an H.inlirdy acn.11rato churad:e-ri.za.Uon of Bafor1s _posi:\:ionr since sh{! d.esc:irilJes can1: nr-~ a 1'1lese au.lhor:itari.l"Jn h11.m1anit..arian .fi.1-I.J'.-£ili}I0;QI!111 to the for.111.s of 111or-al r(:aBo:ning (~.mb(i:ddnd in nwrc imparlia.l.i.str ]Kantlan .. -style v:i.twvs (1.985: 2f_xny _ nmvhasts). Yet she al~m descrihe,~ *notioms-of obhgat1on a:rrid prowtise--kneping as bning 1'prJ:rasiUc11 on nof.iorn; like love and tnwt (1994: os_p. cJhs. 1, 2 &i:: 'Ji4). In any ovenl..,. this does sorn:'n Lo chamd.eni:11! Llw posiliorn, of Noddings (]984: dos, 2 & 4) and Ruddid, (1989: ch, 3), and bolh f ldd ( 1990) and Ttonh, (1993: Ch. 5), hav" explicitly aqr,trnd Lhal 'care is the wideir nol:work into which juslice nnrnt fiL' S"" also Murdoch (1970:]02), who asks "Will not 'J\d. lovinp,Iy' trnrn,fole 'Act perfecLly,.1 wh{irn-as 1Act raU.onaHf wiH noL?tt 22 I ! ' his oir he[ rrw!l'al deliberations .. 36 But to porftJraty mornJ agency as ,m exerdse in earring is fo rrn1ggest that mornJHy typically, oir at least id(!aHy, involves a much rnmrre dired, unmediated resporn,e to other persons in lhe worlld,. and hc•nn: lhrnt nnorrnl thinking 111itima11:<:dy reside;; in a kind ol "serrisitlvity to lhm1mm1ty" and "'corn,dmnsrriess of your influence over what's going on" (Gi!Hgrnn, et al: 21), Cm*e••*ethicfots do not deny nml mon1d pdnciples may sometimes lrYE" t1sefol, but Gifligan's findings suggest Hmt people who rdy on time care--orrierrifolion, are extremely relud:ant to appeal to such prindples in m*der to justify 1:he.ir moral! acl:rivHy,.'17 imdl ca,re-•etlhicfal:s iU"e united in the co11111idiim that acting rn1 principle .is seldom, if ever!',, nocessa,ry in onle1r to be adillg morally, and is definitely not the most ,ulmnrabie or 1ideal form of mor<lll adivHy in a great many rcmtexts (see espedally Noddings *1984: S 16, 24; 1990: 28, 9}, Defonders of mone i:rmdliUonaI ethical theories iio111cetime'S object tlhat care-•etfocists treat mornll adivrny as 1mreflect1ive rnr merely lr1sti111dive, as well as obj,~dionably p,ntial. But here ,11g:,1in, ii is im,pmtant not to over,cxaggcrate 1:he cm1trnid:, for all caIT~~eU1iidr4s porh"ay caring as an imporl:imt kind of thinking ifo1t can often be difficult wowk. Diatm1 T,. Mleyers, for exannpJe, insists thrnt autonou1,y is a "multifaceted C()mpetency" that cml b," e)(en:isc•d in at least two ways: the impartial and prirnciple--~1overned melhodl of the justke-orie11tablon, and the "responsibiHty reasoning" of the care,~rnrientii,tion (1987),,. %This pictu.m ifl devdopod in pi,,rticular dolail by HP111rnn (l99'.,: osp, ,Ju,, 4 & 7), wb.o arg:tH-\S that moral agonlH re]y on a s-~:t of 11J'-u_[c:s of m.oraJ t)a!i.1,1:ncP/ as well as lJ:,.e Ca1Lngorkal limpcn.11Livc procedi.ure. 1•7i"{ocal.l Gj_]].±gan1s ccn1cern Hrn1t fo*mafo8 were bPing inapproprii:tlely 11*dowmwoir(1d 11 !)n Kohlb-nrgitm. t.esls of moral reaisonlng pr:ecise.l!y hc:ea.usP o.f their u.nwiilingne-sH to rnak(1: such appoaIN. But noLt: that ILhern fa still rooTn:I' wilhin Hw ,~thks of caring, for agen1Ei' l.o roly o-.n moral "n1loil of 11,umb" as a helpfol faourisUc ,fovico; tho daim is only that the, n:1ornlity of an ar,ent_is adicm i& not def.m11:ti.nod by i.l:.s implidt. or (-!xplidL confo:rrni.ly with any parUcular (srl oJ) adion-*1;uiding pri.ncipfo(H), 23 I I I i I bi l:he faUer, agents proceed by a kind of "1imagi111111ti,1e infrojedirnn" and, insl:ead of reflleding on prinidples that mir,ht be\ used to govem their lbelhavior, they aslk themselves questions l1ik,~ 11Co1ild l lbear fo be the sort of pQrson who can do tha1ft11'.>il Simifody, Sara Ruddick is nuefoll to note llrnt she 0171Jy obj,~ds only to 1111 certain ldernUzed rnnceplfon of reason as i.1mperscmaJ ,md detached ... raU1Pr than lovfo.g" (19&9: 12).. And Nel Nod dings emphm,1i:c,:s Urn1l CiH("rs "can mui do give reasons frnr their 11ch,,. foul the n,irusrn1s often poi111t to feeli.ngs, needs,. silrnrutnonali cond ilions, and a sense of pen1onal ideal" (1984: 3; 96). Tho kind of "loving atltenlfon!'" thi.nkem Hke R11ddick and Nod.dings rwve in m1'11d requfres nol allowing one's ov,n needs, biases, and con§dous rnr t1m:orn,dous desires regarding the other person fo get in the way of appreciating his oir her iJ1i1pairtirulity tlmt is ideal1ized by a great many western mrnral theories, it does seem, to be impartial in some sense of the term .. Moreover, al!thou~;lh 1.l\ey do agree Hnat H1,e rnpadty foir cariñ; tends to be exhHiited m o:,I: folly in fairly close!, personal ,relationships, care-ethicists beiieve lhai H can also be E)Xi:em:led, i11 a som,ewhat mm~, limited fashion, to stnmgen, ~nd distant otherrsilY 3*8M:eyem con.Umd1;; that. bolh of Lhos.n .mPLhodH "depend on nw_ honnsty and hu1na11ity of Cho ddi1(}DrtJJtoru an.dare only 11as good us ll1e vractiUonor is r;;k:iU~:clt,11* a1nd her rn.ntn poinL *IN H,at Hin rns.pomiibiiit:y reasomimg that J\s dnara.de:rrlaUc of peopl(\ who n!Iy orn tJ'le car<H)rk:u.talion .is JlOr.fndly cmnymUbfo w"flh: a.ding fro.t:n ono's *morJU. au.tl1rnnlic cono;tTm, This is bec1;1usn a1 ñ~pons.ibHHy l'nasonor v\rho honestly .1rofh-:cl:s Uf.HYn wfrlkh of Eler choke~ 111:1.re; cornpaUbl.e with or rrninfo.rn! d(-'.S.irabf.0i iu;pnds o[ here per1:;oria) -tdenl:Jty11* may find that she sincen:dy 11idtmHfi0;u wi.U-11 lJn.o interests of ollters and t:hernfcre rn.ost wti,nl]!'s] t.o r-mcnxte thoNP inter<'f,l:s" (19117: ]5] .. 52). '.i-9NoddingH r<:*stricln car:ing to 11facO**{Omfoce11 ñfalionsl"i.ipsr but l10l('$ thul these do J(IOL m-:cossarily have lo be o.ngoing: a :rnoraJ agent can f:xhib.il g~~1rrufr1e caring fo-ir anothe;.rr person '1⁄4rho!' rnorrn-~11.Ls eadfor, wafi a CO.ltt_plde strung.er and who.r:n sh.r. may nt~v,1:r again P11counler. Arid ofhe:r GJJ.fCH)thidsts. do not endo:rGf\ thi1H rc~sl:r.tcLion, Virf~inia ~.--lddr for (ixa-mpk\ ha.r:1 convindn:1gly argued that a caidng ti,gent. can_ corbidnnT:y k:now cmour~h 0Th-ot1I. fl:itP co1twrc-Lt1: needs and silua.Ho.n of f'a sta1rving chHd. "in Afr:licat [.o rocognizr. st,-1pf~ sho could lak('-Lo frn_prov(' Um: cbild\~1 phys.ka*I welfare, despite Lhn fact that slw i.r-.; not i.n a _pt1rli.cuiar!y good posiUon Lo r<'r;pond lhe child's omohonal nends (t987; d.1993). Similarly, bolb Murdoch (1971) and 24 I l Clhamcterizing GiUiga1111s two moral orientatirnim i11 ternrrn of a cm1tn1st between auto111orrny amd rnl"inf; us a way of mnpkrnsizing that th,,~ m1rnc,11•* phllosophkal debate that grew out of hel" fim]ini1s i.~ concerned, firn1 arn:l foremrn,t,. with qmestions about what rngeITTrts m us.t consciously or unconsdously be doing in order to ad rightly m deHberate effodively abouil how to pmceed, Bui theire is ii minor problem with this way of ptntlfr1g the nmtmst Hmt is important to call our attention to-* .. mm1dy, that it ern:ourager, nm fo confuse differences in the m:ulcish11.i:i.i:.1; ,n .ffl'<::ll,~. of am agent's morn I umcern, i.e., diffen*e111ces in the most bask e11alm1live assun11plforn; that miighlt "orient" an agent's morn[ outlook, with differences in the concephml sl:rmdure of the a,gent's 1rxwrml underslandimg am! the methods that he or s,he relies on when consbuing mornli problems and ddi.loemting e1bo11t 1:heir solutions. Mor:e specifie,1cHy,. it tends to conflate differences in the 11ounative commiitmen'm that shape a p,11rticular "way of thinking" a,bout morrnlil:y, with d1iffotem:es ir11 the way tJmt morn! pni11dples rnr rnles are used wil:hi111 Hhat way of thunldng. lit. is the fo11*m,er ternnion in vahie .. orienl:aHon v;1}1dch Gilli1Y,an seernrn to have, ,in Irniml ,, when she speaks of rn "difference in theme. 1140 Yet it 1is the Irntter, sonwwhal. more formal or 1111dhodoiogicaJ tensirnrr, which seems to be at stake in tbe dispute over whether a phHosophkaHy satisfy.illg dhic mu1st ultimatdy be grounded in absbcad and genernl principles m rlllles. To lbe 1,1ue, z,ding ]\hmsTt:n:1u"m (1990) contend Lhat ]loving alLenUon grounds. a vety wid(H"anging fomi of co.rl'll[H:lBSi01'.11. 4-0whet.her lam right about lhis is diffic1:li1Jl. lo say for r-mrnr sirn::e h1tm(:cliatcly after she nm.pl1crni7J18 lha.l Lhe jusHccu1nd ci:1rn--orienl.aUorm are disUng:uishod prirnarHy hy l.h(:nH\ Gi.Higan says thal t:hoy akm 11hipJ1liglh.L a d'lsu:incUon boh,vnn:n lwo 1mod.<:s of Lhought.11 (.1982.: ?.). WHt (:199:~) porlrays "G1Hi.gt.1n]m-ri11 as having sofoly Lo do \NiU;h l:Tr1e assmrtion of dlffernnl conmptual 1:;ln1d:t1ms; son also Lyons (1988), Trcmto (1993: 27-28) and Wingfidd and H,wlx, (1987) on lhis point 2b m:donommisly is 1:ypkally 1.mderntood as acting on a parfa:ular kind ol moral pfindple (tJ1e Categorical llrnpe1ml:ive or "re~ped for pemons"), and acting from care: is typica.lly irnderrstood as exlhibiting a particular kimll of moral sensitivi1ty (a, concem for the good of other peoplle and for co1nnrnnily with them). But o?:lther of these com:eptnu1I stn1dures seems to be perrfod:ly compatible with commitments to a w1kle 11arielly of substarntive l!JHH'al noi*nrn including, for example, a commitment i:o rmñinte1rforence rnr a commitment to adively pmrrnohng others' good, The sort of conflation I amr1 concerned a,boul ifJ evident thnluglhout GilHgan's work On the one hand,. she distinguishes the JiusHce** and c.ue, rnrfontatriom; by their diffo1rent 11mo1*al irn1pen1tives," crnn,b'asting the injt.md1ion "lo probed from 1lnlerfe1rence the riglrlls to lifo m11d 5,e1IJ • .f1.11fill1rnent"' wilh HK' injundi1011 "to disrern ,rnd alfovirute t:he real! and recogr11izable trmnbl,e of tlhis wndd" (1982: 100). On the other hand, she dislinguisher; them by tlheir driffer,ml methods of deiibernt:ion,. con,brsrsl:ring moral ou1:lookr; tl~at are "tfod to the umde!!rsla11ding of rights and rules'' (Ibid,: ]9) witb I.hose that "shill [moral] Jitndginent @way frrn:n th,! hiei*@rdnical onierring of p1rindpl:es and tlte fonmaJ pmcedtU'es of decision ma,king'' (Ibid,.:: lO!) ... HJl) and cm1sfrmt a, "narrative of relationships Hmt extends over time" (Ibid .. : 2'1ll Hut as M,ugare:t lfrba11 Walke1r has poi11tedl out,. these two ways of charaderizing the d1ifference 11appea1* not only distinct, but muhu1lly in1d(:pendent 11 (1989: §II).41: After rull, an rnv~nt need not value rnre and rela.1:iom,hips 1in m*der to Ile: a "particulairisl" realizal:im1 or em.!arimonia withm1l valiuiHig can-;,. or fhink Urnl care malte1m too, ,nsee also Omnold, ol. at (19%); Dancy ('J992); 'll'ronlo (199,\: '79ff); F,Iedman (.1993); and Ja,11gn r (I 99S), 26 j Alternalively, an agent might t1mforse am "inJiumdion to n11re11 while at least ilnplidtly relying on 0111e or more adio,r1,,guiding prinriple(s) m fonnal ded1,io11 p1roced1111'e11 for del.i,bernling about what to do, ]ndced,, dassirnl utiHtmirnnfam (and many of its contempon1ry varinm1:s) might be considered 1:he "ultimate" in rnro pernpedives along, these Iines. 11:ie uti!ilarian 's only moral concern is with human (or senti<~nl), happiness,, and thi:s is t:ypirn!Iy specifiecl in tenrnrn of plleasure, pniforence 1mtisfaction,, or desire,Ju1llfiUment ,., in 0U1er words, by wha,t Girllip;ain rnlfa "the weH-bei111g of othen, im their own terms" (1984: 78). And a,Uhough utiHtmrians frequently pride H1emseivc• s on being mriore p,ensitive to prurlficufar contexl:s than their deontologkill riv a fa, inasmuch as the Jrightness ofr any adion-*type 11,IUmailx"Iy depends on the aduul or expectable ul:iUty of performing that adion in eiltd1 specific case (mther tb,m its accordance with moral principles that are pwesmned to be~ el:Jh.kally fondanl1~n1:al), they nonetheless contend H1,al the pdndple of t1W11y pnwidcr1 a formal dedt;.i()n--procedtnre for making sudh determin$1l1ions, and Uris doer, S\eem, to 'allml:rad Lhe moral: problem from the interpersonal siituatiion,' imi.mrm1,h as it tm111sfates the concr,ik~ interests rrnd prefonclln'r, of pa rti.cular h1dividuals into commensurable umits on an iim,persomd utihty scale,, Tkms utilibuiarnism does seem to l"(cliy 011 a metlmdolog:irnl sl:rrndure that care,. ethicists wa11t 1:o wejed,42 ,rnd yet,, when 1:he cu11wrn for ]happiness is mm biined wHh the requirement to maximi,,e 1:lhe aigp;regafo amcnmt of lmippiness in the 4f2.JPor lh:iN i*eti1sonr lJ:rTn,a:n ,Nalb-~r dos.crih(\S utililmda.nism. afl a for.ni: of und.mi.'f1ist:rallvc cmn" (1989: l?.7; """ also Held 1996); and soo Nussbaum (1985) for additiorwl concenrs afHw.t the .fon'11.a!.i1y of a utilitarian. app:iroad1,. lf. should, howc-:ve.rr bn rw!cd LhaJ. so--calfod 11id{1:al11 forrms o.f ut:ilitarlanlsrn rn.ay bn ~10.m.ewhat ]tnmun.e frcH11, Lhis cri.f:fr:ls.111., 2.7 work!, "the srremwusness of this nning seems hard l:o outdo" (1Jrlb1m Walk,:r 1989: 126), If we are gonng to rrrntke sense of 1:he daim 1:lml. the el-him of can, umnol be cmptrnred withitrt any previous mo.ml theory, it seems that we need to be much more s.peclfic aibm1t wlrmt each of these le11sio11s 1involves, And lhe cmnpardson with 1.1til.itairiatnfom 1.snm,rr1.1cbve, since it rnH1y not he imniediately obvious hffW the methm:lologirnl sh'uchuct1 of these l:vvo ethks diffoL For exa1mple, Leslie Canm,ld, Peter Singer, Helga .Kuhse 1rnd Lm'i Gruen l:iave recently Rl'j~m,d that while~ utilitarianism does differ from Hte etlhics of rnre [1n il:B 11imperso1riaJI focus" and the fact that It "has a lmsis in abstmd prdndpl,e ratl:ler 1:lum Hie nmtext of personal rdatio11ships 11 (] 995: 373), bol:b of thiese ethirn are fully "compatible wilh conse91rnc•11lfalism/ and hence 1:he diffenmce in their formal or melthodologkal stn11ctmes is not in fad a 11sii~rdficm1f1 distindion" (libid,: 368). In tlheir view, tlhe real diJforeince between these two ethics fo Hiat utilitairiianism pfoces more emphasis on caring for pernonr, generally, while an etlhic of care places more emplu,si.:, cm miring for pen;ons wHh whom one ii, in smne kind of special rdal:ionshnp. /\It.hough !hen• is .cl degree of trnth to thii. laUer claim, however,, to arg;t]e in. this way is Lo ove11fook rn hmdaimenhll distinction in conceph1a.l stmdmre, 1md Jhcmce l:o obsnff'e what is perhaps tlhe most disfi:indive moral Pl1tsight generated lby a11 ethic of c111re .. As evidence for their view, Camwld et. al. cHe a pa.simg,,' in which N,,\ Nod.dings says the reasons [ rn crnring agen1:J wo11ld give shoulld Jhe so we.111 co1mected fo the objective el.eme11ts of the p.rmbkem that l[horll 28 ' lr i i I -,cmuse of action dea1dy either sbnds a chance of s1.1cr,•eding in behalf of the caired-for,, or cam hrnve been engaged i,n only with the hope of effeclfog so11melfong for the caired,,,fo,1* (Noddings 1984: 23; Crnmwkll et al 1995: 366). agent's "motivahoirn iITT car/mg,'' and though she chamderi:ws this moUva:Hon as being "dfrected towc1rd the welfare,, protection, or enhancem.enJ of the caredfor" (,0~J[IIJP-'hasis mine}, her disnrnsion stmugly suggesis that GimHar surts of reaso,ns would not lbe mornlly significa,nt in l:he absence of thrut motivation. Moreover, she .introduces her views lby insisting that it is impossible, and even wrongheacfod, to aUempt to fommlate a precise sd of "action criteria" fo,, ca1ring,, insistinri; Hmt we m1rnt exa,mimq the ideal "fn:,,m the inside" (l 984: 9-16), A11d fotc~r on, sfõ is eve11 more explicit about this, arguing that the rightness of mn aidicrn or n10n11l decisio11 crnn never depc-md rnn the cmh'ome, "His rigM or wrong according to how fail:hfolly i1 was rooted in caring •** Hurl is, in a, gen11ine respom,e lo llhe perrceived needs of otheI*s" (Ibid,: S3). 4:1 Whc11t Noddings is here defending is !he view that no aiction cao be right in the fullest sem,e 1mle,;s it fo rooted in and so 1m rnnifosts 1:he gc!mli nely .~@lfj]Jtg rrwtivatiion of the age11t who pedorms it H is not enough, in her view, to simply ad on bdrn!J off othc~1t1s v,,elfare, fm' tlere añ a,ll r,01,*Ils 1Tmti11es that mJlg;ht prompt one to do so, only smne of whkh are sufficient to rnnde," such adions momHy appmprfa1:e. When understood in this way, liter mnplrnBfa on those forms of rnrrh1g thact are most typical of dose personal rl'laticrnshipr, (such as Um relationship that is at least ideally forg,•d belwc!en 1rnoOwr 1.rnd rhiid) 11s not simply an en(.lor1,e1menl: of more partial over mon' 1impmrliall fornrrn of ol:her--regarcL Rather, it is pad of her overnH dd~mse of the clain1 that 43Jnterc,,;Ling[y, Cammld eL al. also cil<• this pa,ssege earlier in lhdr ar'li.de (19%: '161), 29 I ' I ' I r [ a very deep ki11d of cawing or loving attention, of a, sod thait nm, only be fully exhnbHed toward persons who are refabveliy near and d,ear, ns the ldml of prndicaJ r;tti.b1de we mo.rmlly ought to exhibit toward ourr follows, not b(xa11s(• of a,nythbrvg suppos,~dly more ethicaHy bãic 11,bout its (liikely) cffocts, bU1l simply because of the kind of motivatiom.11. sl:at.e U1,~,t H fri. As vrurious comme11tatorn have poim-ted 0111t,44 this kind o( emphasis 011 motivei; rmakes the formal strnchae of mntemqporary c,ue .. -ethics rnuch n101re similair to a virh1,,e .. ,ethical approach to m()ra1I theory such as the ,uudenrt phi.losophers pirefeñd 1:h,m to any form of consequentia.IIsm .. 45 Yc1I ca1reethicists have not tended to porsue lhlis more lraditiorCTa.l optiorn, prreferdng a moire "relational approach" to ethical theory. Indeed, Nel N«iddingr1 hafl eve!(\ insisted tliaJ "rnring is not Jn il:self a v1irr!ue" (l9!l4: 96) desuibiing It as a "relational altrilml:e'' instead (1990; 120) .. One teason for this seems to be the corln-m1,, widely hi"ld amon!', conlempornry philosophers,. that virluE1 ethkr, ca111 only be a 1;11.pplenw-nl m* complement to other, more "prindpl.ed 11 or "action--focm,ed" approad1.(*'f> to mm'lll theory; since most care-ethidsl:s waltll theirapproach to seirve as rn fullfledged alternative to tli.eo,ries lik(' kantianism and 111:Hitairiarnl§rn, this viPw 11riakes virh.1e ethics obviously 1mat!:irndive (Tronto 1993:: 148),, Alflother, refoted concern is tlhat virtue etMrn is essentially conservative and can only "systematize" om* conummly held opinions abornt what tmits a1,, virtm's. lt its «sec cspocillll,Y Dancy (1992}, Fl.anagan and jadrno" (1987), and t1ri,,dm an (l 99J}. 45 Kantia:n moral thl-~ory can ~1]so be Fmid. Lo vlace 11:1:ore r:m.phasiG on moUvc:r,; (or: intentions) than conr'.iequnnces. BuL Kan\L ~olds holh that the xnosl Jmpo:rtan! moral m.ot:iV(\ * the m:11.0-Uve of duty .. ,,,_ is a cornmil.:rmm\L lo acting on llw Mo:rnl Ln,i\1 (or Cnl(;f1,CH1ci.1l im.pe.rative), a-nd that actions lhal conforn:1 to H1.e Categorical lrnven:lUvo o::u1 b(~ rig-ht Pvr:n if they ar0. pedorr1:1~:ed frou:i .moraUy qu.estionabki molives 1 o:tnd tll1118 plnc,!s 1,1rtud1, mo.re ,.i,n1.plhm•ls on moral rufos than e-it}r:cr consequcmUali.st or vid,Trn--based ap1r1roacheE1. d.i~;cu:;,s the strt1cttrtrP nf deoul.olog:ical or 11prindple*-bascc,P1 vi.r:ws at llw end of llrils m1hsodi0-n. I nio accident according fo one Line of l:hinking, that Aristol:le is bo1Un a, vfrltiP ethi1dst and l:he inspilrnlfon for 11nany com1n1milmriam, who ilre foi1rly rrellt1dant to d'mnge 011u common, pracl:in!s,M, and since e11,re--ethicfats want to tnmsform m1r morn] attt:itmfos (and in particular 01u atlitm.les abm1cl: what have traditional.ly been called lhe "fenrirnine virh1es 11) this al.so make:, virtue ethics Look to he a questionable ally (Jiriedlman 1993). A third sod of concern surely stems from the fact that andc\nt philosophers exhibit precisdy the sod: of male--bias feminist plhilosophern want fo overcome: Ari.stoUe is notorious for his sexism, am! even Pilato, who was convinced that: theni mulld be ph1ilosophy 91u1eens as weltl as kings, did not think htis philosophical mom1rdw would Cl1Hivate anyth1i11g like the caprndty to caire. Indeed, he wais one of !he first westerlll phifosophern to insist on l:he 11primE11cy of justke. 11 However, recent: work on A1ni1,totl:e has poi11ted to deep inconsistemfos in hfo vi,~wpoint towards women: 011 iiJh,e one hand, he portrnys U,mn ais the primairy rnregivern and eairiy morn I, educaitors,. i.e., the people n1ost 1respo11** sible for initiaiting new (maile) members of the mornl c011111111mity; yd on the other, he porl:rays them ais incapable of moraI achvi.1:y themselves. Givm1 fo:s emphaiiis on the 1imporlance of moral ll'ole-.. modefo, il: is d iffkull to see how these two views ca11 Ile reconciled (Sherrm,m l99l: l5i 56; d. Schwm7;,11bad1 1996). And of course, he was simply wrong to suppose th&t wtmK•n 1,vere constiitutionally incapable of eng,1ging in all the rndivit1ie1, that Greeks 1rese•n1ed for n1en. Similarly, Hu,~ fad that Plato does l[!Ot m11ch emphasize vir1:ues )like compassion am:! Cflie dlo,?s not yd show that l:Jlwy rnmrnt be rn1--Ucufated within a viirl:ue--cthicai framework: wilm~ss St Augustn11e1s Christnmn approp1riation of 4lfvJh.e links hdwnen *vi-rLu<-~ ethics and. Cumrnuni.Lar*ir.mism are 1nad.c! explicit. hy MacIntyre (l981; 1988); sne also Galston (J980). Jlor a contra,;iing view,""" Nussbaum ('1988}. i ! ,_ :1 I j i I 10i I I I i I ! i I i '.I i -! Platonic rr1on1l1 views .. l'hfo, does !lot,, of comrse, mallo A11g1wtim, a, rn1odd of feminist moral theorizing (see Lloyd 1989: 28--33), but Ill doeH at least sui;gest that it should lbe possible to ir,,corpornte care ... et!hical notions within 1.1 virhw, the,m,,tk mpproach, and the fad l:hal Plirnto porrbmyed womeF1 11s the moral, equals of melll pirovides us with rnt least some reason l:o thilllk that su.-:h an approadh shornld be abfo to leave th, 0 taint of sexism belhirnd. And in fact, I believe ihaft a radically viJrt:m,-etl1icaI, or "agent .. l.msed" app1roach l:o moral n,eory iB in the best position to explicate the legitimate insighb; that airise from a caiñ,-o,rienhition to mornillty, and a somewhaf: }leU:er posHfo11 than tlhe "relal:ional" a,pproaches contemporary rnre-ethidsfa seem hJ prefor,. Demon, slrating that this fo the case will be the central fask of Chapter Two, where J wiJ'li also show how an ag,e:nHJased approach to vfrtl!e ,~thicG can ovp1,corne them on" gene1ml criticisms about: virh.1e ethics, just m,entioned .. merits a brief comment at this point. For care-•,!thkisl:s also w,mt to e1nphm;i:;,,e that relationships themselves ,WE! mornUy valm1lble,, and it is not. entirely dear that [he sort of value they h,~ve in mi,nd can he reduced to the pn,actirnl aUitrndes or 1inolivalfonali states of the agents who engai;e in tl:iose r,,fation-* ships (Held l995J)6),, 'Jhfa kind of poiint fa not wholly u.nfamiliarr lo vfrhJC* etfoml tlheorie,s, for it was made by Aristotle when he noted thrut while l1ishment and maini:ena,nc,~ of a fr1*iendslh1Ip,, the frkndship itself is nol "in" rnny ot lthe prnrtfos involved, but s,?ems lo He so1111ewherc:0 between tlhem .. And Aristotle was ireltK1:a1r1t to rnU friendship a 1111frl.ue11 il1i an mnquallified senise fow predsel!y th:is ñason; rather, he charadc!riZ<'fl it as an ",,xtema,l good" 32 L I ' (Nicomachean El:hics: I.S-Hl).47 Nonetilhelies.s, we Slmll see in Ch,1pbi'r Two that Aristotle's. approach to vil'trne ethkf, is not enbrely "age111t-based/' and altho11p;h I want to crmcede that there is ,l ce1*hl.in kind of vallle •** whal J\loddings cails "joy" and I shall call the vallle of rm1tm11Hty , .. that an a,gerit based ethic of eating cannot quih" capture, I shall coin tend Umt the prohllen.1 is not in the formal shmd:mre of s11ch an ethk 11:ml: in the nal:11re of the caring ideaL Indeed, I shall 11ltimafoly img:g:est 1:lmt coniteimporary care*+'lhkfots rma ke the va,lue of mutualily a1 hit too periphernl wil.hin thehr accmmtr, of mrnrality muJ the etlliical Jifo. 4J\ fo IJ1.e mrnrntime, whflt ris im111porranl to recognnze aboutt1n.e distinction f'xitwec'Jll the conseque11i:fo1Ust dflim Hmt tlhe rightness of actions depends. on their out.corr:nes, and Nodclings"s daim that 1:lhe rightness of actions depends on their motives, it, that there mre at leaist two vvays for a 1noral l'lh1eory fo limit the exh~n1 to whrich it relies on rnd.ion-guid ing pwincip.les. The first way I endn-i-sl'd by Canm,Jd, et al., is to Irnsist that t1rw-vaiidiity of any such ru.Ies m 11st uli:imdely He in adual or expecra ble con.sequences of adhering to thc'm in specific sihrntions. Jim* although such am appl'Oach does erndot'Sf' rn1,, highly a.lJstmd aiH.l g,~11ei-al pri.ndple (srnne veirsion of !he Principle of UtiH1y), il impHes that hi Hne fast. ana.Iy1,is, it is jmigm.ents abm1I the (1inl:ri111sic) mor-11.I value of cerfain consequences m* stad:es of affairs th11t mic crucial to om* judgments a.bout what we rrnoraily ouglhHo do. The second way, at lea,s! partfoily endm*sed by Noddings and by virture-ctlh.i:cirits more 1;enernlly, ris to freat Jiudgme11ts about-U1e (intrinsic) moral va.lr.1f' of certain kinds of motiva., ,:JV/Thnl it.1/' he doscr-fhnG hicndHhip m1' n:01nething -LhaL is in an C:RSlmtfol way ouLsf.de the sdf. For discw,r;i.on, "''" 51.wrma,m (1991: !\4.7.) and N1rnsbaum ('1986: ch. 12}. -48 TJ1{~ con1plolo argunu:.mfl for this will not be dovolluped unLH Chu_pte.r Four. 33 Uorn, a,s ethically fmtdrmwntaL And allhough Uris app1*m1ch rn n ,~foo br., smid lo general!Jii an a!Jstrnd and r,e1n,e1rrul principle ('ad virlu1orn,Iy, 1 or in Noddings's case, 'be 01,ri1rng'),, it implies thait tlrtE! Principle of Utility will a.lways be imldequale, because a perplexed mo1rnl agent rn u1sl honest:y 1,,eflied on heir i1111en* moitivaUons as wel.l as the (pote1n1faI) effeds ()f the vari10UJ1s actiton,s she might dmose. Of comrs<1, the theoretical merits of such an approach rnn be disputed, and responding to various olbjcdions will form m1Jclh ()f the suhjed, maUeir of later dmplers, llut 11111lcss we lake this distinction quHe serimisly, I beltieve ,it is impossible to giive dur., weight to the rrwrnJ insights tlhal arr(' genernl:ed by the care-orie1rital:im1. Of comse,, tJhe ide111 :hat H1,e 1:iglhmess of actions depends oin som,ething 0H101r than their co11sequ<~nrns cru1 also be found within deontollngical 1Jwral thcrnries. But thifi. sort of apprnach placer; much more emph,1,sic1 on ad1io111•* gcuicHng prindpies a,nd nifos l±mn do either conscq11entialist 01r vfrtue-•el:111kal theorries, arn:l hence fa the one Hrnt contempornry c11re,,-etJhJic1is1:s seem particuiarly keen lo reject f'or Kantian deon,tologists, our moral! judgment; ull:imalely come forest in a single, overnrchi111g nwrnll prindple (the "Morn! La1,v" or Categorical Impe'ral:ive), which nm be used to ddenrnine the validity of rr11_ot'e spedfic rtn!es or 1111.axh1nis we propose to act om ijn any spc-d fie ca.sli.\ and it is run agenfs commi\J:nent to this principle i11cat shows him to bP motivated in ways that are moraHy good. For nile--deonlologists like W. n, Ross,, om* nwrnl jt1dgme11ts are uHimatdy i;nmnded in a more complex oi' moml princip]es,, each of which has independe11t valid my, lmt an1,ong which thewe fa pol:enl:ial for conflid sm:h that hitgh]y sitmition-spedfic jml.gments a!Joutwlndch principle ouglhl to be ñIied on wm of~en h;uv,! l:o be• m~cfo. YE't this app1*'oach sti.lll insists that sotmP principle or ol.imr will ll.llimatel.y llave l.o 34 be appealed to in order to reach a moral dedsio11. Simifady, whnle corrtrmc,. h1ria:ns su~;gesl: Umt omr most fondame11tal morral judgments Err,' about the principles that rational ccmtradorn wou Id or shmiM ai;ree to, they too treat appeal§ to ,1ction-guidlng p1rinciiples elJS the basis for judg1111<'nts albm1I what we mornlly 01:11ght to• do iTii allly spedfic case, This threefold! dfol:inctior1, between cor1sciq 111entiadir;t,, prim:1iple-hased,, and motive-loaised theories ma.lkes ii.I: eilsier fo see why lkrrnbians and contrad:airians tend to be the fimt l:o object that the ethks ol care 111himately trnrn 0111: to be objecbiona bly vagm~ and 1mprim:1ipled. Howeveir, some contemporary kamtiam, have wanted to resist Hie dassification of K.ant Mm,seH as a (traditional) deontologisl:, by taking seriot:mly his dlaim that the only th1ing good without 91t.mlifkabon is a "good w11I!" (1785: ':•93), irn.d aUemptirig to 11alu1e of "rnutonomous 1,villling" (see espec1i111Iy Herman *1993: cln. 10),. If it could be s11stained, this sod of ini1xcrpretrntilon wol!.lkl make KaI1t's view,:, abo•ul tl11f, s1:irudui-e oi mom! tMnling rn1uch doser to those of anciomf, 11irh1,! ethidr,l:s than fa commonly believed, rnnd! hencf• make his claims rnbrnJt moral achvil:y much more similar, in terms of theiir formal 01r methodoiogkaI sfruchnil'!i to the claims of con temporn,ry ca,re-eHiidsts, 49 lfow reasom, to be dfacwmed ifll §2,.l, I dmibUhat such run inberprefailion crnn 1-x~ sustair1ecL IButwhat is im porl:ant and inl:.eresling to note at thns point is that eve'il if such an [nl:erpreildion turned out to be the mosl: m.:cu.rate, .Kant's auionomy,.\'nised views wotild still differ* si~;nificantly in thi~ir nornmUv1~ con\J.?nt (and hencr iin their prndic<1I implications) from Hie ethi,cs of caire. Jin order fo ,,ee wlhy, WP n1hove. 3S ], -, I beHeve is llairgely 01rthop;onaI to !:he m.ethodologicrnl tension tlmt lhaG just been discrnised,50 and which constitutes the most significant difforence in 11thmn1•11 of Gilligan'~ two n1,ori11 orientations. Wh,it is the best way to ch,1mcl:eni:r"e fhir, diffo!rence? The rn1.11t:omJmy / the di1;l:ir,,dio111in com:ephial slTu.ctLnre aloñ;side tlhe distincbion i11 nmmcnUve outlook. HoweV(ef,-GilHg,m Imai;: lately s1.1ggested th,1t the "theme" of the c.m3~orie1ntalion is "grounded in connedi1m" (:1993: xxvi; 1995), and this ptoposail seems fairly apt Her plrum;ihk': idea is that a11lo1110l'YHHJS (ol' .irn her terminology, "jllsl") morn! agents are thosP who "focus on" tlw s,•lf ,rn ,1 sep,1rate individual who must proled the mornl rights and/ or respect the morn.! autonomy of others,. but whose own r.ights 1nnd rnutonomy also place c:onstniinl1, on how much he or she rn,aiy be required to do for those m'p,1,rah' others. By contn,st, clllrini; rn1ornl agents are those who, "focus on" the reiatiom:hip bel:ween the self mm.! othern, and seek ways to enhance and 1::rrnintain IJ1e m.orally valtmille connections h•tweein them (1986; 1987; Gilligan et ,11. 1988:: Chs, 2 .. Af). Gilligan is, somewhat mmbigrnous as l-o wheHw,r these "corn,edfons" are 1mdiern1:ood lby cari.ng agents ~,s instn]mentaHy vrnliuable to valuable iin lhefr own rtirlr1L But these illre not exclusive aJl:erñHves, and l:h,• rnre-mienfalim1 is em,iiy interpreted as revolving around lhe idlea thal SOln Cbaptc*r 'l'v,ro (p .. 81ff.) W(\ will fK:n thltt the1*t~ is at. fonfA one reafmn .fr)t th( 1 odstr; V\rho omhrace the valurs of inh*l.1'.'perrso.nai conr1.~~*d1~dneim Lo n:jecL _p.ri.t1dp.ln--busod vi('.*Ws. i I j11ts:.JCP~~.rllQl1l,§tl,,,C;(lJ1,!11§)(:~l()ll~.l)f .Y ~1r:yj1Jg,Ji1 l)d,?Jli Tl:f.JllryJ2Q1rt11,r1t ,Jltl(]Junda111n1 e11 tal g!)*Cl~~l in human lives,, and hc-!l1p to sustaini us. ill both mu role m; mmml ageI1l:s and omr rm lie as benefida1ries of 1ru101"al rudfon (llrlrmn W rul:ke1r: 128), The jrnstke** rwienbltion, by contrnr,t, seems to 1revol ve arnvmd wllrnt I shall I cnlll the yaj1]t1s of imHvidmil sepandeness: goods like autonomy (constrn,1d very brnadly as a tmH llmt is valuable i1n ways that go beyo111d its m;efullness to morn I reasoning), it1tegrity, self.-suffldency and independe111ce, which rure baits flrnt mo11it of ur, value in, both self and of.hers, as well as the minin:rnl. deg;re(" of resped and liberty we seem to require from oth<c11rs in Ol'dei: fo susmin our r;ciJf. esteem. I believe tlbis way of charnderiz.ing Gilligan's d1isl:indi0111 mrukes h,,rr Cl.aim that 11tbe mmal domain i,s comprised of at. least lwo moral orriientaUom,." (1987: 20-21) s1ig11ificanHy more pl,rns1ible, for hvo main reasons. First, both separrnteness and com1ectediru~ss are persistent a11d u1navoid,1b,le feah1re1, olf ail! human living, U is a simple a1nd undenia,ble fact tlat, as we grow rnnd mahm\ each of us develops a urniquely 11persom1l 11 point of view that 1is whoHy distinct from the point of view of any otlher individual. Not suupirisingl:y, we typicatly enjoy dfocovering aml p11muing projed~ that we rnn identHy as "our own," and find it painfol to have omr interests and goals thwarted by llw people around urn. But it is an equally simple and 1mdpnfable fad that without Hie assisl!rnce of othern we could 111ot even st1n1ive our earliest years, timt W(" contimlf' to rely crn the support of others thrnughou.11.t our c1,follt ives,, and that shaped, in ino srnaH measune, lby our linguisl:ic and emotiona1I, interndions with other people. Iii addition, a,rnI perhaps rrwrP lmportanUy, iii. is oinli.y /11 3'7 I _! and through rrdationships thrvt some of 01.1r most covdedl llwrmarn vallues, sucli, as frilendship and love,, ec1111 b,? realized. This broader dfolindion in vallue-orie1rntf1Hon is signiJlkantily Jess "binary" than GU!Iga1rn'1, Justice/Care dir,1:ind:ion S{X~ms to be. Mainy crilics point out that her contrnst olbscures the more subde 11arfatlfons in mornl personality, But she n:,ay simply be assuming that a1111y more sUJbtle 1rnriations in orim1tatirnn wrn necess11si!y ste1m from more spedlfic a.speds of either perfecdy piausible.51 For exaurnpfo, some moral agents maiy be espedaUy concr.:med to exhilbiit integrity or consdenUm1sness withont lbei,ng partk1.1lady Independenl or sbm.gghn!; to ]live a wllmlly seH--m.1ffident Hfo, whereau, others milght he so roncern1<c,d with personal indepe11dernce Hnat they fa ii to be jtrnt Still,, both oft these p<ersonalities rnn be thm1glr!Uo exemplify a sped:fk form or type of them.ore genernI "'sepamb.,nesr;,,mientation" to momIHy. And nmsi:der Lawrence Bh1m<"s conternbim1 drnt there aire 11'11non1JJy signllificant: giroup id12mtities" sud1 as one's pimJession, one's etllu1idly or gender, or one's family, local community or nationality, whidh Gilihgan's justice/ caro di:stim:1:ion overfooks (I 994: 244-59). Bh1m is surely correct: thal: agents oHen reflect on these aspect~ of their pewsmmlities in order to ori,:flt their m,oiral achvity or to priodt1ize among competing morn.! responsibilities. B1Jt all of the examples he gives po.int to ways in which peopif,'s connections to some sped fie group of ofoeir pt'opl,, frequently shape thei.r moral om Hook,., tlhal. i',~c, they 1,.ll seem to b,e ep,:!cHk i11shmces of th,c> 1n01*,0 genernl "corn11.ectcdoess••Orientlltfo11" toward mornI Ufo. Sim:11 we have already fon.md reasons to rejed th,'-idea, !hat ag,~n,t,; S"lNote that alU10-ug.h Gillignn**.nevor discm;,m\N any pc)s.s.:il,ilities 0th.er than "jusUc<( and 1\:a:l"{!,n Jtwr mqolidt. daim is only that there airo al least Lwo mo.ra.l orkntaUonH (t•Jee n-r-rp. G;llii;un 198'7). 38 ", I I mrnsl rely on eitlther a separnl:enoss,. oir 11 connedednet,s-orr1ienl:aifon, bun not botlh (recall p. 13, above),, tlhis broader distinction a,llows for at greatt deal of vanial:fon with respect to tlno types of mo1ml pf,rsoinalitnes tlMt achmJ aigt,rrts mlp;ht develop m consciously adopt That is, it enrnloies 1rn lo acknowledge a recognizaUe difference in theme,, withornt Mip;gesting thrnt l:ltere are exadlly and only i'Wo ways of thinling abmnt morality ar~d tl~e etfo1c:all !ifo. apply to a, wide range of moral co11foxl1;,, and to aHow the concepls of justice and care to bol:h play a rol.e within eitlt11el" 11sepa1rateness,-h11sed11 or "conm,eckidness--hased''' morml v1iews. hi addition, it is lnroad e11our;h l:o captuir,,, important similarities in l:he baseline assumpliorni Urnt govern compebng moral theories, even if H1cose theonies also refled different views about the sfrud:urre of moral Ul1(le1rntanding. For exampfo, it a,lllows ultillHmdimism to be cfassified alongside the etMcs of cmre a,s a, .moml thteory that fa grounded i_n the values of interpersonal comi.echon, despite the fad U1at 11hlitarrians and care .. ethiciBl:s disagree ,1boul the role of formal decision procedures in m1, ag!-'rnl:.'s moral tlt1ought 52 In fact, if we temponuily set aside H1e debales about llw role of moral principles 1md rules, JI tlhink we can see tlhal foe the1r111e of hjsfory of westewn 11110rall thm:ight. This fa perhaps most obvious i:in Ow C/Jise of the moderl'l mom] li.~nsfon between kimtians, wl~o ill"'<c' mo.re likely to i111sist tlhHt every pewson is a sepmrate im:lividua.i whos,e rights mnid auhmomy 11noraily \Nays in which the Hfo and welfore of rnny individual will be 1L11exh*icably tied "2 c; _A similar poinl is macl.e by Omno[J, el. a,I. (19%). 39 to the !Jv(c:S am:! welfare of at least Gorn(' olhers. 53 ]3rnt it is mistal""1r1 to think thillt this kind ol' disp11te .is 1necessarrilly linked fo Uwir fmther dispute aboul Uw appn1priarte pface of mom! n1lea, and in Chapleir 'll1ree, we will r,eo lhow the separal:eness/cmmedednoss tension c,rn be used to classify different strnrnds of virtue-efl11irnl (or motivatiion--ba,sed) 1:heorcy as well The pre.%ince of 1:lhis historical leI1sion is my second reason for thinldng that the separateness/ connedednesri distinction makocis Gi1Higrun1s daiim to have identified two distinct moral oriientatimis .... two "ways of t.hi11ki1nig11 about morality that, while not folly compatible, are iin sorne sern,e eqo.rnily legitimate*** significantly more plau.mible. And mt least forr the purposes of normative ethics, I wa11t to suggest lhat it is this more ge11,crnl "'sepaimte11ess/ connededness" i:ern,ion tht1t is the most import,mt one 1:o resolve. I1or altho11gh we have seen that l:lhe conrl:rast belween 'Jiusbn'' a,nd 'caring' fo somewhat problemal:k, (}1illigan's rnrigina.l choke of those! terms certainly seems to have fbeen intended to signify a differrence in their 11,onnative commitme111ls, Morre im,podantiy,, both Gilligan and other camel:hkisti,. see the foct that an ,1gent war, genu1inely committed to ,'nhandng Jfa, good of others, m* to mai111tainl11g her refati.om,.liri.pa with them, as 11ot only 1notivat1ing be1* n:wrad adivily but as ultrimateiy justifying her nrnra.l response* .. that fa,, as expfaining why it is 1rrwrally preferable flo vadous al!Pr.rmtiveo. i\s w,~ have seen, rnre••el:hidsts do not think of this commrihnent flS a commitmeni to specific moral princ.i.pies (,".g., a principle of beneficence oi: utillty). Hut it is,. S3111e emphasiB on: ]11.t.erpnrsorw.l conrn.:d:ion is 1pcrha_pn not as obviou.s .fn the cus<~ of contem_pomry ublu-Larians \Nho frec_p.ie.ntly take up thti _pnsilfon of r.i r1odal Pn.gfr1eer with. a p1uely technical prob:t011r1,. lo he .solved, hut it is evidntit in Uw wotk of dam~_fr:aJ uli.hf.trr{anN wJ1.o adopt tI1.e p,c-\*rsp,c\d:ive of a hcnt!Vokmt npnclal:or. Snci;,. for exart'tpk, John Slnlrrl Mill's dn.lrn that. ulilitarfan morlli°liiLy fa the (-\X_prnssion of"thn d,-$_1.re lo be in union \Nith om* fr.Ji.ow crnal:urP:l' (l86'1: d.1. ~; pa,r. 10). 110 first aml forenwst, a 11ormii1bve claim, and H seems u1111ikel,y th,i,t Gilllig,m woulld h,we created ,.JllHe so 11rnd1 controversy lrmd slie s.imply reported thal won11,en anid men relied on difforent methods of mornl 1lelilberation bllt otherv,dse 1,hared pmdkally identical moral 11ahl<',s, !\,fore genPrcally, it is the fod that people em brace diffore11t normati 11e coi:111 m ibmenls Ota t seem;;, to lead to the m.ost pressing moral conmds, and simflaFly, rn fo the lbm,eliine commit* ment to different values or normative principles tl1at most dP:a1dy i::hffere111l:iates competing ethical U1eories and 11iews (reg,irdfoss of the concephml sl:nuch1res that tl!ose theori,~s pres11ppose or explikWy appeal 1:o).54 Expforing the separatenc,ss/ connedednerm lensio11 in 01ore histo,*irnf1 deta,U wJll he the s111bjed of Chapter 'fluee, where I shrnU in1g,gest that we have no good remmn,. nwral. or otherwfae, to view elfher the vaJrnes of ind.ividual priodty over the other wlthnn the moml or el:hical life.. M.on-• sp,~dficrully, .I shall crnot.end that theories which do give geneml prioriJy to orily one Gd of val11es are obJecbimtabl.y "0111e*-sided," and hence Umt 11eithe1,* of the orie11taUons. GillHgan idenbfied providet1 us with a satisfactory way of thinking about momlity as a whole, FOJ the reasrnrw presented Jin this. dhapter, JI think the conikm pornry Justice/Care Debate iis most pll'ofitably viewed as a specific iln.st,mce ol lhe much mow geneml deba,te about the reh1,tive mornl significance of s,,parn!••* 1*4 ;J -Thiis po:iint has b(-l:(-11r1.rrtr:1.de by Sloto (19-96)1 vvho su.ggesiB Lb.al wht1,Lcwm~ orw thinks of th,e methods Ra,,vls useN Lo arrive at and dn.lln.rr1d. l1i s fo111.ou.s 11d.:iffonmcx.'. pr]nd_pfo/ fhc idea that _jus{ i.nGtit11tions should m11xin:dzo thn *woU-botng of the vvorst ... o.ff 111.ernhors: of ::~odd.y was fll-riktr1z]y new, and tJ1tal-rmwner,;s nrny account as .much as anythl.ng else _for~ ll1c nnon11ous infh.1.0:nce of Rawfa1s wor.k1 includ:i.ng the i111terer,;t in the picture of-' 1r1:11oral ddJb<~ralion !*1c nelH forth, 41[ 11,ess ver~ms cmmectedlless in moral l1ifo. Advocates of the ''dlhi.rn of Jim,fa:e" emphasize the values Qlf indivich.1.al seprnrateness amd defend a pidure of moral m:l:ivil:y that is id I.east implic.itly strm:l:1ued by the imparrtial review and application of moral principles and rnles, whereas aidvocattes of the ethirn of carre give priority to in.terpernona,l connectedness whlile afao ddend1ing; a more v[rtmi--based m:c01ml of moral responsiveness and 1rnornl judgment. Hec<1m;p the jlllstice/ care distindim1 is prQibfomatic i11 the ways mentioned in §J.2, and becamie the arntonmny/cmd.ng distind:ion seems fo Jrncorporate both the ten,skm in v1!1.11e-orl,mbtio11 and the tension in me1thodologicaI slruchire, I shalJ conHinue to refor to H11e debare that grew out of Gilligan's worlk as the autonomy/ cmririg dell:mte. This ~ias the <1ddi1:ionall a,cl11a111fage of keeping us squarelly focused on guesbons about individurnl uwrnI agency. Hut ass1nming I am coned H1at the ,,utonom,y / cairing dehatf, is only iln i.nst1111ee of l:he m,ore general separnteness/ cormech~dness tension, ii: might be now be wondered why I have chosen to focus on this pa1rticular 1instance .. *nw faHure to distinguish the dispute 1we1* formal or conceplual sl:nu:h1refl from the dispute over baseline normatiive commitments has made th<c\ rn,nton01my / caring delbate sig;nifirnntly 11l1I01ce inl.i.'ad:able Hurn it. needs to be, bernm;e p.i11rlidprnrds on both sides tend lo criticize the otfrier ways Hrni are al least slightly confosed. Thr~ very pfaua,ible claims tl:ml: rn,r-e--dhids1s rmake about forrrrnl st:rr.uchnre, for example,, aire' frequently 1rejeded (by defom:lers of autonomy) for reasons tlliat in fad have to do with lhe normative mw* sidedness of caring. And lhe very plausible dainrn 1:hat dcfondc1r't'1 of autonomy make about the va.lues of individual: sepilratem,ss are frequently overlooked (by cm*e-ethicisb;), for reasons t.hilfr in fact lhaw, to do with Uw formal stn1d:mr,~ of those views .. lfodeJrshmding wily Hu~se sorlr, of cribd;;ms 12 foil to hit their 111:1,rnrk wm help to briing the, two sides into a, mow fruitful diailog. And I believe that engaging in srnd, ad ialor; also 1ilhlminab•s lh,, possibiWy of a moire n:mified ethic. For 0111ce we isolate the debate a!,out formal structure, we will] find that ai .rndically v1i.rt1ic-ethirn.J (or "11gent-baried") apprm,H:h 1:o 1nornl deliberation 1is mu1ch mme plrnus.ible H1a1111 H may at fi1rs1 seem, andl even haa cer1:a,in advanrages over both pI'i 11dple--based mid com,equent:irulist nw.ral views, Allld once we 1lsollate lhe debate about val1.11Porientation, we wHl find that His neither ruufonomy, nor cuing, tml. shasing that 1is best d,le to serve as an overarching ethical ideat lFinallly, bernu.se it 1is the pxadical deslire or "WH! to Sha,re" both things ,md experiences wifih other people Ornt 1.1111:imalel.y g11'01.11111ds the goodness of sfoued ,id:iviil:y, we will h,w,, fu1rU1er we,lson lo sus,ped 1fo1Lt a folly adequal:o moml theory will rieed tu be agent--based .. Focusing on the a!ltonomy/ cm'ing debate, hi. oth('f wrnrds, helps !JS to overcome both of the tensions entbedded in lhe western mornlphilosophical tradition via ,m agent .. Jorusl~d '"thic of shmrfrng .. CH.M'fER TWO: AGilNT*,,JllASED VllR'I1Ultl lETJUCfl, AND THE liDEAl OF CARE In Chapter One, 1 su1ggesledl H,al the ni,nceptmd strud:me of the "can•* orienfa,l:no1111 c,rn be <":xplirnted mrni,t de:arly witbi11 a. vfrlue-ethkal approach 1n moral theory, and in tMs chapter,, I want to de1I1ormtrate wby T beHPve this fto be tlh.e erni;e. I begin by distinguishin!'; betw!':en ',11gent .. focused' and 'age11t based' approadh.es to 11i1rtue.-dfocs, bemuse the lat!Er approach seem,s best aibie to iilumilllate the distinctive cliai1rns of contemporairy rnre-ethidsfa. All virfo.eetlrikal 1Jh.eorfos seek to explain aind justify nnornl, pol.itical arn,d/rnr ethical ideals in terms of fod:s about d1a.1rrnder and the irmer Jifo, hut w herrea:, a,genJ .. foc11sed appmrncher, e1mdeavor In flesh out: 011r uncforstandfog of what [t ls to ad nightly by providing 111 ll'khly psychologicrnl description of 1mornl agency, age1*it--ba1sed appmrnches im1fot lh.d the moraI sb!.tus of various (types 01) aids. can be Lmd~•rstood ,is being entirely depend,,!1111: on lihP 1Jinorcall v,1,I1w o.f 11,ll"iou1s human n-1.oUva,hons and traits of dHuacteir..5!; After defending the impliica1fons, of ,in agent-based approach against a nmno1ber of possible crr*ilidsrnrn (many of which }mve 1.tbo been made agai1m1l lhe conle11rnpomry ei:hirn of rnre) T demonstrate how an 11,gent ..based ethic of caring overcoJnes a m1m ber of diffin1Jties lfla,t illl'ise for I.he more "rellational" approaches conteinponi:ry rn1rcethicists have lended to prefer. 5!5:Here and olsewhorn t trnn th.(~ lm~.m 'rnoral sLalltrn1 m, u catch--1J!lf to rdr!I' Lo Lh('. hroad range of morn ( .. -t11dion ca h:go:r-iiesr imdu di1n.g: at. 1<:ast wrong/ imp(-H'1TdRs1ihler "'ig:ht/p(:rn1.im,;ibh\ (b1rn1L not .nncrn-marily 11nohfo11 or particularly good), good (but .not .n<-:*cessa,rily rnqu.1rnd), had (bu.t 1r1.ot rm'\cemmrily :ir.n permissibfo), obl*iga1lory1 and R"Upen:rngalory /nohfo/flnr., Simlllarly, w.h.011 l' _rrefi,!r to the 1rnoral value' of molivns orntd charnclt 1.l" l:rraii.t:'i\, [ l1:• WH in mrdnd cntC!fJ,Orfo,".i Hkc evil1 vid.oUBr h1ul, good, vfrLum.Hl1 and adm:11.1.rab.k~. But ,ve wUJ soon s,ie that an ag~!1t1L* based nthic om also mal<.f! the fine-grti1i:H_ed isUncUons thns-i:::: rnore didalfod calegorim, pn:f.mpp-o,w. 14 The llJPShot of the present chapter will be lh,rn ,m ethic of rnñ rn1rmot be rnjected on the bas,is of ils formal or n1ethmfofogkali stmd11!"f, aJorw, l:ly itseU, however, this is nol eno1.1gh lo slhow thrut am ethk of care is wholly satisfactory, for we fo1ve seen Um 1. tlhe autonomy/ ci1:riil1g debate also stems from ru pervasive 1:ensio11 irnr vahlie"**orienlatJicm. Expforiñ; that tension wiH ll,i lh,e las!< of Clh.aptew Three, where I shall contend lhat botJh ",5epm•afoness*, based"' and "connedion-bau,e,i"'' moral theories (induding an agent .. fbas,,d ethk of cmre) provide us with an objedionabiy one*Bided conception 01 nrnrnlity ru111d the <,l:hicad life. And 1:hat will set the siage for me to demonslrntc, begilu1ing v,ri1:h Chapter I;our, how an agent,based ethic of sharimg; 1is able lo connedtedness te111sfon, thereby pmvidi11g us with a mud11 ITwre philosophically satis.fying way olf thinking about mmru.lJ1ty. But first, we need to get clearer about the merdts of an agent*•based approach. 2.'.ll I'v,roi tywes oJf wfur11:oie .. e01tilr,,nli l:hernry Most ccmtemporary virl:lle-ethids1:s Jhave followed Aristotle, who clearlly beliieve,5 that it 1is impossible to unde1mt1cml 111otions like l'ir;Mm!flS and oblligatiot1 without 1mderstamding tho wayr, in whklh 11arious sorts of addvity 1,1.re cmrnl:itutive of the overall excellence of an ind1ivid1lal agent, therPby enabling the virhiot:ns agent to "flourish" ow live w,dL56 Accord!og lo lds Nicomacherm Ethics, a pr:mml acts nlghtl!y if she or he does whait a vfrl:u1ous person wuuld do in 1:h(, ci1rc11mslances, and more importantly, does i:hP adion as a vill'hwus pe,*so11 wo11ld do 1it _,. that is,. if she or he perforrms the f!ctioo in l"f ,J J'nie liLerahtre _heñ iH vasl, hut l havo in 111.ind Lbinkers likP 1--lurr-,lhot.rnn (199-J; 199b; 19%), 1\/urn;houm (1986), Shnrman (1. 991 ), Sfotn (1992; huL nolcr, that Slolo has since, bocm working on "'f\<,n!o,basCld apprnachos), and .in mm>! oxplicil.ly polilirnl conl.cxlB, Galislon (1987) and Madn!yre (19811; 1988), the right way, wUh tlhe 1dghl feeling, and for tlhe righl r<°',J:Stm (I 'I 05hS--8; l 11J6b20,,-22;: l109b27--?:9). hi add1ition, Ariblntle inr,,J1s1B that a, r;igrnificarnl pai'l of the va1l11e: of right adfoni lies in the fad that engaging iin m,ornl acUvnty expresst~s m' achnaliz,es the viirtmms pPwsm11s iwmeninosl ci1rau"ader ('I '1'0ba2:8, '.-\:JI),, with the resrnll tbat this vah1e cannot be whoUy cfo8l1royed if the ildion foils to achievo its intended 1re,mHs. Truly "fine" action can thereforr: 0111Jy h,! explrnined, on hiis vJtew, by u~eol"lies whid1 make reforenc,i to stru111dardr, of 1inner mffed as well as to stamfards of exterrnal comllud. Yet Anistolk rnlso allows thal: properly guided or momenfarily 1lnsp1i red im:lividuafa nm sometirn,es perfoIT'lm right ads even tlhough the agenls Hwmselves an-' 1nol (hnllly) virhwu1s (ll031J14,,,?J; -110,,,fa34--l:13),-and he frequently d1c11eadi,ri;,,~s lhcvil'hious person as the one who se,?s rnr perceives what is right in a,ny given set off dircumsbrnces (lW9b15,,23; 112:6b4; -1142a2:3-30). _A11d these llaUcr comrmmls, suggest that even ainongr.t the pe1rfoctly vfrtuo1w, the nighnncs.o of a perso111,; actions Vlrill depend on fadors ilia! are in some sens,~ externali l:o, or Jlnde•• pendent from, tJnie goodness or exceilemce of the pernoni's character. (The peFceptual metaphor, in pa1rt:icufar, seems to imply this.),S7 To be sure, Aristotle does not say very much about what the independent slamlard of rii~h!:ness is, and he irepea,1:edly de111ies that it is possible to dislirigu1sh right act!; from wrong mws at some albstrad and general level. Huit !his m_ay slem nmre from his connnil:meinti; to the parrtkulariam of morfll: judgme111t ami the incominensurabilily of moral va,lues than from the view that the righlner,s of an c1d:ion is dependent 11pon the virtuous inner d1an1cter of the agent w lio pe1_forms it. When Aristotle tells u,ns faat we must becorrw 11irt11ous if we want to be rnble to ad righl;Jy, 1it does not seem to be lbece,usc, assumilng WP arc 57sec, McDowdl (19'79) for an approacl1 that laker, tl:,fa m,,Laphor quil:" seriously. 46 suffessfol irn acbievi11g inne1r vir!ue, we will then be ruble to co11(er a spedall kL1nd of moral 1mlne 011 the rnd:ions we choose. Rrnther, it is because 011ly afb!r we !have achieved 1inner virtue wrn we be in the posHio11 to wecogni7P whrnn morally problematic sihrn.1:imw al'ise and delibemt,! effecti'vely acbout wltai shonld be dollle in foen11.58 I am not convfoced Uml: any of U11is makes Aristoltfo's conception of aUribul:ed to him, foorngh I s11sped: tlmt how one views this issUle will ,fopend, in large pm*t, ot1 what ome wants 01r e;q:,eclls a mora] theory to do.!>9 Hut I shall not explore those issues liere. l\!][y poinl is simriply fhat in am Arisfoteliarrt apprnad1, pf:rsonal virhie alone does rwt 91,1He explain or determine l:he fightness (or "nobilily," in the cm,e of actions that are espedally Cine) of an lim:liividual's ads .. For this reason, skeptks about 11i1ttK' ethics Jhaw: long. b,,en convinced tha1l: while ill l:heo1y 01 virtue rnrny bf' a11 importrnnl: suppi,,n1(,nl: to a theory of right action (for example, one th,d enriches 01.ir underntanding olf why some people awe bel:ter al: making right choices tha111 othrnrs,. and lho1t helps w, to Lmdersfamll the poi.mt of mon1I acllivity fmr.n a personal poi11t of view}, it ca1mot flllll)I explain whatit ls a:lbouh::ertai11 (types of) adiom, tbiat makes tilom right m obligatoiy, amd so ca111not servo as a froe--s1a,mlillg apprnach fo ethicali theory as a whoie. BUil Arisfot]e's approad1 ils a1ri~1mbly not. the most rndical or p1ue form of virtue ethics that cam be articulated, and 58 AristotJn .hims.dJ _may not he as fuHy corit11mHJ,~d to 1xn ohj8cUvJsl position or1 rnoral v&hies as lhiH phr:a1s:ing s1nggesto,, But the paHsag,~n, jm,l dted. d.o ~mggesl n, and _puWng ii. Lhis -way hd.ps h} sharpnri the co11.lrm~l; helwe{m (rougMy) 11 Artr~Loleliar,(" and "'agnnt-basod" m.orti.l views. S9i_n: particulairr it \Nill dep~-:nd on t:vhefher ono nxpncls a Yirno.mi thern-y Lo provide an explicit tfodtJicw, p.ti'.'oceduim capable-: of gonera.tintg n singh-:* nmi.wer Jn responsn lo any r;pecifi( cur~c, *For d.isc1.msJ.on1 s.e:*,-~ Armcw ('199'.i), (1.HpedaHy pp. 3 .. -10, 108•"ll5 1 and 4<'9*4bS; !-hrrrsthom~c~ (1991), pp. 2?,'1--13; t\lusshuurn (1985; 1988), and Sherm,m (1989), esp. Chaps. ).. . 3, 17 following contempornry lthinkern Hke Michael Sfol:e and ]iorge Garcia, I want to sup;gest tl1.at it is in fact possilble to 111:CToal the mornl rnr (!Lh1ical sfal.us of acl,s as entirely derivative from inr.lependent and firndamen,tal ethkaJ/arehiic foct9 (or claims) about the mohves,. dispositions or inrner life of the indh1id1rnis who perfrnrm them.''' (Sfo,te 1995: 81-; See rnlso Slote ] 998; Grnrcfo 'I 990; *1992)60 li1 order to m1,dernlrn11dl the rontnmt that I ]have just b1~en drawing, His 1lm1ri,or-tant to be dear that ,m agr~nt---based approach is a l.ype of vi1rtue-ethi1ral theory that makes a very spedfic dairn ii bout the !lillli.nre of om* most bask, ev@Iuai:ive j11dgments in !he! an'a of mon1lity. In a, dfocussi.on of recent jpap,•rs by Slote arnd Garcia, JuHa Dri11c;r has suggeslled that "expechl,biHst" vernions of 1.1tilitarianism might be described as agent-bas,ed (since expedalio1n1 is an inner state of a. moral agent), even though they are rwl: virtue•c,!thkaJ (since' the mo1rnl valm• of th@t .tinner st\111:e is u,n,derstood in terms of uWHy, and utibity ju1dgmenl:s aU,idh to the consei:p1ences, of motives or actions in the <!xternal world •*-that is, to the states of rnffmi.rn tbat 1:lhe motives in quesfam cm1 be* reasmrnbly expected to prnduce) (Driver 11995: 28lff), Hut to arrg!le in this way As Ddve1* herself 11111akes d ar, it is utility judgments that are doing the hulk of the exp.1,matory wm*k in a,n expedabiHsl appll'oadh: they are the most bask eiemenh; of 1:fo,, theory, ,md in the llast analysis, it .is those utility jrndg;ments that 11lt!mately en,atlJl,J 1w to expltrnin and identify both whkh (types of), imwr states all'e moimHy 111irhmus, and which (types of), illdions aire moraJl,y right. Hence,. the soli't of theory she has in miind does not trrea,t tl1t, moral sl:ah1s of 601 shaI( not p!i:tcn particutnir mnp}w.sfs on t.be fod that charadorj:1;aUonr, of agn*nls amd tJ.1(!fr l.'l'tol:.ivos arn typically nrebJiic n:i1Lhn.rl" than deontk h(-\Clmse, likn* Carda ('1990:: A§.?<~) aind .'.i-loU'.* 0992: ch. 10)1. I an11110l co1lv.inced Lhat Lhn lalh:r concepts arc of a f1.mJam0-.nlally differc,nL kind !hen the former. i ads as «:fo1rivdive from imdependent j11dg.ments abar~1: tlw goodness, excellence, or admirnlbilHy of an rng,mt's charadc,r or motivation,, and rm ,11'(, not flf;ent-ba.sed in the i*elevant (and dearly 1/Jl.rt11e-el:hkal) sense. 1l1m* similax ñasmis,. krnntiim1 rrnorilll H1eor1ies do not seem to b,-J compl,etely agenb-lrn1sed. To fã smre, kanlians typ1irnHy i111sfot tlhat then' is S()mc kind of connection between the "motive of d1Jty11 and right 11ction, that the duty n:wbive possesses a special k1in,d of morn!! 11a.h1,~, and hence that no ,iclfon cam have m01ra! wmth unless H is doine from the motive, of dl!ty, Hut l:lw spedal value of the duiy motive is not chairnicterized, w1ltli1ln k111nllian moral theory, in ill way that is independe,nt and fonda,mentaL Rrui:her, it is characforized .in tl;rms, of tit<?. mm*aJ agent':; 11r,,sol11e11 or 11ro1ilnmilffwnl.11 to acting m, morality re911JLres no matte1* what her oth1er mofrwes and ind1inrutions may be; as Marda Ba1ron puts it, the 11definiii11e featm'P of someone wlm ads frotn duty is heir commitment to doing what she really orngM to do" (Haron 1984:: 58; see Herman J993 ch, l; Hill 1995),, !But U1fa 11111,de1*standi11g oftlhe duty motive p1*est1pposes some furl:h,i:r concciptio11 of whai the agent "really oug:ht to do," which K111nt alms to provide with his 11111rious for1nufa1:tion1s of the Caitego1ica1 Imperative, aind whklh conte11np01rary lkantfans typicaily interpret as 01i1ly those specific (content-filled) maxims thail: wcmid pass the: rntegodcal i1npernt.i11e test In both cases,. it is the fact thad ,rn ap;ent is com.miUed lo arting on rn certain kind of moral principle tJrnil explimlns why the ''moUve of duty" 1is espedally, 111:ornHy good,. and wMie mere or accidemtilJ acnlnfance with moral principles may not be 9111.Ue enough 11111 rnrder l:o (explain which adion1s have genuine 1moml wmth (aclfons must also express th,? ag1mt1s genuine commit,* ment lo OJI' possession of "llie Mrnrnil Latw withi1~11),. independently p;rounded moral piinciples ,He crudal 1:o the kanba1n e)(pfonab\on of which typ1's of 49 adnons are mo.raTIIy r1ight61 Indeed, Kant himself alllowu tba,t a111 ai;,mt rnn do wt1at is right even wii:hout peirfrnrmfo,g the ad from the motive of duty. H may also be 1.1seflll to disl:nnguish between a 1virtu.11e l!!\-!(J,D!'. and a 'virtue etfoc,,' as Roger Crisp has recenny done (19%: Imtrodu,tim1). The former prmjed: imrolves givilllg t!ither a d(escdp1:ive, psycli,ologi.cal account of wh,it the virtues an,, 1in g:eneral (e.g., Ari1,lotlle's a,rgument (Nicomachean E/:hics Ill: 5) that virrt1Jes are motlvati.onall "states of the soul" rath,er th,rn mere passions or facull:ie:s),,. m* an analysis of what dlistt\11:guishes one pall'hcul.m* virtue from another (e.g;., explaining how compassion diffo1rs from benevo'" Jenee, or integrily from a sense of justice), ]fol: the laUer prnjed involves giving a ~,ormal:ive rnr prescriptive accmm! of which (set of), virh1es we mighl to culltivate and act from, and explaining why thosr~ virt1.11es are s1thka!Jy superim* to, others. Of cour1,e, the adegumcy of any virlue--ethic wHJ d<TH>nid, i-n 110 small memmre, on the pla1rnibility of Hs (implied) viJrhm-theory: a11 ethk recomm.end ing we act fro11111 virtues that, on any rfausible descidptio11 of their nature,. are prad:iimlly impossibk-; for creatures Hike us to m:bieve, would be hir;hly suspect IVliore tlurn.portamtly, the nahue of one's viriue lh,~nry wi.111 detefl'mine wheH1,1~r or not 011e:1s vilrtue--ethk cam indeed be ag;e1nt-based,. Crl'isp 61c:ontnm.pon:rry kantiar1B havn :in.c:rcDsingly wanh-~d to emphuHin: Lbat l:l'.1,~ fad. l.h.ai. an agent tvas .moli.vaf:<-~d Tt1y duty is sn'l.don1 s-uffidnñ to t:*xpla1i1n *why (or whntl1er) she* a-.d;ed dghHy, i.nsisUng tl1.at other mothH:s 1:r1:.ay work alongsJde tb-.e duly motive and Tin,t1y lw crucial to many s01cl:s ofmoml activity (Herman 199'.{: d1, 1; Baron '1984),. Ami Llwy have even allov,r,-~d lhal tho-n-~ fr, 11f~ometbing rept1gru:1nt1*1 al,ou.t corl..ain 111H:1.yr-f of &ding from the nr1;_0Uvo of duly if it.is not suppfomernl.ed hy fud.her molives (Ibid.:. 41\). Hut Lhey i\ns.iflt !hii,L I.hose forlhe1* mol:hmN CDJnnof-. nrnke L.ho action dght 1111.nfosB lhe du Ly 1motivn* (j.P:.1 t.he 1('(\qu.i-d.lE-!* cornmilmcnl to ad.ing: Oli'.l. pl"ir1idy)fos Uiat '[JBBS Hw catogoisi.ca] in1po.ira:Uve tesU;) if;, ah:;,o prosnnl. l\f,;u1;cy Sherman has rm.ni.11.ded mn that i( one e:m_phtrn.i:;rñ t+w,L [Jw various fo.rmu.Ia..Uons of tho Categorical lmperativ,: are su.pposod tto be p1dnc:llpfE:& of an agent's nw111 1x:lwon,, r<nnUans seem a1J-fo* lo a Hy Lhmnsdves ,-:ve:n rnoñ dor.K!l,Y with vi.rt:tw•--elbdcal approad1<-;s. B-ut a fu.Ily t11p;ent0,,bas,:d. a.pl)rouch nir,;lBIB Lh(1: r-;ug,ger-:Lio.n that being rnor,11ly vveH rn.ol:h1aiLed can a[ways (and only) be understood aF~ a 1:naUor of ading Otl prtnd,pl.(!. /j() contends that one might en1brace: a consequenl:ia:Hst 11irh1e•theory, and ye! sbl.1 espouse a, "virtm,-bi!sed'' ethic (Ibid,,:: 4),. b,1t he must mean w!MI: ll 1rm.ve called an 11ã;er11l:-focused11 or Adstoteliam ethk i11 tMs case, si11ce a theory that teHs. us we mornily ought to act fn:nm certai111 virtues, and yelc identifies those virh1es by l,he conae91uem:e:s Hwy prodm::e,. would not nrrnke adiio1n eva,Jurnlfon '3ntin'ly derivative frmn independent rngent,,evaluafo::mr,. As with the s1.1r;v!sti1111 . by Drover discussed above, Crisp's suggestion woulld nr,ake action eval1.iabo111 so would be a consequential.ist momI 1:heory at the deepest oir 1nos! iur11da• mental level. fo other words,, at.lthout;h the distinction I have !been drawing between agent.focused and ag;ent*brused elhkall theories is fir:st am] foremost ru cl isti11di1on within idhe a.rem of vitrh1E' ethics, there ,ue cerfikiin constn1:ints on the approad11 .. Tfrne virtu1es thrnt gmt.md such an mpproach will have to foe undernlood ,ls being inl:rinsically ,ul mtrnlblle in a way thrnt cannot b,, fully captured lby the consequcmces they produce or lly rnny pr.indples to whkh they coirnfonn,. Whrnt makes agent--foised theoriies h.ighly di:itim:tive is the daim Iha! mu jrn:lg1rr1ents dlout: the 1norall rriightness or wro11gness of acbions uLlirnaldy resl on our Judgments about what sol"fa of rumhves and chrnrader traits count as vilrtrnes, where Umse virtue judg.ments rnn:, not thougM tn be l:n1sed on any fo1ctheI* evrnh1ative 11otions, This does not mean that virtue jLndgment~ vviH not be dose.ly,. conceptm1l.ly Hnked l:o other eval!ua11:ive judgments, .i.nrh1!:ling jm:Ugments .i]iornlt rip;ht adion; the Aris1otelian and the a1genl:-.J:1asc,d virlm• ethicist crnn ag,,ree tlu1t one of ~he best ways to dari:!y a,nd reftm, mu* mndersta11~di11g of i:he vfrbws fa to th1i11k about the kinds oJ adions tl'rnt ,rn agt>nl who 51 ' I i possessed vrurious mol:1ives and charader traits wmild in fact be disposed to pi,irform (Giiircia,. '1990), Nor d(ws an ngent-lrmsed appniadh necessariJi.y imply thrnt: the cenl:ml t11sk of mnoral lhe()Jry is to enable us fo mak,~ accrnrate assessn1ents of othe1* people''s motives, mr fo m,ete out praise and hllain,e, rat/ri:er than to lt1elp us determine how we shouk! act ,rnd to help us see what shollld be involved in our fornt person deH!Jernlions a,bmdwhat to do (Ibid . .), Here again, the agent-hased virtue theon\st might well agree with l:he Aristotelian (and a great many otheJ"s), llliat the goal of moral theory is to enable us lo become more effodive moral] agent~ in tlhe practical. worlld,62 lBut an agentbased ethicist will insist tlu,t in the last a,nalysis, "mets can Ile righl or 11v1roni~ gnly loeca1i11,p Uw,y express virtuous or vidom, attil1.1Jes11 or rnotivalions (Gmrdai '1992: 2:4J),. and hence that identifying which sods of motivalfons arc virrt11es is both necessruy and sufficient to explain when and why partirn Jar actions mre right As we have seen,. this da1im Is no', one that AristoHe is dea1rl:y comn1itted to .. Yet this does seem l:o lbe a drnim tfrn,t contern1porary care*ethidstr, are likely to find congenial, for as we saiw i11 Clrtaipter One (esp, §1..3) "an ethic of caring locates morality prima,rily in the pre .. •11d co11sdousr1,('SS11 of the 1nnornl agent (Noddi1ngs 1984: 24),, And since purely "ar;ent .. foar,ed" conceplicms off ethks ,ue a foilrly mire phenomenon i1r1 wesb:!rrn 1nornl philosophy, recognizing l:hJ\s afliintilly makes It even ,iasil'r to undershrnd why ca.re-ethicists lmvi? wanted lo rnlly l:hemselves ,1:i~aii1ns1: moñ lTaditional morn} vi:evvs. 62,That A.rfololfo1s virtu,-: ethic if; 11ultimatnly prncHcaJ11 iH en1phar~_izod by Shti_r,:nan (1991 ). S2 2,2; 'Ihe foi:m,d i,b•r,11d1mne 1»f aLg1imLt•lb>m,erll wiewB AIH101.1gh t inl,ell's like Phl1to, Hum.e, Nietzsche, Augustine and even :Kant all make the cha.meter of an ,1getd's rniotivatiot1 al least fornfamental!Iy relev,ml to the evalualion of H1P agent 1s ads, eacfrl seems to rely orn fu rtber evahiahve rnssmnptions. i111 rnrdler to specify what typ<c:N of rnctions rnre m1.onillly right. Me:crnwhile, ilh,i demrest hislrnrical example of an entirdy agent .. ,based view•** that of the 19th cenhff)I thi1nker James MaFtineau ..... is fam1iliaJ' to mor;( contemporary philosophers, Hal aII, only becam,e he was so dfecUvely critidzed by He1rnry Sidgwkk in The Met'hods of Ethics (1907: 366--'72). 'Ihis might Ibo?: taken ms evidence th.it ag;ent--bas.ed thinking must somehow be flawed:: th,H it rests 01:1 excessively complex or mwfable gmunding asr,m1np .. tions, or tha1i: it inevitably faHs l:o ruccount for at Ierust sorw? of the moral jrm:lgnmenl:s that we make. Htll: in dlelte1rminini~ whether or not this is so, the• c1mcirnl questiion lo be aslked is w hetlrner we lha11e auy l"ea1;o11 to accept ad1.litilorml assmnptiions abou1l:what it is tlhat "m,akes rigJ1t met.ions right" ulmn to rest on omr most cmw1idered judgments about the intrimllk ,u-imirnbility of various mol:ives (or, spea.king ,d a somewhat mon, mbstract level,. ideals of morali character), Jin what follows, I sha,111 c01ntenid that we do not As we will see, the mdequacy of any agenlA)ased ethic will ultimately depend orn tlhe pfo1.usibiility 1Jf its daii1ms ab<mt which 1ypes of 1motival:ions axe (most) morally admimble, as well as th(e crediloiH1!:y of its depiction of wlhat agents are doing wh,~n they rnirnifest those motivatim1s tluot1gh the actions they perform .. Nonetheless, there are a oumber of conce1ms about thfr, w,1y of thinkinf; about 1morality that m1ight iu*is(~ e11e11 i:f om* is in com plet() aign•(•mvnl with rn specific (set of) claim(s) about Hie intrinsic admirnbillitcy of ce!'fah1 charader tra1its and rm:,,U11ati.m1s, ami\ so J want to respond to those more 53 pur,dy formal objections lbefrnre explorilllg the implicdions of am agn1t-ha,sed ethic H1at fo groi:mded in H,e ,ideal of care. fo order to fadHh1te my discussirnn a1: various poilllts, I sh11,ll occas.ionallly speak as though a motive like benevo., lence or mre Is the (;n!y moml vidue, or as thot1gh rn motiv,~ Hke malevofonce or re,5entbrnenl: Is the only morn,l vke. But by Ute end of U1fo chapter I hope to have demonstrated that a folly developed age11.t-lba1sed dhk rn!f'd not be committed to such overly simplistic assrnmplfons al:m11t om mm-al psychology (see especially §§2 .. 4-2..5). 2.3 l'Jhiree i[nl(lr][HM'lti1.,1Llt idlisthid:irnas If we accept th,~ idea. that evaihmtions of adfons a.re ''!ntk,dy depemforit on independent and prfor evaluations of rngenfr/ moti1vatnoi-m,. there aro: h,vo somewlrmt d1lsh11rbing condusim1s that 1m,igbt imm,edfol:ely seem lo folllow, Th,, first is Hw1t om:e we ha1ve determined a parUcu.lla.r pemoim lo be mrnrally virt11ous, we will them, be committed to the view tlhat any arid c>very adion lhat person performs will automaticaUy count rm moraUy right; a condusfon whkh v,rould be implruusible insofar as it suggesls fba1t mora.Hty places 1110 real cm1sb"ainl:s on iJ1,d1i11.id1ml adnvHy, or Uhat all that 1iI' re91ufred in iH'der lo m,ed the demands of m,omHty is lo gd oneself into the right state of mi ind, And the second! is that unless an individ1rntl is pedecHy well--moHvated, an agent-based ethic conrnnits us to the view that he will be cmnpldely una.lbfo to do whrut he 011ght; 11 conclusion v1hich will be disconcerting to mainy people insofar as it contirnvenes the widely hekl principle of ''ought im.plies can,." Howeve1r, both of tlhese objedfom; m1erfook two imporlant distinctions that He at the core of any r1gerrnt-based e!lt1.itc, and one strand of the "ought i1npHes rnn" ohjed:io-11 overllooks a1 thiird. 54 The fiirat is a dfatim:t1ion between virtues a,nd mere impudses.,. passilons or feelings. As the ,mcie11t philoso)Pheirs ,imphasiz,ed,. the fornwr ,ire 11rn0Uva, tional ~I!!~~; they incorprnmte botb affective a,nd cognitive dimenofons, and so dispose the agent who posses.5es them to ad in specific ways when Um relevant sHmi.Uons a:rise (Armas 1993: Ch. 2).63 When we descrribe a mo1rnl ag,~nt as henievoient, for exaimplle, we are not simply saying Hnat he! or she icS the sod of person who is pleased by imprrovemenl:s in other people's welfarre and trm1 bled by theilr mfoforhme11,. orr who expe1r1i.ences a p,mg of grief m* remo1rne when confrornted wil:h a concrete case of !human suffel'ing. Nm* are we: simply aicknowledi;ing Hial: the agent has peirformed or iinevitably will perform some specific aicl:ion on behalf of othei* peoplle. R,itbex', we ,u0 altdbuUng fo H1e agent a certain kind ofprad:i.cal. aUitm.le m desire: a felt concenri for the good of others which directs b:is atteintion to l:he situation of other people, and disposes him to i]lis.t ini ways that cont:JCibu1:e to ol:hen;' well being. This means that the benevolent agent wHI talke facts about the Iev,~I of welJ-.. bei1ng of otheir people info aiccmmt in determining what he should do ill any partindmr sitllatfon. F[e will not foil to notice when hEi encmmte1rs (in ordinary drcu1mstances), another person, who is in some kiind of distress, and he will respond to that pernon in wimkver nrnnner best enables him to alleviate the other's su1ffo1rlnr;-In other words, the pc'rnori who is gemJi11dy benevolent .is the sm-t oi person who is adively awc1re of tbe sihiatirnn of otfo:'r 63*n1e Stoks "1.umt Lo nq-uat:e virtirne and *ret1i_r.:1,on, a:nd so rnay hf! said to d.m1<i1nplay the ai.ffocUve (.lim.mision of moral *rnrrnt:nvatio.11. But si.nce thni.1'.' argum.nnt "is based. o.n Lht:* need for a rational Lrai:insfo:r11n1atio111 o[ the rn:rwHons in ordPrr to <-:*nm.:im~ tLlw.t lhe obj(-~d.s of 011:r a.ffodions arc sl:ahle and w-~ll'.1uinoly woithvvhile, il d.008 not soem that they Dl"n d.en.yi"ng Lhn role of affod ttltogntho:r. At IJ11c! sarrn-~ lim.e, it is IDOR cfo.ar th.at Lbny cai:n accurately account fo-r the role o( lhe moral n1notforn}, as W{: wil.l sec .in Chapter Thn-i:e. 55 people in the world, who fo influenced by that aw11re11ess, and whose ,1d:icms refled: the fad that he ~;e1minely desfres to see, otheir people do weJJ.64 Once we recognize this,. we ca11 see tlmt to desciribe a peicson as benievolerrut is already_ to say thrnt there ,u*o cc,I*tai11 cr:mstlmints on fbat penion'~ adiviiies: givon the natmre of hfa 011 her m0Uvat1ionall sf:afo, Hie benevollcnt. person's choices about what sorts of aids to peirforrn wlilll lie rom:1lil:iom)d,. in lllO small 1rne11snue,. I,y beliefs about how those actiom, wi.lJI affect the welll .. b,•ing of others, as well as by considera1fons alio,u1t Jh.is or her own resources,. abillities, and so forth .. 6!5 And U Is the presence of tlhese sorts of iintornal ccmstraints thal Gilligan sought fo call people's attention to when she s11ggesled lhat forn1aIPs are nwre ]likely lha1n males to exhibH a range* of psychologkai trrnits -** i.nduding se*nsiltivity to the needs of p,H"tkularr other persons, a heighh 0 ned awareness of hn.1man frmiity and vn.1lnerrn.bihty, f.b(e desil'e to provide others with emotional support and nurh1rnnce, and a genernl plladng of value on lhe establishment and m~iintemmce of hnm,m relat1°onshi\ps -•* Hmt receiw, snrn, aUenlion in the nwst influenl:i1al lheorj1c;s of morallity aml. morn I. de11elo1rrnn1ernt (1982.; 1987).66 Perhaps morre .irnpm*t.l'mtly, wl1ctle ills true that those con* sl:Jrnints mre properly described as operating on the agent "from w.i.1:hirn" (itf she were not so lbenevolet1t,. she would not lbe troulDled by lhe plight of others and 645cc, Blum (]980) .for a much fuller uccrnml of I.Ix, fK>rt of pcmon l have in min<l .. f'' -~-'The fact that an !'l1genPs hrJfo.fs a.re :involved r*a1isr.H irn.porhmt; q_um;U.ons a.bout the :relu!:iom;.Jri.p het1flC:)en practical wisdon1:. and .moiral virtue that/' mnfortllllnatn!y, wou lid fake ffW too for* a:ffo]d to [11ddrem,; flu.Hy. Fen* niasons Lb.at will Q.m_ergc tlffou:~hout the~ mmainder oJ thfs diit.mert.ation 1 h.owev(:r, I tblflk it is a rrrisfJ:11ko Lo fm:n.p fro111 [*lrfs roali:11tUnn t.o 1.hP conclusion that wn can 1M.mess llw: :mo.ralH:y of adions without rnfr~ñncn lo Ll1t: affod:ivc\ dinH>1<1slon of the n1ot1vaUonal r;fatPs that producP Rhem, or that hc-\Jin.g t11:1,.oral]y well-Tnotivat.e<l emmnLlalty hn-Hs dow11 to uliliz.ing thn *dghl sorL of .rationa.l d11oi.ce procnd urn re:gardfosr.1 of vvhat. Oli'K! 1r:; ai.lU.ln.n.dien c1nd _fo*n.iiingr, Tt1n1.ay be. 66cf .. lB[mn (N94: lf'arl 111) for-a, defonsc, of Gilligan's cfoim I.hat Lhnsc l.ndl.s shouJ:d he vie•.1ved tts disU:nclivnly rnoiral qualilties. 56 wo11,kl not ford the need to Jrespond accordingly), 67 tlhere fa no rre/llson to think thlllt llln ,1Lgent-based tl1t~ory js commiltled to the view lhat every action a benevolent person dor~s willl m1fomatirnUy be mrnrally wight Cmciaily, thfa woulcl b,~ tJrm, ev,~n ifwe were folly convirn:ed that b<~nevo.lence wais tho oml1y ad:fom;., Assuming onJy the minimal degrH'i of fre,:•*•Will compatibilism thai seems necessaury before any mom.I theory rnn get off the ground!, t,ven an exfremely vil'ium:ns person will be capable of pedorrn.irng, amJ may ,~ven choose to pell'form, actions tfod fail foHy to exm111pl':fy, exhibit, rn, express I.hill ilnnell' virtue in the external worlldl. Of course, l:here ilre numy different reasons why this may be the case,. some (b11t not a,H) of which rnrny rnrnse us to queshon our original assess1ment of the agent'b' motivational state .. But what /is important for my purposes llere, is l:o see that even when, we are entirely justified in describing an agent as brmevolent (Le., even when our jud:gmenl 1:hat she does in fact possess an admirable inner sLffte is e111:ireiy accunrte), we are not thereby com.miUed hJ tl1e ,fliew that all of the agent's ,ictions wil.J have the 1mme mom! status., 'This 1is beca1rne an ag.ent-bas,"d virl:Lle dhk can rnnd shm.1lld adknowledge that not all of 1111 agent's adions will nrnnifest the moral value of tbe age11t's inmeir stat:e fo the same degree. U she vol11ntee1rn t:en hmm;. of l:imP e~ch i,veek torn local i,oup lkil:chPn, for, f,xrnmpie, she wm exhibit more 67s.(oh-~ notns that even this metaphor rm;lisl h0i La_k(-'.l'I w:i.tJ-1 cauUon: tJ1:c; 11'fil" b(!Lvveen an agen.r:1*~1. bnn<-~vo[ence and the trig'lr1tnm;H of h1B actions *In not. aU 11on.n•-\'"laty11 (in Uw di.nx:lion fro_m agont to world), because thn ugent. coufd not. be 1111.eaningfo Uy d(\scribed as benc)volenl i( h.o was not 1.nfltwnced hy cn:rtai.11 foa:tu:rcs of tho vvoirld (1995: 85---7). S7 ben,evolence than if she gi.ves a irnmaH amount of pockel: change to a homel:ess characterize l:he form,er action, as nwrnlly better benrnse ifi mrnre folily e)(lrnibils the agent's morallly good motivation. 68 Jn addition, since the agein& will presmmibly engage in a vaJ'iety of adions (such as footh-bnishings and nap•* t:alkings) that exfolilt nei1:lwr be1*11<~110Ience nor a deplorable faCk of H, an agenl• based ethic can also 1m,a.ke sense of the thought !:hat llhere are a ~;TI'eat many ad:ions which, while surdy permissible,. are otberw1ise 1relat:ivelly unintereNtini~ from am explicitly moral point of view (at ]least undei' orl'dinarry circmn .. stances)., context .. se11sibve in [ls ilL§sessnient of ind.ividurn.li acts. Flff exmmple, althou:gh two agents may perform wlrmt looks like thP 'same action' when descJribed i,n irmpersonal terr-ms (say, each g.ives $1 [)r() to a worthy cnuse), there may be reasons t:o thfok that one of the actions exh[bitB far more lbenevolence thrnn the other (a $100 domdim1 wiU exhibit g.rreater benevolence,. other things beJni; equal, if U is given lby mn 1indi1111dm11.I wbo is quite poor than by someorr,e who is qu.ite wealthy), and so is morally better a,nd perhaps ought to be pmis,•d mrnre h:ighly, even though the other action is by no means morally wron 1;. Indeed, one of the attmcti ve fo!lh11 res of an agent .. based arcnrn 11t is its !lbillity tn make H1ese tmrti; of fine-grnined d1istindions, within the rea.lm of morn lily permissible activity, Frnl' similar rea1smrn, an aigent-based ethic does not immediately violate !the prfociple of,., ought Lrmplies can,"' According to this p1dndple, it does not 68Son11.c people may find lho n.of:ion o-f "expr,~ssing a vfrtuc( to be 1.u.1ao:x-:ptab[y vuglrn. r sh.an aU.rnnrupt. to rnsprnnd to this co.nccrn in §2.4. 58 even make sense to attri.bu1te obl1igatimw t:o pe(iple unl,~ss th(\ir m1olivatio11,al sfatea m,,1,ke it at le,lst possible for them to folfHl those olblligations.69 H11t in lii1;M of the distinction between possessing and exhibiHng a icrwUvation, ii: seems that e)Vem am ,1xh'emely mallevolent person will typkally be ca pa, lok, of acting in wilys that do not exhiloi this or her deplorable .imaer state, and so will be ablle (amd hence is m~•ilnfogJuily obligated) to perfonn a,ds that an' at least milrd111mily 1.11.orally penniss1ihk, .. Meanwhille, even m<ll,~vo.lent 1refrainingr; wHI admit of e11i1luatilve disl:ind:ions: an ag:errnt wim does not take advant11p;c'' of an easy opprn'tn.mily to h,mm one person beca11se she is bU1sy plotting ã;ainst sollne oilier person,, fol' ex11mple, presumahlly ads in a way that is 1nuch woirse thm1 an agent whose restn1i111t fa motivated by pmrely self--reg,udi1ng consid .. ernbons s11d1 as fo,1r of s,mdi1ons (the hdl:er ar;ont, that is,. ads from a somevvhat beUell' mol:tive than the form,er, despite the fad that bolth ad from motives that are 1*ath~!I' deplorablle). Imfoed,. <!.n agernt--based ethic is jutst as ffoe .. grained in th,~ rna,lm of impermiss.i ble act1iv1ity as H fo in the realm of permissible aebvily, Any adnon that manifests a deplorable irnner mot:hmUon, on the pillrt of the agent w h.o performs U will be ( de1tval:ively), ai,sessc•d as mornlly w1ro11g, but wheireais ads of mil1r1ght malevolen,ce toward others will prnsmmi,blly be charncll:erized by any age11t-based elhic as vkious 01r evili, ads 69cha-r.les La-rm.ore pohi.l:s oul {hat L11,;1*e an-'. in foc:t two dis.find isstwH Lo whfcb [:he: slogan nought implies can 11 has bncm attached 0987: 34 ... 9;. "149•-SO). One conn:*rns the\ reiaUonship hdwet:*n oblig1:1Uon ffnd fow•tib-11-/ty (wtmlht~r -iL rrn:1km, seni-m to r>uy thut u pcn*101:1 has. an obligation if, lry as shn r.r111y a1nd no rnattor-how vvdl-motivalnd slw :may h<\ th('. aw1nt ls con1pfoLo]y iumable to carry lit oul), and J.s 111ore .freqt1.cmtJy raiH(\d in dtHct.1ssfons of uliJiilarliunisnt and '1fr1:ddm1t? rnoral luck. Tl1e oHtt~r, w.hich ClHIC(\1Tl8 the rdali.ol'.1s.hip bdvvc:,:ri obligati.on f.md moli.valion (wh(:ther it makes sensP !Lo say t.haL a _pon:;.on has an ol:dip~aUon jJ h[-: Iaicks a .moli.Vc! fnlffidcml Lo f'nove htrn Lo carry it oul)r iR thn ono i:hat ar1 agonL--bc.rned dhic :,ecmw oi:;pncially li.kely lo viofole, arid ir; lhe onn u.mJnr corr1s:lldnira.Uon hon:. 59 which rn,mdy exhibil a dleplln*aible fock of cm1cem for othern wiH be evalualed less 1,everely. Of course, ,m agent--baised l:heory ernphais1i.zes that the host vvay for Ur1c• mallevolPnt ar;ent to s11cce01d in living n.1p to e11e11 l:IH,• r,1r1,ost rnirnlrnrni' obligation:, will b<o to culUvare a 11HJñ virhmus character. A11d such am othlic does seem to imply that wit.hout such a, chm11ge of ho,1rl:, tho mal,"vok•1]t rofni1lner will bc> tmrublo to fulfill any more positive obligations that require the exprresflion of genuine benevolence. As a, rresuit, it might still be, thought that ru person whoHy laclking in benevoie11ce cumot be tinder any posibi11e ,ibli1i1~alliom, (duties of beneficerrice or mutual aid) within an ag<:mt--based ethic. n fo cerl:ainly noll obvious, that any sort of me1le11ole11t refrainini;s wiH lee1d ain agenll to follfill, Silly,. ru duty of easy irescue; so won't ascribing Hmll srnrt of duly to the malevolent agent violate tho pdm:iple of ought impUe1; rn11?70 Kill int seems to have lbeHeved tlrnt it would,, and 11.ince he also believed that everyone (except the insarne imd child.rem before U1e ag,• of re,won) do, 0 s h1 fad have (imperfod) duties of beneficence Htat musll be exercfaed at foast some of the time,, thfa led him to co11,dwfo that u1,oraI 1n0Uvadfon m usl be 11e11rnpirlcaHy unconditioned." a11d possessed by ail persons (induding those• 1NiOt mallevolent desires) simply in 11frl:11e of the1lr rationaHty. But it is nmt ck11i1r that we sltwuld accept Kan!' s crnndusion on f.hfo point, for l:wo main Ire11soI1s" first, not eve1yone is convinced Urnt the puu-ely raliona.1 duty"motive Kant defonds is s11fficie111t to moltivate i;em.iinely llenefkent (as oppor,ed to merdy pn1ilent) ad:ivily. And second, evtm if the d11ly"*motiive is suffkient lo do this, 70:t\[otko thaL an agoñAoirned t:lhi.c dorni no[. im.ply that H fa rnornlllly aco-:ptali-fo for th(i agont .not to a.cl in this si.tu1:1f:ton; wa1llking by ll drowning child whom one-could easUy .rrn;cW\ surm.ly eX:hi.bit.s a d:e_ploraH.n lt.nck of concern for onri 1,1 follow hummr1 ~H-~in.gi; (and on an agc:nLbased accm.l!n.f; is wrong for that roaNon), nvPn .if il. is 11Lhc_'. bc$[U t:hal. W(-~ can c,xpcd of a mafovolm:1.L in.d:1viduo.L 60 I 1: 1 ' i I: Kant's defonse of H1e idea that such a motive is always 11sun11mon!lllr1Ie11 (bemuse "purely rrutio11w1Y') imi a way that more e1rnpi1rirnlly--gro11nded motives l!Ike be11evokmce cam never be,. is not lbremendmnsly com1i111dng: .. '71 Kami. may b,, 1rnoirality re:(J[Uil!'es, but aB .John Deigh (1995) and S11sa11 Oldn (1989) hrnve •~8d1 a1rgued, a mme e:nwtiom1Jly-laden capacity to emqpathize with the plight of other persons seems necessary in on:lor for such knowJedg,'! to have gemi:ine mornl-motivatimrnl force.72 A less sl:rkt hul moni plausible vreirsion of the "ought impHes nm" prindplle, suggested by C'.h81des Lm'n"!,rnre (1987: 85-6), is thait agenl:s can meaum1ngfully ho said to h,we obli1;atimrn if they pireaenHy have, or once h,11l,. or ,d lleast m1,ce mu.Id have had 01* could evenl:urnHy he bnmghl mumd to having, an e1npfricadly condilfoned motive suffide11t lo carry them out Everytlhing we k11ovv about h1mum mornll agency seem,s to count int fovor of thfa slightJly weakell' version, which acknowledges that agents are sulbjc,d to a degwee of "consli1utitve" moral[ luck, and th,,t rn1or-a); education, as woll as attention to the development of one's own moral dmmdor, oft:en p.lays a i::r1.1cfo.l role in our abiliity to do what w,i ought And on this ve1rGio111 of the principle, malevolent agents can rnlso be um:lerr* p,Jsil:ive ohligations, despite tl1e fod thd 1:hey are extrei:nelly tmlikely fo live rnp to ftlrwse ohbigatiom; willnoufr a cha,nge of mimf cind hc:!arll. 71I-l,•rman ("l99'1:. d1. 1) has 11,LL,•mpl"d l.o show Lhis, hut her a:rgtom.,nLr, hav" he<'n sotnndly cl'illicized by Oakley (199".o: d:1:. ' o), nsp. pp, 93--J:08, 72Psychoiogir;!l.B have a!r:m Hi:rPsb~'"~d. the rofo of ern.ymlhy in tttoeal devnloprnmtt; fJ(!e, for ,•xample Hoffman (1976), Eisenberg (1987),. and tho arLid1:s in l<urUnr:s &; Gewirtz (19117), 61 To rrna111y peop.le it may seem. that there is som,etlling parl:kulal'ly objediom1ble about the 1l11,11plkatio11 that somi!one whoHy ]lacking in bemc,110 .. lence will have obligations he simvly nuinot Iive up to w.iU1md cfmng1i111; hris chamd:e1r •***** som.dbing that loolks suapici.01.wly lrlke 'blaming tlhe vktim' in childhood)..'7 3 lllut it shmilld be noted that no,Utinr; ahoul rm agent .. bm,ed approach implies that indivfrl1i1111fa shouJd. a.llways be praised for ther'r r:nrnmJly good motivations 1n* always be blamed or erHidzed for l:heir mornlly b11d mres. Indeed, .1mthin.g about the form,111 sl:md1.1re of an agenl-lrmsed fheory impHes that agents should always ]Je blamed ev,~11 for the !!.9-IQDii Hmt c!XhJibH or e•xp1ress thf,•fr load 111rnotivatrions. Thris bri11gs us. fo rn thiird disl:i111etion between, two typos of 11ap;ent .. a15sessments." Tho first lype, wh1ich I shall call "motfvre-.. a1ssessrn1ents11 and whkh rnn agent-based eUik takes to be c1mda.l to the ovaforntloin of individ11,,11l ads, involves rn judgment about the dogre,, of moral value (e.g.: admirable,. good, acceptabfo, foul, depforn.blo, vicious, ok.), of tho mol:Jivo(s) l:Jho agent exhibits m* mm1ifosts in performi.ng 11:hoso aclbions. The second type, which I s.haII. crnH "n,spons[biHty-assessments'' and whkh seenrn to be involved in doten1ninatio111s of an agent's prniseworlhiness or blame,. wortM11eM, for perfo.m1inp; cerb1in actions, reqt1in,s 11s to make an additional jmligment about an agents degree of responsib1i1Jty for his OF her molivalrional states. And al:tho11gh it is tempting to 1:hir11k that 1''rnm1Jive assessments" ,md "responsibility assessments" Bilwrnys go hrnnd 1in hand, notice that there its an importa111t asymmetiry here .. For while we are often wiHinp; l:o pm isE, a person who exhibits good motiv,1,tfona regardless of whethex* we t.hink she is (who.l!y) 73This ohjedion is raised by Driver (1995, 283). 62 I ! responsible for them, we are Iypkaily 1reluctant to Marne a person who exhibits bad motivations unl.ess we ca11 Ile quite sure she .is (wholly), n,sponsiblle for themi.74 )[ sha11JI not att:empt to delerm111e why thfa rs Ou•' cas,• (though nt presuma1bly has sorniel:hing lo do wilh tlhe in1flu<mce of Christianity and the lldea that we have aH "faHen from gi*ace").75 And I do not deny that Ollll' 0veryday assessments of tbte firnt kind may quite frequentl'y be collored by asi,essments of the 1,econd kimL Nonetheless, [ do want to e1rnphasi.ze UrnJ i1 if' only mol:ive--assessm.ents l:hat nece1,sal"ily serve as the basis from, which ain of specific ads. This means that .u1 agenfu .. J;.as,ed lJ~eory rnn acknowledge Hu,t H1ere are rnses in which rugents aire not responslihle or bfarn1eworthy for Hie acticms lhey perfonn (bec1rnse not responsible for lhe moUvabom, that prnmpt them to act irr1 ll:lrr,ose~ ways)!, whifo ~,tHl insfoting that the a,cls lhernselves are m.on1Hy wrong (llecam;e they nonellheless exhibit bad mol:ivrntions) .. And it see1I1s fo me Hmt this Jis an exl:remelly im.portant result )For notice Hrml icn cases where we think that it is s1Tldly 1imposs!Me for a penmn to, ad in ways that do not exhi1bit depfornble malevolence towards ol:he1rn,. we are typirnlly inclined to wond(•r whel:her the person is capable of morail. agency al all ..... Hud is, we wcmder whether it makes sense to say lh@t he or she 11our;lr!:" to do anything .. EveIJ when we thfok such persons nmnot mem1ingf1.nlly be obligated, however, it is '74To b(.i m.1.re, w<i: 1'.1i°lls-.o Lc:-nd to praise agonts who ovnJ"conw dit:pkwali,fo o:r at an.y raln less than adrnirahfo mol:iv,~s in ordnr to 11do tile rig.ht t.Jiing,t' us kantlurn; in paxficular c:ir(~ õtnn keen to polnl 01.1 L 1 shall t:ake up this point in my dfac1U1ssion of "tho tmns(i of duty," pp, 79ff., b,fow, '7SKorsgaard (199'.') m:ukes fmmc: l1Q1hlway on Lhns: pcint by a,rguing f.hal them c~rr prac1J:ica1 (as oppos(~d. ft-o f:heorntical or rnota_pliy,•;ical) n\ar,;onB 1,vhid1 exp-Jain tl\rh.y we\ hold rnw ainollher l'ClSponHihfo in tb:e ways that we do, 63 sbll a bit odd to say that they do not: perform wrong or lmpe.r.111i,ssible ads, and an a11;e11,t .. based ethk nm mak0c, good se11se of this lJwught. Jfor ii; all lows us to flill)I th&11l: th,,: ads whkh such agents perform illre Irn1?<:!I!!!l~1,ib1': (as m:liom,), lbern us(0 lbose ad:ions exlhibit depl!orablle motivations, while at t:he im,lne tiime ackl1lowled~;ing that the perso11s who commit sm:h acUo,w arre .!loJ bfamm,ror01y. (as ag0n1ts), becaus<E• they an: not nii,ponsibL" for th,~il" dep!ombJ,, motivations and hence ecmnot b,: morally oblligruted in ,1ny fufl.,,bfown sense, (And of comse, in cases where we do lliink agents are meruningfolly obligated,. ,rn agent-based ethic allows m; to sruy boH11 :hat tl1ei1r aid:ions aire 1,rrong and 11:hat they aire momUy critidzrubke or blameword:hy fow performing those adions . )i We have seen Hrnt a11 ag;enl•basc~d ctm,n!plfo111 of moralrny dm>s not commit ur, fo Ute position that anything a wel 1,,,mo1:ivat.ed person does w iH autornaticaHy count a,s morally good, no.r that a hadly motivated pernon will have obHgations he or shc0 cannot Uve np to,. n simply i11sists that: rrigfrl actions are Hwse that exfrlilbH morally admirable fmcms of moti11atio111, and w1rong acbons awe H10se thatexhib1it moraJlly deplomble forms oi motivation. lt rnlso poin,ls out lJmt wilJtin each broad cate~;ory (of perm issihlP and i1mpermi1•1sibltc actions), His possible to make forther and much rno1*e fiine**p;rainied distinc*, tfons in accord,mce with the exlen!: 1:o whid1 specific a.dions exhibit the good mr bad motiivations of the ai;ent who performs the nm. Of cmlm(', I.hes<.• fo rthPr distintdfons willl not a,lways be obviom; rnr easy lo pick out [ndeed, ,;ince a11 age11tt .. lbased conception of mornlity contends tliat 01u ability to determine tlhe mmr*al s1:ah.1s of ,rny paicbnnlar action is ultimalle.lly depemfomt on ma aloiUty lo discern the motiives l11at achrnlly i11dun,d foe person to pc,rform it, and since it is often very diffkuII: to 1mrl: mnt predsel.y whalt: one's own :moli11aHons are, lei 64 I i I alo11e wl}ud ar1wH1er pernon's motivations may be, anyone who adopts this sorrt of approach must admit that: om evahmtions of imllividurarl ad:s wiH ofte11 rw 1i1nprecise,'76 for exrnmple, we may chrnradex'ize a pmrl:icu!rnr act of charily as especially m1on,Hy i~ood, when rin fod the donor was moti11a1!Pd sol'ely by self. illterested com::erns (e,g,, a desire to see his name on the mntside of a rnniversity b11llding, oir to im prnve his rreputation).77 Irtd(eed, we may evern convince m1rselves that we all"e actinp; ben1e110Iently toward anothter when in fad we are mol:ivated by arm objed:i.ona1ble kind of patternalism thait has nwrc' to do with what we want than what the other truly needs, But this is a reason to be cautious (because we may be mfotaken aihm1t what is motivatil"lg may often be unaware of the motives that are prompting 1:hem Ito ad as tt,ey do) in om" as,%issments of m()lml agents; it is not, by itself,. a reason to d.iscard 1:he theory as una,hle to help us um:lerstand what linds of considerdiom; ought 1ideallly to enter info our moral deliberaHom; and what kinds of adicms arc in fa,cl morailly right It ris simply misl:llken to think Umt this soirl of practical difficuHy sI10ws the lh,~ory ifoeH to be flawed, _______ , _ _ 76:1<1:1.nt"f~ "a:nti_ ...moraliHUc sh0t11"i:111 11 arid accompanying emrnpb.asl::; o-n tbr: delibrnralivi~ pr1ocesscG involved :i.n ou:r firHt-*pers.on n1.o-raf1 ad1v-i.1Ly/' sntw1r.i to bn baNed on a siw1i1ai~ vfow of tho diffkuKy-ir1 dctenn1J'.11.n.gpredndywhatmowm a person Lo act as she dm~s (1:~ee llill 1978, Hill J99?i and. (Yl\leill 1985). On tho olher lmnd sc\o li1:1rstJrt011sn,. who HuggnsLs that our abiliLy t;n discnrn whether a peff:1011 is (-':XIh.ihiUng genui.ne vtrhrnf; may h(~ so-111*1,m,vhat h(~lh.~r than mu' ability to dider:n1dne whethe.r a f1pedfic 01clion--lype is mo:ira1l.l:y rir,hL (1996: 24H). 'l7'[( we arn n:ilucLant to dmwr:the Lhn r:Kdf-interesLed d.ono.r us. ading wrongly, an ag:ent--bar:ied Coli'.1nipt:non of 11:1orahly rff11.gr,esl~.l that Lhi.s is bncairne we think IJ"'tat sclf-inlm*pr.;l is, thcm.g.h not Hw mos.t admirable of molivesr at [eusl not *wholly dnplorahfo, artd hnncc: thaL ads that Hi"C 111.oUvated by (c(-\i"tnin fo-rms of) Bnlf.,./ntcresL a1*e not, rnr .not ahvays-, tmpermissihh:. Cont:rtl1d.a1tim1 moral tJn.norios arm _p:rodi.c:u1Lod on this possihflityr and a fflmilar* thought S-<~t-wns to ur1.c.fo.rgird the 'cool_!' lh~oJI'les of virhrn to hri: discussed. i:11'.1. C::hapler 'fhrt\P, 65 2.il 0[11e ~:e1rntbrill1 1rein:de1111,n;tml!:iim11 Tllere is a final olJJedion l:o the idea of im agenl*•based appmad1 lhat we rnYw need lo consider. Fm* such an approach does require us to rei11fce1qprel the familfa, distind:ion between doing the right tbdng fo!:.!!_goocl rc!atS<?.!!. (or from a i;ood motive), and doing the rigM thing for ~1.~t1.~X"~'sg.1n, (or from a bad motive); as V\/elI as the correspo11dJng disUnction between doing the wrong thing for a bad 1rernson (or from a bad motive),,. and doing the wrong thin11 for a good reaison (or from a good 1n0Uve). This ts !Jecatme an agent based ethic implies that when the age11,t's reasons are not l'ight (when his motival:ions a1re not admiralole), the adfon as perforrmed in that sped,fic case is in fad wTong (and vice verrsa). Since embracing the adion/motive distinction requires us fo Ile albfo lo specify tlh.e .rightness (or wrongness) of a person( s action in a way that 1is. independent of any given agent's mo1Jivations, an agent-,based ethic is unable lo folly ,Kcommocllate it. Two poinl:s mre worth noliing when considering whether a very strong disl:inction !between the irighb1ess (or w1mng111ess) of adforrns am:! the goodness (or badm,ss) of 1m,oti11es i appmpdale. Tiu,, flrnt fa that "events that are 1101: personal adfons Oll' responses are nol: rnwrally i,vah.mlted ataII." (Garda 199?: 239). They are m:it even com;idered lo Joe nmrnUy right or wrong, let afone to be m,ornJly good or bad, aiid thi1s already srnggests that mu jucllg1rmmts of moral r.ightrness must have something to do wHh l:he px*adical altulw:lies of the person who performs them. Andi the second is that when we are indinecll to invoke this smt of dlis1:i111dion, ii is typirnlly bemuse we want l:o acknowledp;P a difforence behveen agenln who perform the same ge1n,eral type of ad[on, bul who do not appear lo be equaily mer.itorimrn (or critkizahle) in tl1eir pcrcfonnance of that action type, becamm one agent performs line ,Kl.lon from 66 motives that are m.oraHy betl:er (or worse) tforn 1:he other, /\n age111'-based ethic cam easily llm,ke this sort of distinction, since it will say that the a11;enl who acts from betll:er motives performs an action that lis in fad morailly beUer (or 1:hal. an agent who ads from wome motives performs an action that 1is in fact momllly worne),. am! hence is more meritorious (m more criUdzable) on precisely those grounds, It seems, thei*efore, that ,m agent--based ethic fa still alblle to rnph1re this distinction(s basic point:. No1netheless, there arre cases in which iii: seems appiropdate to many people to say that: ,m agent 11did the right thfog" even though we know that lhe or ~she did it from rather deploralbfo r1111obv.itions, S'!dgwick 1s exmnple of a prm1ecu1fo1r who punishe;; c1*imina1ls to the foll est extent possible um:for the law,. but does so out of 1rnrnlke, might seen1 to be a depiction of this kind of case, and assuming we lllgree wiltb Sid 1;wkk that malke is not: a morally app1roprfatte motive, an age11t--ba1sed ethk does imply tlmt such a pmsecutor in fact ads w1mng[y, Moreover, H implies that a prosrocutorr who pedormed Hie same type of adi,011 , ... ie,,. m1e who mered mit exactly tile: same kinds of ptm.1ish1nents in similm* cases .. ,_ but who did so out of ,1 r1111ore admirable motive (say, a concern for public welfare) wm11ld in fact ad rightly .. Inter, estirngly, Sidgwick himself is quih~ sympa,thel:k to the view t.hal: "a man wlho prnsecu1tes from mrrnHce a person w lhom he helieve:a' to be guilfy, ~lg.§'~,J1,\)J ~,iJIY-act rigJr:itAYi for, thoU1gh it may be his duty to prosecute, he 011ght not to do it frmn malice" (1907: 2.02, 1rny emphasis). And it should be noted Hrnt an agent••lbased eHik dõs not imply t1~11t it woL11ld ht~ morally acceptabfo fo1r th,, malicious prnsecufor not to mete out the purnishments that he does, only that the way in which he does so is inoralliy oiljedionable, aind hence that it woukl be 1norally betl:er for him to endeavor to change his motiivaliom; (rnsr;u1111in11 6'7 that lhe cm:1ld). It shon1ld 11fao be noted tlhat Sidg;wkk believes Hml: a more admirable prosecutor would tnel:e out pm1fohments in tMs same way. for assuming we 11giree witb Sidgwkk 011 this latliBr poinl 1 JI think an agent-based ethi1c rnn nrnke some sense of the idea t:hat it is, aH:e1r aiI[1 the m,nlidm11, prose1c:11tor s 11 dlufyn 1:o pmsecute,. a1nd lhenñ tbtait there is som('thing 11 righf'' about tlhe general type of adion he performs 1 if we are wJilling to rndopt a, Jkind of two-leve.ls view. But before we rnn see why, we need to get cfoarrew about the piace of mrnrail principles and rules within a11 agenl--bm,ed accotmt We Iha 11e seen that am ag,>.11t-baised e!hical theory tells u1s, at the 1mor,t g:eneral level,. to ad i11 ways that exhi.bit. ,.1dmirnble or morally good moti** vations, and to avoid acting in ways tbtat exhibit deplo1rn.ble or morally bad mol:i11atlm1s ..Thus "ad virtuously and do not ad viciously''' fa 1its most gemmil moral pri.11.dple .. And W(' lh,we also seen thrnt II folly developed ,11~ent-based ethic wm include a defense of whiich motives are (most) admirable and whkh arre (most), dleplorabie,. Once~ tlhait conception is 1111 pl.ace, thewefo!'f\. every 11ird:ue will geno;,rnte a pi*escrtptlon ("ad benevolently"}, and every 111ice a prohibition ("do not ad malevolenHy"),. But mm a,gent .. based ethk Gm also )_!;enerale 11summary mies" oif riglht adion Umt ,ue even nw1re specific than th1ls?8 llor ii s111ggesm that when we J*epec1tedly condemn certairu broad types of actions (e.g;., lyting) as rn1ordly wrong and commend otJtier broad types (e.g., prnrnial'* keeping) as 11n,1raHy right we are at least impHdtly rncknowledging how md:rt!rnel.y 1mlikely it it11 Hmt any person's decision to perform l:lhe forme11 type '78'[l1c idnu tbafr. an agont.--hased ell:h/c can rrm1akc use cf Lhe noUon of 11rm:1wm£H:y rufos111 ,,v:hich i,FJ fo1rnr11iliar from discussfons of utiltta.riall'.1is:m and jH an.tk:1pated by A.dam Sm ilh (l'/,S9), was bht'.if. su.ggeste:d. Lo Trne by SlotP V1rho kindly prtovkfod fYH-\ wilh rJomc) of b.iH <!adi,!st WJ'.iU.en flJ1cmgbl.s. in this area;. 68 of adfon couM ever 11,1 attributed to an admirable motivrntion, rnml how si1mifa1r!y unlikely H Is that any pernon' s dedsil.on to pell'forn1 the l,iUer lyp<' of adion coulld ever be atl:rib11ted to a deplorable motivation,. To be smre, the normative validr.ty of s1.1ch mies is dedvcxl from the fad 011e 1in w hkh admirable 1cnotivations can be reliably expected to Iead to somE' types of ads and not otheirs .. And beca11se rrnmmary rules lu,ve no indP* p,~ndent nmrnl stimding, an agent-based ethic leaves open the possJ\hility that they might 1mt apply, aml hem:e Hmt a specific agent oi,ght 1101: (or at least is not required) to follow thm:n ill any partkula1r case Thi11 me,rns l:hat bH11d ly relying OIi such principles will not loe momUy a,dmirable .. a point wliikh nm'* eth:icists have been p,.1rticula1rly keen to emphami:z:e. For exampfo, Noddings insists that Ben11U.ise c rtai111 regularities of mrnraJ life have been eshlblir,.hed and observed, we are able to state certain principles, but these prind.ples are minimallly useful in new and genuinely puzzHng s.itua1fom,. Here we do beUer fo rely on a wruy of being,. rn brnsk condiHon ofr receptivily or empaU1y, thrut connects us to Jiiving others (1990: 28 .. 9; cf. 1' 9811: ti; 'B). Yet Noddin,g:s also says l:hat "1:bere fa no objection to the 11npmblemalk, dayto .. day use of principles as genend guides 1:o deper,,dable behavim" (1984: 10), and an agen1-hased ethi.c can m.ake sense of this, thought This is because !the normative validity of such rules can itself be derived from the theory's assrnmphons aboutwMch moUvrnticms are (m.ost) mma.lly adinirnble, and so rm a,gent who relies on such pri:rnciples .in heir day .. to--day lifo wiH at loasl bee indirectly exhibiting the kind of motivations thal, accordfog to 1.he llwory, we ought to (s.b'ive to) m,rnifost in ,md tfii.ro11gh omr vm*ious ads .. So Iong as shE! i,; a:lso attuned to sitnrntions in w hkh the summary irules a ire not 69 strn.igh1forwiudly applkable,. tlhere is no reason why slhe should be cri!:ki;1t)d within ,111 age11t--based c1,cco11nl Of course, Sidgwkk' s m.aHdous prosecutor cc11rmot be descrfoed in this way: thouglh his adirn1s, 1ma1y acconI with fo,~ sur11mary rnler, of ,u1 ag<>nt.* based ethk (for exa,mple, Lll1e "Lnterioriz,ed''' version of utillitm'ianii,rn to be l!.imned in §2.5), we are told tbtrnt he performs them from bad or depioralble motivations mrul hence an age1nl.AmsPd ethk cmn11ni.ts us fo, foe view that he does not ad wigbtly. Nonetheless, I thirnk m1 agent-based ethic does allow us lco speak, a1: a hii:;hly ahshrrnct ,md impersonal llevel, of the "barE!•,pcnmissibility" of cel'hlin actions if they are of the smt prei;cribed by lhe etlhic''s summary rulies. SU1ch sfaremcrnts about piirmfosibilily are "bare" in the sens(' Uurt 1:hey m*e made witlrmut reference to the motivalfo1w off any adurnl moml ai~ent, and irri trr1,~ fi1niai anrnlysis, awn agent*bascd dhk rnmm,itg us to 1:h,; view that they are rncrely a. fõon de, parfor thrnt makes certain kinds of usefo1l ,ompairisom; a hit easier to point out,. or l:hat em11bles us to make highly spc,culative rnsse.rl:ions about the sl:ah1s of a person's actions in rnses where hfo rnr her actuatl moli'INiliona are seriously Ln doubt 13,ut since such bare (im)permlssibility j!ldgments do allow us to point to the ,5alienl: features thait aibs1tract types of actions have in common , .. munely, thal: they are the sort: of action toward which admirnble moUvatirnns ordimiriiy prompt X think we, rnn 11'5(\ lh('• lm;on die par.le1c to say th.i,t ll11e m.al1iciou1s pmsecu.tor does th!; kl1nd ofr thing Hmt a person in his sH1rntim1 morrnlly migM to do, ev,m though we .know that I1e himseU does not ad righUy when doing it Precis(;i.y becirnse lhe prPsenlly 70 facks a mormUy 8ldn1irable moUvarl:ional state, rt is impossible for hlim to confo1r any of his adi1ons with moral vrnlue.'79 To some people, refosini; to say that the• pror,ecufor c1cts rightly evPn l:hour;h be does exadly the smne the kind of tlhiing that a mm*e vfrhrnus proaecufow wo1.iild do will seerrn objedionabl.y moddlosome, 8\S though telli.ing him "what kind of person he r,,hould be" in a way tltat is nobody's busirl,,•ss 1ml his owr~. Hut there ,U!' both theon*etkii,I and pmdical reasons to doubl Hrnt his moUval:ions reallly are nobody's llmsiness. A Heir di, the overall charade1* of Hie pro•secutor's adivity wl1en he takes 11n,11icim1s satisfa1dion in meting out severe punishments fa !likely to be very dnfferent from the overall charade!' of a prosecutoll"s activily when he vfows severe punishments ,rn a necer,,sarry evil - «lifforent enough, according lo an ag:ent-*based account, to alter the mo1ml sfotm; of e,1ch prosen1to.r's a,d:s (recall! p .. 76, above) .. And at a mon; prad:kal level, We' have every rer,son lo beli,,;ve thal a mauidous pros<":cutor wi 111 be more likely to overstep the bounds of the llaw and pu111ish crriminals nwrch more severely l:llrnn H1ey truly deserve .. Pointing out that sr~ch a person does not reailly act R'1ightiy even when (ex hypothesi) he does not ovp1-sl.ep those bou,nda is a way of emphasizing the import,mce of paying illlt,0 nlfon to onds motivalfons, so that one will be ahfo to chf;clk or redirect them if necessrnry .. 80 '79:Notiõ !hti1t an agent--htu-md nthic n11nnot foHox,v AristoteUm:m who :i.d.<~*11.Lify right ad:ions ttH wbtdJ:vn-r a fruly virtuous IH*!t''Son wou(d do. 'TI1:o diffo:rnnce hr:twee111 tTho virtuous and lhie non-virtt11.ot1s rnol!al agent l.i.,-:H in Lhe:ir m.otivationn.1. sfol.:Ps, a:1ind according lo an agent based (-~th:k, H. ls or1iy by oxl1-ibiting an a,lrrdrabfo inJw:1* sf.1.1lt-i hat an agc~nL can act tightly. To adrnit that th{~ non--virh1om, can fiomoUrrnof.-l act dehtJy :is al foasL implicitly lo ui.l.ow Hwl son11dhing 52:l}J.lJrlhaD a f\nod m.oLi.ve (e.g., lfo-: actuaHzau:ion of a value Lb.at* the vfrluou.r~ pe1rso1n is i.n a parlicuiar]y good pos.iHon Lo p:.:!lX:el.ve, hut thal might b<~ brought. ;;1hout 11:1on'. acddenLally) 1§ wl1at really mak'"~s t:he action right. Andi :it. is *pñdsely tLhiH conchm-ion that an agent-based nfJrdc .m.e1:1in.s to avoid .. 80u. sh.outd al:-;o be remomrnhered Lhat to say he a.d.s wrongly is inoL [i.<'.cessa:rily lo say that he is morally hlamnworihy for doing so (see §2.3(iit), above). Tl There is, of co!!rn<,', 111 p,uadle[ kind of case iJ1 wlh.idh am agent ,Kts &om good motives 11,nd yet may seem 1:o do the wrong lliing, ,Htd it is some1:ime>s tho11ght that amy vfrtw~ ethk (imJudiJ11g mi agent~lmr,ed one) can easily lie trapped into havint; to admH that such cases exfot Bul: Rosalind Hmrsthouse~ has pointed out that this thou; 5hl: is typically the result of conceptual confusion (1995: 6S). As we ha1ve seen, a 11irt1]e ethic does imply lhat tbe smm' genern1I acl:iirnn-type can be eiUter mornllly right or morally wrong, depending on the 1motives, that induce an agent to perforrn it J3ut the b:uly vfrluour, agf'nl who is forced by tmgk d.1rcum.stances to "dirly her handi;" and ad in ways sh,* is loathe l:o do does not thereby ad wrongly or non-vi:rtuously **** l:hat 1is,. she does nol: act from bad or deplormbie motives hke indlffore11,cr: rnr malevole110~ or greed, Rather, she acts wil:h a cerrain degree of pain and re 1;rd, aware !:hat altbou1gh the horrible action i:, 1:he "best" she can do, Hie action is honihle nonetheless. To be sure, such an adion may not exMbit the ã;E,I1t's inner vfrh1e to a particularly high degree, hut neiithe1r does it exhibit deplomblcc motiva!ions on her part (ex hypotJnesi it is tmly lhe best she can do), c1111d hence ,m agent--based virtue ethic is forced n,~iUter fo rn(hnit that tht0! agE)nt in such drcu1nstances is vkioti1s nor that her adi.on is morally wmng.3 1 N,metheless, the1re may be some s1itu.111.1tio111s. n which a peirson st'n(*erely cares about others, wants lo help the1111 and tries her very best to do so, b111. due to enrms in reasoning or i~;norance of relevant fods, her wlholehearfod 8lNotk.e the diffoli"encn belvvee:n this ctH:m and tJn.n Ctise of tlw* inctii:rahly n11alnvofont. a1gonL 1r1n1entio:rned ahovo .. Tlho mnfovofont rnay nol he-n1oraHy bltm11,:wur*thy and rnay "hoincapabk* oflon:llmg u.n<lot m.oral obH.gaUorm, but because his acU.om, nxJrdbit cfoplorahfo motivalfonH norwlh.elesr,, IJJ.ey can be descrihed. as 11ntorufiy vvnmg. The v.irl11ous ttW'-rtl Jn frag:k drcumsl.anceG, by cont:rrasl1 n:xJ1ih.its n1or1:dly good (or at least: accep:lable) nwUvat.-ions and BO acts rightly, nven t.h.ough she pr:rforms an acbo:n thaL, if prnrformed by a lnss w:..hmdrabJ.P* character ((:.g.1 _if perforrned 'i-\/Jth i.ndiffor<.~11Cf.~* m:1d glnn)r wou.ld h(: ar,mem-ied 1.:rn morally vvrong< 72 altempts l;o h,~lp oflbe1m fai\1 l:o lhH tbeir mark If we al/'E! convinced Hmt the ndiom1I errors are 11101: the resrnll. of ,;ome hidden resenlmc"nt rnr i11difforern:e or whrnt have you, an agenl:•lbased approach does imply that sud1 foilurer, wm not be distim:tively morn! ones. Uut acknowliedp;in;; this does !l(,t imply Hrnt ~, person needs perfod knowledge rnnd/ or a complete tJheory of the hmmm good in ordcerr to ad be11,evolerritly, (even though a bem!volent person will try to learn as much as sI1e mn about conditions of !human flourishing),, mrny more than kantianism i11nplies that a 1111on1J agent ne(~ds peFfecl: kmowledge in onfor to fulfiU the imperfod duty of beneficence,. or 11tilihuimrrism implies that a moral! agent: needs perfoct knowledge Ln rnrder to folfill the general obligation to promoh:c aggregate welfare. Inde,~d, commUme11t to such a th,~ory mighi iilterfore with U1e agent's rnbi!Hy to respond to the (potenfa1lly 1idirn;yncrn1:k) needs of other persons, Hence,. al!though it is committed to lhe possibiWy that a benevolent but incompetent person ads rightly in some minimal sense, an agent--based ethic can still insist that such a person's actions are for less mom lily good than they could or kleally shou.lld be. And as we have seen, it can afoo allow 11s to speak ,11bou1Uhe "bare impermissibility'" of h<c!l" action, by making Jndired reference l:o the foct that i1: is somdI1ing a henevolenl and Hut 1110w it may seem lhat an ageni*based ethic is objedfonahle in anothei" sod of way. After all., 11i1rh1011s persons are ofl:en the first to ,Klmit thal mo.ml decisions can be quite difficult, aml the 91 uestions of a sincere, yet genuinely perplexed mol"tllc agent tyricallly ha11e less io do wHh whethei" benevolence (oir cournge, m justice) fa, called for tlhan with what wot1ld in fact '73 he 1:he gemiinely benevolent (courrageo11s, rnr just), thing to do given the uiniquc parhcinfars of the case. Yet by tyiing lh0 rightness of om adim1s so dosely to our admil motivati.ons, it may se:1':m that an agenl:.-1:msed ethic is 1]11able to muminalP Hae pn1cess of n:wn1I deHbemtion tha,t eveni the nno1,t 1✓ irtuom, agents 1rnm,t su..rmly go through wh,m confronfod by very difficult mmal issues .. Si.m.:e at lr:ast one of the 1reasom1 for engrnging in moral theory fa bl* aUempt to provido?: some prmcbcal guidance in s.ituabrnns where we are gen,uinely perplexed rnbout what we should do, am illlability lo shed any light on the kind of deliberalive process that might ideally lead ufa, to the proper mornI conclusions would p1resumably 1rern:le1* an rugernt-based el:hic seirilously im:onnplP.t.e. And tlhiB sort of concern, seems fo 1.111de1olic the ofnjedim1, me111lioned iin §1.2, HrnJ care-cthi.dsts treat mornlity ms purely instinctive or non .. ,reflect[ve. The firnt thing to 1mtkc rubout tMs olbjedim1 is thrnl it nrn rnnl,y be a compamtive dai.im. To lbe sure,. l:hemfos bike utiHl:arianimm and kimtianism ,me' frequently said fo Ile more "acticm .. ,focrnsed/' in the sense that they endeavor t:o expla1in the rightl!less of adions in a way that is fourgely independent of tlie motivabions an agent mir;ht have to perform them, and they are fr,,:quently said to Joe mrnre pmdical beca1Jse of this fad. Yet neUlher utilitarianisrn 111or kanbanis1m is likely to geineride al!lswern for* the perplexed mmal ag;cnl' i1n any stralg;htfoirward way: knowi111g Umt she shornld aid in such a way as to promote overall utility, rnr ad only on a maxim Uml she could wiU to lbe a 1miv,,nml l'rnw, do,,s not, by itself, wer,;olve her dilemma. To the Pxb:mk f>hal those theori,es, 1,vith theilr long and illlustrfous bisl:odes, ,uc able to prnvide us wHh effective practical guidance, they do exactly what an agen,,-based virtue tbeoiry, when <level.oped hi sufficient detail, would do ..... namely, pmvide 74 rrwre concrete advice about what kinds of iihinp;s sh0, needs to know in ordcrr to figmre out wfod benevolence (or cm1rnge, or justice) ireq11inc,s.82 In U10 agenl:--based case, this ki11d of guidcince i1, mrnde possible becauBc nw cognitive diirruem;ion of mornl mohvrul:ion effedively "doubler, bacl" on, the wo1°Jd, d1lrodin1; a moral! agent's aUeintion to spedfic kinds of informaldon (depending on which mol:ives are considered to !Je most 1rnornHly admirnble). For example, a theory that dired.s the perplexed moral. agcml to figure• out: how best to exliibit i:notivatiomil benevol:,,nce is effodiwily telling bei* to find out as 1mud1 infoirm,ation as she can about how, or whether, the vardous options available lo lheir would ccmtiribute fo the wdl--being of other peopllP illLl the world (Siote l99ti 97--100). Since this wrnl typin11lly requi.r,~ brr to integ1rate a great dernl of in:formaitior~, it is not at illll s11rprisi111g Umt sho will often be in doubt about what is tho rriglht thing tin do, oven if she fa gen 11i.11eJly v1ii:tu1ous.8~ But rnotice that determining the rig;ht thing to do does 11ot ñquise her i:o perceive any mysteriious "righ1:.,maling"* fads on tl1is account 11or rn!Hmugh rnn agent--based ethic accepts Urnl there fa somdhi1ng essentiillly corred <1houl th,'" Arislotelii,rn idc~ai that the rig!iJness of ,1dions ultimah-!ly l:ies illl t!l(, parliculai-s ol each aml every case, it does not seem to be the 11iirhmus pe1rso11c"s pc!IGc'ption 82Consi.d.err for oxam:ple, Barbara Ffor:ornan1s (199?,,) interprntatio.n o.f KanHan r.nor.~ahty tliS .rer.;.Ung on certafrt ndd.iherative prr:su.n1.pUons11* (e.g., agair,st .kt.Hing, c:on.rcion ttnd manipuh1ition) and in.co.rporaUng sophisticated. ll'rufos of m.o:raJ fUlHc-rncnn that ~~l.ructure an agent's p-nn*epHon. Tlriis B(WG w,nH beyond lhe forrmal strrud:ttre of the theory. mmn:Harly, considm J.S. Mill's (1863) varimw cone.rel<' dcmons!cmliom; ,,fwhal: Lhn Prrincipfo of UHlily, w.hm-1 the foctr; anl suitably intnr_prelNl, ]Tn.plios about the appwi,pdat.e rnon1tl ros_ponse to varfrn111s sorts of sftualio:m,. 83H:ursli1omm (1996) _po:iints out. lhat. _in rnany r1H:11t1:U:fons1. a ccmHdn*nt answer may f1imp[y bt1. *1u1w111n*unted;: Hu-:re* *may bn a n.um.hnr of gent1innly benevofon.l (nr c:om*ag<-1-ouH, or iiusl) tl1in.gf~ fl> do. Tlhiis dGns ng:1 m.oa.n Ut1.P vfrLU1ous _rn:rson (or u!l'.1y01:1c: else) can (or should) simply fl.tp fl1 coin in Huch cm,os, since Lb.P 1viW,ngness to do rio vvouJd typkaUy betray 1:1 callous ñoraJ1 alUtu.ide, and a person ladd-r1g: in virtn.11.e mighl nol. even r~l\r:r,g:nize Lhat Lfo\ situation calls for a moral :resp-ormc. '75 that l'mables her to choose ,rnd perform the right action, b1Jt is raither her admimble 1mot1iv,iliom,l state. The ordimiry facts, we might say, aro "processed tluough"' her vit'tu1ous motive,, and it is the expression of Hrat motiivo, i.n a way that is reisporn,iv,~ to tlhe facits, that 11Jltimately 011,abfos lhor to do the right thing. And Jrmtke too that H1is kind of prncess seern11s to be precisely what rnre,-ethicisl:s lrtave in mind whon they speak of the imJporLmrtce of exhibiting a kind of loving attention toward othen,. Sara Ruddick' s duscrirns,im1 of "n1aternal, thinking" (1989), for exainple, explicitly airn1s to provide an extremely det\1:iled accmmt of hmN this process wrnrks (Ses, also Held ]987; Tronto 1993: esp. ch,, 4), Silnce U1e virtuous illgent's aittenlio11 will ultimately have to be dfrecteol toward possible conseq11ences olf her actiornJ, H might be thought that !he initial app,~al fo motives iis wastefol or urnlecessrnry. Hut then, are reasom; to suspect that thfa cannot lbe true, After all, if WI' jtH,l!!;<' actions only by their consequences or dfed:s i11 U1e world, tben it is impossible to distinguish accide11taHy usefoll or benefidaJI actions from, those that are truly 1morally good (Slote 1995; Garcia 1992:),, And aH of um know from practical experience that the o,veralll charnde1" of an agenij:' s adio111 fa likelly fo be at foc1st so.nMJy different when he acts from one motive than His when he aicts from anofoei1*, This kind of point has be~m emrhi,1.siz,ed by thinkers .like l.ruw1re111ce Bfo rn1 (198()), and Michae.l Stodker 0976) who 11ote the dHfere11ce between acts done 110U1t of foiendiship" and very sirnilmr ads done "out ol duty." And it seems to be for precisely fofa reason that A1rneUe Baier insisfa that certain kinds of obligatlon5 ,,,,,,, such as the obhgaUons of parents lo ch[ldiren ,_,. ue pa1msiitk U1pon thf! possessiim1 of "belief-,infom1ed,. action infl11encing atl:ifodles'' like love or !rust or care (1994: er;p. dis. l,,2 am:! 5,9). An agent-based ethlic :,i1rnply endorses this 76 wid,~ly-heM view by poi Ill ling ornt lhat a d 1iffen,mce 1in motivation rnn often lbe great enough to alter the mond stalnw of any specific type of ~,ct .Although an agent-based ethk insfots that moral judi;1nent does n,ol: rnlthnately come to west in e11alual.imrn of (expected) co11,seq1uernce1;, it shoukl afao be noh~d that 1rwtlh.ing about this vvay of thinkinp; abo11t mornlHy im1olw•i; denying that virh101.os molivr,,s ai.m at or are dired,xl lmNil:td certain emls, Jior mie l:hing, any motivation that might piau1sibly serve as a moral vfrtrne wornld presumably have to be one Hrnt Ieads e.gents to pay atl:enU011 to how foe1ir adions affed otheir people in the woJrld, Foir a1101lher, spedfkaUrn1 of 0nds ls crU1cial to our abiiilly to distir1,g;11ish imJlividnaJ motives from, one another, sine,' the ends form. 1:he infontiiom1l cont,int ot an agent's pmdical desire, iiilld so defim 0 : the pos,sibility space wUlhin which the rngent ads. Ihnt according to an ageITTh-hased conception, wh,it is .mPr<1.)J_y good rnbo11t any virtuous, moUW! has uiltim.ately Ito do with !~Ee ~:!11,c.l gfiI!i:q:r!!!iJI1~! sJ,Jc!•t}1. ig, and not 11 rnything snpposedl!y more ethically fondamentall about 1its expectable rnr ,KhiaI dfedr;. for hmmm (or sentient) beings, In tJ1e Im,t araalysis,. an age11t-•loased ethic contendG that certruin motivatiiom1 a1re simply the appropris,fo kind of prnd:irnl aU.itu1de to take L!p toward our follows,. Of comrse, 11n agent-based virtue ethic sni~;g,Jsls thait the first step in an agent'i; morn! delibendior1, will often be refledion on her own motivations, aiu« H has somolimes lbee:11 stiggesfod Urnt much ai pmce8s ii, Ilna.ppropria!ely 11a1*cissistk (cf. Willi,mrn 1985: lO). Hut H1is complm\nij Jis largely rm.wairran\Pd moral! r,elf,irefledio11. Hut suppose, for example,. that (HI!' perplexed morn I 8411t is alHo not u1:i:ique to agent-hm,tid vfows: cor1r;-idt~r Su~.an *wol.f' s (l Y'/9) crit.idsrrn o( hoth kaonLians and ut:ilitarfo.m• for rportray:ing moral agentH ,rn br.ing l'.oo co11.ei:nn.Pd with their own ''m.orn1 pudty." 7'7 a1;e!llt"s doubts over what would be the mosl: benevolerrnt thini!? to do an' 110I the result of inadequate knowledge 1ml: of rinfodor motivation•** i.e., that ;;he is, harbming some kind of deep seated r:esemtmenl: towan:! the person(s)she iEi inteirading with, and hence tlrml: her "nmf1.wiorri" overr hov,r to help is in fact rooted in a deeper co111flld about wheUter r;he really wants tu do what benevolence is promplini; her to do. A theory that directs much an agenl: Ito reflect solely on the (expectable) outcomes of th,~ various actions 1;he nrnl.d perform, or e:ven on the moral penmissrlbrility of viuious nr,aixims she r:niglhl: reasonalbiy adopt, seems signifiomtly less likely fo help her urncover tlhfs imwr conflict thmni a theory Hmt dirc\d:s her to examine, at ai fakly deep level,. her inne!I' attitudes toward the 0H'1e1r person(r,,} she is respowu.lin@; to (cf. Sherman, '1989; 2.5,-7). B11t once our agent does discover her hidden resentment, she may be a Ible to delibemte more dear*-•head0c',Uy about what to do, and even if she u!timatdy finds Omt s,he is ur1a1bl,, to o•ven::om.e rit, she unray ait least recog)~rize the need for assishmce !irmn someom! else rin order to rresolve her dilemma. ln either caise,. reflection on her own moi:ivaitiom1I strnte seems to he a nucfal step in her efforts to ad rightl.y.85 That aiUih1dnnal changetJ can indeed be a form. of moml acbvity has been emplmsrized by Il'is M11ud!od:1.86 Arn:l thfa kind of self.-refledion seems to be wfo1J Diana Meyers hrns i.111 mind wlhen she dtarncternzes "respm1sibility reason.em" as reflecting 11pon whid~ of the:fr dm1ices ",u*e corrnpailihle with or 8-Ss[ot.n point.gout tJ:w-.1.t we~ oflerr1. d.o think alongthliBP tinrn:~ (1995: 99), dU:n:1.g: bolh vic(~p:rel'.liJe_r1it Gore cu1.d Sc.m1lor 1\/JicheU (~fl. arguing, du.riJ1.g tlw. N/\Ff/\ debatnri, t"hat the: l',rP1:dy onglht to bn 8ignnd bncauA-e .failure to do so wouldi betray a dl.eploruhly fomfnl und c:Ting*lng atlliLucfo on Lho part of lJ.S, dt:i.z1-).nf:l. To givo a GOmEnvThat .n1oirn l1.01tH:y exa1npfo., noUce that a:mo:ng tI'l.e n:u:my reasons we lyJri.cally g:itvn d1fldnm for not hitting and not l.yi:ng is the simpfo fact tTtwt. doing so i.s ifnol rdce. 11 86-f:,ec in particular lier fa11r1,m1s example of fJH~* mother--Jn ... frrw who cor0r1,c\1⁄2 lo fW(' Pw.rson'n wifo in a 111orc, fovomhJ,,, light. (1971: '17ff.). 78 rei1rnfoirce dlee,iralble rnspeds of [1J1,ifr] pe:rsom1.l identity" (1987: 15'1), a,, well ap, what Nel Nodldings fa rrn1gi~es1:ing when she says thall: a caring agent's reasons for a1diI1g will n11ake mfe,ence to "a sense of persomi,1 ideal" (1984:: 3; 96), All of these accmmlts ultimately com,~ l:o rest in c,ertain dain1s about whkh (lyp"s of} motivations añ (most), mon1,Jly admimbfo,8 7 And Hwt iii predsely what an agent-*bas.ed ethic implies a,boul: the conceptu1aI stmchnre of mu mora.l thought Nonetheless, there are al: lea,st some sihrn,lions in which even 11eiry since1re moral agents recognize that 1:hey mrnmlly ougM to do something 9(];1,:y Hum what they mre (1most strongly), mo1:ivat:r~d to do. This is typically described rus iJhe exp,~rlence of consdenbiousness or a "'.sense of duty," and deontologists in pad:kular ue hikely lo 11uspect that an ilgenit*based ethk simply c,n,,not ruccount for this real and recognizable mon1Jll phenomenon. This fa becai:me conscientiousness appears to be a classic case of "adlng on principle" , .. that is,. of conforming to tile dictates of am a,dim1-guid ing principle or rnle thm,t spedfies o1i' identifies which actions a1re right, in a way that is dearly independent of one's mol:ivahon to perform the,m (bemuse the dearest example of a sense of d1.1ty arises when one is in fact motivated to do something else), Since we lmve seen tha:1: any agent-based ethk cannot explai:n the goodness of any fonn of mohval::io11 pd1narily in, terrns. of a co.rnmi1ment to ad:i111g om pri11dple, it may seem tlhat an agcmt .. based ethk cam10t admit l:hrnt a genui11ely virtuous p<c>i'Sotrt would <'Vfl' ,~xpedenn' th,, kind of inner conflict P'.7 > See alr.m Tro.r1:to1 \,vho hurt em.phar-dzed_ that an kfoaf COT(tco_ption of care 11provir.fof1 a fltandurd hy which we can judg<' [the] adcq,rncien" of adual rnring ucUvitics (1993: '!'.[()), 79 thilt a sense of duty seems to p]*em]ppose. Yd many peoplle do find a sens.' of ,.h1ty to be morally admirable. An agent .. based rnpproach does itmply that actions 11ro morally bettor to His not obvfo1rn that defenders of :mch an ethic t1eed to ~pologize for this irniplicatim1. I1or 1if we take seriollsly that idea tha,t henevolemx, (or loving aUention or c.ue) is 1.he kind of prnctinil aUitude we morafly ought l:o take up toward ouir feliows, thet1 Bernard 1Nilliatms (among others) seems irir;hl to suspect lfo1.t a person who is always keepin,i; am eye on morn I. ni!e.~ will frequently have "one UmugM too many" (1973), .. This is because what is p,utiicu.nlarly adrnfrahl.e about tlmse kinds of motiva,tions is the way in whidh they "conned,,. a 1noml agent's interests dil'ectly to the inler,,sts aild concerns of other peopfa, a11d tb:is me,ms that there will bf! at least some s1ituations 111 which an agent who aippeals. to niora.Jl rules Hke "beal othel's c1s emh onlly and to be less i;enminely benevolent, m* less deeply rn.ring than a pernoil w Im ads rnn 1mothe1t' s behalf witlho11t rieedinf; to appeal lo such rules. Of course, if one does not believe that benevolence aind rnring a,ee mo1ratly ,11lmirahle then one may not be particularly impressed by tllis poinL And whether the exmnpfo glveri by W1iliiams,. in whJich a man carri e1itlher save a to1:all stmnger from drowning or save his wife,. is one of those cases wilil depend 011 what one takes tbe most admirahle form of motivation to bl'.88 Hul 88 A.11_ ethic H1,al er11doimes m.m"e parhali forrns nf care seemstn r.ugp;est [.hat ff 1Nould he "one rJ1ou1iht to rr1rtany1r for tht'.* man Lo check on t:hn P''"\:rrni.sHihility of saving hJ\s, w.i.fo, beca.us<> ff conte1J1ds tl1t11t a dired: concern. for Lhmm with vvhrnnr1: om\ Jr,. i.n s.onw. kind of o-ngoinc rclations.hi_p lieg:itimutcly override$ a co11tcr:.rn for total sfrangers .in situations of Lhis so.rL BuL an ethic th.tlit e.ndl.urseN m.ore universal for.mbl ofhm1:evolenco r-mgg~sLs Lhat 'iil would be rmUr-dy appropriate for su.ch a sib1alion Lo ptive the man pi:rnse (nvnlil if he ult:im.ately opted t.o r,;aivn his 80 many people ,ue convinced that ilhere is al Ierust sometb.ing r1iglit abcmi Williams'' example,. rund 1in the context of the autono.my / ca1ri11g der1mle this point takes on a great demi: of importa1rnce. !1or it suggest1, that therre is al:m somcll:1i11g ri~;ht about Ne! Nodd.illlgs' s claim that "principles function to sepanlll:e us from one another" (1984: 5, ~.:m.lQ'ha,sis nll!ll\:"), and h1cmce l:h,1t tlw insights of the cmre-rnrie111:attion cannot be explkated within a principlP-l:n1sE1d ethic. Given the disl:iind:ion I ma.die i1rn §'t3, 1it miglht at first seem l:hat Noddings is confl,din1~ the methodological debaile abm1t the place of inornl niJles with the much more overarching sepairale11esi,/ connededm,ss deloate about l:he pdmary 1noml values. Hence, it 1uriglht rn.lso seem tlhiat th,~re is no reason for her to reject ,i pnindpie of beneficence! or utilllly. One,~ we recognif'.e thad: even moral agenls who rely oin connection-ba,sed moratI principles willJ &equently show themsel:ves lo he Iess folly conneded to other people Hurn Noddings (like Wilhams) _presmnably believes we mornUy ought lo be, however, it turns out that care-ethidsbJ, do have umdershmdable J:'ea,1mns fo reject m.ore l:rnditim1atl moral views. To 01e extent 1.lhal they are coned to insist thcit,certlllin kinds of deep inte1,personal i:om1ecti.ons are ITTmordly appropriate, ii seem1, faidy clear Hmt an agent-liasedl ethic wi.lJ be in ,l Imich betlccr position l:o capture the mmal significance of those cmmed1irnns than any more mle*** govem.ed accmmt Even if we rugree thai it is beUer to act benevolently than from rn sern,e of duty, however, we must srnrely also admit that It fo loeUe!f l,0 ad frmn a sense of duty Hmn to ad m,1le11olently .. Hence, ain ,1gent-base,dl ethic must b,; able to explaint why a, sense of duty leads lto acts Urat are RI lc'm,J rn•il11i1mally w:i.fo in IJw ond) :~Jlnco his dirod cor1.Cer1n fo:r his '\Nifo would corn_pete wUh his. d.iT<;ct concerrr1 foe Lhc~ slsangorr-;. 81 *11 , *•J *«1 • * *11 " lbl" ,,, .. " ( mrnrn y permwsrn e,, even n 1 'lley are no, espec11a y 1no. e or Jlmt• as Aristotle would say), But !~iven what we have seen, ahout IIK! way in which a,n agent-baised ethic genernites a derlvabive a,ccoimt of morn I niles, it i1, in fod possible foir such an app1ma,eh to endorse a scnr• ti of duty i1rn a,t ki,;rnt a, condiitional way.89 And 1if we think dearly ,1bo11!: wha,t makes ill sense of duty tnorr*ally adm.imble, this co1nd1itio111e1I .rndernla111ding is 1101: obvious.ly inappro* The ffrst thing to nohce 1is Hnat a p1uelly conventiorml sense of duty is not particularly admirable, as Jonal:haI1 Henne!± points out in his arrtide on "The Consciew1ce of Huckleberry JPinn" (19741)., When Biuck a1;onizes over whether to d1lsdose the~ whererubm1ts of hlis friend Jim (a,n escaped slave), it is a sense of d1.1ty thillt appearn fo. be telling Huck that h1c ought lo alert the authorities, and some other motivation (be111evollence, friendship, follow .. feeling, or some such) tlhaJ is prompting Iiim, not fo do what hi.a nmsdcncP says. Some people may th.ink IJ11ad: B11ck might to Im ve followed Info conscin1rn iI1 this case, but imost of us bc~lieve he is to be admired for dfoolbey1ing it ... , a Jim:Ri;ment that fa presumablly baisc)d on the forther judgment that Jfock's heHefs aibout what duty requires were simply false, Ilut H we ,~re Jffepared t.o say tlrmt,, then, it seems that whe11 iit comes l:o the adm.irnbility of a se118,' of duty, s1lrn1ply acting on, pdndple is not w lhat is irn porrlant; mtln1f!J",, what i.s important is acting oin tlhe right sort of pri.1Tidple (nam,ply, a morally approp1riate one),. Given this fad, a deontofogisl n:rny want to insist that bernmw Huck had fa1llse lleliefa abornt momHly, he did not in fad possess a seuse of: dl!ly at 891!:-forn again, I am gratnful lo l\;Hc:h,11d Slol.n fo:r providing .r.nP *with hls as yd un_ptihHF,hed writings on this isr,me. 82 a1L To do this is to adopt a moll'(~ specfolized notion of duty, of whid1 Kanfs notion is surely tile most famoUls .. !BUit Kainfs idea that duty is ,1 maitter of adheñnce to aiutrmomo1.rnly m,rrde laiws lhait fhre subjed: to p1rocedun1l categorical i1rn.pcrative checks is surr*ely not the only way of umcforsfanding ouusense of duty_90 To Jl'etmrn to Bennett's example, therefore, we might also wa11t: to say that Huck did in fad have a sense of duty, and one Uu11t (almost) led him astmy.91 And if we are prepared fo say that, then we mr*e weH on the way l:o understainding how a sense of duty can be mornUy .i,dmirabl,e according to an agent--based v1iew .. We have already seen that an age111t-based virtue ethic does prmdde I.ls with a derivative rneco1mt of which sorrts of pd111ciples m*e nH)niUy i1pprop1riate (in the form of s1J1m11:Jilll''JI rules). l:Ie11ce, i think we can say Hnat an agent who ,5Jm:erely believes, for example that umlversal benevole111ce is 1:Jhe most ad1m1i.rnMe moral motive, and who corns,dentiously ,1hides by Ute "sum,m,uy rrnles" of a, belllevo.l.ence-based ethk in sitrnations where slw iis not. moved by henevolem,e more dfrecHy, will exhibit a motivation Hmt is surely good emiugh to 1,nake her acti.ons morally permissible. }7eeHng the pull of orw's sense of d inly in the face of motiva,tiions to do otherwise will cerl:a.iniy be less admfrable than foeling the pull of a.dmira.lAe m.otivattons m.ore d.irecUy or more overwhelmingly, But i.ff 011e does feel the forJ(Jrne!I' sort of pull, thr-n oñ''s overall motivatfonail state does at least seem to be isubjed l:o the so.rM:s of motiv<11tions 1:ha,t, according to an agent--based ethic, udl:imately maikP one's adions rii~ht.92 Of i:ornese, an agent-baised ethic wnl only find ain agef!t:'s 901_ owe this _po:i.1nl. to T\lancy Sl1n1i1:n a . 91Julia Annas ,mys IJ1is abmit Uw "lwro" in Ll.1,0 novel Effi flrfosl (1988). 92] owe!* this po.i11L [.o Mi:ichad Slot;e, See also Gm'.da. (1990; 85,ft)i. who Gt.i~~,gt::;;L~,. lhuLlhe ronscfonU1.ous agen1 has two rmrnons 'Q.o net: 1:h.e vtrluomi mot:fve vvhich (on Carda's agcmL• 83 t*ecognition tlhat a certain acbon is "the x*ight thing to do"' l:o be admirn:bfo if JI is based on her (focH} acceptam:,i of the summmry mies e11dors1~d by a partic11lar @ge11t--based accmml:.9~ Hut unless we are 11Uerly convinced tlhat the deontologisl'r, rrwra,1 pirincipfos aire in fad: corred, Uuer:e is no obvious reason why we should rejed this way of undex*stinding what iii, admirable about a sense of drnty, 2.6 Si.dg;wkk's owerrl'lilr,,lrnt * If the foregoing is corn,cl:,, then there iii 110th1ng parl:icula1rly im .. will often make rrefanmce to "a sense of pernona,l ideal." (ñcall Clh. J, p. 24, albove). NoneU1eiess,, many philosophers seem com1faced Uml assumptnmw a.lmurt the ad1nfraloility of cerl:ain rnotives are too complex a111d urn,1:ablle fo b,~ar the kind of foumdatnona,l weilght lhey rnn, g1i11en wWnLn agent- .. based views,. Since 111.al daim hrns to do wiH1 the formall sbmctmre of the theory, we need to undershmd wI1y it too is unwruranted. And the best way to see thi.s, l lhink, i's to see why Sidgwick's crilidsms of James Martineau ultimallely fail to hi1t thei1r mark 94 In the second volume of hiis Types l:f Efhical Tlwory, Mm:Uneau develops an ,~xtremely detailed scale of human mobivations that places reverence for God at tile apex, foHowed very dosely by com.passion, and piroceedh1g hasedl. accm1nt) iv*ou..nd.s l:h.e judgmonL that a certain a.cllOn. lH wrong,. and R.he ccYnsdenbnur; des.in-~ not to d.o vvhat is wrolllg. ]n hit,; viewf lhi.s shows tha1L co:nsc:ientio1:~B.rmss fa. not ti:hQ .highesL 1:noraI vhenomenon, Hince t..hc* co.m;d.m:1.t.iot1s ago-nt .rcqui:ires mo:re reas-Ot!.fl t.o a.cl morally l:har.1 flw rno:m vill'tuous pt:*rNon. 9?i] do not: 1ne1u, lhaL agents nrntrnt l,e mora[ phHosophnrs in order to possess a s<-1:m;e of dul.y. Bu.L the c!grnn.t tnust at least believe/' for nxam.pfo, Hrnt lrw;'n:wvole:nce is an aohn_irabl{\ rn.olivaHon, and tha1l. the act.ion vvhi.ch :;,J1e .iH nwtivuted to perform *would m,h.ibi.t. a dep]cn'ab]ip lack o.fib~:ncivofon,x-1.-, :Un o:rrdm" l.o "ñcognJ\ze''' that ,ir;he ought. f.o do something c-faP. 94.For d18u~.ssio1r1 arnd histo1i1.ca.l cont:r.xL1 mw. Sch:nenwind (1986, ChEip. 8). 84 through l!ower molives wh.ich Jndm:le, 1i11 {hir, ordleT: Jove of powei* for oneself,. resentment towa1rd others, love of gain for <meself, love of ease or sensm1l ple11s1u1*e,. and vindidi11eness towards ol:hern., His defomw of this nmld111.g ir; based on a p,uti.cul,uly odd Mt of numd psychology; in his view, we always experience ouir inner motivations 1in pauirs,95 By irefled:ini; on l:he 11arfo11s pairs of motives we expedence at: different l:in*H,s,, he argues tha,t ,rny individual will evenhmllly come fo embirnce lhe s,1,1ne rmrnkirr1g he prnvides, and lhe contends that if people di0ag1ree about his rain kings, th1is is berntJse they have not yet e,cperienced enough pairs of motives (1!89'1: 37-48),. bi a,ddilfon, he arrgues that an ,Ktion is alwruys right 1if it is done from, fhe better (orr higher), of tbe b,vo motives that ,u,'c inciting th,~ agent to action at il:he moment of moral choice, and that run adi.on is aiways wwng ff it is done from tlne lower of nhe two nioUves (Ibid.: 2:70),, lEve111 the best of morn.J rug:en!s may stilll be subjed: to "rational" or "prndential" ,irrom while aUennpting to dete.nnine the most effective means for rernlizing their hii~lhest motnves. Ih1t 1:hat sod of error is not, in Mmrbinea,1.111; view,, the distinctively moral orne, and hence, the moral value of the action hies solely in the quality of its nwtiive (Ibid.: 232--5; 275). Mmtineau's rigid ranking of molives entaiib, that, with respect l:o any pair that might be "co-,present" within an rngenit,, one o:f them is ahvays. t!w he1:ter motive to ad from. (i.e., it fa always better to ad from compassion tllmn from resenhnent, always beUer 1:o ad. froirn lov1° of gain than low• ol ,•ase),. U ir:; 1:hls fatter daim 1:hal: S.idgwkk finds i.mpl.ausilble, insisting that. "it is impos, 95 AIU1ough. t.he asnu.rnption puit"'fl of rnotivm; iH cHidr t.lll~ hi--H.lic point iH not: MarUnPtm ls a1lteniptin.g to d.istingu.ish 11'volu_nl;aryt1 adimt•-~r which do admit of moral asm:r,;sJne:nL, frm:in. 11r;pon.l:annous.11 actions which, (in his vie,,v) slem frcnn_ a sJinpJe 1111.oLivn mnd Lht~rC::fore do nol (1891: :-\3ff). Ag,enls nnPd not have\ explicit k.now1cdge of tho nrnking of mot:.h.mr-; in order to ad m.m:*ally, hoV1rcvcr; they need 011'.1.iy 11a feding, 1:tlll.c to tho nia[ :re[alions of duty, that this i& worlbim, Lhon that" (Ibid.: !58). sible to assign a definite a11d consbmt ethik:all vatl.ue to each different kind of motive, wJtlhout 1reforence to the parLic11fall' circumstances under which it lms arisen, ... and the cmisequem.:es l:o which this [motive]] wm11ld lead in any padicu1lar caise" (1907: 3-69}. More spedfical1ly, he ,,ngues thal: "it is by no means to be laid down as il i~enernJ ruJ.,i Hmt compassion ought to prevaH" over rresentmen1 in all cases (Ibid.: 3'71), ,ind sim,Had:y, he s1.1ggesll:s thal "fovc of ease" 1111ight som.etin11es be) legitimately reg~1rded more highly Uum "love of ga.in." lnh~restingly, however, he does 11otimmediately say thal: 1Ji1e probkem with Mairl:nneau''s ranking Jlie§ 1i111 ils lack of sern,itivily to the res11lts of ai person's 11cting on various motives in pecufou cfrcumstances. IRaH1.er, his first ohjectim1 is to .Martineaa11s failnu'e to appeaJ, to the I!J!iit sort of 1moli11es: I t:hinlk tha1t tlho11gh 1:he stmgglle rnuighl: be1~in as a dueJ between resentment and comprnssion, or between love of case and love of gain, it wou.ld not be fo11ght out in the llists so dm.wn; higher motives 1,vould inevitably be called in as the conflid we111t on, regard for jusbice and soda,! welll*••heing on the side of n,sent• rm,nl.,, regaird for health and 11Himate efficiency for work on 1:he side of love of ernse; and it would be the in1r0:1c11eniim1 o.fJh~~§': h~ghei' motives tl:iat would decide the st:mgg[~ (Sklgwkk, 1907: 372, my_empha1s.is). This su1gge,,ts 1:hat tbe prolblem with Martineau 1s 11pproach has lesr, to do with his attempt to begiII with an 11ssessment of lhuman motiviltions, tham with the specific motives Jh,? takes to he ethkaHy IJasic. fo Sidlgwkk's view, bJe fails to t*ealnze that nisentment nmy someti1nes Ile an exJH'ess1ion of a m me over-* arching or "supremely reg11labve 11 1:rwtive, like "regmtd fol' Jiustice" mt 11crñce1m for sociaJ well-being." Once we irernlize this, the 1*eal questiion is whelherr compassion rnr eer;a1cd for jt.mbicP is the b,~\t(>r motivc, 96 96NoUce thaL the pa.tr of nr-mpremdy regulait-iv<-~11* *motives S-tdgwtck pli.cks out st:,:ms Lo oxrn:np.Hfy IJ:11e 11sepa111"alnm:Hs/ cormoctndness' 1' tmmion th1a-1,L, ar; J suggost,;d Jn Ch.a.ptnc ()n{i, cha.racl.c::rtiz.nH tlt grea.l mas1y no:rrna.tive debates in \Alcstern moral LhoughL It is thus nol 86 I I " Put rnnotber way,. Sidi~wick's point is 1101110 m m:lh that res,enlnwnl is in fod smnething we jm:lge to be beUer,. as .i moliY.\'), than compm;sion (,1 daim. wh.ich I think would b(~ highly uniinl:uitive}, bu1t thmt given Ma1rbineau's ass111rnplkm lhal .molives, always come solely in pairs, it is impos.r;ihll,~ for hiim to give place fo the "regard for justice" that Siclgwick deems necessary to ground omr jm:lgments in this kind of case, It is imporhmt to 1rnotice, however, tl11<11l: it is the fad that ii: appearn to be lbette1r to ad f11*om compassion 1mlher thani resentment only on some of the occasions wlnen tbese two motives are at odds 1:ha1: makrc;G Sidgwick wo11der albm1t: the n,~ed to invoke a hJighe1* m* more supremely regnlativ,) motive in order to settle conflid:s at lovver l,Nefo.97 Ami tbe 1mme se<?ms to be lrue wi1:h the mot[vei: of "love of ease''' and" ambition." Hence,. Sid11wkk's critidsm telfo us something im prnrtant a lboul: H1c) mobves on Martineau's list-*namely, tha,I: H1ey do not S(':P:111 to be the most ethka lly significant or overarching n1otivati:onal phe11.ome11a .. Bui: tlnfo does not yet show that it is impossiMe to defend a ranking of these ITWre overn,rchinr; motiv,~s,, without thereby prod udng cmml:erimh1ilive condtisfons aboU1t he relative value ofr lower motives amd ]hence the (derivrntive) 1righlx1ess of specific ads .. 93 NU r_pdsi.ng Lha:t. he finds JJ d*i.f§k:ult o deter:1:m.ine whid1 of thcm-i Lwo candid.a[J~f: 1s !Jw most. ll<lmirablr>. 97vvhetJuer res{~li'.1tmnienR. f~hou Id in fad 1LK~ viewed 1J1ri an exprer1sim1 of _iu.stkr: has received. co1t1si(fo:1~able aUenUon oflatt~. Jnf.frie Murphy defen.dEt the pos.ition Sid.gwick r.;nnms to he holding., and Jean Ham:pton airguos against, it:,. in thofr joh-1t voium.e, Forgivcnet;fl and Mercy (1988: <'flpeci11lly Cha,ps. ].</.), 5r,e also Nusshu11111 (1992,), who arg111es !Jial. juslicn aihNayr-; .1tequirres n:ns lo ~~xh[hit co1tupaHsio-r1, 9ãkhrn_:"<-~Wind Jpoirrrls out that U1i:s is lf)fOdHel.y what. Si.dg,11.1k:k t-.l-1.inks-he rrrust sbovv. r*l:is disa1g:rfK~ment with l\,1arl.:ineau .1H 11(YVer the iHsue ofwh(:lher w.ha1 "i.s ccnL1tv,] to a r:rwn:il ti1:eo.cy !f:l conskle:mU.on of lhe good 11nss o:r bad.n(-:ss o.f tho chu1rn,der of .moral ag<:11.l.sr o consideration of the righlinoss or wror,gnc;sH of tho ads moral agents perform .. 11 Contmnporary mo-raiJ1 pTh.ilosopherH have 11:ncfod to irnsm1r11e that if either posi.Uori is ~'orrod.r il 1s Lhc-laLLnr. l311t 1S-idgwick diid not l11inl<. the: Tona!:Lnr e--nHrdy obvim:iiS1 11 and he.ld t.hllL 111\!1an:tt.r11oau1i;; pmiitiom must: therefore be ju.d.ged as [any] theory i.s.-j11.dged, in lP:r'.nw of if.n 87 Sidgwick goes on to irnsist that "ff a serious (jUestion of cond od is mised, 11 he camiol: conceive of "dedcling it mornHy by ar1y comparison of motives below l:he !highest" (1907:: 372} It is easy to see why ii. would be aU:l!'ad[ve to find ru "supiremdy regulative" motiv(-! of this sort, though it i's perhaps not as olbviollls as Sidgwicl takes it to lbe th,ait we should expect to find one.99 In any event, he does not stop to consider the por.sibillily of a, plurniilly of reguladive motives .. And whaJ is especially importrnnt for our purposes here is to 11otice that Sidgwidk im medirntdy interprets the idea of regulation by a supreme motive a conseq11enttiialfot fashion: the comparfaon ultimrntely dedsive would lbe not between tJte lioweir 11111otives pwinunlly conflicting, 1ml between 1:he effects of llhie di!i!erent !lines of com:h1cl: to which these lowc11* moUves respcd1ively prcom pt, CQll~idlf,'.f•~t!_l1n 11*,•!,Jl:JionJo 1-Y]1a,te\/e1: we ir.egard as the ulHmale end m enc!!~ of reasonal:,Je ii1ctio111 (Ihi:d.; emphasns m1i.ne). The suggestion here is tbat it is (achievement ojf) the goals of the "supremely regullati.ve" motiv,, (whatever it uWmaldy tun-ns out to be) tbat wiH ultilmatel1y fix the motive's value. And tMs is simpiy assumed without argument. But as a great deal of work in moral psychology has recently emplmsized, lherre are many kinds of rnoHvatirm thait we do, in fad, aidmfre withol.11: necessadly believing that they help to achieve m11y kind of "ullimate enid,11 and indeed t:h,~we seen1 to be a mimher of motives tha,twe admiire even while thinking !lmt ~--------~- --------------- ability to account for the cl.ala and to :1t1rH:et tho oHl()-r :ireq-ufron1onls which Lb.eorkfl 1111.1,r,;t 1ll:11Qd11 (.Schrnmwind,. 1986: 2:47; d. 256), 99Noh-! that Kant r;:omns to 1:J:i,ink of tht: 11-rr1r10t.ivo <if dut,i' as s1.1premdy regu!aUve in. th.is '(,vay, Af; wn havn seen, hov,.revr.r, hn interpreh; the idoa of regulalion hy a supre:rrne motive in 1Lern1B of UM! agenl's connn.ilhnm1t o the .Moral Law,. and HO his view ir1 afoo nol enlirdy agr:*int-bmind. 88 they ,1,re 1i11 some sense cmmterpmdudive orr likely to produce Jess thmt, desirable effocfa)OO U is, of course,, rn fairly small s,tep from Sidg;wick 1s suggesbm11 fo tlrtP claim thrnt conflid:s between llower motives can be resolved dinxtly, by 1teforence to theilf 1''ulti1nate einds" -** a step wlhidt Sidr;wick himself im,. 1medialelly takes. And froin there, it fa perhaps a.n even smafler step to the claim that actions lliemselves can be evaluated in hirms of 1:heiF effect~, therelby obliterating th,~ need to make any 1reforenco to motives at alt Hut consequontialism produces notoriiously counleri11tu1itive condm,ions in many cases, irnd Sklgwkk has not yet shown that it is rn:xessairy fo rely on a riigid ranking of motives (as does lVfartl11eau), nor to evalm11te motive11 solely in terms of their cmtseqnences (as does Sidgwkk himself), fr1 order to resolve potential conflictr, hehveen .motives amd develop a more 1mified accoiu1t of what the moral life is like.1ffl ]For if we could artictnlate am:l de fond a 11rnm'e overarching rn-wtival:1ional ideal,, or "k!ea]I of moral ch;irader," we could !lhen evahla,te potenbirnHy conflkblng motives (rnr co.mplexes of mol:iv,1tions) int remw of how well, or to what degree, each of them exemplifies or sen1es as a 11ecessa,ry consbltuent of tlhat ideaL 'JOO A:rmeUo Ha.for (199"1) interp.rellJ; Hume 1:w dnfoJ1ditng u theory of v.tduc ind11ding nutne:rmm m.otivns of this sort; less histo-r.kal disruBsions arc found in _f<1anagan (l 991.)1 Foot (l\!H'.1), Sl.oLc, (19B'.1), Williams (1981; l 985), and Wolf (1982), Of course, m,tny of lhc,sc, rnotivcn may not ln-:-morall.y a1dm:ira.hll.P. The point h,-'.-re is simply t-hat !l1erc; is no !'ea.son Lo accept Sidgwic.T:(1S: twsusn1ptli.ou that if we consider ti mn;oliv<: to h(:* gouct vve -rrnrnL do rw on the baf'i:ifl of furlhe.r assumplions aho11.ltl , \1hat ends ar(: good. lOJ AHhough he if; gnne*raUy sympathotk Lo Si.dgwick1s cril:idBrns, Sd11nec~wi.11d poinLu out Sidg:w.ick never quite con-ws to grips-wKh *Mad,incuu's dairn ttlw,L o:nly t.hn assnt;s.:menl of motives its 1'111 .n1.aJt.er of disli:ind]y rn10Fal conn;r.n 11 (1986: 255--6). 89 To see tlriis, com,ider the impHrntions of a them*y trreati11g 1mh1,!rsal benevol!ence as an ideal of moral clharader. 0111 such a view, the most a1dmirnble fonn of 1nm*al motivation wou.ld be a deeplly feH concern for lh1umm (or sentient) beings generally. ]\fore limited (complexes of) motiva tions sn.nch as compassi.on and kfrndness would l:he11, be evaluated dirredly in, tenns of the extent to wlhidh H1ey approximated universal be1nevolence, ,rnd actions would he judged derivati1vely In terms of l:i1e ñlalive vallm~ of the (cou1plexes of) motives that piroduce them. Such air1 aipproa,ch may seem too monoHtlhk for our plrmarHstic aige, bid i1 would certainly be no 1more monolithic thain utilitarianism. And ind,~ed, it would seem to serve as a kiind of" aigenb-lbasedl anaiog" of 1:ho utilih:ul'ian moral outlook Sidgwick himsdf seems to p1refor. 102 Meanwlhik~,. I thinlk ii is a mistaike to conceive of m1dvernaiI benovolence •** or any 0U1er ideal of nwraJ chmrader that tnighl be p1mposod **** as a 1111.ilarry form of n1.obival:ion, and he!1ce I suspect that ain aigent-baised ethic of univorn,aJ henevolenc~1 wm:nkl tmrn ornt fo l,,oc, much Jpsn mrnnolHhic than ulti!lttarian mm*,.11 views. for a motivdi.onall ideal is best conceived m; m1 ovornrchir~gpraclkaJ attitudo 1fo1t would presrnmably be the resuillt of a highly complex sei ol molivati.mrn, aind while H serves as a tmnchshme by which an agent--hasc!d ethic evalrnaites varim.1s motivdim1al states, in rn11 uch i:.h,, same way ltmt Hie ideal of utility serves as ai touchstorm by whi.ch a ut1i.litarian ethic evaluates various i;lat-,s of affairs, ii: seems dear that the motivational idea!: m1'g:ht very weU be consl:ihnted or rrealized in differrent ways by different morn! agents. Th.ere are presumably some cmce motivaiticms Hiat would Imve to be d:mraderr Inti ts of 1025J[ol;e (199S: !\11) offers a nouch more thorough discussion of this point. than [ can provide here. 9!) I anyone who was g,~11u1ineiy possessed of a spedfk Jdeall (e.g;., compassim1 ,.ind kim:lness in the case of unive1rsal he11ev0Ie11ce),. but thefle may well be a h1rgl, 11111m ber of motives of whkh rn fo impm'l:anl: for ev0c,ry n1101ra.l awmt to have at le11st some, lnit of which it iii by no means necessary, or even possible, for ,my given moral rugent to have evei'y one. In othe1r words, while the nõio11 ofc a motivatkmaI ideal sets certain tJh.ernretirnl constraints on 1:hE, sorts of motives th,lt are thought to lbe involved in moral activ1i ty, it allows that the sp,,'cific pa.tl:erin of mot1ivations which enab.les actual moral agents l:o lfve up to or realize any given motivaticmal ideal [!light differ significa,111tly from one pernon to the next In addil:ion, notke lJmt ll1e dai1m Hrnt the pmrbicular mom! viirtues are lu be specifi(~d in lten1r1s olf their rela1:irmship to the compJex motivational idea.I is not tJh.e cllaim. that the parti1cuiar v1i1:tues mre all and only forms of lhat ideal Some character fraits might simply be possib.le s11prorl:s of the idea,!: cournge m fortih1dE, for example, migM be Umnglht necess,ny t(J Inve up to the ideal of 11rniver*s,1l henevolen1ce in numy rnses, and 1,0 count as gen1.1i11e virtues, even though iit seems undeniable thal: ,icting courar;eous.ly wiII not always or inevitably be am ~,duall expression of benevole11ce. Similarly, other traits might be highly sihiation•-specific expressions of fã, ideal: rrwre parlfol forms of care, for example,. might co uni: as genuine virtues insofar as they are occaisfonally com1patilbie with a more universal benevolem:e, even though m1 agenb-lbased ethic of un.ilve1rnal 1Jenevole111ce im.phes Hmt it J's IJeU:.-)r to ad on 1:nore 1miw 0 rn/ll foirmi; ofi co111c1'rn wlwllPVl'l" possihl0. lf/,w both, of UwM• reasons, we might require an extremely detailed vfrtue-th~QlJ( (n,,call the di1,l:incUon in §2J) i1n order to folly charaderize the p,uRJicuL,r virli]<E!S 1:hrnt are crrncially im1olved i11 the oveirarchimg ideal (and l:o disl:inguish them from om' 91 another), let alone to d1,airaderize al! the other d:iaracter IJmits that might !be rel81ted to the mol:ival:ional ide8il in some people but need not he prcesent iln every virhrnus agent Hut a,n a,g;ent-based ethtc does. not (Inke Martineau1 1s theory) regrnire us to defend at r•,ig.id rnnk1ing of m,oUvrntions or fo assunw Hmt motives will always come in pairs, and .11eitlier does it assume tliat any single m.otive is "supremelly regl!lattive" in! tlJe way that tlw lamtian motive of duty, or the utiiii:llrimrn comrmitment to producing aggregate w,>.lfare,. is cOJIHilOIJly taken to be. Rather, it insists 11:hat any given compl(~X or patterm of 1.noti11es that maker, up a1n rngent's motivational i;llde can he assessed in l:erms of how f1.1lly they exemplify (or enable the agent to "'live up fo") the 1rrwre overarching ,:;thirnI ideal. Iii Iight of S1ldgwlck's doub1n about the abiHty of Mrnrtineau's theory to resolve conflids betwee11 vairiom; motives, it is wo,fh melilt:iomi111g briefly how rnn rngelilt ..basecl ethic that was grounded i11 the ideal of urti,versall be111:c,11olenn! would effect such a task.. Since mCLiveirsal or g,:;nen1,liz,:;d malevolence .... that is, rn pradical desire fo han111 other people -** represents not only a failurP to live up to the iregi1fative idernJ,. but a moti11atiimmll slate that 1is i11 fad antiJhetical lo it,. it would dearly be considered the most deplorable form of motivation, with mailevol!ence toward sped.fie groups (e.g., rn.eial or 1religiimrn com** munities) being on!y t1Iigh1tly foss problematic, followed by .rnrnJ!evole111ce towmrd specific i1id[viduais. Meanwhile, benevolence clfrected toward ,my spedfic individ mil (indu1ding: oneself) would lbe <1ssessed fo ii: foirly posit:i:11e li.gM, but benevolence towamis l!arger gi'Cmps of indi.vkhrnls wo1.11ld pre* sm.m1bly be even bc~tler, and 1mivemal !benevolence woul.d of course b1* com,ideired the best motivrnffoti of aliL Meanwlhile, 0,ince molives like courag1) seeim to contribute to the oveni,U goodness of any bene11ol;ent motivadion'"l 92 sta1te, but mightequ1a1lly well! conh'ili:mte to line overall badness of any malevolent mol:ivatiom1l state,. they will nol lbe ,1r,signed a definite moml vafoK' independently of the other motives that a,re present 11.may seem. to some people t:hat asm,r,siing 1rn0Uves by how well they "approximale" an idlernl of mora.1 chamder fa miacceprably vague. llnterer,tingly, however, 1*ece11t work .in the philosophy of mind lends credence 1:o the view that this is in fad whrnt we ,ue doing when we uoake any kind of jt1dgrn1ent According to the views X have i11 ,nind, delibem1fon procer,ds by comp,u*i11g new exeu1plars of a phenomenon to a1 stoñdl prntolype in orcll,m, to s(,e how closely tlwy resemlJfo one another,. m* IJy "seei1n1; thrnf'' a dedsioin with which one is confrnnO:ed is. analogous to a parndig.m G1se or instrn11,liatcs a certain prnttem)O'.~ A1nd if these accouinlcs are correct, then it rnay not be por,s1ibl.e,. even 1111 theory, to specify tlfJie necessrury and suffidenl com:lilions for judging that a partic11l1H' mol:ival:im1 is mondly rndmira.ble,. Meanwhifo, even ff it ult1imately does tnun out lo be poss1iblle to, spec1ify such comJl[t1ions il1 theory, thE!J will certainly he highly complex•complex enough to make it very unlikely Urntt any moral agen1: is able to LN!ly on U1em when confronted vvit11 a niew <1.nd ifficult rnse. For practical purrposes, tlnerefore, H seems en1frely a.ppmpriate lo use the n0Um1 of 11appmximatin1; an idleal" as a toudmfone for ma evaluabol'ls ofvrnrfous motives,. ]/1wtiJfylrng m<!llla1i11,11Hol!lall i&e.il s Ciritics sometimes com plain IJ1at any vi1rtue-hased ethk inevitalily lr1c,ats a par1ticufar th,eo1isl:1s own (idiosyno*atic and/ or c11]turally conditioned) beHefs 11bout whrnt s.oi"IB of motivations are most rnomily admirable a.s cerllllh1 'H)3Fori" somn rno-ml dJscm~si.onH of how these proñR,,s: tni.ght he _involvc~<l fin motaf jud8Ctt<,nt, see Ch11rd1land (1996), Dworkin (19%} and .lohnnlon ('1996). 93 andl imm1me lo co.rredion in a way Hmt is inleileduai.lly offeñive as weJI ali m.oraUy lrn1.1bllesome, But tMs S\)1"1: off problem is ailso not 1miiqm~ to vfrhie•* el:hin11l theories (IHlumfaouse 199".l: 228ff). Cornsiider the debates omorng u11:iliforians about whether 1moralHy requires us, to maiximize m simply 1mtisfice wfll}n resped to tile gen,ern1l welfore,. or whether the prdndple of uliHly should be applied to specific aids or to r;enernl mles; and mnong kar11ia,ns over how m ud1 1infonnriatfon can and shouid be included in an agent's maxims., or a,bout wllrn,t kind of categoirirnl impera.t1ive test fo e1npioy in assessing the momI penn1issibiHly of those 1maxim[ls. fa many cases, tlhese sorts of ilntmthem*etk disag;reeme11ts (like disputes ,1bm1t what general tJwory•*lype is best to adopt) seem lo be genenited by preH1emetk dfaagrreemenh; about what sorlli of nmchllsimm a mm*al theorry needs fo be able to generate, and those latter conclusions are thereby taken l:o bo "immune, to cm*n,dirm," relative io other parts of the thernl'y as a whole. Vfrh11c ethicists are no 1]11ore exem1pij from these difficulties than pmpo11ent~ of runy otlher typ,! of rn,oml theory .. lflut: if they differ,. as a g:roup, from prnpm1ents of other appmaches, it is surely only wil:h respect fo their views ill bout what lypes of judgments are most morally ba.liic (namely, Jiudg11111ents about motives rntl:ie1* th,m judgm.enl's about action-• guidi11g prindples or stales of affairs) and n,ot with respect to tlleir willingness to lest those jmlgmenfa and revise them if necessary, In fad, agent--based theories a,ro abfo to test their grround floor assm11p** Hons about mom[ motives 1ln 1:wo distinct ways. First of alll, any diainn ,1bm11. morn! motiva1tiion mmit be compatible with ourr knowledge of hmna.n psydwlo1,;y mrnre gen,emJJy. Empirical! e11i(fonce cannot, by itself, telil ur; what nwhves we ought h1 adruiJe,. but fads allout the types of creah1rre1; we are illduding fads aiboul mu natu1rai sociability rus weU as omr exiGlence as 94 sepande indlvid!llals -* dlo pfoce corfoin H1mits on the ideals of chmmcb!r th~t ca,11 be set forth as h1.1manly possiblle, as weH a,s on tl1e spedfk motives we nm rea1mnably exped to be a Ible to cull:Jval:e in ourselves and others (cL flam1ga11, '1991; especially Cha,p, 2), And secom:iny, s.ince a 11 &genl-b,rned vfrl:ue '"1:hic ml<'" its j11dg~10enfa, about motives as a basis from which to derive claims about 1ri o•lht and wr(m!!, adiorm, those deri.vaUve clain1s can in tu rm be, us,,d! to test llhe b ,..., vallidity or reasonableness of its g1mm1d ing m1smnpt1ions, Someti1nws,. Hw theory may gem,1mte "a,nswers" to cerfoin ca,ses 11:hat m*e simply 1im,possi:ble for us tu accept wi1:lhoul rnc!irnllly revising a great nrnny of mu monil aU1itm:les and beliefs, Other hirn,~s, the theory may genernte tine "right'' mwwer but SPem to do so for th,~ wront; reasons,, or fo1r reasons tba,t wo1.1ld onily be $,n1epted by people who sha,1*e addU1tilom1l and extremely Iocalized n,onnative conunit* mentt1. hi eifae1r rnse, the theory will have 1:o be adjusted, by altPring its gromuHng assump1:irms,, or by pro11id1ing add1ibcmal @irg1m1e111ts to how t:lhait what looks Hlke the wrong ,mswel' is achmlly b,rned m1 m1i.slaken beliefs. However, the fact that our views about whiclh motives are most mrnr*,1lly adn1irable will need to he tested for theiir ,1biH1y to expfa1irIT our deepei;t imh1itions about w hkh sorts of adimrn a ire momlly rrigM does not show that the I"eliltive value of various sorts of mot1iv(1s ca111 simply lbe red m:ed fo llhe kinds of adfons they tend to produce,, and does not show that daims about what srH'l:s of motives ,ne most mornlly adrnl1n1ble can be dispensed wJ.1:h altogether as being irrelevant to our evahmHorn, of specific act,,, for 1"e~som; we have already dfoc11ssed (see also G,11rda 1990). bas(id theo1ry Inight pursue its evaluatfo11 of s.pecific moHvaU0111s and adimm,, IF1irs1:,, it can Insist that adfons ,ire wrong unless lhefr m.olives 1:olally 95 ,11ppnrnimare, that is,. rnre aidual in1sfo:m:es of the rn10liivationa.l state UrnJ is held to be supremely regulrntive. Second, the theory may adopt ai more satisficing view, accm*ding to wh.id1 acts are perrn1isr,ible if they refled a moftivatimml i,l:afo tlhat wefl-Prr1m1r;lhc apprmdurrntes to tlhe nr,otivat[onal ide,al Each of lfa,s,, opftions enables ,m agent--based lheoiry to distini;uish bdween permir,s[ble ,rnd Jim perrnfasi Ue 11ct1ions; the second f;C3⁄4!ms somew hall: bel:l:e,* ablle to capture our sense that some acts are supererogatOJ/'y. But, and this its the third option, a theory could also adopt <11 scafor view according to which th,~re is no baseline ltl:ueshold of moral perrmfasibiJHy,. and ads aire simplly judged m; belier or worse aiccording to how closely their motives appmxima1bii to the theory's ideal of charader. It might even tl!rn 0111 !:hat some of our morn!. judgmenfo m"e scafatr i.n charnder, while others are rrrnch more rigid .. H11t whkheve1r option ultimately tu1ms. out to offer the most sati.sfactory expl:rnnalion of mornHty and mom! agency, it seems decir l]rnt !hem is an approach lo ethirail theory that Sidgwkl<, despite his. del:l1:Hed and systematic comparison of alternative morn! concepti.orn;,. simply overlooked .. WhHe ,m agenb-lrmsed ethicfal'1, dlrni1rrrn about the adrn1irabilil:y of certrni11 motivational strutes may be' somE:1,rhat more comJPiex H1rnn the conseq11entialis1's claim.s abollt the goodne1;s of certairn state1; of affairs o,r the deornfologist's daii1ms abmxi the nonnative 11aHdil.y of certain principles, it is simply not dear Urnt this degree of compl!exity is unwanranted. '1.:J' Cillll'ing illS ill lllln111tiivattiiom1Jl fofoil l \Ne illre now in ai position to see v,1hy an ethic of n11re is most plam;ibly interpreted in a.gent-based terms. Such ii view is quilt~ simH,u to an 11gpntbased l'thk of universal benevo.lence, but Hrne two are not idenlicaJ. For ni:Hwr than exhorting 11s to !be concerned about the welfare of people genernliy rnnd 96 to exhi.hit and express ij:Jhis fa1idy umllifforentfated concern fororngh mu* ad.ions, an agent--based ethic of caring exhorts tis to concem oumelves first and foremost w1ith the welfare of those persons wiH1 whom we are i1n some• kind of cone1°cte relationship .. By "c1mcretc 1*cfal:ior11s.krip," I mrnrn on1c Hmt is com,fr Jtuted by smnething more than 1:he fad that the parties st.and in some a 1tistract refoiUon to one another (such as being follow 11111embers of the morail com• munily), for an eilfoc of caring also assuimes tftat, other !hinp;s bell'lr; equal, the mm*e concrete the refat1ionsh.ip (Une more specific details of H1e parties immlved that: are i.rnpmta1nt fo the charade1rizat:ion of the irelationsMp), the more mornUy impoda1111t His lhd Hie refationshJip be enhanced! OJ' snrntained. Iri 01I1er words, an agent--based ethilc of cmdng imsists lhat a degree of partilality is moraily j1rnti:lfod1 but not for the smts of reasom; that have traditionaHy be1m given in favor of keeping one's mmml activities fairly dose l:o one's lhe1ul: and one's ho1ne. fo particular,. the 1:heory does not imply that friends and family are fogiti1rnF.ul:ely viewed by a moml agent as being of greater monlll (as opposed to personal) importance than othew ind1ividuals,. amd it does not n'st solely on the ernpfrkal daim that a11 agent's cairing tends to Ile more effective if it is rlirocted toward H1ose who rure relatively near and dear. l11stead, it insist~ that a deg11*ee of partiality is mornHy justified. bocaitise the1*e is smnethi111g ,especially admimble about tJhe very deep kind of concern for a ind sense of connectedness with other persons ttmt is most clearlly exhiliitl'd wlithin fairly diose ancl enduring Jil'("rsonaI refationships Iike frfondslhips, m,nantk parlnersbips, fami.Hal relaU011mlhips, ~md ,o forth. The va1lue that is commonly attached to broa1deir a11d more impartial forms of n1orn1 nmce1m (like Lmiversal bone11ole1nce) must then he explaiined in tenm, of Hie ways in 9'7 which those altilmies serve ,),5 nwre or Jess i1111,perfoct instn nces of or a,pproximations to the more ov,~nndtinf; 1ide11I of rnring. Since it is Nel Noddings who has ,mg,iged in lhe 111110st systenrnhc atlem p1: to de*velop an enitnn-+y cmcr:-lh1.11sPd dMc, it is hc,r views. that JI want lo focus 011 here. The hulk of heir work is devoted to "charaiderr'izing tho id,*al" of ca1*i111~, and it fa clear that she umde1mtamils JI: primarriJy a,s wlhd I have lbeen calling an ideal of m.oral chmmd:er. She points out, for oxrum ple,. tJlud tho value of run ai~ent's mrir1g Hos in tlflE! al:ftit11de H expresses as wolll as in Hie actions to which rit lc1ads, and she corntends tha,t H fo impossible, aind eve1n wrnngheaded, to attempt to formufate a pirecise set of "a,dfon or1iteriai" for caring;, 1lnsisting thatwI, m11st examine the ideal "from the in.side" (1984: 9-16). And she describes the psydcn.olog;icrnl capadties immlved in this motivruticonal ideal in p;reat detail (1984, espedally Chaps., 1-*3}., The ciiring agent is open and receptive: she is willing to lalo fad, rubout the "natures, way:, of life,. needs and (fosires"' of other people into account in determining what she should do [n any pa1rl:kular situation (Ibid.: 14}. Lnke !he beri,evolent im:lividuruI, shP wiII not fail lo nolice when she ennmntern mm I.her person who is in some kind of distress, and this im:hndes psychol,ogka1l OJ' emoU.omil dfatrest, lhat may not be imml11edirutely evident to foe more casrnal observex* (Ibid.,: 3l-3S),. The cairing agent is allso responsive l:o 1:he conditnrna of ol:hern and ,,:ommrilted to pmhxtinig m ,,nJlumdng thefr good, and she is more likely H1,0m amy peoplle to (stirive to) cullivrut,! her own capatcil:y to discern rund allevial:e the hardships of others .. Hut she nm be distingu.ishedi from tbe benevolent individua:l by her "llongi,ng for 1relatedness," or desire to estrubHslh deep emotionrnl cmmedimrn wH!ri other pen;ons (Ih1kl: 6;: "HJli), rnnd it is becausP of this tlmt i,ho foct]ses her afo-'n.lfon primrnrily on the good of peopie with w horn slhe is in sorn1e kimll of relabkm, 98 ship. Th,ese meed 11,ot lbe on;;oing relation,shops: Noddini;s fo eagPr lo point out that a moral agent who possesses a sufficient degree of imagilrnti11,,! awareness ca11 biecome deeply, emotiom1IIy <?:11gaged w1ith another pe1rsom who, moments Buit genuine cal'ing does require some soir1: of 11face-to,,face 11 intermdion with tbe other (Ilbid.: 47-8; 85 .. 6) .. In Nod.dil'lgs's view, ain agent c,m be descrdbed as caril'lg only if her attention fa d1irrededl toward spedfic, crnrtcrete individ1rnlis, as opposed to "all sentient cre:ah1res11 or "aU rational beings" (cL Henhabilb 1987). This restriction on the scope of a genminely nirint~ motivatto111 m1abios Noddi.11g7; to empll:msize Uue moral signifio11nce of what slm mils "motivaitional displacement. 1110"11 Sho contends that "cairing involves stepping ,mt of one's own personal fram,e of rderenco into the ol:l1er's11 (1984: 241-; d. 34), arrull wtmt she seenu;, to find espedaHy admirnbl.e about the caring agent 1is her ~,bility 1:o care so fuilly a,bout the othi!r pe1*son1s inlterests and goals that she is 111:1011pdl,,~d to <1d as though in [her] own l11ehalf, but in behalf of the otber 11 (Ilbid .. :: 16). In other words, caring agents not 01111y consider the other's point of view,. bul become so emotional!ly engrossed in the ol:he-r person that their own foellings trnck the other's joys and sorrrows, hopes and fea.rn, satisfactiorn, and dissat1is.fadions, ek., sm,d hence that they become motnvaled lo do for the other person whillt the other fo motivated In do for him,,, ()f hers,"ll At the sa1nw lime, Noddings fa carefol to im;1ist Hmt the caring agent does not reHnqui\s,_h herself completdy as a resull of thi\s prnces.s: tho1.11gh sh,~ puts her motive energy "at _______ ,,_,,,, ___ ,, __ ,,,,_,,_,,_,, 1(MThis sec1:n.s to be: an extñme forn:11 of'what other CUJ"t.~•-eH~icisf:s cull 11lovin.g ut-Lt~nl:ilon/1' in add]Hon to fH"t\*V<-~nUng one's own noedn., bia1se~,1. etc. from obficu.ring one's pr.rñption of U:he oi:hm* p(-nmon1s rn-\*nds1 11r110U.vationa! d:ispia!CE!m<-l:1'.1.L involvns adt1ally pril_Uing oner1nll.f in tho-other's shoos. tt1r11d foe ling h.is or hPr mol:ivt1:tion1~, For conLempora:-ry defonses of this CflfH]dty and its rol!n in tnorml. a1g:fmcy> sec Gordon (1996}1 Goldrnan (1.99S; :1996) tntd Deigh (1995). 99 the service of the other," she must always conrifdler whether acting mi Ow cm11patilble with her com,mitmenit to the other people she is n!lated to in to mne perr*son 1iun the name of some other p,~rsoni's gomt 105 The caring a1;ent wiJII also have to consi.der whetlh.er what the other person wrunts for l11irnseU 1r, rnt1imml or will indeedl con1rihu1e to hfa w,~ll-he1ing (a genuiJ11ely caring mother, for exa,mple, wm not buy rnndy for her chuld every time the chilcd desires it)i.106 Iin other words, her .moral deliiheratfons wtlII be guided by her commitmen,t to caring as an ove1*arch1ing nnohva1:ionaJ 1ideaL Noddii111~s•s restriction of caring to actual encounters with specific other person§ also enrnbles her to call attention to a "special affect'' that arfo,•s 011t of some kin,ds of ca,l"ing relationsh1ips and represents ''a major ñward 11 fo,r Lhc' caning agent (Ibid.: 132). U lis this affect which she calfo "Jioy,11 am! shi• is careful to dlsti11guish it from the more practical desire tfod mot1ival:es the i:nornI agent lo engage in crul"ing rud:ivity, Caling itsellf is always ditreded toward other conc1*efo im:lividu1als, andl involves an assessment of how tJheir lives a.ire presently going as well as whd might be done to e111h.ance tlhei.r good. B11t when one experie1Kes joy, there is nio de<1.r objed of one's co111sciotwness or appmisal of either one's own slhiation 01* the sihrnticon of others, There is 105]\Jodd]ngs chwVi not say qulLr: as rrmdr1 as ono m*it~ht l!i.ke ahcmt how a ca:ring appnt. who iH expl:rioncing: 11mrnoUvaUo.nal diHplacQt.nl:nt 0 can strrnu.lt.anem.:nEily t'i.-~LaLn Tr1orr ov11n motivoltiorw,Jf_ f;ll.uLes {,1nd. so 1.we her own co:rnni_n.TiLlnrwnt to ca:d.n.g UH ti, ro.foreno-: polnfL froyn wl1ich. to assess tl:i.e ner;ds and 'ftntnresiLs of olhors. For somP useful suggosbons as to Ilic kinds of psych.olovj.cal 1rnochanfams lha1t n:dp;ht he aJ work 1 sen Gordon (.n996). Ji06u_ko tht\* 11.nivP.rmatiy henovolkmt. agent, a caring agnr1L 1nust conHidt-~r both objedi.vP and su.bj~:cU.vn fea.tu.u-es !l.haL conl:ributo to iiU1.ot..hm* _pn1mo:n1r1 good,. H(l•nce 11\/\rhen l ca.re\ ... irn]y motive ent~:rgy IDows toward_ tho o,lhor and lfH:.~rl-u.1.pr:;!' although .not. necnssa.dly, t.owatd hi1,; ,mdr;" (Nodding" 1984,: 3~). 100 sim.ply a "sense of connededness, of haurmrnny, , .. , of being [11 hme" wi1:h another tlhat is "linked" to botlh oneself and the othe.r, but .is "fonwed somewhere beyomd both" (Ibid,.: ]4-41; 137). Noddliin,gs believes llhat ti11i1, joy points fo the deep sig11ifa:a,nce of 1relatedness in lnim,m lifo, and helps to susfo.in us in mu morn.I endeaivorn, And she repeatedly suggests tlhat ain agent's cuirng is morally better to lhe extent 1:h,at his seinse of rnnnectedness i,s experiem:ed, 'llut she im,fat~ that joy is 1101: ,1, necessary foatm*e of moral activity, and is not }Jy itself a morally worthy 1rnoU11e, M1nal activity, in her view, flows directly from arnr agcmt's caring for others, and everyone 1is obl.igaited to care ñgardJess of w hothew they are experiencing lhis special joy. The nrnin reason !that Noddings 11-esb-lds caring to the domain of faco,* to-face enconmters, howovor, stems frrnm her com1idion !+mt 1Jh.e "ethical goodin.ess:' (or admirabilHy) of caring 11ltimately Ji1es in the "nrnh:nrnl goodness" of achml caring relat1io11rnh1ips, and in prnr!icufar, of the very deep kind of reiationship that is lypically .... or a,t any rale, ide:aUy .,, forg1c1d between mother and child (19841: Chap. 1),.107 All of us, she insisl'i, have fond momordes of caring and being rnrod,-for,. and it is by dl"awing on those memories that we can see l:ho point of ethkal rnring and motivate ourselves to rnre for others in s,ituatiom; where il does 11ot come so "natmralliy,.11108 Whifo thris may be an accurnte psychologkal claim about mrnny people, however, tl:iere mre undoubtedlly some (and 1mfmtmmteiy, therre may foci he a g1reait mainy 10'7The aignifi.cance of the mother/ chi.lid refo1io!i'.1HhO:p for boLh mo:ral a.nd pc:*:rsomtl development. ifl a pieIBir,:LcnL Lhem.e ln lh~: w.ri.Ungi,: of .mrn,l ca:n-:-tithi,d1'.>Ls-,. urn1 :i.~• the Jou.d point ofworlrn by Ruddid, (11989) and Held (1987), For discussion ofiLs psychofogirnl unde.rpinning,s, """ B,,.,jamin (]988) and Chodorow (1978}. Gn,em,p1m (1.989) a,nd Stern (J98b) have a]Ji ern.pha1sized Lhc* Nig:nificance of a nloc'.h lvid.er variety of affocLivo bonds in humcJn lifo, 1.08cf. uThn NOll.ll_rce of 11ii;y ohli.galion fa lhe value l *pfon: oin the reJaLe,lnc:1,;R ol carinp/1 (Nocldings 1%4: 84). JOl people) who have fow, if any, of the requisite memories. He111ee, if a p,•rnon':;; ohiigation to act as "one--caring" arises solely oul: ol that person's mern1ories of n,ahural cari.ng, it fo sim.ply not dear that those who fa.ck such 1me1J1iories can be tu11de.1* the same oMigaUons as the rest of 11s,.109 An agent-based ethi.c ,woids, this difficuily hy irn,isting that the moml value of caring Hes solely in the ki.nd ,>f pmdi.rnl atl:ib:nde rnr mol:ivatirnnal stake that it is ..... namely, a11 altitude that, wl1ile particuiady atl:1med to fhe special joys that can be follnd onJly in and through relatiomihips, is nondheless directed toward, and responsive to fads about, the well--being of spedfic other, peoplle prdmariliy for thefr own sakes. 110 'Tihns does. not mean that there rnre no rewmns that cam be given to explain the value we atl:ach to cadng (and derivatively, to cairiinl~ adivities) .. Armetl:e llm\er ha, emphasized f11al: "we begin as helplless chi.ldren, ... at allmost every point of our lives we deal wHh both the more and H1e iess helpl.ess, [and] eq1rnH1y of power aind interrdependein.cy,. between two pemo111s or groups, is rare m1d hard tu irecognilze when it does occm*" (1994\: 28), and I tlhink tlud m1Kh ofwllud we admire about achrnl earring agents sh~ms from their keen awa1rene1,s of uhese focts, as we] I as their ability to dfocem and ñspcmd to the sp,~dfic ways in whkh others are 11eedy and vulnenible, withm1t demanding o.r everrn exped:ing that those othern (will) reciprncate their acltlions compl,etely.1 11 hi addition,, Noddings is surrely mrred that we admire a carinp; agent's opem1ess and receptivity: 1in rnlllownng herself l09The:ire of crn.1.rst~, a good deal of ernpirical (-rvidonce t.hnf. vjdims of aihusc ai:nirl/ or :noglect a:ro ofton la.eking in ,tarfow,;. _mor;;il crtpadt.fos, and lherP is CP_d.ainly no r<i:ason L<> tl1ink lhat. sud:1 persons shoul.d be blamed for their (deplombk) c:haracl.ms .. Bun: only in exfrP11w cm,rn:; does it s,-K:m. approprialn lo say tJru1fl'. Lhoy arc: Ltnde.r 1:10 n1ora.l obligations "WhalscK~v,:.ir. 110cc Lawrence, J31um's (1980) dii;rnsc,i,m of lhc, moral value, of aU the "alJT"fal.ic em of:io:ns, 11 ll11n Cha,pkr '11.iree I shall altempl lo dofond this daim more foLly. 102 to be emoliomilly engaged with ollier people, lmch a person de1uonstral:es a kind of deair,.11,ceaded acceptance of her own inevitable v1dnerability l:o at least some othem that avoids both excessive paranoia,. on 1:hc one hand, ,rnd more m,hre kinds of trust, on t:he other. She also demc:mstrnl:es a willini;nesc; fo lake olher people's thoughls and feelings seriouisiy, without worry1tng about whether the dai rorrn that othern might make will threaten her own sense of what is valualJle or 11om,ehow jeopardize heir own pmrsuit.s. These sorts of traib, hruve obvious practi.cal value,. since being too quick fo judge, or lco interprel: anotheJ's expei*iernces in, one's own terms, can oHen lead an agenl: to respond im1,pproprialeiy to ,mothe1r eve1~ when the agent is othcrw1ise wo.Umeanlng. And they are oruciall l:1> the devdopm,enl of dm,e pernonrnl relationships that most of nm find to he espedaliy worthw hil,~. Fiw all of lhese reaisons, cmrirrng seems to be at hti;hly appropriate' aitmmlle 1:o lake" 11p tm,vard mu followr,. Using these sorts of psychollogi.ca.l facts to help lo explain why we admlire caring and why we ought to en,gaige in adivities that exhibit or express it does not entail that we are under any genernl obl!.1igatiion to Jet omrselves be cared .. fm. Hut conceiving of crure as a, motivaitiom1l ildeal does ~11low 1m l:o insist that even a pemon with fow memories nf genrJlne caJrinr; 011ght not to ad in ways that exhibit a faihue to Ci111*e (even if vve mm be surre that, as a iresu111: of 111,e person's 1.mforhrnatc upbringing, U is quite likely Hrnl he or she will not),, and it also helps to explain why we lypically prafae ]Jrersonrs w*lho mH~Oef.l!d in c11dt1ivating a calf'ing aflt1itud11P hlward oHH~rs !f~V(~n though we do not alwaiys bfam.e persons who lack such rnU1lt1Jdes. Three f1uthew implkalions of Noddini~s's relatiorml ethk are everi mon• pro!Jlem.atic. Hirst, iJ the goodness of the caring relaitfonship is used to explain J:03 mu genernl obl.igatioti to adively mire for other people, it would seem to follow that we mus1: also be 11ndler a general ohl.igal:ion to 1rece1ive.!:.~xir1g __ fr(J:lll1 other people (Siote 1995: ~5) .. Nodld.i11gs insists Hrnt "for (A,B) to be a miring relation, both A (the one--c,uing) illnd *s (the ea1*ed-fi01r), must conb1ibui:e approp,riaitely" (1984: 19, .!JIY em,phasis), The plm.1sible assurnipl:ion is that l:Jotlh, confributions serve as necessary consl:itl.1e11ts of the betlt and most pernmwily rewardin[_!; (most "joyfol") kinds of human relationships. But if this 11B the ultimate gTound of otlr rrnoml ol:Jlig,ati<ems, then the d11ly to ad as rnred--•fot will preimmably be every bH: as strong as the duty to ad: ,rn one-cani111g., and thell'e is suñly something odd about the Hmught tltat we ou.ghl: to be seeking 0111 ways to be cared for by otbem. An rugent--bas,~d c~li:bic Hmt lakes ca,ring as, ils nwst 011ernrching mol:ival:ional ideal avoids. thfa prolbl!ern, since ii: ent11ils that pei*sorn, who are conll'nt 1:hrou.ghmit their lifetime to simply receive cm"<" from others. without acknowied!ging anid/ or recipmrnbing thrnt rnre 1in any way are jm:tnfo11bly criticized fo1r exhibitirng; a d!eplornble latck of otlr1er-regaird, and in particufar, a fad. of enga.gem.,~11t with and gratilude tow,ird the s.perifir persons who crnntribule to their Hves itl varim1s ways. Nod!dings's own view Is tbait it takes s1uprisingly little effort to disclluuge our duties to receive or "complet,~" 11nother p,~rso111's care: we nrny respond with an approprriale aUih1de such as recognition and/ rnr gratitude (][bid.: 19; 65), or we may simply show evidence of !he persona]! growth and development Hm1: the 110111e--cari.ng" intended to lori11g abm1t ([bi1d,.: 69; 74; Eil} But lfos mises a second kind of diffkully, The claim that th,! person being cared-for 1mrnst ''complete" the caring in order for the agent's adivUy to be considered foHy mornl.ly good leads Noddings to the condm,ion that an agent wUl be "ethrica 1 ly diminished" if her attempts to rarre Jre 1msuccesl,ful, ()I' .if she Hl4 finds herself in re.lalionships with othem who foil to acknowledge, lo>l alone recipl'ocate, lher rnn! for them in any way (1984: ll'.Fn0). 112 And as 11u1nwrmrn comn1ental:ors haive pointed oul, llhis is simply too demanding .. 111 Noddingt,; does srny Lnrn1 Lhe caring: ã;ent "pmw;eirly pays heed fo her own condition" (Ibid.: *105) and may legitimau.~ly wi.thd1raw fro1m re:lationships that IJhn,aJ<!n her owm caring abllities, yet she repeat,~dlly suggesls than: the need to do so betrays some kim:l of rnwl:iivaUonal fock on the agent's part, ,md hence that a cari.n,g agent who w,mts to avoid this dirrminis.lnnent must co111ti11rne rirng fo1* the other urntil she finds some way to get the other to 1respond and "complete" the cadñ; relation. Nod dings mrny be rrilght Hrnt many people withdraw from, ndationshipa too easil:y when they could provide genu1i11e care. Hut tb,! other person's failure to respond does not alw,Iya indicate that tbre ai>,,mt's motiva,, tions aire Iacking.114 It is lmportrunt to dislingu1ish tlhe kind of case Noddings has .in mind, whe!'(~ a cmring agent acts on behalf of rnnother who does nothing to mdpm** 1l2cf.:* 11Th,i i;cadn.g agent] conf~idP1t:'s ahvays tl1e JJOSsihf1ity th.al Uw om-Hirppt~a1ing•tn"•do-evil .ls ad:ually .in a cfoterioraLed Nil:u1le, that tw* iu acting under intolerable prc-sf.un: OJ' in er*ror. She retah:1f:l a tf$]fmIDHibil.ity, then, t.o relieve tJh.o pn:Hsurc and to inforrn11 the error; indeed, she.Jm~mainB rest29ñLiliJ~.Lfu:rJJ1Ã acl:~1~J iz41JJ.9!!.. of_Jhfl.Jlth~r'.f• eth i.ca:*11 .i tiJ~-~-?' (Nod di ngr.i, "]984: 116r _t].!!!_pJJasis .11ni11f),. 113*1J1iH cdHdsm_ iH ra.iNed by nearly uH tJu~ conlrihul;orB Lo Ll1c-R(wiew Syi:n.p0Giu1:1:1, on: Noddit1[lS's 01'11ginal book i.n. l:!y1w,lc1a (1990: Vol. 5, no.1), and is pal"lic1.1forly c,xplicil i.n lHoai;la,od (1991: 25!) .. 52),. Virr1::J,da Held,. who rdiee heavily on the mollwr/chil.d rn[adonehip, points oul that such rnlaLionr.~ can bo-comrne oppñssivn for hod:1 _part:ins, m1d sugg:ei-rts for this roDJJOJrl th1al reHtu-1ce on the eco.n.omi.c-exchange model Lhal'. fa farn1(!.[ar fror:n Hod.al conlmdariariism may also b" a 1isefol source of moral insigbl (cf. 1987: 1J4 .. l 7). Simila,: concerns fu.11e[ J<-:an. }foimplonl's inlert~sl .in 11FeminisL Conlractu:ri.anisnn 11 (1993-; r.-srwc.tully pp, 2::1>8--46), as V\r1:ll as AnneUQ Baler's i.ntnmst :ii'n relai:iom~hipN const:i.l.:uled by b:*1.rnL and tn.ifltworfhiness (1.994: Cht11,rrn. 6"'9). Jn Bt:1for1fJ vie-vv, .ftJI1 patUes l'nust he hoLK-1 f:nrnl.ing und tnrnbNorLhy -i.n order for a rda:t:itonsfop R.o 11Jo morn.Hy good. 114n. is irnportant to d:i.sti:rr18"uish epiistnmofogk:ali concr:Yns from Ht:dd.J:y lhoord:ic:ai dairns about '"rh,11t n1akP:;; an !'ligenl's 11101:ivQs and. acU.orn.; nr10.-rnl\ly good and./ or r:fighL ll1(! fad that th.c person being cnñd for faJlr.; Lo con.~pJeLP tm_ agent's 11car'i-ngu n:1:ny b-1-~ a fllgn that. tho agent ,vm• n.oL in foct 111.otivalnd. by 1~ontti.ne caring and so was not a_pp-.roptiately ñs_porm.tvc, bu.l. fn1d:1 ovi.dmtce is scJdom definitive. Hl5 rate or compie,te lhel'.' rnre, from tlhe klild of rnse discrnssed nrearr the lbeginning off' §2.2,. where mn age11t was imai;ined to possess deplorable molrivationH bLJi not to be responsible or IJfameworthy for 1:hem. If !he person beirng canid for in NoddJn1gs's rñe b abusive over a long period of time, l:his may have the eHed of "diminishing" the agent fo the 1,ense of eroding her capacity for,. and willlingness to crure. This is, I 1:hink, an important psycho.1.ogical trntlt Urnl Nod dings is conred to call !HIJI' attention to,. !But Nodd.ing,;ls approach seems to commit her to l:he vfow tlhat an argent always ads wrongly in some sense H others foil to "complete" her ca,re, c1nd then? is no rearson to thnnk this l'B bue. Claudiill Card O 990) has raised the related concern tha,t ag,mts who exhibit mol;ivational displacement will be m1aNe fo resist eviil,. Jinr the sens,, of being 11mable to avoid complicity in the evH deeds of others (cf. Housllrnn 1987). He1* worry is that since caring has the cm1seq11e11ce of supporting* other people rin tb.eir proji<c,cl:s and a.Uih.1des, the cmfog agent may lad< the ii!.bility to &ldequatdy distinguish the p1rojeds and 11tl:it!Jdes (of ol:hern) Hm1 mi~;hl 1.o Ile supported from those Hmt ought 11ot It is dear that Nod dings w1JL111ts to avoird thfa dirHic11lty by making ireference to tfne caring agenr1:'s persmmJ1 ide<1L Hence she says that if run.other persorn hrns attH:urdes or projects that 11folate the'! idernl of cai'nr1g, those atti.tudes a11d projects c,1111 a.1ul should be considered by 1he mo.ml agent as wrorrig.115 And l;he also suggests tl1,d an agc'nl who ns genwinely c,uing will simply he unable to endorse mr1,caring altitudes, wi.H tnake every effort fa cot1vnnce other peopl.e to give them up, am] will cerlllriniy However, it should he noted thart smne of Noddtngs's exam.pies do 1,mggeRt a 1l5soe aliso Tronto (l 99'.I: ch, 5, ,,sp. pp .. 1'.l?,45) fen a fofrly dntailed discuss.ion of w]hcm g,H1ui.ne caring shi1:1tdnH into 11cu.l:pahle ig.n.ontno-'.1t arid olTn:er m.oru:!!y p.rohJe:r:iu1;U.c h,ner ntD:Los. 106 d1ish1 ll'ibirig wiil1ing111ess, or~ the jp,ut of the c,1:ring agenlts slhe depids, to al low olJjecbionabiy m1mrl11.g (abusive, sexist and racist) aUitu1des to be continued to be h<"hl lby others, and occasio111rnlly evelll 1:o ad in ways that do seem to endorne or v111Idrnte tlhose ruL1Hudes (se,s esp .. l 9841: 109ff), And I think the reason fm this allso stems from Noddings's view rnrnJ to reject H1,ose attitudes would require the agent to give up the value of an (1)tlrterwilse) caning rellrntionship. An atf;er1rt-b<1sc'd etJ1ic rnn capture what seems coirred about J\loddings'R, projed withmd being com.miUed to tlhese moñ 1:roulbling daims. for exam pk*, promoting the "ad1rnJiz:ation" of the rnr1ing ideaI in otlher people rn11 be said lo exhiibil an admirable kind of nn1ing on the part of mornl ag1mts, since crnll:ivaling another's moral caprudty i.s surely one way of enhmncing their good.116 Moreovei*,. it seems likely tbat anyone who fa r;enniinely commitlx,d lo cuing for others and who recor;iniz:es the llimits of hew owin time a,nd energy will be motivated to c111Wvate other people's capacities for carin!j so that they, in turn, will be able to care mme effoctively for at llc:ast some of the people thrnt: she hernelf is simp.ly 1.mab.l1e to reach, or to nrnke mp for her o-ccasional and inevitable mistakes. But an a,genfu-based care--ethk does nol: force us. fo tlw co111clusion that an agent is "ethically diminished" wl1,,n, by as she may, l:lw other pemons she is intemcti.ng with fail lo "comp.lele" her caring in any way. So long as the a,gent exhibits gem1ine caring, nol only her motives lo11t also her actions will be assessed as rrno1mHy good, In addition,. since refusing to critkilze a frie1ul's uncmfog (mdst or sexist) attil.rnder; would bc•fraiy a depl.orahle lack of co,ncern for llie other people l:lhose rnttHude,, might lnut, a 116conBidcr Aristoll.e 1s discuss:ion of"virt1.1e--fdencfoh-i-psr1 (Ni.comaclwan J-~f:hicn: Hook VJJ)1• esp .. chs. ~l-4. And r10U.ce Lhat v-.rhilo this a:ssm11c-s U1al vil"Lue is inde0d a y1erso:rud good, i[ d.ons not imply th.at vfrtm-: *if,~ the only personal good. 1()'7 tmiy caring agent would pres1.1malbly be able to avoid the complicity in evils aboutwhid1 Caird is cmrKerned. Card suggests that these examples mumrinate a gap withinr Noddings's specific account of earring, .... mrnrnOc':ly, !Jmt ii: "does nrot explliciHy i11ehu.de the idea of valuing individuals for 11:.hemseives" (1990:: 106), .. Am:I tMs poinlc1 to l:lhe tbtiird pmblem llmt results from. Noddings's i*efational approruch: it ,mg:gests that the moral significanc~1 of pernom; lfo,, primarily ,1nd perhaps even exd11sively in lheir potential lo contribute tto na1:umlly or ethkallly good 1*elaUonships .. As ,I result:,. Noddings often s11gr;esls that caring agents should (contimie to) sL1ppml:peoplle they a,re aheady or iinevitahly i.n iiome kind of relationshi1p with,. even if doing so leads lhem. to difl.regard the needs and interes1:s of other people willi. whomri they all'e not (so dosoly), bmmd up, rnnd even if doing so leads them to disco1.ml many of their own needs and inl:erests that a ire no,t folfnlled by the rdalnrnnslhJip. Noddings also concludes that we have no ololigatnom, whafooeve1r to distant strangers: though we may clrmose to do smnelhing for the sake of, e.g;., stanliñ; chiJd r0m. in Africa, a111d l:lh,ough it rmay ofl:en be good fto do something fo1c l:hem, we are not oblir;ated to do so becaurne there fa no possibility fol' developing a meaningful, ongoing reliilltionship with shuv11ng African diilldl"en without being frnreed l:o leave• our: friends and family and so "abdkate" our caring for themri (J984: 86) .. Ye! fl:1ere 1is sm:ruethling very odd, as well ais monid.ly disquieting,. rnboul these mnls of restrictions. After rull, the same sod of i.mrngi111aitive awañness tlrmt enalblles fhe caring a.gent to respond in ain ,•imofo:mailly engai~;ed way to ra s.limnger she m:hmlly e11com1tters can surdy enable her to rei,pond in a !less specific fash1ion 108 to the plight of distant othern .. 117 Of con1rne1 W(~ do frequently dlstinguislt between the ve*ry deep kJinid of care and resporisiveness lfa1t most of rn; foel and exfobit toward (only; a fairly selled gTotip of pEiople, a111d a bmader kind of concern that is dill'(~cted Inward h1umm fri,,~ing:s generallly. Ih1t Wlh ile our depth of concern for a fow people oflJ"ll seems to conflkt: with 01u broaider concem for humamUy,. l:liere is no rea,son to l:hillk Hmt these rnotivaltional states are not constihded by extrem,~ly similar psyd10IogicaI capadliesJ 18 Ind,~ed, it seems extremely plausible, phenomenologically speakirng, to suppose th~t a,s we rnmnrow the scope of our a,ttention tow~.rd a srrmlier 11111m berr of people whom we can lnow about in grc~at<.1r del:aill, we* tend to experience a 1;real:er degree olf emotional engaf~ement wHh tliexn. Once we r,ee this, Nodd ings's l"esl:Jrid:ion of caring fo l:lhe domain of face--to---face enco,mtern appears to be morally arbitrary. An agenll-based ethic of care can G!ilI [1ricorporate the insighl that the distindilvely mo1*all task is not a, 1mllcter of finding 1.mivernaiizalble rernsons for adi111g but of exhibiting a kiind of "loving atl:ention" to the co.I11crde reality of imllJvidu~,1 pernons, lfhnt while r,uch an approach implies, tlial enha1ncing tlhe good of our family amd Close friends should be given gf!nernil priority oven* cadng for people we interaid with on ai less rreg,c1lall' basis or with whom we have not formed pairticlllmriy deep, affective bonds (e.g., mu pmfossiorn1I colleagues and feUow dtizens), and wluile tlnose, forms of caring will, in tllm, be given p1rior.rny over h1mrnnita.nian concern more gencra:Jly, run agenl,.fbased ]'1 '7vi:rg.i1i'.lfa. H(:ld. rnotrñ, lb1:1!; D starving d1t1ld in Alh'ica. iH still a pai:rticu:lar indi.viduarr ~nd wo d:o not need to know a.11 the spncific deLafls of his co-:nc.relo l"<-~ality n ordrnr Lo rtico5;ntzn ways in v1rhich we rn.ight :hnpt*ovn his wolfaro. M.rñnovP:1~/' th.ere an:. .fli'H.t!i'.i.Y Lhingi,; W(: might do 'iAtdthm.d. sanrifidng: our orngoingtefo.Uom-.lh:i.1ps in t1:r1y way (:1987: 1J8). l'l8This point has boon made oxplidt.ly in rornnl work by Slotn (1998, forthcoming). 109 ethic of caring does not entail Umt we ha,ve no olbligations to slra11g,m;: comple•te indifferem'.,~ loward any person fa simply anWrhebical to tlhe caring ideal. .As a result, a11 agent:-lbrnsed ethic c.m acknowledge that the1re may be sihial:icms i11 which mi agent can be rn,ecrningft.nlly said to exhibit moire carin,g by helpring a strnnger (say, sonieone who has just been in a,rri accident), and so morally ought to do so, eve11 if that meains missing ii pernonal engagement with a long lewm friend. Indeed, so long ilS the "floor" of humruni.tuia11 concern is 1110t set too low,. such an ethic coukl piresu11nably d,!illi wil:11 q1ws1fons of justice am:I bask moI*al rights in a diistirnd:ive and plan.mibl,e way (Slote *1,99b: §5; 1997).1l9 In other words, while an, agent baised elhk of rnring evaiurntes 1nol:ives mnd adion types in a way tbal: Nodding;s (and othell' oue .. etfodsts) is (a,re) likely to find congenial, it 1is based upon fl1e gnrnnd flooll' admira,bilHy of caring for others as im:liv1ldual p<E!rsons (nither tlmm as potential conh'ib111tm*s to a caring refartirn1), and so entails that a complet:e lack of concern or total di1,ll'egard for runyone will alw,1,ys be mowa,Uy criticizahle. n should also be noted that an agent-bm,ed ethic of carrini; is i,igrnifi. canfly less monoHthlc in Hs com:eptfo,~ of vah.ie than Noddings's own. Hrcli' vliew s11ggesls that moml agents u!tirn,ately cmre about the croaUon and mainienam:e of thoae dose personrnl relationships tha,t rure often accomprnni.Pd by joy, and this has led some critics to obj]ed tih,al she ultimately direds us to "c11Jre about caring."120 Pm:'t of the obje:cbion is that Hds as simply rnm-ealfotic: J. 1911 ,~hou[d be nolnd. t.hat Noddingils 111.ore reno.rut wdLin.g,s l:mve co.m:udied ll-1.at she neod~; lo i:nco:irpo-rate sonw* ground floor co1r1.ccnn: fo:r ,~vm~yon.(\ w.ilhin hnr 1:q:>J.irouch. 120This critidsm i,s particularly nxplidL in Urba,11,,Wallrnr* (1989: 12:8-9) who points out that although ih(-1 \Nom.cr11 Carol Gi1Hgv111 identifim, em relying on a 11cwr-e ..orirn1ta1Uo11,11 Lo mor*alin.y d(J por:i~r-mss an 11ovo.rrid.in,g concern with relaUorñhips11 and ,~,:cogniu: '1Hu: t'.or1l.inuing imporhmce of at1l:ac'.hmeY1L in tho htmiHHI Hfo cydc 11 (G-iJHg,an '1982: '16; 2.3), it does not. ncmn m1Li-re1y appropriah-~ lo d.m;,c:ri.lH! them mi c,o:-nng about earn itr-wlf. Thoy o.flrnn invob! vahH$ 110 even ff caring is immelhing tha,t 111H people should vah1f" to some degiree,. a,11,d even, though many of tfrie mrn,t signifk,rnt h11miln goods, such as frk•nd ship and ]love, are achievaible only in rund tlhrough relal:immhipi,, partidpahon in such relahonsh.ips is surely wnot l:h(~ only thiñ; we do value, nor U1e only coni:Jriliut1ing fodm to tlle goo<Cl1ness of individual lhmnan lives. Hut the objed:ion also sterns fr()Jm1 plau1sible concerns, that ,11n agf"11.t who cares first and foremost about rnainmining and/ rnr enhancil1g hor ongoing relatirnrrnhips with others will be likely fo overlook the possibility that both she,. and the other person(s) with whom she is n11volved, tnii~ht a.lso benefit from. m,oro individualistic pmrnunts. This 1'.epresents a serious stllmbling b.lock for m1y effort fo 1mdersfa 11d morality soliely in l:ernrrn of the goodness of certain kinds of relaUonshiips (Davirnn *1993). But notice !hat once cuing is conceived aF> an [mlivid11afa 1,vith whom we are (m could be) fr1 relationships, rather than toward relationships to whkh other persons pote1ntirnlly contdbute, l:bten Io case about rnring just is to he commHted fo the good of other persom; and capable of respondin,i; to them hi an emoUonally engaged way, Jll.ecaw,e Hmse persons mrmy themselves be, commi.ttedl torn wide anrny of moni.l valm?s., including fhe value of choos.ing and pursuing projects and goa1ls of thei:r own,. the agent who hopes to orno effod:ively fo1* and have me,1n1ingfol 1vlalionships with others wiU need to appredate tho s1ignifkanco that values other iha11 ca.wi111g can oH(~n have in individ1iml lives. N onethel,ess, those other values still gel: into rmch an account only imi a derivative f,ishion: an ag1011t-based ethk of carinp; 0:xhorts trn to p1J1rsuP goods such at~ oq_unlity, ho:inestyr authentiJcityl' prmmnal growth, a:rn:! evon soff.pres~!l"Va:.L-io.n (Lbid.: 64, 64, 52,111, 129, J:59). 111 like ,rntmmmy,. for examn,ple, only to the exl!ent that is 11,ecessairy to rnre effectiveiy for othern, stish1in "joyfoll" relatimrnhips with them,. or enhance omr own catpm:ily to rnre. m othe1r 1N1Hds, m1 a.genl:--based dhic of cam still 15i11e1; moral prionlty to wJmt I earlier cailled the value~ ol inttmrpernoml.l nlrm,edte,JI.* ness (§13)1, and it is not clear Hrnt this is entirely ap1rn*oprriate. Indeed,. Hmt a vallle-•orientatiion 11ro1mded in rnre and com1edion is rn,oraily apprnpriah' 1:s pñdsely what mme en:ub:mrnmy-based ethics deny. Hence, we now need to explore the more ovenndhing separnteness/ com1C0Ctedness tension i11 a lbH more deh1il. 112 CHAJPTER THREE: "SJllll''.AJRATENE!lS" AND "('.ONNIJCTEDNIESS'' INll\lES'rERN M!ORAL r1IEU)§OJPHY "Sepan1teness" versus "con11ededness" .is, in my view, the most signifirnnt difference in the "l:11eme'' between the two LnrnrnI rnrienhitions Carol Gilligrnn identified (1recarn Ch.. 'I, pp .. 4il.ft.), and in this Chapl::er, I want to show how this dfotindion ecrn1 be used to cfo,ssiJy smne of the most J11J'l111errntfal phi.l!osophical conceptions of moralily as wdl. It should be noted from the beginnim1; thrut nearly aill nonnative ethks ackmrwledge the significance of both aspects of hmn,,u1 living, and that 11:here 1re 11mmy other diofferences among moral tln,eodes whjch this dassificatiion will simply gloss m1e1r12J H shoul.d also be noted that 11separal:e111ess ..,based 11 ,md 11corrned:edness .. lJ,ased11 moral theories do not 1n.ecessarily dis,ngree a,bo11t what kinds of sihrntions are mornlly problematic, nor ahollll: wh.al: kinds of activity we ought to engage in or what 11,ypes of insl:iitutions we 011p;ht o set up (a,Uhough l:hey at le,wt sometimes d.is,11gree in these ways))2 2 Hut theoriies do disagree rnbo1Jt he flnndiltmc:ntill values tha,t maike certain sihmtions espedrnlly prohlerm,l:ic m th.al jusl:i.fy certain ac1:iion-1ypes as consl:i1tuting tile most a.pprnpriah:! rn,ornJ respornsc,. 1/\/hile some idealize va!!les Hke autonomy (hrnadly consbrued to , include the capacity fo1r self.-suffkiency amd self .. rel1lrn111ce, as well as the rnpadft.y to adJ11dicale between competing mornl prindples or idealis), personal Hberl:y or respect for indivichml righ11s, olhern give pride of pface lo 12J-Th~!Se indui.de lhe diffnronccs in 111othodo1og'k.a1 structu1ro which can a]lso he used to J.iffore.n.Uale between Gilligan's lvV<) moral odrnTLati.onr~, und v1rorc; the r.n.ain focus of Ch11pler Two. l22This afao fiL•; *wilh Gilligal'.{1~ frrn:l:ilings. ln most of the hypoffiolintl nxumplcs GiIHgar{s .interviewees tue asked to rQ.Hpond tor mrt:.al.ns and .fern.a.Im; u]f:irna.tel.y arr.hñ al [Jw r;an1u f.fodsion. The no:rmat;ivo concepts 111,ey J;_ppoal. to in jusUfying lhosc! dods-ionr~, hm,vevm-, arr. quite disliricL See c-\HrJedaJ[y the flrn1ous "Heinz dikm:una,, (Gilligan 1982: 25 .. J,l), and !..hP e:xa.rnples discm~r:ied. in Gilligar11 987. 1*13 va1rimrn forms of inh~rdepeinde1nce and to adlvilies g1roum!ed in 1Jenevofonice1 felllow-foeling, rnr.ing or trnst. Becaur,e GiJHgmn.'s work stresses tlhe correlation between a pernon'r; com:eptio11 of the seU,, and his or her cm1ceplion of morality, debates a,bout the refative mrnral adequacy ol th,~se two 111ormative orim1tabions are frequenHy conflated with rnetaphyskal debates a boflJil whether the s(df 1is iilherently 11separnte 11 or "social." lBut I tliiink it is a, mistake to locus. l:oo exdusively on qL11estions alJOut the essential nab.iñ find/ rnr consbitt1tior1 of the self. ]Fm* onP thi11g, I do11bt that eltherr* position in the mehiphyska! debate is le11rn!Jle io ac1CTy pllro form.12,\ For ano1:lher, I doubt that resolving the debale at the metaphysical J.ev,~l would be sufficient to resolve the debaite al. the 11ormativP one, Even if we wei*e foHy convinced that each of us is nothing irrw11*e than lhe product of mn* sodrnl interadio1u;, itm1ight stiH lbe worl:lhwhile lo (strive to) ad1ieve as muclh in-1depondonce from others as fs, possible foir being,5 Hl<.e us, and/ or l:o creaire sodd conditions that mal,e it moro likely for individuals to develop with Mghly d istind:J.vo perso.11alil:ies. And even if we lhad good reason lo thinl of 01u1r "true selves" as cmnpletely, n1etaphysirnfly separate lirom ono another, we might sliJ!l prize friendship, love and partkipatiion 111!1 varimrn sods of group inl:eradioin over mrnre im!iv1idualistk forn:rn of adivity, and we m,ight sLiU 1::lh.ink itwais morally 1imporlla11l to u.lll:ival:f, v1111•io111s affiHal:ions and emotional atl:achmeni1:s ~o one ano1:lwr. In any eveni:, exploring the metaphyskal debate wo11Jd take nw weH--beym1d the scope of thfa dlissertation, and 1lt is oñy the m,01mll sigrnificarn1ce of s,•parnteness and corLnededness i:n ln1man living that X shall be concerned with in what follows, 12'.lsm, Flanagan (l99l: PL. II) u,nd PelliJ. (1993) for helpful n,wnl discussions in iJlis 1J4 I shall 1mdernfond sepanmt:eness and co.11nededness as two general assmmptions about wlu1t fo of pri111t11ty vahle in th1c' m.oral or m.ore brnadly ethical lifo. To say that a (sd of) vafoe(s) is "primary"•*or 11ha1ik 11 ore "fornlarn1enl:al" •***** in the sense intended here is not neeessadly to say that Jit is the "hij~hesl" or 11nost important (set ot) moral valu1e(s), 11or Jis it to contend l.hait all othier values must be Jillslified by 01r deriivable frnm 1JhP prrillmuy ome(s) .. llu!. it is to coniendl that the p1*inuury (set of) value(s) is t:he most overarching, in the sense that: any other values must sta1nd in srnnrne kind of lilrnrn-accio\enfall relationship to it, and thrut rnbsent some kind of baiseHne commitment to the pl"iI!llillry (set of) valmi(s), it Is extremely unlikely Hud any other nwia.1 vallues can be achieved. Put a1111other way, it is to ins.i1st that: the (set of) vallu1e(s.) is primary for moml lmderstatl'ldimg, in the sense that it strndures an entire m.maI outlook or moral theory, and thereby estahJjshes what that 01.d:llook m* theory fa most centrally concerned with or about.124 Demo11strating tlhat the separateness/ connectedness tension is. embedded wi.thi11 Hie wet1tern philosophical 1:rno\iticm wiJI helip to explain why the contempornry ]fu1stke/Care Debate hais been so intractaNe. And seeing son1e of the vadahonrn within each broad type of morn] 1:I1eory will shed f1uH1er light on the way in whidh. the ethics cf care o\iffor from other connection•-lmsed v1iews. But the mai11 aiirn ol this chapter fa to show t.11.aJ both ways of thinkirng about ooorali!:y are objecl:imrnbly "one-r,id,?d," Tlheornk*s which give priority to individual separateness prnrtrny moral agenls as bei11r, detached from ol:hf'ir p,0:rsons in ways fb,it can ca1Jse signifirnnl 1rnrnrai ha,rms: not only do ,5uch agenits deprive other peopfo: of i,1npm*t-1111t sourc(*eei of (nwrnl') 1.241:()n Lhis Ttnmad.or notion of 11pr]muryir (!thical concepts, m-:e Armas (l 993-: './.-10), wbo argucB that uncicYnt: moral :pluilor.;.opho:n:, :madci. pritnacy dainui, if al all, in only U1fa broaJ senr.H-!. 1J5 vaJm~,. they themselves a,re cul. off from those smm::es, and far from prese1'11ing what is valuable aibout om* amfonmny, thi.s nrn fosu~r a debiiHating sense of anomie, Meanwlhile, p.redselly becaUJse lhey place so nrnd1 signifie1rnce on Hw 11ai1U1es that arise through our attaid1menl:s fo or affiliatiorm w1iH1, others, tlieor[es which emphasize i111forperscmal connection, threaten to absorb mornl agents complete.ly in reldionshi.ps, 1~1ruvi1rig them with too little time and/ or ene!l'gy to pursue their own, m.01re aU1tonomous or i111dividualistic pursuil:s, am! pedmps evern corn1rdling, lhem to remain hwolved in refationships that are personally debilitating, The upshot wm lb0c; that we m\ed some way of integnding these two ways of thinking, and nn Chaptel!' ftmr, I shall a1'.g11e that the ideal of sllmnfo.g is able to do just thid. 3.1.. An ,1Ut11d1ei:d <lllebate Becirnse the separatl,!ness/eonnedednes.s tension is pmrticulairly ev1d1-nt wH:hin m.odern. moral dispufos, and lwrn11se His mode1rn mmraI theories (indmling their eontempora1*y varia11bs) Umt cmre .. •ethidsi:.s, hlive l:,een pa.rl:icu1farly keen to critkiz:e, it is thm1e theories ll shaH main.ly focus on. llut in §3.3, we will see how a very similar t,~nsion arises wiJhin "ager,t..-based"' conceptions of moral,it.y (i11dudh1g the ethic of care). M,ianwhile, l:he seprurateness/ cmmededness tens.ion is already evident withic.11 am::ien, phiJosoph1irnl dfsy.rntes between thinlkPrs lilke Pl:mto and the Stoics, who e11cournge agents fo, cul!tivale the [nnex* strength and self~tmfficiency of their indiividual souls, and Aristotle, whose conceptfon of the vlirtU1ous life tends l:o presuppose a pn3'•existing network of inte.rpe1*sonal connedions, and who seems to have recognized, more than any ol:her ancient thinker and a great many modern thinkers as well., lhe distinctive value that relal:ionshlps have, in 116 humrnn Hfo)25 Hence,, it 1is m,efol to see why llie tension fa nlJt quire so pro•ml1t.mced in tlhis c,1se. Minch of the reason ba.s to do willi what some have called Hie "fonl1al self.,,eentei:edness" of ,1mcient themizing ---IJh,, fact that the~ andenlls bf,gin by refleding on the question of "how one should live" rather l;hain on H1co q11estim1 of "how one should ad" towards other people. As Julirn Annas has empha, sized, this does not moan that questiorn, about what we should or should not do to and for others pfoy no role at all in andenl: elhkad, thought: a great many of their debates concern the precise ways in whkh Tooth seJf .. regard and other .. reg,ud woll figure into tho best hnman life,. and very few ancient 11hinkern treal the Jatfo1r as a me.rre species of the fonnor (Annas 1993: chs. Hl--14}. Still, then* does seem to be a kind of self-oriented weigMing tlmt atladte1, l:o aH th,i1ir discussio1111. ofvirlue (Cott[ngham ]996),, Fm* oxampIE", whille Aristotle praises the "fdend of humanity" (Nicomachean Ethics: 115Srul6--22) and driarnctoriz,es "great souled" ind1lvid11mls as bei11g magmmlmmrn as wdI m; healthy and wise, he also says th,d lhe honor tlmt iS due to ,mch individtm.fa stems fmml'I foonr ability lo acernmpHsh moire for themselves than is the J'HH'm for ht1man beings ('i '[22 '*-'29 *112• 2''" 1 * * ) 126 _ . ~* ,IU'<>. -~ .. ':ta .Jll' (;:;JJ:lllp 1Iaf.HS IOC~.Ul1e • * bi aiddiltiion, whiJle rnost ancient theorie:, do admowlledge virtues like friemfah.ip, gonerosHy,. and even 1merey, rnn empha:;is on rnre and com par,sj1on, and in pairtkulair,. th,~ Hwught that these might serve as distindively monil idoah; that ought 1:o gove1m our inl:e.rnd:ions with one another, :,eerrns tu have ]2'' ~0Sr:e N1111sr,;:ha11u1:.ts d.l.!Kusrdon of Aristotln1s com1111ii:ment to uni!aUonal goodsH (1986: ell. 12), aB well as Sh,1rman's diec1Jssfon of his emphasis on "thn shared Hfo" (1991: ch. 4), Arrir111:o\JQ1G v:i.o,,vs have also had a good deal oJ inflm:*'1'1.ce on co:ritmr1q)on1ry coYn:munit.ari.anr-;, most famously Afasdafr M111clntyre (1. 981; 1988). 126soo Shenm:wn (1988) for corm[;n.11.cUve: criticisms off.bis cfon:wnl of Arit,l0Lfo1N lfo1t1gliL 117 e1cnerg,!d most dearly only in the wake of the ]ludeo,-Christiam lbcadition,'127 Tlhus,, while Aristotle does not neeessa.rily l:hink tha,I the rest of us rure lo be bliamed m* criticized compairison to the most virtimurn people,, 111eitlher do1•s he prnrtrny his "greilll:-,soufod" imlividrnab ,1,s necessa.riJy feeHng or bein,g obii1;ed to 1mise the less forhmate up to their .leveI. Srnne people, he sugg,!sls, wiH simply not do as well as oth,~1rs, and this sfonds in fairly sharp contrast lo the biblicrul cormonrund to "be ymu lbrmthern'' keeper.," In other words, wl1[fo,, Aristotle derndy gives at certa1in primacy 1:o i'nl:erpersonaI connections, the 11.mplirntiom, of this am somewhat less demanding; or otlher.,,regarding,, within his :mornll outlook, than they lx"nd fo Ile within modern 1111oral 11ie1Ns)28 To han fo the opposite kind of caise, notice that while the Strnics srume concem fo "the renH1fost Mysian" that we aI*e typically moñ ind[11ed Ito give to otuselves, this il, very different from the Christian nwnidate to "love thy neighbrnr as thyself. 11129 Tlhiis fa b,;cmwe the Stoic reconrnrwndation ils, !Ja:sed on l:ile view Hrn,I we should "extirpate" alI those pam,ioins that !lead us lo he excessively concerned v,rUh a1chievi11,g any sort of exk,n1a,J goods fo,r* m1rrselves or any olJrmI' pemon, and this indudes the sorts of "attadnne11l: e1nol:ions11 127Tin:.ir; fod.: fa (ltnphasiñd by Anscorr:ir1Jr~,~ (195-8), wlm .fo_rrrnvs-ly uq?;ued Hta!L modern ideas a1bout moraII ohHgation d.epend on the noUom of a 11divine lcnv,U m1d Urmt contemporary p:i1ilosophers wl10 arc-no longer w*iU:i:ng lo appeal to bdi.ds in a dtvim-'. Imrvg:ivcr .mw~L turn I.heir ~1tter1.Li.on away front deont.ic conceplf~ likn duty a.nd. ohhgatfon in fovo-r of ar(~i:aic conceptH i.ike virh-1.0 and vice, ie., :in favor of the sort. of theory Htt: ancfontn preferred. See abo Humll1m,se (1995; 1996) on thi,; poinl. *]2.8 1'-Jottce Owt l do nol da.i.rn thfr, ]s in.appro_prJ\ate. Ikdow I will expfore wayr-, in whkh co!i'.m(-'.*clion••has:Pd view~~ knd lob~: objed:ionahly 01l1.(!r-*rcgardi.11g1 buL v .. rhnther AiristoU(-'. ir1 abl.H to escape this charg,: w.ittb.out going too far in th(-'. ot.h(-:f" d_fredio.n iH noL D qtwstion l will explidffy take up. For d.iscmision, see Annm, (199~: ch. 12), l\lnssbat1m (1986: en. 12), am.I Shnmrnn (1988; 1991: ch .. 4} 129Not0-1 J:1ownverl' that !.he Ro.r.nan Sloir.s ha.V('.* a:conñ:ptior1 of rnercy lhal an.Ud.pa:Les Ch.dsbi11nity .in certain wa1ys, See Nm~shtrn1Yr1s c.hscuns.ion of Sn:rn:ca (199'3; 98ff). 118 whi.ch might Iead us to be deeply movf"d by l:he pllglht of otlhers. As a result, the com:e1m we are to give the remotest Mysian fo restrided fo a, fa.irly detachc~dl acknowledgni.c:nt of his bai1,ic hmnan11:y •** Jhfo (capadly for) ral:irnrrnJily and vfrh1e. And theiir emphasis on i;oods like self--suffidcincy and self-reliance allgns the Stoics 1nore closely wHlh the "sepmraleness--based" si1de of the wesrern moral tradition (along with thinkers l.ike Kant, upon whom they had obvious lnflluence) .. 11\lhen we tmm to modem moral! philosophy, the prnctke of treating l:he separnbmess of pen,ot1H a,s mo,rn,lly ]primary while giving i,nl:e*rpmson,al connedirnns only a secondary moral rok; is prob11bly most dearly exemplified by Thomas I'lobbes. He viewed momI c1ge111ts a indepem:lent co•nt,~rs 1i,f activity who naturnU.y endemvor l:o dJirect theiir rnpmdties and resources to the fomHment of U1efr imlividual interests,rno and he assumed that what is of value .... mornil or otherwise•*** is whateve,* an individual agent des1ires or prefers, Accon:lingiy, there fa nothing 1:hat moral agemfa ought to strive for beyond the tlndngs lfod: will in /rad sa,tir;fy their individual preferences, and thie1*e is nothing that morality encournges m* den1ands beyond l:he satisfoctfon of lndividm1l int.eresls. B.obbes took thfa lo n1ean Hmt we can oilly nrnke sense of moral adivily if it can be shown that tho agent has i11terests that sm:h activ1ity tis likely to serve. And the explamdory power of thtis way of th11rnki11g aibout nwrn,Hty stems frmn Ms arg11ment Hrnt there are at !!east some interests !:hrnt any 1?r011co.nsider :m.en aB if hut nv{~n. nm-..v sprung out of lhn earth, Hind. suddmdy, Hl.<-i: m.ushrooms, cornP tn .fu.Hi mal.1.1rHy1 '1⁄4rithou.l. all kind of t:*ngag<:mHml. witl1 oad1. othm,u (l*lobher,: The Ci!izen, p. 205). 119 1individuaI rnn reasonably be exp,~ted to have. He begins by poi n,ting ,)ul thilt all individuals have a natural] desire for self-preservation, a111d notes that io <1 wc)Fld with limited rescmrces, we must acknowledge that IJhere are ait least sotne cm;es in which the spedfk desixes of separnte inid.ivid1mb are likdy lo conflict Once we recognize t.h1is,, Hobbes sugi~ests,. we are forced to cor11dude that cive1ry Individual. is at least a poterrntlal lhireat to the inte!l'ests of eve1y other, anal to ad:1mwledge that the desiire foi* seff-preservation, Jif left rnnchecke:d, would eventrnally lernd Ito "a, war of mil a1~aim;l all" flt65'1: ch. 13). Because r,m:h rn Willr ir, obviously Lmdesirablle from every imHvklual's point of view, Hobbes argued 11:lhat the desire for seif-prei;ervation eve11hmHy leads ,~ach of u1s to develop the fm:ther desire for social peace (Ibid.: ch,. 14),, 1111.is, in trnrn, rn,ruk,~s It rational lo form a sociai.1 contract, agreeing to abide by a system of rules dosigm,d to (1) grnard agai111st he likelihood thrnt d!estrmctive conflicts of inl:erest wm rnrise, a,nd (2) arbitrate in those sihrntiom, where such conflids are simply 1.mruvoidaible (Ibid,.: ch .. IS). It 1is those rules, on a hohbesfa,o rc11ccm1nt, thilll: constitrnte l:he most basic 1noral norms, ,ind tJhey are prc'Sllrned to be mornHy him:lini~ on everyone insofair air,; they rnn be shown to be compati!ble wiith each it1divid urnI's na1:ura.li desilre to satisfy the int.erests and goals that flow frorn his separal:e personality,, Tho contrndmrian elemerrnts of this approad, mrnke ii: possible to build in certain foatrnres of morality tln<1t point to our inevlltalJfo mn11,:-xcl1c'dnerw w il.h one amother,, rnnd aUhm1gh he ls often criticized for portmyi11g mi a,s much more i,eif.-sufficient than we adm1Uy are, lfobbes does at lea,st acknowledge that there are smne benefifa lo social cooperation. lfot he is con1m itt:ed to th,~ view thait there is no specifically moral value to be fmmd in adivdy caring allornt others' welfare or in promoting othem' folerrests, noir* in cultivating 120 ongoing relationships with them, unless this can be shown to s,itisfy individtml preferences. Tlhfo does 1101 (Jllll:e mea11 Htat relationships can only have value as the means for achieving more eg«Ji1,tk desires, since specific indlividuafa may to fad desilre vairious kinds of human connection shnply for their own, sake. Hut i1: does mean that there is no reason to enfomce or eve!11 maintain ornr connections with other people beyond !he contingent ernobonal sentiments tllrnt runy spedfk individl mill may m may not feet Hence, any valuc\S tllrnt aure found only in human refa1tionships seem to lie sq11mrely ouJsid,• the 11rwml domain. Hobbes's s1]gg(~sllfon that we need nol think of ourselves mis connected to one a111other in any mornlly sig:ni.ficant way has a num her of trm:11J.Ii11g implications. To begin with, there s.eerns to ll<1 no obligation to dfredly consider the welfare of other people wfr1en one fa delibernti.ng about vvhal: to do; at nwst, there is the acknowledgmr,nt that the benefifa a gen tr, n,ceive for themselves by constraining theii' individual pursuills in ways lll'ml. an\ comhicive fo social peace w1ill fr(,quently coincide with siimi:lar benefits to other5. Though Hobbes assumes lli,it separate indivJiduals are 1i111 a posHim1 of roughl.y eqllal powerv1is a vis one anol:her,.'l'll he does not po1rtmy persons as being entiHed to a basic l.evel of mornl cmKern from their follows, and is fllot:orio11s for the daim that II a hum.am being's worth is his price" (1651: ch. l!l) .. As a resuH,. the wfrfoly h(~Id !belief lhat moraHty at least occasionally stems from 1111d may even trc-!quire a di.ired concern for olherrn' welfare, and simply for their own sakes,. is not: one thal his approach seems easily a bile to accommodate .. Hobbes's approach a,lso suggests thal there wtJI IJ.p fow, if rnny, l?i'1Fen1inisl. philosop}mes have bt~{~'i'.i especially keen lo poTtnL oul Lhal the asfn1mpUo.n oJ 11equu[ pov,rern fa hi~1-1ly q-uesli.onab[e u11Iees \VC! sovo-rd.y lii:nil the du1ss of moral persons. 121 so cailed "positive duties" lo help the lless fortnma,t0 men1.bers of any imcial group. S1ince the very yornng, the weak and Hie infirm ca1u1ot pose any seldom;. thread: to the people ffobb(eS set fortlt as the human, norm, Jt appeairs tlrnrnt there is simply no reason l:o e~fahlfah 01* .~hide by moral rules that constrain, our intemctions wah them)32 JF1ina1lly, t is commonly thornght faat even the ll'm!t~al:ive dutiesll' of non-interference that do seem likeiy to be induded in the social contract m*e placed mi a irelat1ively weak fmmdation. Consbminimg our morre i11dividt1wilistic ptlrsmits in sihmtions where igmming Hie moral n!les would deady lJe a more ,~ffedive way fo satisfy ornr long-term interests and goats is simply 1irmtional from a, Hobbesian poillt of view, and it is not entilrely dear 1~;hethter (or how) his theory allows h1im to criticize s11ch opporhunfatk activity as 11nornliy questionaible,. fodeed, llernu1se Holobrn binwelf thot1gM the opporhmities ar1d temptalions lo break the social contrncl would be f,u too gñat mrdess people were wiUing lo grm,nt c1n albsolrnt,~ sovereign the auH10rity, ,mdi the power, to enfoxce the mmal mles (1651: PMt Two),. he is sometimes viewed as a beU:er political timn m,orn,l p/n,ilosopher.1 3~ '1,32.rt is Lhifl foatun-\* of hobbr:F.fa:n conlTraclar.tan.is1n that contemntpora.ry care, .. elhicifils (among: othi1m) find espedHlly dist1ub:i.ng. 133*More rece:ntiy 1 Dt1vi.d. Gw.dhier (1986) has sought Lo sl!'Jow that. lH.ol~ber~ 1s rather p(-$.S-in1i.slic condusion is tH'1necc\Sfl,m"y, because cedain typos of 11111.ut:ually advanlo.geom-;'1 coo,porative vnntums afford eo1ch of Umi.r parf:idpai.:tnlf~ b,-:u(-;fils Hwt 110111.P of lhmn couJd expPd to achieve on tJn.oir own, A!i:hough.he conleir,ds thut. we arc cfr:-pe:ndcnt on others in orde:1~ t.o achinve "lhn foUrn,t realization [of burnari ndivity] that is possible for each of us" (1986, JS?), however, Gau thi.er f~t:m dons nol J'.>1"escn.t th :* fa.cl that we are int:e:rconn.oded in thir,; ,,vay <rn grounding n1.n:y of our m,oral. obligations or as m.ohvatin.g our .moral acUv1J.y1 arid he n-m'H:lins 11comn1i.U:ed Lo f~l1owing ,,.,,_rhy an 1nd.ividua11 ña:soni.ng from: non--mo-ral promises, woul.d t11ccept. he consfrainls of moni:W.y on h.is clh.olccfi\11 (1986: 5). BectH.H::le J1<~ fo!Ji.ows 'Hobheo i.n equat:i.ng 11roasoning from. *n:1.0n--moral. prt:-rn.ises1*1 with rcaso-ning-egoist:icul.f.y, b_]fl. argu.rn,:*nl hinges on the m1n:p.irical dairn Llwl Lh(! b(-mnfnls of co-operative vnnlur."<•$ a-re ptirvafiive enotllgh, aJ11d ou1' ah:iHty Lo detoct dw!:l1Ln1ts i ~Jo_phislicab-)dl. e.inough, thul. fhe.n: arc in fod. no sit:uall:ions in v\rhich an ind.ivid.ual can mo.r(~ e.ffocU.vd.y adva:nce his or l1(~r ow-.r1 (long.,,Lerm.) seff-inteñsts by bn!-a.kllng thc* ntora[ rm llns. J.jko n11any corrcrmentators, 1 fi:rid il .highly unliknly fLhal thfo is true. 122 Hobbes also believed tlmt the be111efits of lhavi11g a mrnml code 1nadle il ratiom1J to agree fo this sort of arrar1genumt,. thouglrn many of his contem .. pomr1ies expressed seriious dloubts almut lhis,. As John Locke fom,ously pui I: il: ""Ibis is to think that men are so foolish that H1,!y t'lke carre t:o avoid whill mii,chJiefG may be dlone lo tlr1em by pole•-cals or foxes, but are con lent:, nay, think it safety, fo, be devoured by Hons" (I 690: §93). ln any evemt, (me way lo avoid these: sorts of diffkuHies,. whHe still gJ1v1ing priority to irndivid mil separafom,ss, is fo rely on the Lockean notrion of imlividu1al rrights.134 On this appwoadt, penmns, are still conceived as separate indlvidtmls who rrnhmidly endeavor fo satisfy thefr owlil inleIT'ests, and momHly is stilll thought to sexve the nahnml interest In self-,preseJvation that alil lrnman beings nhare, as, well as the rnwre idiosyncratic i111te1rests tJmt distingu.nish u1s as separmk, pernomilitirn. Bul because Locke identified moni,l ad1111il:y with activity 1:hat pro1:eds em:h person's natural irighls to life ,mcl liberty (whkh he ta,kes 1:o include the pursuit of prope1ty), he was ,1hle to build [1n tile idea Um1: we are obligated to treat one another .in ce:rrtain wruy1, even before any ldmll of sod al con1:rrud i.s in place: Every one as he is bound to preserve himself ... ; so by the Hke reason when his own P1r1,servatio11 comes not in com peWcrion [with ol:hers]I, ou11ht he, as m ud1 as he Ciut, to preserve the rest of mankind, rund mily not unless it be to do Jlustice on an Offen,der, take a way or impair lhe Hfe, m* what tends fo tlhe Prreservatfon of the Life, Liberty,. I"foa]Ut, Limb or Goods of anotfl,,,u* (Lodke *r.690: §6),, Notke, however, th,1t doing 11ais much as we can"' to preserve the rest of mankimd adnmily amounts to faiirly lit:t:le on a Lockc• arn v11ew: we rure spedfi.• --------------~~~~ B 4Note !.hll,L GrofillF< (158~-*164:5) sr.<'mB Lo have hrcn th" firnL to hold iloal ev"ry porn<H'l1 simply .i:lil vfrtuo of lri.s, f'l:t.tturn as ari indiv.td.uaI, posf:leRNCG :righls. V,./l1ich musl be respected *ri,y Pvnryonc and whk'.h therefor<-) give dse ij;o naLura[ obligi:!Hons. cal!y told not 1:o mke away rnr imJpafr the lifo,, liberty,, or goods of any other, but we are not specificrnlly folld to actively concern ournelves wi11rt !:he good of others. And 111.ltke that there fo stiU ve1ry BUle nico 1tnilfon that ii11re1qpenm1ru1l connededness is mondiy valllable in its own ri~;ht. The reaso111 agenl:s are given for 11'preserving 11 the life of other peopfo fa ver"'y simHa,r to 1/rtP rernson they hrnve for 11pñservi11g11 themselves: 1111,mely, the F'ecognihm1 that alll peopfo are m1tu1raily "lbound 11 by seU-pt'eservatnm1, and hence that each perrson has nights that are simply 1in1aliena1bl(~ --* that is, impossihle for tbe indivkh.rnl to sunender or for other people fo 1ignore. In other words,, while l:Ms approach does adknowledlge that any indnviduall's actions will almost 1i111evitably have :m i1aip,ict 0111 the lives and welfare of at lea.st some othern,, 1:llw fad tbait othe1rs may sometimes be dependent upon an rnge11t's assistance iis not presented aB the fornture Hmt olbligates !:hie agent to "preserve" Htem. t\lot smrprisingly, even thinkers who defond a faiirly posibive com:eption of indiv1Id tml rnght9 (that is, a coITTcepl~on of righi,s as reqrnfrem,ents to ,IdiveJ,y help thnse who possess them) m'e still, commiUed to the view that 1Nhenever an aiJ;ent1s o,wrn 1ri1ghfa come i,nilo diired "competition" with the rii;hts of others, the i,gent fa always n-nomlly entitled to rnd on hiis or her own belrnJf. fo this vvay, the sepamteness of moral agenlti; is given pri.ority over their connections fo others, Locke's owwn writini;s leave it somewhat uindi'ar jusl how m.uch assistance we uwrn,lly ought to p1rovide fo otheir people. Howeve1r, many contempornry rights .. lbased thinkers, indm:l.ing Jobin Hospers ('19'1]) and Robert Nozick (1974), awe quite ineiskmt !hat so Iong as im age>nt doPs ino1 directly infringe upon another person's life or Hlrierly, he is under few oblii~a\ions lo attempt to imprmve lheir sihrnUon orr aJlk>viafo l:bcii: ,mfforilllf,, even if doing so would ncquire the agent to make little or mi sacriifin\ Put 124 ar11oll:hc•r way, theiir vfow is thrut morality dfred,; ou1* al:le11ti0Jr1 l:o other people primarlly insofar as tlh1eiir right5 serve as consbminls on what we may do for om*selves; it can neve:r compel us to pro1mofo or enhance others'' welfare, nor prev,~nls moraJ agents from helping others if they *w is,h to do so, hut th1is sort of aictivity is 1:honntiht to lfo outside the dom.ain of morality prope11'. Hence, this libertarian id:rand of righfo-,baised thinldnr; might be said to altach even less mornl ,5ig11Hkance lo inlerrernonal ccrnnedced.11ess Ilm.n conlnid,ufan views which al leaist acknowledge thrnt cerftrnir1 benefifa can be achieved flhnmgh cooperation with olhern. Kant empl}msizes 1:he sepan1Jenes.s of p~'rsons in a sHr,hfly different way whe11 he locates the source of our mrnrnI oblir,il!:kms in our (rnpacity for), aufonomy (17815).135 Ifo held !hat 1:his capa,dty givei, lwmain befogs a sp()cial kind of "dignily" since, rnl:.her thrnrn simply being compeUed to p!U"GR!e ends that rnre given b> us by nature or nmrtme, we are in some sense able to "will" mu own ends)% At tlhe very least,, we decide which of our competi1rng ends lo ptmme, amd how to adt1ieve as numy of those ends as possiblle wiU1in a si.llgl.e, coherent life. Even nwre impo:rrl:anl:ly, the rnpadty fore autonomy makes morn[ adivity possibie for us, because it enables m, to be liten1,lly self--fogfolrnting, and so to recognJze tile impennissilbili.ty of certain kinds of adions .... namely, adions Hiatviolate the 011:egm*ica,I Imperatnve to "act oniy according to that 'Jl35snn ospmiaJ.Iy Lhe dlsctrnsion_ of 11Antonomy of Lhe ,NH! EW t-Jw Su-promn Prin.d_plr. of .M-01raJHly1'1 (1785: 440ff), Page ref-c.i.rn11.cor1 an\ lo the standard P'russ.iai.n Acttde:my vent.ion of Kanl;'s texl; my citaUom, arr, from tho EngJiflh l:nm,lation hy 2.lli.ngton ("1983), -i 36wrhe diignfiLy of Jhu.rttanity com;isls jtHi:t i11. .ilG cacpaidty to fog:i,sl:ate 1H1:lversa.! law, Lhough with the condition ofhm11.anity 1s being aL the sam.e UmP itself strJ0j<:ct. lo t1rlis *very samo logj.s[o,Lion" (1785: 440). l2S maxim whereby you can at the same l:ime wiill that ii should becomf' a rnnivenml law"' (1785: 4l2J),B7 Kant calls U1fa urniversal law formulation n,e "only categorical imperntive" (Ibid.), Yet to ma,ny people,. it seems lo work best a,s a prn•cedure for testing the mo.ml pe:nnissibility of lhe ads we propose to engag,~ in after we have already forrmudat,id a more specific maxim; it fa not very hrdpfo.1 in 1JI11coverillg mo1ml ad[ons that nright not otherwise occuu" fo us, m* i11 helping 1w to determine the best tb.ing to do from among a 1mnge of pennfosible alternatives, However, autrnnomy also figures into Kanl's them*y in ai m,ore sul1stanti11e way,. as is brought out by his "pmdkal imperative*" to ''aid in suclli a way !:hat you trl'eat humanity, whether h1 om* own, pernon or in the persm1 of a:nol:her, always at the same tiime as an end airnd never si11nply as a mc~ans" ('1'785: 429). On a minimalist int:erprehr,tion of tbfa end*•in-itr,elf fon1rmlation, the autonomy of pernons fondions primairily as a constraint on how we may ad toward! others: we mrnst never ad: in ways t:hal: foirce othe*r people to lTeat mu auhrnomously chosen ends ais their own. Yet K,mt also recognized that we are finite rational befo.gs: that we are vulnenible to various rmrt:, of hardship and harrm, mui that we frequently depernd 1.1porn varim1s kinds ofcooperntirnn and asslsfarn:e from one another in order lo achieve m,,rny of the ends we 137 Of cxm.rsn, ox:JitAe.inUalisls such !:l1s Smrfrc-rc:jnd. the idtia U1aL !J1ero ar'f-; uny :ma,dff1N a gnntn.inoly aulo.11omous agent Vtror.dd nncessari"hL dwost\ and theni is a hit of u puzzlt; abouL wl1ethe:l'.' Kai:rnCs Jdoa of an aulonomous vvill lhat lJH ncmet.hofoss constrained by a 1'lnait.1.1:ral11 rnoral law can be madn coherc*nL (for one rc!ce:nt attern:pt, snc: Hnn11an (199;\: ch. 1!0) vvho conhmds Oiat Um conBiLraintrs l(anl p!aG-:s on pracUca[ rationality am.ount to a conception of vai(ue). I do not Jincl-ude existen1t:it11lism. !in the briof au1"\rey alwV(-\ bccauBe1 vv}dfo H cetlainly c-n:nphas.Jizes U:1e vul:nes of Jinclividual separa.h:111ess, H i:s. m.on-~ oflen posed as a challenge to nor.rnative ethk:N than as a parUcular v.icv,r a.bout the content of moral norms. Bul not:ico that lmwfor tis it does nm.body a moral conception/' it.1,r,; nno lhaL g:iv,-'.s primacy Lo Llw valuer; of individ1rnl sopfl:IY'al(-~TieHs w}dfo al Ll:1:e samn tirnn r,!jncUng !!.he viPv1.r tJmk :rnoral!ity iF1, u Himat.dy ffL*otmded. :in _pri.nc:ip.lm; and rulr$. 126 @ufanomously choose,. Arn:! cm a, more positive interpretation 01 tlhiis formu[a,, ii seems tlhat morn.lily requires ns, a,t least on occasion, to take up tlhe (mora:lly legihmare) ends of olhe1r people~ and to actively promote thefr ability to succec;sfoliy @chieve lhe various ends flu,t they dwose. His worth emphasizing that !Ka,nt Is not simply defending a set: of reciprncal obHgalions: he does not asgue that we ought to hdp spoc•dfk othern, because they have helped us in lhe past, or only when we know we will ,ilmost: certai11ly depend on those othem at some point tin the fob.ire. Rather, hfa clairn1 fo Hmt the fad that an end has been autonomousiy chose11 by another (finite) agent gives that end ai specia! kind of value,, and one th,it pirovides the rest of us with at least some reason to puusoe it. This do,"s not nec,~ssairily mean lfod H gives m, a suflident reason to do so, since there .may he other, com poling ends that we have ,rntonomously chosen and that we may purs11e withoul v[ola1ting the m1iveirsal moral law. However, H does provide tho basis for a wide, imperfod duly of bem~fkem:o:: 11Foir tile cm,ds of ,my sul1j1,1ct who is an om:l in himself 111 ust as far ais posi,Ibfo he my ends also, if that conception of an end in itself .is fo ha 110 ifa foll effed .in 1JJt1e11 (Jl 785: 430). To go through life without ever !being adively committed to achileving the good of any otlier, Ka11t suggesfls, is to fail to fully resped their autmiorny, and so to fail to b'eat humanity, "'iin the per11on of rnnother/' L11 tl,e way that morality conn11a1,1ds. 'Dtfa goes even farther than other separntenem,,-hased views i111 suggesting Umt we are morally required fo concern 01.irselves directly wUh the lives and/or welfore of olhern, and simplly for their own sakes. Yet it sUII drn's 110t frcat the bonds that occur lbelween 1i11di11id1.mls as hi,viin.g brnsic or foindr.mcntal m01rn1l value, and whille it may allow our relationships with vm*iom, othern to influence the contcint of lhe sped fie maxims we ad on, ii slill 127 does lilot trreat ol!r co1ilneded11ess as f;rouJ1.ding, our obligations Io ot11e a11other.138 llri other word11, a kantian co11Ceptio11 still suggests thal n10.rral adivily has less to do with the establishment and maintemrnce of interpersmwl relationships than with the cultivation of amd net'Jped for individual. aud:mmmy)~9 In so doing, it poFtrays moml ai;enlis as being psychologicalliy detached from one ,mother in ways th,~t make it very diffk11lt to acknowledge the monill significance of i11herently mutual goods, such as friendship and love, that depend for their realization or1 a, compllex Iyiing tor;e1:her of thotnght5 and emotions thal two or more people share. As a result,. more affilidive ern:leavors, in which the ends of any one indlividual canuwt tK' d!earl!y distinguished from the ends of ,n.11 fhe others, seem to drop out of tlhe mrnrnl domain (cf., B,1ier,. 1994: di. 2:). And thfa stanids in ooarked contrast to "connedioni-•hased" moral views. llliodern morn! phiJlosopfõrs who give primacy to the conned!'•dness of peirsons have emphasized thlis foahue of h1u11~1111 livint~ in two m,ain ways., One way is by adopting an expliidHy causal or conse91uentiaHsl. nrndeI whidh i;tresses the fad that lhe ad:iorns of any individual will inevi,tably have a,n B8,For* example, lllthough Barh11,ra }forman says Htal tho n,gufolivo priority of 11w duty 111.ol:iive (the motive that Jn.ovcs n.n autonrnrnm.m will) does .not tnmsfoJe inl.o llw vuim-: priority of U,at .I.Ttolive ove-r var.i.om.~ 11mot-i.vm~ of connedio.n,U she alrm i.nJ;isl.s tl1at moUvPs. of cormecU.on I1ave no h1d.epend1en.t; n1ora1 vulue and m.711,sl a.[wuys l,o constrained by the "JrnoL:ivc of duty .in order to be 1m,r*ally good (J 993: ch. 9, esp. 188ff),. See also Baron (1984), who arguer:, Uial 1:dl 0111.er motives 1nr11UsL b(\* t1.filfored tl:1rought1 1J1e mot:ivc: of dnl.y in 01*-.for to l'lavo m ora.l -vtro.nth. 1391n the [)oclrine ~f Virtue Kani: prntraye; our moral adivity as a kindl of mw[eady Tbalaance hehl\l'(X\n 11th1e _pri.ndp.lo of mul.1.111[ love 11 whicl-1 dit(-i.ct:s tw "constantly to avproach on(-: another/ a.nd 'the pd.11'1cipk~ of t'C-\Hpecl}1 vvhid1. <lin-:ds us 11tn keep [ou.r~]selv(;~S ul: a dislc:inccu (1797:: §2.4). A:n.d son *vvood for discussion of K11nt1s mnrP gonond p.icture ofhuma_n bdngr,, as dw.rt1cleri.:t.od by m'.l 11u11sociable Hoci.11biHty11 (1991). '128 impact on the lnves and/ or welfare of at leasl some others and exhorrts m; to promol:e !:lie common good .. The other way is by embracini; am LKh more psychological model whkh emplmsizes omr "'nahua1.l sociability" and lhe v,ilm• we place on various emotional atill.chmen1:s, as well as the rnle of 010~e al:lachments in motLvaUng moral adivity, The first model 1is familiair fm.rm, dassica,J tltHi1:llrianism, w1mkh klentifies moral.i.ty with activity that produces "the greaih~st good for fhe giread:est number" of humain (or se111tienrl:) beings.140 A11d the second approach is m,ost clearly exemplified by the 181:h centu.ry mornl sense theorists such as Frmnds Hutcheson,. Admn Sirrnith,. and David Hume .. But elements of these two mode.ls mre often combined. The moral sense tlheorists were 1m}ted in the mnvktfon that peoplle posses various kinds of benevolent affectrlons which c1*eaile wlhat Hutcheso11 calls a "secret chain between each person and mankind," and d1ispose tJS to morally "app1mve"1 of those adions which "are ge111eraHy imagin'd to l:eind to the rmtlual Good of Mankind,. i)I" of some I'fllEt,~ of it" (1'72.5: 121) .. They allso insisted that both moral motrlvalfon and mornl jt.ulg1m.enl: were built om this foatuire of our psyd1.ologkal make**llp .. fo support of this view,. they poi11ted out th,it we frequently mornHy prnise people for exhi bi Ung qmillitie» thi,1 can be of absolutely no benefit to 11s, but that do cornfribute to Hte i~ood of other p,~opie. lf we did fl]otcam~ rubout those additiionrnl otlhers,. why wou.ld w,, bestow ornr moral praise 1in this way'? They frnrthm* sugi;ested that if w,~ sincerr*ely refled on our own na,h1ñs, we wilt find tlhat we often rnre as much, 1.4.0 AcL1u11Uy, the moral m)nse tb.norfot 1"1rands Huich.eViOll:1 n1ny have hPe.n the ft:i.r~Jl to mrticn:ufo1Ln the vrnatest hap11i.ness pr]J1dp.ii1• (Sdtmoewind 1992: 864). Howev,-:r, in his view this prrindpfo iH derived from tll1e m.oirc ba1sic kfoa of El benevolent. moral smme that nalurally aipprovos of I.he types of a:diomi Hw1L uniV(\rnaUy benevokmt petsons _perforrn; i:n ulillitarinnism, f~t1ch a principle is ethically fundamental and lS it.r-m[f Llw banis of our 11w1:m*aT' fl(~l'1!He, It 129 or morre, abm11: achieving go-ods for olher peopfo as we do abou1: ad1ie11Ji11g goods fow om*selves. In other wrnrds, H fa nol simply Uml our henevollent aHedfons j~ive us (no1'HJJ1oral) pleasure; we morally admfre mnrnelves for beint~ thfo way and are morally glad to find that we fowe these srnrts of sentiments lowanl others (Sd:meewind '1992: 862-H).'141 The moral sense U1eoirfafa were also convinced thal the~ mm*al point of view is enlirel,y distinct from the point of view of ind ividuaI self-interest: it is t,he point of view of an impartial an,d m1iversaily hon.:!vollent "spPdalrnr" who is a1hle to "sympaUri.ze:11 willi Hie motives and actions of other people, Henn!, they ,ij_]l made a disti11dion between the particufor moral sentiments (such as benevolence, comprussi.on, and gem~msily) whi.d1 are nm::ial to our rolf, as moral agents u1d literally "conned:" our own interests to tlu) interests of others; and Ute "moral sense," mr sympathy mechanism by which we mak0~ mo1rnl judgments in oUJr mle as moral spectators observing foe moral activily of other:,.142 !Because both of these cap,Ki1:ies were seen as pr1irnai'illy emotional, the relati.om,hip between them cam be diffkuH to dis.r~nllmgle)4'., But while the former are portrayed as motivating reasorns whkh presuppose some sort of aHection or disaffection towrun1 their object (e.i,;., a pernrnn in J.41 [Lis notetvorl:hy that mafos were prosum.ed by t},o moral sn.nse theoristr; to possem:i thest~ qualin:ies, sfrKX-l; th,ey are Lypicalrny assodatc:d with '11N"omen 1s 111oralHy11 among thin.kom ..... both JH11SL and piresent .... who d(-~fe:nd a corre!a-Li.on: betwrn-m n1oral odnntati.on and g,,nd"r (Ba_ier 1994: ch. 4; Tronto 1991: ch, 2), l42*rhns dishndion. :in. sha.11,,.cst in Hu Lc'.hefmY1; '0.rho argu.ed. tbal rJrie motf:d neñer ha1virn.g been :i1nn1.pfontcd in us by God 1, ls cu1alogotw to t:he other fivl~ sensns and enabl,rn1 UB lo grasp morfl1li. qualities iu]111od i1:tlely and non-h1.fhriential1y,. Hume and Sm]Lfh were mo.re sd~~11UJi.caJly .. mimdnd and hence roTtudanJ to posi.L a m.ora( S('..1!'1Ht! in addition to lhn more familiar and! obvious psyd1ological capacities, Ttmt hoth hdfoved t:haL h.u.nuu-:is poGNc:s a na1tural capadt:y for sympathy, wl1ich is not :itself a n10-ral senfirncml 1 hu.t which f;nn.ms an a rrwchai'.rflsm by which we mtty nnh~r into Lh.e sen:HmonlB ult othorr-;. And li.kP J-lutcheson1 \:.hey both insisted that it was th.is ca_pacity (as opposed lo :i:nslru 1rn.0n.tal r,~ason me 1r*aUorml autonomy) lhat underp).rd8' m.11" 111.ora.l _ji~d~111ent.. '143-'For a vnry detailed discussion r;podfic Il:n David Hmne 1 smi S:nare (1991). 130 need),, th,e faUe1' appe&rs to be moire refl.ed:ive or irespm1sive faculty which "sympathizes with" ow "emJlo.rses"' the momlly good motivations of oll~er people, and ls mai,fo "indignant by" or "hates" the momlly had ones .. And v,rhille the .moral sentiments w,• re l,elieved to b," depern:lleIJI: on am, agent's specific inleI'ests and <11Uachments and so fo be exercised by differ,~nt individuals toward diffe1rent padicu1lar objeds, the nwml sense/ sympathy mechanism was consider~'d to be a univemal capacity which operates 1in S111.bstantiallly the) sam,e way in aII moral ,1,genls, and whose approvals and disapprovails were wholly independent of "any a1dvanla,p;e or loss to ñdm.md to" the sped:alor (Hu1:drieson, 1725: '124).144 In other words, the moral sense/ sympathy 1111echan[r,1:n is whait enables us,. a1ccoi'ding to moral sens,.* theory, to determine whkh sods of moti.vating rernsons are justified, and hence what sorts of activity people mrnrally ought '.o eni;age in,, in the absiTad. Ifoweveis, itis noUypk,1,Illy involved in our fi.rst person moral rndivil:y; i11 their view, we ad mornlly simply by m:ting frmn mu .ruwraI sentirrnenrts.145 This, conception of mornHty is distinctive in the co1*1,vicdion that eadh of us mo.rally ought to C1.1Itnvate and act frmn the sorts of emotional iirnteJrdepend endes that make it difficult, if not impossible, to dfotingui:sh mnr "own" m!Nls and interests from the needs and h1teresi1, of aH the olher peirsorw we a,re conneded fo .. For example, F[n.J1tcheson aq,;ued that 01.1r various 1nornI senti1menl:s (in om* role as moml agenll:s), could be sorted into thi'ee mJio kindR: '144:t-Tun11e bolimres we m_m*wliy approve of lhi1ng.s whkh a.re uBefu1 or llgn-;eabfr: to ourse]vps1 or t.o o-tl"i.m"f'ir hul a1gte('B '\AJith 1-hildh.oson (and Sm1ith) Ll1af.. 11lhn rtiinds of aJ!T 111cH1 ore shnifor Jn tl1elhr fonli.ngr:; and. opc;-raUons11 in this 1~egard ([ 740: 51JS, .. ,6). 'T1'1,at fa, an thrN:* agrnP Hmt t;he 1no.n11li_ f-mnse approves of qualit.iori U1.aL arc beru-:fida.l (uNefu'i. or agreeD,hle) lo humankind gonorally 1 and g1.vn no special m,oru1t tvo.ight to qua.lilies that arE"\ beneOdal lo th,: self. 145 Adlam. SmHJ1: seem1fJ Lo ho sorrwthing of an <-1*xcop-Lion here/' as discur-mcd in .1rty Lexl bdow. 131 (1) "particular passim1s)' lik,~ love or pity, Hrnit (?:strublish an emohonal cmmedfon between the r1rnonlll i1gent and a spec1ifk other porscm;: (2) "kind affedio11,s.,"' like frfondship and palTiotism, frmt link Ute 1,norall agent to th1, "universal bene11olence" that lfos the m,01rnl age111t's ccmcern to the welfa1r,e of human beings gonernlly,. Ai, a rosuH of: tlws1! sentiI1rnenb,., mrnral a,g;enls tmflc•r when olhe11'11 suffer, feeI pleasure when others feel pleastire, and germ1mHy desill'e to s,;o othern do welt ]Hlence, lhey an! directly motivated to ad on others' belu,IL Of course, the moral t,ense theorists did not suppose that tJlw needs and [11,terestG of all the other persons a moml agent was emotionall.y connected to would ,inevitably com.plement one another, and it is impmhmt to notice tl1,1t l:hey were not simply suggesting that we sl10uld ad on lbelrrnll oJ the persons we are J:imrnediately inclined to cañ about (1-•.g., persons who are relatively ,1em* and dear). indeed, l:he morn,lly best individual, 1i11: JH[utclheson's view,, wrns the one in whom the senliment of univemaJ lbe111evole11ce prevailed and .regulated over the other two kinds. And in a similar vein, both Hume a,nd Smith porbmy the centrall moral task ,is that of "e:Hminating the confl!icb, that wmiild inevitaMy arise for 1nd1ividuals who were aw,lffe of both HK~ir own and their fellows'' desires and needs, 1in.d.uding emotional rrieeds" (Baier -1994: 56; see also J991))46 II miglht Ile thought ti-mt H1e moral sense tlheorush portl"ay us as mm:'1 1noro widely altimistic tlmn we ructrnally are,147 But Ffotcheso,11 seems to have, l46Alll1,ough Baier i.s only Pxplicilly c:onc:r,med with the moral theory of Hum,,,, 1,er cht1ractn-1rizaUon applies oq11aJly to Hull.iehc-son and Srnith. l47on t110 other hand., renmt rostia1*1rch on European 1•1Rescun-rs? of Jews during \florid \/Va:ir U, as well as G:i1ligan1s vvork, fonds Ct:'(-idoncn to lhe v:imt\7 Lha:l at lnast s.on:te poopk: do fo!:I lhem.s-~hñs to /iw conn.ectod to l11e l.i.V(-'.'f~ and ,;,vdfan;• of olhersr and are directly nrw-Uvated by tl1i~1 fi:tcL 1rClairn11 ls quol,;-d hy G-i]hga-n m; equ.atir1g morality with lhn r*mnsn thrJ1t any "o!:hc:r 132 beH,~ved that in many cases, m de~;ree of parilalil:y couid h1 fad Ile u 11derstood as the appropl'iate ,!xpnession of a more universal bem~vofonce: "Th1is 1mivernaJ1 Be111e11olence toward all Men, we may compare to that Prindpl,~ of Gnnvifoifon,. whidh perrhaps P)dends fo ,~I~ lBodys in the Universe; but, the Love of Be11r~vofonce,, increases as Hie Distance fa diminish'd, a11d is ~.l:!:!>.!J!.g'"~! whe11 18,odys c<:Hne to .tJl~1.,;:!J each oHmr. Now this increas0 g(A1tmdi<,m upon neaser Apprnach, is as necessary to l:he Fmme of the Oniverne, as ilial the1*e sb1rn1Jd be runy Attraction at all ('1'725 1911--9). H1rnne also argued that there wa,s no co11tmdidion between "the extensive !iY!!lJP:'!!J!.!.l0 on whkh 01u sentiments of virtue depend, and thc;t Hm.iJc?.d gc~ne.rnsi!,y whidh [he had] freq11ently observed lo be natural to men" (1740: 481). To be siure, Hume was uwre concerned to show that we are able to a,voiid bias in our spectaJor judgments, despite oin m,tural lendoncy towall'd aeH-love (and hence tho likc~lihoodi Umt we will morally app:rove of peoplle whose actions benefit us or 01u friends). But Smith later arrgued that we could eventually learn to 1we these spedalnr judgiments to gt1ide even our own mornl cond11d:: once 11'1inl:eirna1Hzed,,"1 they served e1s our moral, conscience:.118 Al this poi11t, the moral sense Uteoirists part cmnpany, for while SmitJ1 does nol: demrl,y disti11guish between the moral value of rnd:s moh\vated by consdentimisnes.s and those motivated directly by m.oral ,,eniimenilJ like benevolence, ffot:d1,eson is quite explicit that only l:lhe latter have tnie morrul worth, aml Hume seems happy Io endorse morn! mol:Jves tlmt come in a wide vari:ety of person ir-;, pad of thin g.iant coi.!.cdion of every'hody11 (1982; 57). And rnany of Hw R<:scuC'.rs (who tiskod U1,eir lives for oiluH*s) insisl ,.ha,L they w,m1 not ;:I.ruck ll>y lho Lhoughl ihaL il wa;: lhoir duty or even. 11 th.e righl thing*11 to dlo; raU1.nrl' i s:iiim11ply fdLlikn Hie only thi.ng f*.o do given the circumstances (Blum 1994: ch. 6; fladhwa,r 19%; Monroe 1996). '.14.H~rJn:is process was U1ou.ghl to he-itself i'n.ol:ivatrnl by our dem*ñ to .nol ordy be judged (by oth,:m) as adjng "'prop,,rly," but a,lHo Lo merit ,111ch j11dr,1nonts (17b9: 13'/ff; 262H), 133 d1ifferent forms (,is well as the nu1hmll 11!:alenl:81'1 whkh support 1:Jlwm))49 Stiltl,, m>ne of these thinkers il!ssrnmes thilit moralily is ililways a sl:rnightforwil!rdl e)(pressioi1 of mdt1rnl altruiism, and they aJl ad:nowledge the need to "coned" some people while completely disrreg,1nHni~ the needs and interests of others. T/rni1, way of thinking about mrrnmli:ly presupposes, tlrnt there are at leas! some II first order" desires or brusic h11mrun needs for benevolent 1rnornl a,gents to be i*espoml.ing to. A111d 11:he distinction between, the partic1.nlrnr moral sentfr11H"nfa nd the univenml morn,1 sense,, which was l!leeded to expLain why difforent i,ndivid1.1als exhibit difforent paUerns of moral ad:Ivity, ,1.lso makes Jroom, for the separateness of pe1rnorn, in their mle as moral agen,ts insofar ms it ack1mwled1;es that tJhe monll.l se111time111:s of one! Individu1all irnay differ fro1rn those of another. !But the moral sense Uuernris1:s were convinced that our em,oti.rnnall conned:ions are morally val1.1alole in ways that go weH beyond llieir insl:n.1menhll use i111 satisfylng any other, p1npoirtedly m.ore lornsic hmnan needs. 150 The desire for connedion just 1is a basic mornl intere:st, in their vilew.151 Benet\ when we c1dlivate m~d act from mu mrnm.l sentiments, we are not simply respecl:ing or responding to the interests ,md needs of separate ']49.A comp:Habon of !:.he viirll:tw-s !-~ndotscd in I-furn.n1s Trea.ti.se can be fori.lind :i.n Bait>r~ (I 991 : 19911) . ];50 11Us:t;_foJ or ~1p;rnoahfo11 iB 1-h.1 nrn's. pl,_n:wc;•, Note t.l1a.L o:n flome n:udingr1 1 lhune even soE:rns to suggest !hail a nwll:ive or ch.antcLer L1ra&t in a_ny given in.d.ividu.aJ ..... even a. rn.oU.ve like: be-rinvo[nnco , .... couJ.d not count as, ~11 ge.nu.ine oe cmnplntc moral vfrl:1.11.0 unfosf; and until ]L 11Vas t 1syJnpathiznd 11 wit-.Jt1 hy anothnr: "Kt is Hw naJQ_t0J tu'td indocd/' t:he dnfiniU.on of.' \rirfaw, Lhat jl is a. ,11rnlny of ll:he m1in.d ~,J'l!{_~_ai_ble_lo or a.]JJYfOV,\*d. ofJ~.'t.every 01rw, v.rl:lo co111r~idcrs-or conkm.pla:tos it' 1 (1'752: 68n; Q!J.!12hn.sih':..ntiJJQ). This 1,1;101lld rcr.ake his view 11co-nnecLfon-hant-:dt1 at a second fovol. Sno 13axtnr (1990) foir discussion on this point 151cc Adam Smith (1759: 9): "Howmmr so.lfinh ,;oovor m,m may bo supposed, thorn a.rte evidnnlly p.rindpfo.H in .his na.Lu:r-e, whkh inlm:*est him .in 1:hn fortune of olhnm, aind render thcfr happi.l:'.l.(~ss: neccsm1ry l;o fo1t.vi:., Htom:gTr1 he do:rrh.ms nolthine from iL exce:pt ttw p-kws1.,w11 of seeing 'lLn 134 olh,~m,. but aire also frnlfflHng al least some of our own desiires at the v,!ry same, ti.me. 'llmt is why it makes sense lo say that it is the connecHons beb~ri!e111 irn:lividrnals, ,is opposed, for ex,unple, lo rndions done lo or for 1\ndividw11I ol:hern, ttJml: are ,5een as p1rimm1ry within l:bi.s coinception of morn] lifo. 152 Thifl makes it possibl<~ to give ground 1flom: sigt1ificam:e to interpersonal rdat1io11-* ships, but H ,llso li!atds to two sods of d1ifficulties wilb their view. conception of mora,Ii1:y •--not,. as we have seen, because it rests on unfounded assumphons abornt Hie exte11t of mu nahnral aJbruism, bul: bemuse it threatem,s to absorb mornI agents alnwr,t completely info relationships with 0U1er people. As Rawls lms poinled out, the equation (most evident in Smrnl1.'s view) of mon1,I adiv1it-y witb the lype of activity that would be cho1,oin by a11 impartial and u.miversally be11e11ol.ent moiml spectator results in U1e "conflat1ion of aII desires into a single system of desiiro" (l9TI :: '188). The problem is not that the a,gent's own needs arn:11 intorosfo rnnry no morn] weii;lht within this "single system," but 1J~at hey have onliy Hne weight of one person amoni.; many. As a rr-esu.!t, hey affi likely to he overwhelrm~d by the needs and 1tnterests of all the 0H1ern, a,nd the sense 1:hat there must sm1*elly be at least sonw bimHs on what ,my imHvidu1al rnn he morall!y requ.nfred to do for other people is dJifficuH to explain .. Mor,~over, althougb acUv[lies like fl"ilends.hip aind love, ve1y high degree of m.ornl value in the abstract, Hie concn,te attachments thie<t 1 "2 ,., ~NoLn ILhat our ca.pad.Ly for emol:ional connndioñ is also Lreated DS a.bsolu.tdy cnntral to the procesHns of (third pc~rson) morn! juJgn1,ent: whc-1*fwm Rav\lfo1s, idl!al rnoral aigen1ts 'iNcrc porLiraycd as comniplntely detad1<-1d from any ond al1 parlicufor others and hence being concer:n(:d onI:y with Lhn ~1hstsad interests that a1U human *bei.ngs caY1 he fH"eS11"1T1ed Lo r-.ihtlLte, lhe moral. ,o:,orme tJ1.nodnt.s.1 idna] i;.11edator Jis porL:rayed as acLivn]y sym.rmLhi.zing wiH1 ILhe coticrnln concerns of cm rrumy peo-ple a:s ji::; hum.a.n.Jy possihle 1 atLempt.ing to hring thefr actual inforrests h1Lo harmony. 13:5 help fo shape any partkulllr moral agent's sepamte pemonality tu1rn ou1: to have relatively hUie mom! signHirnnce 1in aidmil s.il:u1ations (since they mus! ml ways be h~mpered by a more 1mrveirsail fa1nev0Ience). And even Hutcheson's suggestion t:hat it is o§f:en morallly proper for agentll to keep their benevolence close to home falls prt!y to this sort of difficulty,. IFrnr it still] r;ives an agent';,; affilfo1ions with othen; a cerl:airrl mon1,J priority over aH of hns m heir more fridividtmlistic projects and goals, am! it is far frmn dear that such ,:m absoluh*! rnnking is apprnpri111te or eve11 desfrable,l.5:l The porbcayal of rnll h1Jma11 needs rnnd i111teirests as part of a "sinr;le syste.m of desire" also admil:s the possilJJHt:y thcd the welfare ol: a,ny 1:ndividual a mon11l ag;e111t may lbe lr<c\spondling fo wifl need to be sacrificed for tlhe "Good of Mankind,." I-Ie1r1ce, the second difficulty for moeaJI sense theory is to explain why we frequently lhi11k lyiilg, theft ,md other "inJ!rntices"' ,Ill'<'' wnmg ever1 in cases where they are pl.ausiibly nwtival.!d by benevolence toward a,t least: some "Parts" of hum,mity, fol: rnlone toward humarnity as a whole. Hume's 1response was to argue that justice fa an '''mrtifidaltl virtrne, and is beneficial only because it makes our social wmld, rnnd hence the typer; ol: activities and reli!tionships we naJuraily val:ue, more secure. P1.nt ,1rnother way, what is useful is th.e sysfom of justice, which indudes rniies (against lyi.ng rnnd 1:heH) which everyone 1is l:o follow, even in those cases whewe doing so may not he i1mnediate!y "usefol or aigreeable" to eil:he1c oneself or others (1740: 587-9). l531ndrH1;-a:l, _it is t~iH a.sped oJ cormocLion--based. mora1 thin.l.dn.g Lhat Tnads nrnITTy fom.inlsts lo balk at tho ntlhiics of cttre. ]~(W, .it tends to <-~J:'1.couragn the sL,-n:*noLypo of 1,vm11n*n as whms r;;-nd :mothers . .., !Ji\al iH, as veoi1In "'rho rue V<'.*ry good at. car.ing .for and supporLine otlw*rs, and who perhap~i rn.11.g.hl !D bn adinir'<Kl for this asped of the.ir mon.ll p0.rsonaHLics, huf who are 110111.Ptheloss JncapahJlo of pu:rs111i.ng m.ore indepnndenL .li\n!H. And it st:Prn.s objecliorw,ble for a moral 1.h,w1'._y lo insist that moy (v.roup of) person(s) shou Id 11ccopi emch a !i-rrliUng f;od.al assign.m.ont, even if Hwit is indeed a hfe lha.L many poop[e VlOul<l in fod choose if left: to th.eir own dmr:iice~. 136 Arn:! SmHh similarly held that in the case of jusUce, we are acti11g from a regard l:o generilll rules w hkh "s111mnariz,,i' the rei,:ilts of our sympathetic judlgments reg@rding our own @nd other people's condt1d, amd so cmmterad any forn:fomdes towm*d in]iusl:ke on grmmds of sellf-fove or d istorb.~d perceptions of what OUT ge:m1.i.11e rnotives aure, But it remains ve1ry d ifficuit to sh()W,, rus Hume deairly saw, Hrnl exhibi1:ing the mt1fidal virh1es would Joe rnaefoI a,nd ,11greei1tble to hmmmldnd generally in every insl,rnce, and lhence difficult to explain why one should 1101 be a, "sensible knave''' a11d ,:ake ad11anb1.g,e of ail! the excertions, 1541 In short, 1if there are fonidlmrt1en!:iilil consha1lnls on how any individual may tTeal any other, it fa difficult lo see how this appmilch can accon11m11odate them, These sorts oi diffkulties are, of cours,,, fomiliair from crnntempornry criticisms of uUHl:arianism -** a fad which is hardly sm7p,rising !iven tlwt it followed diredly in the nrwnlll se11se theorists' foofaireps,,155 But utilifa,rianism emphasizes the con11edions between individ urn ls in a som,~what differe:nt. wily by :,imply insisting; Umt morilll agents should (strive 1:o) promote overnH well•* be[ITTg, regarcflless of what the1i r nab1rnl, ainifidal and/ or "corrected" moral lS4NaLural vi1tlu.E1s, for *Hu.me,. do not t'>'hirtply ur:is1:: .rml.1ually1 bul are also useful or t11grom.1.b'lo to hurn.ank-i.nd i.11 ainy circu_mstonces. ArU.fid1:1l vfrtu.m,, by conlrasL, are only w-t<~_fol or ag.ireeable o.r11ce C(tr01:11in sodul conventions haiv,-: hee:rn esilabliGhed.1 and even Uwn there miv.ht. be rnser, where brt,akinV, 11mm will he nven more, ursefol unc! agreeable (J '751: Appendix III), ']SSH-ulch.eson in. pt11rticular is froquenl:ly dtPd as ll1 lsanf.llt/onal. figure who t1r:mt the s{t1:lg(!11 .foe 11billitaJ•ianisTnr for wlii.1.,-:-he cornlnndH lhat. univerm1l h<-~i'.1.Pvokmce in H1.P rt101"a:JJy bes!. of hmnan rnol:ives, he a[au conJe.nds llhal actions ani ~o hn eva!-uat<-~d as To--olh:r or wo.rsti 111 len:m, of how well Lhr')y fu.r~her 1hg_J~Qt!l(0 ofhenevo.l.e-uce (amJ nol in len:ns of whether, or the extent to V\rhich., Lhoy exl1:ibU genuine hem-:*vo.lenco on the parl of Llw agm1t who p-nrforrrrn then'j.), HJs vim,v th.us *rrepn:een.ls an i.11.ten:r•,tl.ng hybri.d lyi.rng lw1LV\men an ag!-~nt-hased Lhoory ll1.at taker~ bencvofo*nce as lho m.oGl overarching lTloral idea.!, and cfo.m-iica[ -uLllitmiar1isn1. /\nd if m1y t1,rg1unenl; in §2.6 .is correct/' the co:nr•:w:quen[: :ir[se of utHi'.::.ru"ianis'fft is sornd:hi.ng of o:tn historical ..... or aJ any rate a concc_ptm:n.I . .... a o::id.ent ] Iut:d,cimnrs vfow m ighL jusl as t:m~ily have heem deve:lopf:d "i:n. u piJJniJy agnnl--based fosb:i.on. 131/ sentiments may prompt mem to do. ']l'Iiis ls l:r1.1e of most cm1tempo1mry varianl'll as well as the classical. formuJaU011 of the theory, for they all i11sfot that the moral value of any adion ullimateiy lies i11 the aggrer;a1.e amount of bum an (or sentient) well--being 1:hat is (reasonably expeded fo lb0), prn.:for<ed in Hie world,. and is only indirectly affod:ed by the way in which it is disl:rib1.1ted among iindivid1:mls, or by the emotiomiJ rnltachments that mip;lil lead agentq to (strive to) prnduce it Tl11Lis does .111ot mean Umt uHliforirn111s 11ltadt ino tnoniI weight to im:UvidtmI sepairnteness,. AHer alt,. Jenemy !Bentham's famous slogan that "each couuts for one, none counls for more than one" insists Hrnt the happi11e:ss of evel"y individ1rnl must be given strid:ly eg ual weighrt in the ovemH lltiliiy calculus. fo acldition, the happiness of any given individual is typically asser,,5edl by a 1;1tandrucl tha1: is fa.irly sensitive to his or he1' subjective point of view, !But am Bermud Williams has pointed out (19'73), utiliitarianism sWl ahs1Tads from tbe separate11ess of pernons in two main ways. Most ohviousiy, i.t rnhstrads from their sepawaiteness as beneficiaries of moni1.I adion, s1ince what matl:ers is whether the action, maximlz.es ( or optimizes, m* rnn be reasonably expected to maximize or optimize) 01e benefits to pc~rsons overall, but not that any partic11far perrsorn was in fact the one to benefit. And it rnlso abstrads from thefr separateness as moral agents, s.ince whrut matters is that overrull happiness wrns (or could Imve reasonably been expeded to he) prnduced, tmt not the fad that any particulmr imlivid1.ml was Um one who (aUempled fo) produc,! it. One way for utiHlarians to minimize this sm-t oi difficll.lly is to aid opt a version ofr n1le,-utiiifarfanfam ,1,long tlhe ll11es set forth by JS, Mill (1863),, or the more "ideal" utiHtal"ianfom G.E.. Moore;, (1912). But:these fornn1lati011s still t38 have noforious diffkuHies e)(plaining om moral co11vidfons in the airea of justice and ri.ghls, as many cr.itics, including mlle-•deontofogislls Uk,, W, D. !Ross (1930), have pointed out for it is difficult to ex1plain why anyone whose mmall outkiolk was sha,ped lby a fom:la1:ne111ta1l concern for ffo., general wdfore would re•fose to sacirifice the .rights or autonomy of one person if, for exam[:ille that we1*e the only n1Leans by which the welfarf\ of a significant n1.1mbe1* could be greatly im,proved, m why such a p,~rson would keep a prom[se to one imlividual in when breaking it would make it possible to he.lip several others. Yet many peopl,~ are c1mvi11ced that we mo.rmlly ougM to avoid rights 1infri111~ements and promise-breakings 11t all! costs. The sihmtions l!mt are problematic for ut:ilil:arianB mrny he fairly rare, b,rnt irt is surely the caise that they sometimes mdse. Not surpdsingly, some 11tilifocda1ns hrnve wrnnted to supplement their apprmKhes wirth an independently gro1.mdcd acrnunt of basic .individual lrigh1s.156 And the refusal to make any concessions to the separntenes,s of persons may !help to explaiin why J.J.C. SmaFl's 11iev<1 that whe!l our commo!l moral beliefs conflict wHh the dictates of ut1il1ity, ti i.s "so much the wmse for the comm.on mrnmI conscim11me1,s11 (Smart&* \l\l[l]liams, 19'73) has fofrly limited conten:1.porary ,ippeal Tltds ]brief sul'Vey m.ay not be sufl'idcnt fo show that there is no way for separatenessOJ connecledness .. based theories to ove1rcome the one-sidedness with wl1ctch they are associated. !But H does at least sugge1,t tlmt Ilhere is nio olw.1io1.1s reason to favor one way of thiinking aliout morrn.Hty over I.he other,, and that neHher is fully srntisfocto.ry. It afao suggests tha,t moral theories 156For D co:ncisc, nx:e.nt dofm:me of rmch a m.od.if:o.ed uUJJLar.ianism_, sne I\adwls (199:1-). 1'39 ~- ! J I Gumot be ciritidzed for being objectionably partfaJ simply becam,e they emphasize the values of inte1versorna1l conmededness, for we hrnve seen that both moral sense thr.,ory and utilHarianism give impairtial concern for hurnan hehrngs a kind of general priority ove1* concern1 for those who ~1 re 1relabve/,y near and dear. And it fortiler suggest~ thrnt separateness**based views are not tbe only ones that tend to limH the role of the emotions in moral deliberatfon:: though mornl sense theory and commuri,itarianism both allow agents' emol:ional attachi:nenls to others l:o play a crucial role in their 11110ml dk,dsion-1rnaking,, drnssical u1:iilib1mianim1a demands HrnJ morn! reasoning be i.solated from more emot[onrnl p1.ulh This smrvey a,lso helps to expfa1i.n why Gi.lHgan's original distindion often leads to confosfon about which domaim of moral activity is under consideration (irecalll §'L2'). :for the most infl11ential modem theoriei;, of separateness do tend to focus more on political concenw and to have fower diffkultJies in the area, of justice and rig Ms .. In addition, the survey ind kates 1:hrut the ,issumed link between a separateness---based value o:rienfobon and 1reliance on 1110ml principles may not be entireiy acddenl:al. Preciseiy becaus(' they do not give mo1rnl primacy fo our more emotiom11l connedfons l:o oil1Prs, such views rely on moral prindpLes as a way of building rn (deiri11ative) kind of other rega11rd inlo H1eiir theories. Intereslnngly, however, this survey suggetits l:hi11t the aibilHy l:o justify what are commonly called deonl:ic comil:rnints may have less to do with the fonrrml su:rm:turi~ of moral iheories than with whether or not they añ separateness--based, for all of the cmrnedion--basedl views disc11ss~~d above' tend lo have d iffkulties in this arefl. fo the context of the ,mtonomy / caring debate these are very important results. For we have seen that am ai;ent•brnsed approach to moral theory is ~bk 1410 to male sense of the basic concepts and distinctions tirnt 111rc! oftern1 cm1s,1iclered to be the hallmarks of principJe,.basecl thinking (rrecal!l §§2.4-25), and thfs su~;gesfa tl1at an agerrnt,.J011sed ethic that incorpornted notions of indivkhml separateness might be @hie to overcome the 11orts of problenw tha,I: pllã;m• an agent-lmsed ethic of care .. Of cou1rne, an age11,t .. based ethk that freated indlividual sopara,teness as primary is likely fo have diffk11ltie1, of its own. Hence, we now need to conside1r how tlilis tension plays out witl:hin an ag;ent* based approach to moral theory, in order to see if they axe any IJdteir at avoiding the forrrns of rnne-sidedne:ss that plla11,;u1e modern moml vliews., :l.5 C,ml ws. iNMm ildk:*ollls of dtollr.10::l:er ln §2.1, ][ pointed mlt that l:he liistmical record! does not give us many clea,r,,.c11l examples of a1gent-basedl theorizing,. Ho.it H dloes inch1de a gn::at de,111 of phnlosophicaI reflectio111 on tlhe admirabiHty of valfitmrn .motivei, and charnder traits, and it suggesls that such reflection lends towa1rd two gerriernJ types of motivational ideals. We have ailready seen that Martineau takes compa,ssion to be second only to reveñnce for the deiity in terms of its moral value (recall p. 841,, above), rund if we set aside hlis religious assumptions, his entire scale of m.otnvabions nm be said to I'efied an m11derlying, convldio11 tha! any motive whid~ faUs under the general n1b1*ic of concem for othern will be better than a mo1jve that does 11ot reffoct such con(ern (this include,,, motives that reflect excessive concern for oneself**** e.g .. "love of easic"' atnd "'low: oi power,"' as well i11S motives that reflect 01.1fri~;ht rnal!evolence l:owards others ... e.~;. 11v1lnd.idiveness" aml !eresenlJmenl:11). Simil,uly, Augustine claims Hml aill: virtues a,re instances of love olf God, and if we recall thal A11gur;l:i11w1s God commands 115 to love our neighbms as omrnelves, he can be pl!aus1ibly inteq;,rel'ed, in a more agent--1:iased fashion, as sugger,Ung thrnl: motives are 141 bel:ler fo tlhe extent that they reflect the agent's lovf for specific othc~rs. TMs line of Hm11ght cm~ also lie fcnnnd in more see1111lr th1inkers. Sd10pe11l111rner, for f.,xample argurc:d that corn.passkm is the only morrn,l motive, and Hutcheson dai.med that vi.rl:ue consisl:s wholly i.n various forms of benP1mk•nce. Conl:e10111pormry dl ni1J1s about !he mmal value of caring seenn to be 01.e most 1recenl manifosfation of fai11 general poinl: of view, rnlbeit one that plac!'s a bit moire emphasis mi relationships with oihers tlum the desire to do thfogs for others (in 1:Ms way, rnre"*etlhidsts are closer to Ar.istoHe). Plato, 011 the othc\r hand,. lbruses his eth[call views on a maurkedly different sort of daiim '"'" namely, that vi1t1.1e (or adnniniblc rnol:lwdion) can he understood in terms of the beamty, healfl1, harmony, and/or "frme1r stirength" of th,~ individual son.111.157 The Stoics seem to be expressing sfrJ11nlar conv1id:ions when tliey defom:l an ideal of aotarkeia in terms of aforaxia. •** il freedom from dishubance that requires detachment from or "indifference''' to worldly goods. TMs, in t11rn1 1'.'E':(j uill'es cultivation of one's rntionmLity in a way 1l1at ro1ndr:1rs the virl:mms individuiiil fa:r less vlllnerahlle to various human infirm,mes, ,is wPH as to trnglic fo,ttme,. flian his or her foHow hummn boings) 58 And Nietzsche, too, fo impressed by our capacities DIS individuals, exlh.orl:ing l]S no\: to trnke pity on the weaker and less fortunate, lb11t 1ratlherr, \:o, exercise our m,rn "'wi U \:o power." Although Niel:zsche in padiculair is eagerr to jar people Olli: of a kind of complacent mu:! LJnl:hinking altruism tlrmt lhe sees. as ultimaitely dehilil.at1ng 157This is parl:icularly evilfont in lhc hiH Republic, §§407, 444,, and 591. 158,Th.n Stokt/ notion of 11:i.n.dHfe:renc:e-11 is :not. our ordilna.ry o.ne. BrinHy, they ho!J thal ar,ything Ifl1cldng in infrinsic goodnefils is 1'11.l1idiffon-~n.l.,11 and Lhis indudes (-'.*V<:rylhing (l:X<'(-i,pf. mi'le1s owm inner vfrlue an.d/ o.r rat:io.nality. Howeve!", v1rithin tlw (exlron11oly Ja1l"gc) dor-m of ind.ifferc-:nt i*hinwi, m.any im~Lrum(mial goods (m.1.ch as hoa"fth and Lou fossc-:r cfo*gT<-~<-:r (~ve:n wc,allh) a,n lo be "preferred" (cf. Annas 1993: 159 79, '.~884] I;. Loni\ l!nd Sedk,y *1987: 154 .. :,9; and Nm,ebaum 1995). 142 to ills recipients as welll as fo Ute ailrnistk agent (ct He:r~;mann '{985), he does mot quite say that we should be solely concerned with ournell11es. In fad, we vviII see in a few momen,ts that all of l:hese thinkem are able to give a 1m1rpri.singly form grounding tot.he mon1lnty of otlh.er--1regt1rdiñ; adivily, Hence whrnt unifies them is not 1w much their devalt1ahon of m.otives like benevo-leflcc~ ,md compam,irnn., hut their level of esilo:~oc!m foir Jrnm,rn chairader 1:raHs that fall um1er the rubric of self--sufJidencyl59 and self-refornce,160 Peirlmps the m.ost intuitive way to describe the difference between these two main hisloricali stwa,nds of lhinkin1g about huimm charader is lh~l1: the former idealize agents who are "warmly" rrwil:ivated whereas th(\ Ila.Her idealize those who ,ffe re.lativelly "cool" tow,urds «>thern.I61 An.cl vvhile tlh,is i.s a distindion 1:o be mado wlthiin ag;ont--basod theonies, 11t is quite c.learly an instance of the more general s,~parnteness/ connectedness dfotinction. "W um" agent,,based U1,ooll'ies emphasize conned:edness, in the sense that they make benevolence, com,passion, and/ OJI' conc,:rn for ofoern basic 1o mornl motiva .. t:ion (in contrast with 11lilibnianism, foll' example, which explains the morn] signHlica11ce of an .individual agenl:'s eonrmclliom; 1:o 0U1ers solely i111 h';rms o,f 1S9Notti: lJ:11a.t. 11Belf-m1fHdency/ l:!$ :[ s-hall un.dt:-H",1~l.andt :lll1 is meanL Lo signify ,m air.l1m:.irnh.lln .moUve (or com_pfox of m.oUvatio:ns) t:hut. rx.hib:its an agenl~1r.; imwr strength, Self. sufflldency V\ras also mind as a htand.a:rd.111.arkor for Hw n.oUon of !the 11finul. good 11 fror:n Pla1Lo 0-:nwm~d.1. hut whnn lhi:nkors like Aristotle sug.gnsl f.hat the conn:p]eL<: and 11self-s11ffi.denit11 Jlifr. wm ind.ude frrfondsh.ips an.d political rmk1Uonships, Lhey c:t.rc! using the lcr.1rY1: n a very d:tfforonl sense lhan, l a:vn. re:ly1hng on h(H"~l. 'lfiO[l wHI lbo n.olod that All"istotJe .... aHhm::agh om-; of the m.cmt fo1nous virhw--{:lJh:idstr; •-• is coJ1spicuously aibsenf; frmn, Lh:is r:,1d1.nm.e. 'fl1is f.s heo--.msc JliH nornrntivc orinnLDl:ion Lu qtdfo dliffictdli:. Lo dm,,sif31. 0-n the onti J'land, he :i.s deu.r'ly imt('.ñ1,ted in inner h~.1111.ony ond m:lfsu.ffidm11cy!' and his diHcussfon of "rnag1:u1ni.mityv anUdpttlns n:tudli of whn1f.. Ninf..zsdw.-says about gcn.c~ros(ty. On thr.-other hand!, he Jplace~ fl~n!tll: Pm.p}waiG on the (qui:mi) vhd;ups of frinn.dship and polilUca1t aUHHation, an.d U:1:i.nk11 exLPrnal good,~ Bf'(\ oxtrom.nly :i1nporlartt Lo the be-st hm1n1.a.n lifo,. La Lor on (ns.p, in Cb. 6) 1 shall 1911gw,i:fl.L l:hi:1:t hi.s vinw 1cn:ay he ar1 (~arly expmssim*, of t11,o ideal of s~aring,. Bui. I do 1101: aUempl. lo ddr11d this explicitly. l61nK, l.crminology is Slote's (199S). 143 the fod that hns or her adio11r, will inevHahly have some kifld of effect on Uwir we.lJ. . being). Similarly, "cool" agent-bas,xi theories emphasiZf' separnieness by irrrnisbñ; thrnt sellf .. ,sllffidency ,mdl self-Teliance are basic to morn] mol:ivation (instead of beginning with daims about the 1*ights and a,ul:cmomy of moral agenli,, in fue mmme1r of most: mode1rn1, separntem'!1,s-based views)., Charadf)lt** izing agent-11:>ased tlieories as "warm" or "'moll' is a way of ernpl:msizing that they make the mornl value of actions o!erival:ive from tl:1e inner ,111:i:iillules aind motives of the aigenfo who perform them, but 1ini the same way that imodem m' "'action-focused" theories tend to p1)n'tmy one broad type of vallrne as deriviltive fron1 or of secondary importarn:<0 to the otbei*,. v1irtL1e•e1:hic1isls typkaHy portray one broad type of motiival:iion as being dedvative from or of 1,ecom1dary in11 portance fo the other. And this leads to fomiliar pmbllems fo,1,* botlh points ol vlevv., Cool ,agent,-li,.ns.iicl e\tl11iics It might be thmight that any "cool" ethics of virtue will be co.mpletely urnable to accou.rnt for our ord inmry sense of JoiisUce, and hence that they ,ue imporlantly unlilk,0 modem theories of separateness iin this respect Woulld111I: tbe wilHngness to .nm 1*1mghshod over the interest!, and rights of oth,~r peop[e exhHiit a.1: least as m11ch inner strength a,s the willlingness fo 1reslrnin one's own pmrn11ifa when they conflict: with the legitimate pms1.1illl of others"? Thinkl'm l!ike Plato rnnd the Stoics seem to have thought otherwise, however, and if we focus mu atlention oin ce1*ro1ln a,speclts of inner strength .... in particular, volitional and inteliedm11i fonns of self--reliaince .... "cool" ethics of virh.1.e nur1 go surprisingly far in grnunding Ifie gem"rnl obligation lo aivoid infrringeme11ts on others' rights, as well ais mm•t> spedfic duties like t.rnfu-1:ellinp; aind prnmise-14!4 keeping.162 After aJl, part oI whc1t we mire atl:ributing lo a pc~rrsoin we d,,!scri be as seH-x-eli,mt fa a pmctical desfre to (learn how to} foke ecue of and olo thfrrgs for herself, rnnd the lllgenl who ads out of U1is sense of self--relliance, as opposed to at kiml of motival:io1ml paras.itism or prndical deBins lo b,1 takc:m care of, exhibits a degree of imlependE:nce with 1°egard to other people that w,i typirnlly admire. Indeed, if we did not 1mlue this kind of self.-relfonce (or 'sense olf industry'),, if woU1.ld be difficult lo explain why independenHy 1,vealthy people often chooi,e to work rather lhan simply live off their h'1rnt. fonds, as well as why the ñst of us think moire high]y of them whe11 they do so. It fo noteworlhy iITT this conlext thilt lhe mom! foJrce of the charrge of "pi!rais1il:1isml' or "dependem:y" at&aches to one's motive rather than some kim:l of ach:ievement }7or exaimpie, we typirnUy lhink moire highly of people who exhibit a pradkal desire to lake wesponsibilily for lhenwelves than lhosr who are willing to be taken care of by others regarrdlless of how sm:cessfol th1;y asp; i.in this sense, the physically weak ,md socially vurlrre1mble m,embers of society ca,11 oHen lbe just ,is 'self•*i'elia.nt' in their mobval:ions as the moire rnble--bod !led and welll-fo,-do. 163 And 01u ,1:dm1intlion for this form of inner stireng:tli !helps to explain why, for example, lying rnnd failing to keep one's promises is m.orally objectionable, As Kant rightly emphasized, the deceitfol prom.itic•r is !irequently motivated by a desfre tn manipullate 01r llse mnoth.er pernon in order to gain some kind of ad vantage foe hir1111self,, and insofar a,s this fo in ol ired: "162S:lote (1993) offorrn a 111.ud1: 1111.ore deLaJfodl discussion.,. wilh a pm*UcuLar e111phas*ir-t on the *way Jin -vvl1.kh such un approach m:ight be used to grotrnd a thernry of ViOCfo1l! and political justin':, H!"owever, Th.o no l.o.nger bdinvns such a v:iow is ucfoq11a.h-~. 163slot<> (1995: 90) points oul thal wo u,dmim h1J1ndk,,pp"d pnrsonH wino sLri.ve Lob" tW, indlerw.nd.nnt a:s possil,le itiven :if their efforls arc1 ofhu1 frus):rah!d ttnd c-vcm though they may he unaTollo l;o ad1icve 111.n sm:n.c e:*nds ais the m.OJrl) abfo",hod:k:d. 14S opposition to the desire to rm1Je one's own wrny i11 t:hE! worM oir a s1ms1) tha,1 011e is able to do so, ii: does seem, to betray a deplorable "7rmrasHism11 or Jack of imner sl:rrength. IrnteHectual. self .. ll'eli,n:i;:e also seems padic11fa.rly imporl:ain t lo our underslm11dli11g of hum,rn dignity .. This does not mean that the most (mornlly)t adlmirnble person vviU never allow herself to be influenced by the beliefs and opinions of others, any more tliain Ute admirnbiHty of self-sufficiency ircnplies that people ought to sbrive to avoid the prad:icall am:! e1110tionill dependency cm others that is invol11edl in cooperal:ive endeavors a11d is necessary for the achievei:111e11t of hmrnm goods like friendship a11d Iove. To the extent llmal. we are c1real:uues who do, in fad, depeml on !}ther peoplle in order to hve rich and 11m~aningfol Hves, attm1t1pls to avoid 011' rebel against necessary kinds of reliance on othen; serve to u1ndlercut, rather than e11hance,. tlhe i111_ner sf ,~nigtlh !hat any of us may be caprnble of. At the same ttime, individuals who simply "lbuy" tJttefr beliefa and opinio111s wholesale from others seem to be lacking ..,11, a1r,px*opriah~ sense of persom1I identity or h1tegi*ity (Erikson 1968; Md'a,11 198'7). And the ability not only fo make one's own wacy in the: world,. but ahio to choose, for onesellf, what soJl'l:s of ad:ivities to engage in and care about, seern,s to explain (as well as anythini~ does) our comriidion that e11e1y Lml1iv1idllal has a un[q11e kind ofvallue simply as the particular person she or he is. Notice, howevex*, thrnt the concepHoin of human dignity al: work in 1:hfa mod.ell .is a variable one: individuals have dii~nity to t:h,• e)(tent that tl1.<:'y possess the vmrio11s moll:Jivrntnonal1 slates tl11i.1I: are con,sW:uU11e of a strong and J,16 self-sufflcie11t inner lffe.164 18,y itself tMs may 11ot lbe olojedionabfo, sinice theories that insist on ru11 invarriable 11,oUon of dignity have notoriom, diffo::ullfos explaining what we should srny aloouJ, as wol!i as how we r,houkl b"e,11t,. lhose persons who fail to meet Uw sl:amfard of dignity (,von .lif l:lhis hlillllre is tlluou1gh no fault of the person's own, On the sort of c1.genlt-based view under consideration here, even children and the insane presumably have~ .minimal dignity Jinsofar as they have some 1.mreai.llized rnpacil:y for self .. sufficiency and 1;:eff-reliance, though they dearly do not have the srume di.g1nity as those who p()l,se1,s and exh1ibit the kim:ls of inner s1tre1ngth that cool viltLile ethics pmll:ray as the most admirn.hle forms of human m0Uval:i11m. Howevew, the va1riahie notion of d1ignity becomes somewhat more dfotressing whe11 we notice 1:hat s1.1ch an ethic seems fo dfred: an agent's 1morml attention prnmarriiy toward facts about hfo own inneir life irather than toward facts about oUmrs, Indeed, H might lbe thought that l:hinkers who espouse 11cool 11 eth[rn of virtue must have IH:1:lle or no ink,rest in the momJi1:y of other--regarding ad:ivity. IJ1.1t one asped: of inner sl:rength that i*eceives consi11fomble attention in alll ll11e thi11kers mentioned alJove is whrut we mig;hl caII selJ-snfJ.kiency with resped to the good things of this world, and this kind of motivaU!m does enablie l:he1111. to j1istify a certann kind of other•*regmrdL Both Plato and the Stoi1rn insfrud: us to 11rein in 11 mu potentiaHy insatiable appeljtes as weH as 01u more tmmly passions, and the "most noble iype of m.an11 is dt,trndt'rized by Niell:zsche not as conshrntly desiring or seeking more power and oillf:1* good things for hinwelf, bltt a1s possessing a sense of "superab1mdance 11 (1886: §2:60). The suggestion is that the~ truly strong indivi1d uail will, other 1:hiinigs being 164such ai variable concepLi.on of dignity is 11artic0,ifody Pvident in Plato's fomoun "myth of tJu, rrtnlals''' (Republic: Book IV). J.417 equal, tend fo be fairly 11wdernt1:e in his deffi1res si.mply bemuse he is satisfied with wlhat mir;lit not b,~ e1mugh for others. And pr~rhaps the most inlTiguing elei:m,mt of Niel:zsche's ethi1rnl thm11rht is the sugi;estfon. that Ute s(:rmligest and most self-sufficient individual wiU not only make the rest of us seem 11eedy and greedy by compatrison,. but will feel that he hrns more thain enough to spare, and so will] nabually fond to exude or exhihil h1is illmer sbrength through ads tlml: hffve ,1 IJenefidal im pad: on othern. Of cmm,e, Nietzsche sayri that such a person 11honoirn whatevew he recognizes i11 him,self,11 and in tfml: sense, his adion a,n1011nts to a kind of "se!f-glorifica&iou. 11 ]31.11! tlrle ln1ly noble-: ind1ividual does not give good things to othern in oirder to glorify himsdf; lo do that would betray a neediness on his part. 165 Rmtheir, the noble irndividnml fo prompted by "the foeling of plenitude, of power that seeks to overflow" and 11tlhe consciousness of wealth Hmt wouJld fain give and b•estow" (1886: §2:60). Elsewhere, Nietzsche indicates thrnt the pernon who fa mot:iv11.ted by a, sem", of super*&IJundanc,~ "impi11r1:s" vallues. to the actions he chooses (1887: §5.5; clL §61 and §382), and .in this way he gives a veiry agent*lbrnsed account of gPnemsity as am expression of the lideal of i.rnrner-s!Jreng;U1. The daim iii; 1:hal: Uw mosl self,. sufficient indi11id1ml wHJ, be motivated to '''bestnw" excesses in hfa mater1ial goods, lime or emotional ireso1uces on those who rnre less forlunate or more needy Hmn the rngent himself, and that we tlhink of hfa adfom; as morally good bern,1]se of the way they exemplify his a.dmirnble inner strength, Nonetheless, bemuse such a11 appro&ch derives U1,e r1rwrnl' signi1fka11cP of acts of lberrnefkence aml ge11ernsity from the self-s11ffidem*y of agents ,,vho perfonn the1n, it does not seem to imply that we have any g;rouncl floor d1Jties '1651n foyful VVh1d01n1 NfottBche desc1ibes the s11perahu.ndu:nL individual as pof;sesning 1111 bravery without f:ht": dnsiñ for hcH1or11 (]887: §S5) .. to care about or even respect otheir people 1in their own right MoreovPir, w hrn(' it does suggest Hrnl we ought to, be aw,ue of sibmtions in w hi.ch we 1:rn.ve enough to spare for others, and while it doc~s corilemi! that the moraHy betit (,md most strnng:) im!ivid11aJ will often be moved by 1:hat kind of aware1wss to engage in ads of oveiflowing beneficence,. it is t,imply not dear that the self.• sufficient m.orall agent wiII in fad be good or sensitive enough to disdmrge tmch duties effectively (Hmrnl:house 1993), My com:en1 is not that such agenits wiU he too selfish; il may very weH be true that the most co1rnpfotely self, .. sufficient age1111: will not be moved by any selff.-1*eganJliin1; desires foir personal giorificatioJ11 oir honor .. But 111e1ither is ~,e demrly 1noved by Hie de~sin• to lwlp the otlh.e,r people he "lhestows" personrul excesses 11p()n, oir by amytlhimg more tham the very minimal. a1,11areness of others that enables the agent to n•cognize when he has "enough t:o spare." This irncreases tl1e lnkc>lihood tlhal. Hie seJf .. sufficient agent will rn.ake erronemrn choices abolllt how hesl to distrribL11te excess goods, g1iving them to people who don't really wrnnI or need H1em. And more imprnrhmtly, I lliink,. even if he does choose the most effective IneHwds of dfotribtnhon, the self-reliant agent may be "detached"' from thr" peirsons he is helping in ways that dliminfah the moral 91ualil:y of his acts .. It is far frmn dear, for example,. tlhat he will express, m* ev,,:n foe], foe regret or sadness al. [h(, pliglhl of tho loss fod1m,ato thait enable the beneficia1ries of his oveirflowing generns,ity to retaiin a healthy r,Einse of self wmth; but un]ess tlne moral aip/inl does express tlhose sorts of other .. ,regarding emoliorn,,. tlhe benef1idarit'S of his ad:ions are likely to feel that they ,ue mm"<?, objects of Hie ,1gent's e1upern,-• hundaint desires,. rather than individuals whose ne~'ds and frlt1~resfa nmlter in lheilr own nlght. Similiarly, it is nol obvious that a selJ,relfont 1110raI ag;ernt wiIJ convey ,1n altitude of irespect foward ol:hez* people wlhen he refra1ins from 1:49 interfering with 1:hem; he may slmplly he "doing his own l:hinr;" in such a w,1y that thought~ about other pernons rnnnot get a foothold in his dlelilhe1I11Uons, fo saying this, I am not denying l:lud "doing one's own tlhint may frequenfly be permissible, Hut an agent-based momli1:y of :inn<,rr sbeng-tlr11 suggests that it fa better to be uwro concomed with mu own (ability to achieve omr) au:ntonom.ornsly chosen goa,ls and punmits, than wHh liow things acre going with others, and that, I th1ink,, is too stron15-To beg.in with,. the expresflion of various inherently other,-regarding atl:i.hldes on tho pa,rt of the agent frequently confer added benefits to the persons the morn! age11t la responding to. And even whore these benefits aire not obvious (e.g., in sil:urntiorn, when' the 11101ml agont i1s more accmrately described ms internctfog with othem Hum responding: to their rn,Eids),, the possession of those aUi.tl:ndes incrreases Hie agent's morail r,em,1itivitie11 and is a sign of the o:ngPnl's g,emcml Jlevel' of "morn! sincerity. 11166 Moreover,, stllch an agent 1is unlikely to experience th<~ rlpecfol aJffod: of "joy" that,, as Noddings poinlcs out,, rnrises mlt of a sem,e of deep, emotional coni:nectednesi, with others, Without 1nl1Cri other,.ll'ei;rnrding altitudes, irn other words, lhe moral agent may remain psyclhologically detached from other people in a way that can muse tremendous moml harms: not only doe1, sk1e deprive others of imporfan,t sornrces of (moral) value,. she also cuts herself off from S!lch values in a way that can foster a debHH:ating sense of anomi1e. These attitlides mrny not be wholly im:om.patible with motivdionlll sel'f-* sufficiency and self-relicu1ce, hut they are rertadniy nol: entailed by those forms of motivation, and so a moro:nhty of inne,' sl:rengH~ wHl giw, theimi, ~l !Jest,. :a kind of derivative valt:ne that obscures thelr acl:1:ml moral simrrifirnnce, ,,, l6 6on lhe notion of "mom! sincerity, "sec Williams (1973: d1, 1'.\). Shcrn1an (1990; 1.994) and Nus.sbiu.tnt (J.990) have alr~o discmmed tho irnporfamL role of vadom; crnottono.l aU.a.cb.men.11.s to otl1ors. in rinorn:1.mohvaUon. 150 W.rm:11 ,1Lgem1it-•l11i1r;edl «it1:11:iks "'W mrrn'' age11t--bm,edl theor1ies neatly avoid thfa kind of om+-sidedness,. by insisting tlmt some degree of emollo:mal conn1ection to others is basic fo our co111ceplion of moral motivation,, and lhc~nce fu.rn:llamental to mu undlerntandlng of 1rnoralily arn:l its requirements .. They particularly emphas,ize the fad that Ht<' possession of such ruttih1des. can often confer added benefits on the recipient of morrnl adivity, 1,ince aids are evaluated ms mornllly beUeir to tJhe extenl: that tlhey Il'.HH'e folly exhibit and expresH the ar;ent's concern foir and commitl:nenl In otlmers' well-being. However, warm agent-baised views tJ1,reaih~11 to make moral agenls so com p.letely resp,m.sive l:o the si.hmtion of other people that they have v,~ry htl:le time am:1/ or energy to engage in their own, moire individualistic purnuil.s. And in the worst case scenario, they encourage moral agents to be self-abnegatin1g in ways that are morn!Iy objecHonaible (cf. Hill 1991: Cfo,. *1 •. 2). The first sort off difficulty fa illustraited 1nost dearly by an ethic of l1.nivemad benevollence. 1Ne saw earlierr (§2.6), 11rmt snd1. a, view, Uke utilifari- .:mism, is self/ other symmetric: if an ag0r1t ads out of a cmicern for hi 1mself fin a situation where he is in no position to benefit anyone eJ,se,. his act will be evlll Lmlxed just ais highly as iJ he mets out of a concern for so.me ol:heir individual in a sitmdion where he 1is hi no position to be11efit: anyone else (ind.udling himself). However, because it gives 1nornl pr1io:nity to a conc("m for hmmain v,re-lfa.rre mremU, 1md1 a, viow enfallls that an aigent's actions are morally better to the extent thd they exhibit a greateY' ow strongerr prnd:ical de,>ir,c> to improve human well-being, both in terms of helping as many people as p«l'ssible, aind in b~mms of 1responding as frnUy as one rnn to each person's concrete needs aind desires .. Opprnrhmities to benefit others are, of crn11*sp, 151 pervasive, and lhough the univernaHy 1bern"volie11t ap;ent's con,cnn for hir, own weU-bei111g is breated as no less si.gnifucanl: Hum Ms com:ern for the welJ-beint; off any 0H1er individual,, the mer*e foct l:hal there are so many other peopl.e means that his legitimate sclf-concõm will s,e]dom be ,~xhihited and .:,xpressi>d in his aid:s, ore at least, in those acts thrnt are assessed by the theory as especially morrally fine. In other words, since th.1~ moral val11e of self-conce1rn is derived from (m breated rns an insll1,111~e of) the uwre ovemrdlling vaiue of concern for the geneml welfare,, i11lter1,tion to one's own needs and interests will inevitably pllay a minimal l!'ole iin U1e 11niiversally henevollent agent's deUberat1ions. As a result of this fo:ah11re,, ITTIH agent-based morr*aHly of universal: be11evolm1ce is committed to an ,~xbremely demam:lin!? concepH01n1 of moral ap;,•ncy, ,rnd has difficuily explainin1~ 01u conviction that, at least in ordinary cirrcumstances, there must smrely be limits on what morality can req11fre any imlividual agent todo. An agent,based ethk of care can also be sillid to he demanding in thfs way: thm1gh the emphasis on caring deeply for spedfic others srnggesls that an agent's legitimate self.-concern is s,omewiiat !less likely to be lo-st aimong her concerns for vast rtllmbers of other people, 1Jl1ere are s!:ill no (deonl:ologkal) iresbnictions on what she can iJ.e required to do for others.. And as we haw* seen, an ethic of oue e11eoumges agents to cani form; many people as thc,y (effed:iveliy) can, and to accept ii gy*e,1t deal of responsfbil1ily for promoting l:lw carinf; capacities of others.1 6'7 IBut an etbk of cssP fo especially prone to the 1,econd kind of d ifficuHy mernti.oned aibove •**** the prob.I em of self16'7lJrb11:11-Walker has suggested that "lho fad orlouman con1oocf:odnese lfo1l makw f'cw <-~T1dJirnm. vistas of ñsponsihiW1.y (both wi!}i_ resrw:d to ill.'..'(Y~ fl<Hoson and with l'"<~Hped. Lo t1Jl)11 (1989: '130)r uccoimls for the struin R.1.1t11t ir; often 111.ear*d in tl1.n vokef; of GJll-t.gnn.1,~ fomi1tlc: r(-'.Hrl'onde1nts, 152 abner;ation) 68 'fhis reimlts from ll:s empha1,is on wl:ud Noddi11gs's calls "oooti11atio111al displacement." To be motivaied in tlhis way Jis l:o care about others so deeplly that folfill1iñ; their needs mid interests takes fop prfo1rity in one's hfo and in one's dellibemtfons about what to do. Hence, an ethic flrnt i!8 based on tlhe arn:lmirabilily of 1:hfa lype of moti1mtion imph\diJly treats the wdll, being of the other persrñ(s) a moral agent is (or could be) responding to as in some sense nwre 1rn:iom.lly important tlhan the well•-beini; of tbe agent herself (IHloustoni, ]987: H7),. aind correllrutes wi1:h a, ~iighliy extra-regarding conception of mrwraHly, in which an age11t's motives and ,Ktions are eva.lua,ted as moirallly better fo the extent that they exhibit moire cawe amll concern fol' other people, but rngenl:s are only said to be morally justified in foirmulat1ing mnd purs11ing their own good after the needs of othe1rs have been met S1imHady1 it seeins to entail Umt agents are olbligrnted to pronnote Ute good of otfo:-rn, llmJ have no corresprnndini~ obligation lo pmnmte their own !i()Od beyond the poi111t whi'ch is necessary to folfi!ll thei1r (more bas11c)i obligations of earring for others .. B11t this produces a tension deep within the theory. On the one hand, Hie theory suggests that morallity hau, centrnliy to do wil:h enh,mdng the quaJlily of individmil human lives, yet on the olh,er Jhand, it suggesl.s Hrnt morality directs eaclrt pernon to pay very Httle aUention to tbie 911.mHty of his or her own life. And one does not have to reject the 1idefll that interpersonal cormedions are valuable to find this a bit odd, Ilven if we agree that moral rngent9 m 11st neve,* malke special exceptions for themselves or be predmninantly concerned ----***---l68Nol:e 1:hal this diffem from the p1*oblem of "cornplidty in evil,1.11 Thal p1*ohlmn r_"effodod t.h(: co.r1rccm1 LhaJ a cai:rirtg-morcal agent will m.:tpport t.hn evil projects of p{-1:opln wi.Lh w}wrn she is "in rofoL:i.on1~bips,. A1.:, we tUXl aboR~J Lo S{~n1 Hw* pl'oh[Qr.n of sdf..-abnegaUon stems from i;r,e likelihood llhal a cming "'f\"111: (as cha1*aderized by l\loddings) wHl always pul the estahli.shrrnonl and maintenance of ongoing pti*rnon refolionships al11ead of morP irtdividualfafl.ic prn*suihi. 153 with prnmo1:inr; their own good, why sholllld atf;ents be forced to freat thenr own good as in 1,om1e sense )less mo.rmUy siginifican1 tban the good of all others?' It fo 1in this way H1at warm virtrne--ethka are most obviously" one-sided/' implying !:hat other people should lake 0111 a kind of mi oral impmt wilhin an agent's deliberaihon that the agent himsdf prosu1ma1bly lacks .. Crure--el:lhidsts are not 1maware of this difficulty. lln aUempling to overcome it, Noddings lullS emphasized thait her ethic do(~1; place limits oin what anyone cauri lbe m.o.railly required fo, do for others: people are '1excused 11 from caring whenever they recognize that being mot:ivatiom1lly dlispla1ced poses a 1:Il11tngew to 1:hei.r physical or el:lhicaJ; self. But she also says that people form H1eir ethical 1iden1tiHes by 1Jeing ol:her--direded (1981: 'Iii; 49-•51; 99),, a.ind so it is rc~asonable to ask, as many fomirnls,ts have done, whether a caning agent will in fad. be able to reco1_1;nize threats to her own vveH•-being (Hmwton (1987); Shog1.rn (1988); Card (1985)) .. Noddings a]so points out that her ethk iG me,rnt to ltx~ m1ivernal: everyone ought to ad as 11ones-cai*i111g,.11 so a cari1ng a1gen! should receive as 1D1wch suppoirt !from others as she ls wiUfog to provide to them .. Still, nothing in Noddings 1s ethic g1.uarnnlees lfort thfa wifl occur: 1it is perfodly possible that a nmrnl agent wHI fim:l herself involved 0111Jy in relaHonshlps where she is the one caring and ol:hern are conlent l:o be ca.red for. Simiilarly,. Noddings e1nphaslzes that the ber,t relationships are 11doubly mring,1' that is, tl1at they are ones in which it is very difficuH (arnd perhaps makes no sense to even try) to determine which pen,m1 is acting ar; Uie 11one-caring11 and whidt person is the one who is being 11rnred-•for' 1 0984: 691ff). His in these relationshj1ps that caring is most likely lo be' accomprn 1nfod by the special cJJfod she calls joy, and in whkh the fr.lea] of caring is 1most folly achieved. Bu1t lu~re again, tbe1*e is 110 grnanmtee that eve1y mornl agent will 154. find herneif in such joy1fol relations,. and as we have seen, Noddings does not allow moral agents l:o withdmw from refaUm1ships simply because lhey are not joyfoL Michael Slote has il\ttempted to avoid the 011e--s1idedness of wainn, ag("nt-lbrused view in, a slightly dif*ferent way, Toy advurnti.ng an ideal of "bafonced rnring" (1995: §5; 1997). This dfffors from a mornliily of um.nversal benevolem:e, heca1rne rnther tJ1an attempting to derive concern for self amJ concern for other(s} from a more amdifforentiated concern for llte g;eneral 1,velfare, Slot.e treats them as two dis.hnd modes of the most ovemrchfag motnvabionaI ideal. Alld it ah,o differs from the idea,1 of nrning, bemm,e n1H1er them treating concern for r:1tramgern a,m:I disblnl otlrwn, as a somewhat less tdeal form, or highly sitmition-spedfk expression, olf lfa• very admirnbLe kind of caring that is typirnUy exhibited toward those who rnre relahvely near and dernrr, it divides the class of others into (m11gMy) hvo gnmps: those wilJh whom the moral agent is iin foirly concrete refabionshilps (friends, fomjJy, colleagues, ek.)i mnd strangers and distant others w.nth whom he is not The motivaHonal ideal, in Sl.ote's view, ammmts to a l:h1*ee-•way balance bdween care for Ol]eself, care for the class of people who are neru and dear, and care for {he class of disl:i1mt others, where the latter two groups ,ue por1:rrny,0 d mi fadoring into t:11e agent's motivatim1s i11 sensu composHo ratherr than in G.ic'nsu divirm.l69 This meilns that the daims of those persons with whom, one is engaged in ongoing relationships will be far less likely to be ou1weighed by iche sheer numbem of distant ol.lcie,*s, alfhou1gh there may sliil be situaHons in which the extreme neediness and vllllneralbiHty of strnngem and distant othen, (when taken as a g1mup} wiU cmmterlbalance the interests of the agent's 169Fo•r diHcur,sion of this distim:lion, floe Slole (1992: 229-<-10). 155 colleagues,. friends <1nd loved--ones (also taken as a1 gmup), AmI simifady, Jt means that the agent's concern fo,1' his own well-being or desire to engage [11 mme irm:lividualistic pumuits will be somewhat .less lakdy to he outweighed by the sheer mm11Jern of both near and dis1:atn1: otlnern,. though tlhe fad th,11 he must balance his own concerns against two grroups of other peoplle means that illny self-regiiirding concerns w1i II need to be faidy weighty in o,*.,for 1:o Up the, scales in the a.gent's favor.170 ln1 this way, Slote hopes to acknowledi~e whatifI adm.imblle about a ca.1tfog mol:ivaUom1l staite, without sugi~esting 1Jh.al moral. a,gents should be completely aHernited from l:lhefr own interestci,, rnr welfare when they <1re enga,ged in mol'al deliberation. 171 Sllote's elhic seems si1~nificimtly l'es.s likely 1:o result in the kind of seJ.f .. abnegation that plagL1es other care--based vi.c'ws,, al'ld it a,Jso has the ad!van\:age of avoiding the objedfonabie "detachment" of the eelf.-snfficient agent without implying 1:hait agents should devoh~ aH of their moljv,1tional ene1*girn, to rnn' and coincern for othem. As,~ 1resul1:, 1it seems somewhat lbetlei' alJJle to acknowledge the signifkance of both sepmraiteness and connectedness in morn! life. The balanced--mrei*,. one 1migM: say, is "neither a pmrn.site nor " pushover. 11172 Yet however api-,mpriate a degree of i,elf,,concem, may be, it does not se,im quite els admimbie as a sense of self-reliance/ self.-suffide11cy, and insofar a,s the former atm:ude stems frmn a recognition of hummn neediness and vu1nembHi1:y, a "balanced can"--ethic" still seems to give a certain prima,cy to the com1ededness aspect of our natm-es, Mor0•over, beca,1.me l7'0For » 11111oni dd.ailed. account of how thiB ht1,fanci.ng:, process occur*s than J can offer herP1 s.,w: Sloto (1992: Ch.6; cf. fortl1.crnming). 'Jl71 Note thfl1L Gilligan may lta.ve heen L.lw first to suggesL thaL 1*1balanccd cmting-11 is a morn! id,>l,l (1982:: ,mp. ch. 6). 172sfoto hinrnelf dom; fteqm-'.*_nl]y f~ay thiH, a1t lea1~t. in converEmUon. 156 il: suggest., 1:hat nwmJ siturnt1ions are l:yrka,Uy ones [11 w lhkh agen1:a m 11.st r,tril<e an appropriate bala11ce between doing things for the otlher perso11s tJhey are conneded to in vaTl'ious ways,. or doing thing.1,, for themselves, it ah,o !lends to olbscurre or push to the backgrnm11d whal: is perhaps the most distinctive element of Um "ca1re-or.ientali.on" Gilligan identified ..... naimely, the way in whkh Jrelaitionships themselves werre mornUy valued. Iii srnme ways, Noddings's more relal:iorn1l etbic .may be better able 1:o capture this idea. Her daim that tI1e morally best human relationships aire is fo engage with others on !he basis of a mutllal.ly held com 1nihnf.mt to caring for the other, And when Noddings desc1ribes the objecl of a caring agent's joy as linked to bollJl1 oneseU ,md flm person(s) one fa caring for, yet ills befog focused sonwwhere beyond both,. X believe she is pointing to the distindi11e vahw of a "'sense of h!iirmomy" with 0H1ers that arises when ~1.gents engage in genuinely shared ac1:Jivlly)TI However, because NodcHngs restricts the doma.in of rnmtumlly held commHrnents that con1slilute morral1Iy !;ood i11temdions to the comnnitmcnt to c1uring, muhml engagem.ent a11d mutual responsiveness are l:Jreail:ed as a kind of epiphenornen1ai fo mora,I adi11Hy, rnthr,r tbar1 as being m.m'ally migrnificrnnl in Uteilr own 1rlght My own view is that these are in fact nudal nwml-motivaitiorn1l caradties. lfonce,. I want lo SU!~gest that sharing, (rntherr thain caring) is a more appropriate candidate for mu most ovPrard1ing moral IdeaiL *t73stmi[ar .rph.r11Nes have been used by Nancy Sl*H~rrman, \f\rb.o also 1in1_phasi.zcs Lht'. rnoral value, of slmring ('.1993; 1997: di. 5; soe also 199:1: d1. 4), 157 Interestingly, a ñIated point has re~:enl:ly been m,ufo by Christine Koirsgaan:l, who acknowledges her ji111b!lleehml affinity witbi separnte11c$sbased thnrikei*s rñe Ifawlis, Nozi.ck andl Kant (Korsgaard 1993). Noting that "moral pMlosuphers lw,ve pernislently assumed that the pdmal scene of moml1il:y is a scene in whkh someone does sm11el:h.iI1g !Q or for someone E'lse,11 she mrgues that it fa in fad a scene "in which we do so.metlhing 1:oge!h,,r" (Ibid.: 2.i.11), Her idea seems fo be that in !he primal! tnornl scene, concern for selif and concern for others cannot be dearly distilnguished within, the psyche of any individual agent, and there is 1110 need 1:o "balance" the two smrts of concems,, beca11se they are noti in essentiaI competitiõ, with one another. .As Komgaard puts it, the fosk of moral ar;enfo "is lo find the re:asmrn they ca,n share" (Ibid.: 2''") _,) . Korsgaard herself hdieves that this realization 11 [briings] us back to Kamt1'1 (Ibid.: 49), And although I believe that a, pri11dpJe,,,based accmml of moml. agency is inadeguate to captmre the exlñrneiy riclh moral psychofogy 1:ha,t is involved in genuine shmring (this wm be the subject of Clhapte11* Fomr),, I do 1101: thilllk His surprising that the ideal of slladng has been alluded to hy proponents of both separaten,Jss,-based! and connedion.,based views, This is because t.lhe psychologkal fea,hires iJ1111olved in sh,rning indrnde both 11wmml!11 and 1\:ool" fonns oi mol:ivrubion: a kind of openness and r<$po11si11eness to others that 1is accompanied by a sense of supembundal1!ce 01, desire not to bP merely ,11 paratsite on otlher peopie, lln oirder to be genuinely sharing with ,motht•r person, an agent muisl of cmm;e be resp(msive tto that others needs, Bid the agent mm,t rnlso bring something of h1im or herself to the interadfo11 as well,., that is what makes sharing different from crnri11g (and otheir .tirnore purely altruistic adivities), 158 The moral psychology of sharing not only irdi!g:rarl:es motives from both sides ol' the seprnmtenesr,/ connectedness tension, howeverr; it a,foo seems to transcend that trmsion altogether. If/or there is something l:o Noddings's suggestion that lhe affective joy that one experiences when engaged Jin shased ad:ivHy is focused somewhere "beyond"' one's aUi.tudcs loward self and otJ-wr; 1:he shauiñ; ã;e11t is tmique rrnot so mudlt lbec,mse she Jacks a hasel.ine concern for either herself or for others, but beca,r]se she also possesses an rudditrional kind of concenn. for "1rn . ." It ls that sense of mutua.Hl:y that 1is most dearly expressed throllllgh the sharing agi~nt's acfa, and I believe that ii gives, us, 11 basis from which to explmin the speciBJI value 11:hat seems to aU:aclh to moral reasons, and the s,pecirul status that such reasm1s see11111 tu have by comprnrison wWrn more prudenti.ill oir eg;oisl:k reasons to act Ini mn:y even, a normative cmtlook lbasf!d on the icdeaI of sharing seems to be frr a i:11wch IJeUe1* positi1H1 to avoid the forms of one-siidedness tliat pfog11e both sepaeafonoss-based amd com1ededness-based moral views 1:lurn any of the ideals d,facm,sed in this chaplel"o 159 CHAl"711ER JFrn.m: 'JfHJJ WHJL TO SHARIB I ber:;an 1this disserhiticm by suggesting lfo1t the contemporary A11tonomy /Carirr1g Dehal~, lms been so i11trnctable i111 large part l1eca1.1se its partici1pants tend to conflale two disbncl tensions, both of whkh have historical roots witfriin the west.em philosophical trndition. The, most ii;eneral is a !tension in 11val1J1e-orientatio11111 or H1e srnbsta11ce and focus of moml concem,a11d I ar~;ued (in Chapte1r Three) tlud we have no good reason to view eitlhPr foe values of i11div1idlllaI sepc1rate111ess orr ilie vaiues of h1,teFpersonaI connecl:edness as momUy primary. In thfo chapter,, I endemm1r to show how the ideal of sharing lntegndes l:hese hlro sd(s) of vafoies,, providing us with a mt.1eh mme unified vvay of thiinldn1g about rcnornlity rnnd the ethkal Hfo. The second tension, has to do with the sfrucl:ure of n111ornl n.rndemmnding and conresponding mefuods of m.oraI delihembon, methods which ethical theorists typically da.im to be explicating, aind an 1ideall vernfo11 of wlidch they rnre ultim,iltely hoph1g fo defend. In this respect, the Au1:onorny /Cadng Debate rollghly parnllefo the d:ispute lbehveen defondem of mm'e prinoipled rnr "acticm--fon1sed" accounts of mom.I judgment (including both d,~ontological ,md conse91L1entiaJist moral views)!, and defonders of mon• vfrlllle--ethicaJ or "agent-focused" accolllnl:s. Ami here I sided more ck,arly with defenders of U1e el.hi.cs of care, s1.1ggesl:i11g that U1ey are corr<'d: lo insist that indi11idm1I rugents need not be "acting on princi.ple 11 (neithr~r explicitly nor implicitly) in mder to be actinp; morally. Even more radki!Uy, I argm!d that it is in fact possible to defe111d an m1ffrely "agent--based" accm.rnl of rn1oraiity aind the ethical life, and thrnt lli<~ ethirn of care become signifirnn\Jy more plausible when undemt()od in agent---bm;ea\ terms,, An:mding-ly, I arp;ued 1:hal we (nm) 16() 1.mdernbmd the moral s,t.d11s of actions as 1Je11ng entirely deirivatjve from the 1i11h'li.111sk, ow im:llerendently gromrided ad11111.irabillty of the motives and c.h11mderr-traits that mre exhibil:od or made manifost by the agents who perfo1rm l:hose aictllons, anti H1rnL moral deliberation can best be understood as an exercise in whal. has been called "reflexive self,,moniloring'' rnr "responsibiHl:y reasoning" ,,, that is, of choosing to ad in ways that refled: one's (most) admiralble moti11al:io111s, or at !:he very least, refmining from ading in ways that are pl"ompted by one's (nwst) deplombfo motival:ions. Of course, this way of thinkini,i; about morality and I!Hl'T!'ail agency prcisl.lpposes some coJflcepl:ion of what types of rn,otivations are in fad IJ,!st (i.e.,, of whd motivational t,l:ates co1.rnl: as 1;enui11:1c' IJfloml vfrt:ues), a,nd a,o any agent .. based ethic that hopes fo have 111ormaUve impol't will have lo say son1ethlng about: the drnmder of the momJ .. mofrvational ideals we shmi Id strive for and against which more limited or imperfed (complexes of) motiv,1,l:ions and chara,d<er braits are to be assessed. Defending: a parUcufarr mol:ivati1mal iderul is Ill specific way of a,nswering the question about the apprnpriate subshmce m* focus of moral concern, and thii; means that even if care-ethicists are correct (<11s I believe they are) to insist that the rightness of any action depends crucially on U1e v11.lue of its motnve, they may stil]I foe wirong to insist that 11connedion-based 11 motfves like rnre and respo111si11eness have, m* sJ-muld be gnu1ted, genemI primacy over ad,J other sorts of mot1ivdions, not the least of which indude the forms of seif--suffidency and self-reliance that an,~ lyrirnUy C'mphasized within more> 11sc0 parate1rn.~ss-*lmsed11 views. And in fad, I have ,ugued thal: care-e(:hids!s are wrong abo11t this, for "warm" agenUJased ethks (including m1 ethic based or1 an ideatl of mn.iversal benevolence m11d rnn et:hk based on the more partial ideaI of nlrin 1~) a1re 161 objectionably one.-sided in the diiredion of the other people to whom the cairing ã;ent is morally comt,eded,, and ideallize fom1s ol moral ag,•ncy that can be excessively demanding oir even self,abnegating, I also axgued that "cool"' agent-based ethics of the soirt l:hat might l:a,ke trr1<•ir im,pirahon frrnm, Plato, tfoe Stoics 11ndl Nietzriche are olbjedionably 011e,,.sided in the other direction, and ideillliZi~ lhe chrnrader of agents who are in fad "dehu:hc-,d" from other people in ways that can cause significa,nl mom! harms. It may seem, therefore,, tlhat adloptirng an agent-based approach to moral theoiry brings us 110 dose1* to resolving the moire substantive tensfon in vailne,.01*ienfation, and hence H-mt defending this strncture of nmrnl 1mdersbmding has relatnvdy I ittl:e pn1dical bite. 1f the argmnent of l:lhe present chapter is coned, Jhoweveir, fuen that conclusion is perhaps a bit too haisijy,, ]For in the process of demonstrnl:[ng Html the ideal of shawl mg unifies-** and in a certain sense, ewm hmnscends '". the' seprn.rnteness/ connectedness tension that is deeply embedded within both ordinary and phiiosopbicaI moral tlhm1ght, I shall also be suggesting that i1t is best 1mdemtood 1in agent-based terms. More spedHcaiUy, I slrw,U contend tltal the prndical desire or "Will to Share" boU1 11:hings a,nd experiences wHh otheJI people fa a basic mora.1 atl:itm:le that lies at fue core of a11 unmisfakably hllm8\n form of moral agency, and that 1:lhe 1inl:rinsk admhability of s1.1ch a VVill can be used as a basis from which to explain and jusl:i[y the othel' types of morn! judgments that: we make. It t1uns 0111, in other words, that flw be11I: way of mwrcontilng the tensio11 in value--odenfahrnn may be to thiink about moraHly in agent-based terms. The complete argument for this claim wiJl extend into Chrnpter Jive, where I expiore 01e implicahon.r, of an agenl:•-based ethic of shari,tg in the 162 imlivichlal moral realm, Thits chapter fays the foundation for thal hulher imquiry hy idenlifrying Hn,~ centrml foatmres of a Will to Share, sn1ggesttn1j that ii is deeply rooted in human sociability amd so is psychological'ly possible for ms to c1]lt1ivate and ad from, and defond.ing 1:he dai.mn that such ill ,NiH i6' i.11.trinsicallly admirable, 4L:l Two ltllrtm!es of sliillreidl ,atcairvity h1 ordeJI' to undernbrnd what is morallly good about sharing amd sfoir*ed adivHy,. it will be 11sdul to dis!irng1t1ish bdwem1 two 1111ain arspeds <ff modes,, The !first rnm:l perhaps most obvfous .ris the "d.istri.bulirw.; nr,ocfo" which cm1 be used l:o churnrdt~iri,,e chiJl,hen sharing toys, roommates sharning an i!pi!rhnent, or parents sharing resporn,ibilit:y forr mising u child. But thel!'e is rn second, and in my view much more distinctive "experiential mode"' which is d1amderized by variom, forms of mutuality,. Here there is no cor1notalfon of dividing lforngs up, burl: rarl:her of doing things together,, or of g:oing on what Nancy Slherm,m has aptly desnibed as ,1 11shared voyage" (1993; 1997: ch. 5). I bellieve His Hits mode thi111: disl:inguishes genuine m foll•*bl.ow n sharing, of tbe smt that is n1.omlly i~ood ,md proper, from ll1e "mere" oir accidental distribu.tion of things, and l shul.l urlthnutely argue Urnt the experie111tial m.odt' rii; what accou11fa for the intrinsic admirmlbiHly of the Will to Share and explains the spedail value we typicaUy attad~ to mornl activity, Hut befme we ca111 see why, we ne,~d lo get dearer about what each mode of shadng involves. Dl1slbi:"H~11tliwe slht,ir:rnng Even the veiry slhrnrt list of exarmples just mentioned 1indirnle11 that U.re 11objeds" of d istrributive sharing can be 91t1ile diverse, Som dimes Hie object is a divisible good, such as a toy box foH of buflding blocks or an aipadme111t with 163 sevrnrail si.mifarly sizc~d moms, Omt people Gm simplly divide up into sep,nrnh' portim-ns for erueh to ernjoy orr mruke m,e of on his or her own. Other times, rn i's a non-divi.si.bie good, such as the onll.y swirni; on a playg.ro1md, OJI' the coziest armchair in an a1partrn11ent; in t.h,,se ci1rcmnsta1rrc,~s,. peopl,, engaigc-, in distribt>*** tlve sharing by faking huns. The 11object 11 of distributive 1,hmring cam aJs.o be a11 activily,. Hke reading a bed---time story,. al7ld people rnn o1nd often do enga1ge in distributive sharing with respect to relatively undesirable objects of this sort, such as when roomm11Jt.es take hims performing menial household chores, or pare111ll'l take turns changing diapers or geUfog up early 1:o see the kids off to school. But it is also impmfan1: to notice thc1t m11Jny objeds of sharing are not like a1ny of Oi~~se cases .. When p11Jre:t1t~ share responslbHity for mfofog a, child, for example, the responsilhillity seems to be lmmething that each pa1rent hais irrn fo1H and adl the time regardless of what the other prurent thinks or feels or does. Thollgh they ma.y of course take lums pei-formi.ng specific 11Jcts on behalf of the child, one al least hopes thait they each take responsibHity for pue11ting in a 1,vay that is independent of considenilionis about whose t1.1rn it is to 1*ead a. bedtin1e story, alrend an aft.er school sporting event or riano recilrnl, or what have ym1. And they may <11so share thefr parenting responsihilitiie1; without erngaiging in any explicit turn-takit1g or dividing up of specific !tasks. Indeed, 1it seen:1.s that parr-enl:s wlho slhaire thefr responsifoil1ities most f-lllly are not priimaril.y concerned with how those responsibilitie.~ are dli.stdbuted between !:hem .. Put anol:h,~r wrny, sharing parenfa.l responsibility seems to hacve lesB to do with d1ividing Htings up thain w1ith coordinating one's a,cHvily with anolher person. fo using thfo exam.pile, J[ do not mean to suggest that it is impossible 1:o be a p;ood pal!'ent wiltlrnut slhmring one's responsibilil")I with someone else, nor 164 do X 1rnean to suggest lhat parents musl: conl:hrne fo be romantically involved w1lth one another in order to share Jl'esponsibility for their children, As Sheli'mam hair, pointed out, a divorced couplle may engage in ad:1ivity that is "higMy rnrclhestra1:ed as pairt of 1u1 011ewJ[ pfon to pmmote l:heill' daughteF'ES welfm,!," and thlis may include "joint deHlberntion in Hte rfonning: aind reliability in its exerdsei a devotion to a common rn1.1r,e and r;harred viii t1et, in its rea1Uz;atlon" (1993: 28'1 ). Sherman also points out that if the parrenls no longer have any Wlll'm feelings for one anotherr, certain valuer, lhat typicaUy chrurad:erize sllaired rud:ivity wiU be lost I shrull return to ti:his fortl11ter claim in a moment For now, my point is simply that pare11,ts who can be described as gerr111inely shrunlng tlrteir responsibilities wnth one another will (need to) interad: in ways that: go well beyond a concern 1Nil:ll1 the 1ne1re dfobribution, 01 things., The case of prnrenhil respcm,siNlil:y is pa1rl:icu[arly fo.strud:ive in, th1is regard because ii1: also I111t1kes clear l:hat even distributive sharing frequently involves something n1,me 1:hs,n simply having inlerests and cm1('.erns in common,, Ufa unfortnmately rnU too obvious that mc~re!y hrnvirrng 11 chikl i.n common witl1 someone eise fa not enough to emmwe that one will share responsibility for rnising that chHd .. 174 And it seems tlrnat even, hmvini& common 'J:74To be sun-\ \AlC oHen say that. a 11dead--bea1l d.ad11 sha:ros rer;ponsibi.l.ity for b:is dni.ldnrn nvnn lhough h.e refuses to-take .it, and n11nn: grn11ern1.!y, we atfrihut.Q mo.i~td and. legal res_po.nsihili.t:y for a child's u.pTrnringing on Lhn bosJs of biological pañnLhood. \Nhrnn WP uHc: t.he hH'lll 'sha.1dng1 i-n this vvay, WO* do seem to 'be merely pointing oul llrwl people Jnavn s.om,-:thing inton-1BUng or 1-111.rJo:rrtant in co.m:.rnon (e.g., 1bein.g a b:itological parent of Chrir-/). Noth:i_1'.1.g in my account oJ Gh11red. activity is nwanl Lo deny s-udh. usaw~ or requires U1at vve teject it, lr.ruJ my focus here is on Lhn somewhat, narrowor sense of Lh(l; term \;haring' that ('.onnoi.<~s acLiv(:* agency. Thal is, I a.r.n interns.led in what wn f.tcenl if; consciously ol" u.ncorisdously fl,9-i,ne, (thinid:r11.ril' feeling or aimtn.g at.) when s.Jw or .he is r;;.harlng will1 someone l:L:oc-. I--fon<x\ Lo shur*<~ pm*nintaI rcsponsfblhty (or nn:y other activity) in l11e sense [ am i.nlerer.,l:ed irn hem enqu.1.rc!s that one he fl1divdy involved. in a. child 1*s uphringine and nngage in_ Uu1L adJv.iLy w.HJ.1 sm11,f'.orw* efati. 165 illterests in the child's welfare, cotmnon goals for lhe child's upbringiñ;, or common beliefs about how bE;st to ensure the child's g;ood may not lbI, enorngh. ffo1r exa1mple, a divorced parent oit Jiilted lover wlho is exlir<1.rorwlly vindidiV(' or resenl:fol hJw,ud llhe ollneJr parent may do ,.;verytbhg possible to prevent tbat pmren1t frm1111 beinp; involved ln the child's llphringing, despite the fad flml: 1:h,~y share stwiiki111gly similar pairenrnJ goals, It might be thoup;]hi. that the 11imHd1ive p~,re11t lacks 11t least one crudilll beHef Hnat the other may very wdl have•**** the belief that the other parent has a rigl~t to be .involved in !he child's lifo, for exampl.e, m that the child willl be }letl:er off ifbotl1 panmts are i111vulved in hiis or her upbiri.nging. Hut even this is mot necessarily the nrne .. A.n ex-husband may very weH recognize th.at his ex.,wife is a capable mother wlho has a legitimate interest 1in spending time with h<"ir kids, but nonetheless prevent her from seeil1Lg them as a way of punishing her for what,werr H was 1±mt led Ito their divmrce, Alternad:ively, a woman might fail to even tell an ex*., lover that he does have a child, sim10Jy because sh(i can't b,~ar the thought of having to coordinate parentiI1g witJri him, whiie still bering aware Hrnt hfa padidpation might lberriefit the child in 11ario11s wa,ys, aml/ or knowing that he would want tio be .i11volv,Jd in tlhe child's upbringing.17 5 111 short, while a common intEirest in probs><::ting and mirl:t1ring a child may be ~ 1wcessary condlbion of their shared parenting, 1it ail.one does mot seem su{fident. The parents 11n1st also ad: least be wiHing to coordinate fl1ceir ad1i11ities if they are going to share their responsibilities in any meani11gful sense, and while this does not Fequinf that !hey he in ]love, it drnes roguirrP that they take up certain prndical atti.hnd,~s toward one amotlnerr as well as toward H,e dtiild who is tine 175of cntirsn, tl,e faf:l,,,r i11 !hfa laU"r rnsc would lack lhn knowledg" that J-i,, ha.fl ,i drrii.lld. But even if ho did knm"f\r ahouJ hi~• child rs existence, Lhn rnot+wr might sfil'l faj1 to sh,usP pare:riU:ng rE-:::;pornslhihtfon with h.im. 166 rmore cenbml olojed of, or basis for, their mutu1all conce11*11. Eaich of them: must have some interest in p,lrenting with Hie other pomon.. Similarly, when colleagues sha1rf! the s.uccess or failm"e of their firm's mo.~t recent busiiless venl:rnro, or when teamm,des sh.añ th,~ gfoi*y of wJnning, or Hie agony of defea,t,. mu jmlgllll101rit Hmt they airre engaiged im shaired adivity seems l:o have somewhat less fo do wilJt the ways in which 1:hey distribute or divide H1ings up Hmn with the fact that they rnn lie meaningfolly descdbo,d as ~R.<J.!X!g s,omethin 1~ J9,g&Jh~!** This noti!on of 'doin,g thnngs fogetheir' is rathf•r difficult to specify with predsion,J 76 at least i11 part becmrne H seems fo lbe a phenomenm1 l:hat admJl:s of degrf:es. Foir example, a giroup of colleague,; wlho ca11 all be l'eliably cotmted on to perform thefr specific tasks and who are all rn1*efol! to ensure that their own co11.l:rib11tioris fit wi.tbln the overall busim-':,s plan,, but among whom onJ.:y one or lwo have a,riy mrerest m* i1n11olvemenfl in si:imdu:ring that pfan, seem.s to shin*,? the firm's succesr, or faihue to a nrnch IE,ssell' deg;ree than a simila,r group of coHeagues who also engage illl join I strategy sessions iu1d work out lhe business pfam logetber. Si.milasly, most of us recogniz,~ H1e difference between a sports temm made up of "showboaten, 11 all seeking to be tlhe highest scorer or MVP, aml one maide up of players who 11ot 011]y rudmfre each others' ralerds, but also shm*e a common love for the garl'le and gel'luinely enjoy the adlvil:y of playing togdher reg,lrdfob,s of wheH1er H11ey win iYrr lose,, M!all'gmret Gilbert (followini; a suggesti(m liy Cha des Taylor) has also pointed out that a fo1irlly radical chauge i;eem,s to occur wfa-,n two stramgern waHd111g side by side in a desert begin to comm1rnicaih: witb mw mmH1er; althorngh the fact that it is vell'y hot is surely common knm,vledg~' 1 '?6Foir son1(\* .rnccnt dliscussio-.ns see, i11. addKion to Sherman (l 99l: ch, 4; 1993; '] 997: ch. !5), IBratman (1992; 1991), Gilbm*t. (1994; ]9'89), May (1992), l\lagel (19'79), ,rnd Tuonrnla C[988). And see l'ny o,,vrn Lexl lwgfrming on.p. '1691' below. 16'7 before they spealk, when one says "il's hof' and the other r<!plies "you bel," that fad becomes somethi11g "enl:re nmJS" in a way that was not clearly evident before (1994k 12:). And despi.1:0 their m uhml infoirest in their daughter's Shenrnm's example are 1ml.ikely, as she points 01Jt, to 11Jntcn1ct with th,! spm11:imeity and cmthu.siasm of iiharing in each otheJ1*11, tlh.oughb; and foeli1:1gs11 (1993: 231),. rund so seemr1 to be doing things together to a lesser degree tha,n a couplle who coml:inues lo enjoy sharinr; their Uves arn:I experiences wiJh one another (perhaps includin 1;, but cedarinl.y not limited to, the experience «Yff helping fhe\fr chi.kfre11 grow). Th,~ difference, i11 the cases llrrnt Lnvolve ai higher degree of sharing, seems fargely independent of 111.e fact that they possess common interests or are seeking jointly-lield i;oafo, and tlnvolves a 1mique kind of mental and/ m emotional interdependence) '77 B!en,ce, tlhese kinds of exampfos point to the second, and in 1111y view mut.:b more dfall:inctive, "expei'ienlial mode" of shared aid:ivily. In orden* to genuinely share their respom1ibility, succest, or .failure, g.lory rnr ar;ony wHh one another,. parents, collea,gues and teanumlll:es must be mutually enp;§!_g~~~1-At a minimum, this requires Uiat they be muhrnily aU1med: each must pay aUention to, take ain interest in, and be concemed abol]! whether the otlliern are willing and abfo to foifilI specific tasks. A11d in order to be at all successful in their shm*ed m1dea,vms, they m1wt also lbe 17'ls}iorman takf$ th.is to sl1.ow lhal "it :ts not: jusl fo1tmal foatu-rer~ Lhaf* tire ded1.;iV((u in delerminaliorw ofwh<;n (or wheil,m*) ,;baring has occurred (1993: 28J), And lhis ldnd of point if; also-em.phlmizcd. hy Gilhn11'.'t (1.994; cf. 'Jl9H9), '"11'10 cl1arud.eri1zes 1do'Rng things logelher 1 as tl1e _most highly 11llmdt11]11* fo:rm of humtl:11. o.idivH:y, arp,u:ihng ilial r-.oda.hty Js a 11philos.ophically significant category 11 that 1 wbiki oft overd.ooked/' is-indfaprnr1sahle fnr an unde:rslandjng of lh.e human condil:io1n (and <1m110L h,, fu r'lher redumd}, J68 mu1tuaily re.sponshre: eadh must coordinate his or her own adivities iin wayr,; that "mesh" with the activities of the others,, and each must b,~ rerndy to make necessrnry rndj1rntinenl:s rnnd fill in as needed if, for some toason, tl1e olimrs foll down on the job or are umablc to folifill their pEbrticufar role, 'Thir; "meshilng'' process does not require that all of the participants hruve exactly the same gornls or int"'mtfons) 78 But it does seom to requfre that each of th(" parl:kiparrits wants or 1intends for l:he whole g;irornp to perform the shared activity in a way that will not thwart any of Hie pa,rtidpanb;' more individuaJistk "st1b.,plans" (1Bratrn1an 11992: 332; cf. 1993). Andrus we wnll Sc'e in §42,. i1. ia lfos k1inid of prncticaI desire to do things to1;ethe,* that d.istinguishes foIJ .. bJown shaudng fron1 the "mere" or ao::ide1ntai distrH:iution of things, We~ ,~re now in a somewlhat betlr0r positlion tu see why" doing th.ings together" is a phenomenon that m.lmHs of degrees,. ]for 1it seems that foirly minimal kinds of m1.1t:w1l engagement will. freqt1entiy take place for the sake of more perr*sonal goals, such as when coilerngmc;s develop a lmsiness plan together so that e,ich of the1n can carve out a desirable rniche for tlhemseJ.ves within the firm, A somewhat richer or more s111bstmtial fonn of muturul engrngement occurs for the sake ofi' a joinlly-lhelid goal, such as w11nmi111g a tmmnament. Hut, and this is especiaHy important, tlne ends of mutual engagement can also be 1internal lo the sfoired adiviiy it5elf, as when friend,; simply enjoy "hanging out" Iogether, or when tea,mmates play togethm* even after the tot1rnament has been won ( or lost), simply for1* the fon of the game. This is charad, 0 1*istk of the most highiy muhml or shared forms of htmnmn adivity, and in these sH11,ations, "interadion that shows nrntrnal inlex'er,t an,d 178Fo:r an altim1.rt to :n:utke U1iH 11m.es'l'1ingtt procmm explicit. snn Bratman (J 992; l 993}, ln1t 11ote Llrw.U-. his account it~ Hmitcd lo vvhal he caJ.ls 11sh.t11:red coopornibve acUvfty 11 •• * adivily that .if; :imitrumeñaJIIy valuable a:nd engaged f.n for th1.i r:;a kc: of soww furtlwi*, joi.nL1y hdd gof.-lli. 169 responsiveness is va]lued simply for its ow11 sake" (Shermrnn 1993: 2'79i see also Adams .1988). Shennan points out that d1ildre11 seem to value this so1r1. of 1n11h1,1I engagement from a very em*ly age, seeking playnu1ter:1 who are nol: only fair, 1,1ympathetic, and! willing In play by the rnies, but wit.h whom l:hey nm ''hwcnt a shared world" (1993: 280))'79 And experiential shar1ing; drmrn.derizes the !,est sort of ad11 H interaction too, as is 1:he case w.ith good nmversatiion: In 1:ltHc! ideaI and perhaps inspired case, there is the thrill of heing in conve1*sa,tion with a1rm1:foe1r, of seeing the other'r:1 point, of her seeini~ yourn, of hilting mi salience Ag,gg_th~!> of ad.1mwledging that the discovery is not propiriehuy to me or you lmt to us, of realizing that even if it is proprietary to one lout not the otherr, the real pleasure is in s,lmri.ng, 111mking it public to the o1:her who acknowledges a co.mparabl.fi pleasure in i Is apprrehensfon, and then,. of going somewhere with it,. togetheir (Ibid .. :: 2'79). Put nwre geneimUy,. the experiential 1node is perhaps most clearly exemplified in sHmitions wherre two (or more) people can be described, if on]y mom.enhuily, as sharing a point of view. In such situmtions,. the object of sharing is something 1:hat neither person would 0•1r co11kl have if each possessed only a porUon of it, OJ' eveirn if each embraced a very similar point of vliew withm1l beinr; aware that the other emb1*aced it as w,,Jl This is beca1Jse a shated point of view is foiterenUy mul:uaI: pairt of whait makes it Hw point of view that it j1, stems frnm, its being the case that each person recogrnizes ,rnd cares about the fad that the *other has beliefa and attitudes that a.*e striki11r,l y shn1i.lal1' to his 01* her own, and that each person appnidates the other's 179Note* tha.l 1:he sa.mn kind of po.int was made by Jean Pia_g(~lf w.ho 0[1served in lhe 19'.\0r, 11ml. Lh<\ back and forth so,:iJtl rhylhm of faking turns on a swing oflnn ""oms lo bn it1sl as enjoyable for young d1ildmn as I.he back and fo1rth physical rhythm of acl.tmlly lx,ing on !Lhc swing, l70 appn!c1iation of this similarity _UIO This lypicaUy gives the point of view a special. kind of significance or value for each of the persrnrns who shair*e it that would oH,erwfoe be facking; indeed, it fo thir, fad that mmk,~s sharing a point of view smnetlilng quite diffoire11I: from simpliy havinr; 1:he same point of view in common wlth someo111L<1 ellse.. And notice that this v,duo is highly dfstindive: it is rn vah1e that no person can achieve or experience for hemelf wiHm11t the active pariikipaticm of oi:hern, am! that no pe1rson can prov1ide to or bestow on other peopl,~ simply out of a desire to benefit them (Adarn1s 1988: §IV) .. H seems appmprfafo to chrn.raderize this mode of sharing as 11experieJ11liail,"' therefore,. because what is shared in the purest case is a un1ique kfod of experience•*** not just of tracking ~mdl being respom,ive to anoth,"r person for the sake of some forther end, l:mt of 111beil1i; in tm111c!'' witlh anol:hei'1s foel.nngs and thm.1ghts .. Talk of 'sharing experiences' and 'being in tuine' oHein has assocfo:titoins of intimacy,J81 so it might lbe thought lhcd experiential shm*img can only ocnnr between people in neh1tively dose amd ongoing personal relationships. But "the mut11ad tracking that goes mt in good convers1111:ion doesn't presuppose the bonds of end1.1ring friendship or p1revimrn afffliation" (Sherm1,an 1993: 280), and a 1iem;e of being in tune cam occmr in rn bri1ef mou11ml: and oflein quite loy smrprfae: There are shared voyages we trnke simplly by be1ing dmwn into cas1ml convernatnoin w1il:h others,. by play1ing wHbi anoflwr through verbal repartee,. by singing together the same hu1e, hy l80fl.erat:no:n.s of thiH tnutua.I appreciation r,ru.11y go on ind.efinJtely (each party rrwy appreciate t.hal C\ach aipprcci.a.lles the other\; apprrcd.a.ti.on, nlc.1 etc.), d(~_pend.ing o.r1 how doeply llw: point of view is Nhared.. 1.Hlsee, .for exm:1:1pfo-, Thom.11r-; Nag:ol's fouwus disct.rnr-don of the: role that rrnu]Liply iterated. le vols of n1ut;ual a.waronesH pJ!ays in 1:;.nxuaI at.Lrad:f.cm (1979). 171 knowing tlmt others elldmrse bn1mli x over bnmd y,. by putting weight on tJhie same point and acknowledging 1it thn.i,n:1gh a shared gfa,nce or head nod, by concurir1ing about some maUer of taste or foci:,. and acknowledging the co11,sensus (Ibid .. : 282) .. lfore too, "t.h,~ vaiue of affiliaUon is co1nspicm)US apairt frorn the specific ends it promotes" (Ibid.: 280)!. And as these kinds of examples makii dear, expedenl:ilatI shar.ing is rn pervasive ,md commonph1ee event in most of our Jiives.182 'Ji'lhe fact that the experiential mode is such a cmn1monpface may help to explain why the u1,oraI sig11ifirnnce of sharillg Ihm, rnot been. fulliy appreciated, Fm* if we focus too exdrnsively on the di1,tdbulti11e mode, it mruy seem. as thomg:h the tnonil goodness of sharing can be expfained in teuns of each ai~ent''s comm.itment to mme fomilimc ideals of justice, or by H11ii fad tbat their adimm conform fo principles of 11'fain1ess 11 or 11equalil:y 11 with rei;ped to the distribution of th:inp;tI And if this line of thinking we;*e correct then the! idcial of shrnrl.ng wo1.1dd nelilher be pm'i:icula1rly d1istindivco,. nor U1e most dhicallly basic o.r ove1rairching Ideal!. we seem, to rely on or l.o be abl.e lo m-ticul,;le. But we have seen I.hat tbe .1111,utuality that dharaderizes E'xperienfotl sharing is high.!y distinctive, arn,d JI believe that this mn.ode grom1ds 1:he 1l110rnl goodness of disfributi.ve shal"ing as well. llmfoed, the expelf'iential mode is cmcial for determining when (or whether) genuine shairing has occi.1,ued (that is why I charn.de:Jized the distribul:ive rnnd experi.enlial as h,vo modes of sha1red adivHy, rmlheI* than as two discrete types). 1821*1m~ im.p01rlance of '1bei1ng in hnie" to _pr.nwnahty developmr:nt hau bmm empha1,i,;cd by child psycholop,frll.r,. See c,e,pc,cially Grr"'nspcm (1989) and Slrnm (1985). 172 V\/e can begin lo see why lf we consider the difference lbetween what child psychologists rnll "pamllel play, 11' and the mme intemdive forms of play to which (follo1Ning Sherman) I earlier reforll'ed. As am exam,ple of parnlfol play, i1m1agine two d1iMren who have ea,ch takcm tlheir favrnrite vehicle, out of ,1 toy box: one is happily driving a fi.re-trnck anrnnd the niom, w hill0 another is happily driving a sporf:s--car. There is 110 a1rtiurnosity or envy belween lrftem (assume emch is perfectly content wifh his own vehicle and has plenty ot roorn to ententain him:,ell), b1it neithe1* do they lake any partic1.1fair interest 1in one ,1motheir; they mre i,implly off in their sepamte fonl:aisy worlds, pla1yi11p; side by side. Mmny people would be ireludant to describe 1:h,~se two childre11 as genuinely sharing the toys: it is not dear at this po•int that eithe1' child 1is ev,m aware (let alone crnres) that the other child is ernjioying himself, and there fa no obvious sense in which the children can be describedl ,lB even divid[ng l:htngs up (let al.one as doing somdlh.ing together). Each child is siimply "doing Ms own thing," and whifo it just so lmppens that there were enmngh suitable toys to go around .in this t<i.se, there mt1;ht have been gtnite a fight .if there wai, only one toy in the 1:oybox, rnr if both had desired to play wilth the same vehicle. H [s this type of sihmtio11 tha,t I have frt mind when I speak of the "meno" distribution of things, amd I submit tl1at our reludmrrce to d.escribP these children as shari11gl8 3 shows that the fact tlia1: an object has bPern distribut,!d in a p,H"hc11far way is not enough to explain whal is invollved iin genuine m* foll-lolown r,hairing. hi ovder foir people to be tmly sharing w i.th one another, 1831.f wn do describe the pu11ta1id pla.ynm afl skm.dng Lhn loysl' .it is only in the 1nore pi:rnsive f~(m.S<~ 1.n'0trhkh vve sa1y tftial :inanimate ohjeclN f~hlH"e c:property (bdnga liqui,lr l.rning blue), a1.11d has very litJle l.o do with what Lhe children are in foci. doin[; or !:he aims am! fJ!:n,ctnn• of I.heir agency (cf. fool.note J 74, a hove). 173 something distinctive .mn.rnt be go1i11g 0111 in each of their minds .... someH1ing that nu" parallel players appear to lack. What i.s trnis something? ]following, Michael Brntman (1992), I want 1.o suggest that some mi11imal level of muhrnlily (of 1:lhe sort that charactPriizes the experiential mode) must be pll'ese11t in order for fulJ .. IJJown sharing to m::ciu.1841 Even when peopfo <1re engaged in whail: he rnJfa "shrnred ,:ooperntiv,, act1i.vity" **** activity in whi.ch pasticipanl:s div1ide up tasks in order, fo aichieve ai fwrther ~;mil•- "each person's intention rm.11st favor the ollier'r; participation as an ,intentional agent" (!Ibid.: 333) and each muist "trreat 1:he rrelevant intents of the other as end-providing forr [him or] herself' (Il:,id.: 33(],),. Asai res,u[t,. each person feels o!Jliged to consider the~ efficacy of the othern' aid:rlvities as well as of his or her twm (Ibid .. : 3'.33)1 ,;nd each i.s committed to finding some wa,y of doing the activity (or distnibuting 1:he trnsks) thad: satisfies the other people's ends as wen as his or her own. That fea.t11re ae<:ounts for the L1111i91ue kind of 1me11fatl nd/ or emotional inlr"rrdepenclence noted above,. and enables us to determine when people m*e genninely doing things together. B1mtman poinls out that the rn,uitua!1ity requirementexpla,ins why 11 kidnapper and hr\s. victim cmmot sha,re the activity of going tti New York togel:her .. Fm ,~vr~n rlf the victim, is lm*gdy couperattve 1 thfo is sumly lbernuse he views the 1brip as the l!Je1,t means tu 1,ecure his pernona,I survival, and not because he wants to see the kidniiipper's infonbcms sati1,.fied. Indeed, the victim is .likely to thwart those intents ilit the flrnt (reasonably s,ifo), opportunHy! Simifa1*lly, opposing soldierr*s on a baittlefic•ld camrn:,t really be sharing 1 despite tl1.e fact that they 1111ay be hi1;hly attlllned to one another's l 84B1n:ll111u1n nol.t\s 1:hat his acco11.1nt is 11bnn1dly *in,Hviduahs.Uc/1 in 11,c~ sense thal it !Lr:ies. lo undn:rrnfoin.d shairred acbivl1ty *in. torn-H~ of L110 aU.it1.~{fos m1d actions of Lhc individuals it1v()]vcd. Fm* a lem, individuulfaiic a1cn1ur1l, "''*'' Gilb(:ri, (1994). 174 activity and responsive to 011e ,mothers moves. Bemuse each soldier inh•nids to hurt or kHJ his mllversary, 11either can seriously treat the other's fofont as end*"prrovidilng for himself. I,ri l:his way, the m1.1tua]Hy re91uirement enaM<c!S LIS i;o distinguish genuinely shrnred ad.ivily from activity marked by comp<!l:ihon and coercio11. AlH1ough agenl:s enga,g.c:d in Ute falter may be highiy aUumed and respo1:1sive to one ,mothe1ls moves,. l.lh.eir eñ;agenrnenl: wiU be ",!goisl:iic" in the sense Hrn,t each ag,~nt participat1:es for the sake of Ms or her own good,. And lit is imporbml: l:o notice Hm1: l:ruly rm1h1al e1ni;agement r.liffors from, redpirocl!! altrmisrn as well Redpmcal! alll:r!lliSts wiIII each be engag,"'d witli the other for the sake of 1:hat other person's good .. Hui: the engageme111t hat chan1deri:,;es ge11u1ine slh.iuing: is mutlllill.l illl the sense II.hall none of the agents participates solely for the sake of the ollher(s), and non,C: partk:ipales sofoiy for H1e sake of him m hersellf. Rather, both parlicipants "!~lv,C: rnnd lake in a way 1±mt: not only contrilbul:es lo the s,11tisfadno11 of the,ir 1imJlivicl 1rn.l! needs, but also affirms it.lrte larger relational m1it they compose" (Held '! 995: 60),. 4.31 The migmJifkmm:11 o f tllue V\liU Earlier X pointed out that tile object of experiential! slmring is something thait no person ca11 attain wil:hmJt !he ad:ive parl:kipat:ion of othem (p .. 170), and in general I ha11e treated sharing as an activity errngaged ln by two or more penmns .. But 11:enrns like "mutuality" a,nd "nmtirnl eugagemenf' have a m.oHvational semie as weII a,s an ruchievement semse, and there rnre reasoñ to think that ,mly the former is aippropriately used as ru Cl'iterfon for determining whether an act of: gem.1.ine sharing has occurred .. Demanding that ,m intrlnsirnUy vdm11ble senise of "being in tun,""' must ach.mlly be experiem:ed wouM be far too resbrid:1ive, si111ce we, have seen that people c,m and do engage l7S ill (more) distributive forms of sharing for insl:rnmenl:al reasons** that fa, for the sake of a further goal Hut we have also seen th11t such agents must at lc,ar,! desire l:o find smne (m1111l:11rnily agreeable) way of doing tl111ings together, because it is this lc]tt.er fealwre I.hat: disl:iinguishes germine s,har.ing from the "men{' or acddentaI d1istrribublon of things. Unless we appeal to the agm1t.s' motivafo:.ms, for exarnpfo, it 1\s difficlilt to explain our sense that some paren1s truly share responsibility fo,1r child•-n,aring, wherem; ol:her simply divide up theirr J[HllrenfoI tasks. At a minimum, people who e1ngrnge in (more) d1isfribL1tive forms of sharing must clesfre fo find so1ne wrny of doing the ad:ivily tJhat folfilis other people's sub--pians as weU as 1:lheiir own, A second Jeasm1 to think tha,t the desire for muhmlity (rather than the achileveme11I: of nn1hn.aJ expe,wience), is the distinguishing faatmrre of sha<1red activity stems from the fod llrmi there are aH sorts of nises in whkh it makes 1,ense to describe one pe1*son a,s sharing wHh (oll' performing an ad of sharing toward) m1other even t:houi;-;h that other pernon fo comple1:ely unrespo111sive in return Suppose, for example, thrnt one of otU' parallel playerr:, offers the other a trnm with his toy, and the second child mim.ply takes it and nms off to the other end ()f the room .. In that kind of case, there is no, mutual. trraick1ing ()ing on, aml yet it may still seem appiropriaite to aay tb,1rl: the ffrst chlld shaired his toy wiH1 the 5ecQind. Brnt here again, it must be evidence of lhe first d1ild's de,sil'e tQi play mm wit.h the other that expfains our inclination to say he was sha11*iñ; (nllther than giving his toys away). If he was tn()tivalr-,d by a de0ire lo make the second child happy, itwm1ld be more appmprJ1ate lo chmracllerizc the firn.t chi.kl' sad: as altruistic, and he would presumably be petfodly satisfied when the othe1r chJild hotted away. Bul if he was motivated by shm*ing, he will pnesumably show signs of fn11stration and hurl:. 176 The de,s.irc forr muhmlity need not be an agenf 1, only 1reaeon forr en1gaging 1in sharred activity; more exclusively seif,-regarding rnr other rega1rding, motives may afoo be rut work. Hui: file maurk of the shad.ng agent is his m her overarching, desilre for mutnrnJity, Appeal to thi.s Jdm:l ol ovemrching desire ena1bl,es nm to explain, for exam pk•, how friends cam slhare the activity of playing a competitive 15ame, desprne ~he fad Hmt much of Hteill' eni~agement is supedidally Hk,~ thal of opposing soldiers on a battlefield, [nsofa r as each friend intends l:o be Hhe winner,. neHlie1r ecu1 iTeat the oth,~r' s intent as fully end-pmviding for herself. But frle11dlly compoc,tition can be distinguished from warfall'e, once we recognize that the most overnrch1irng; intent of agenllD involved in th,~ !airer is to pfay a game together regardless of who wins or loses (ct Brahnan 1992: 340),,. Of rnurne, ea1ch agentwm still ad in ways she heHeves wi!I emible her to win, ]But rm overairchi11g commitment to playing the ga1ne helps to expl.ai11 wlhy friendly competitorn are wiI!ing 1:o abide by rules even when Josil1lg, and iml!eed,, the Iaclk of airny such commitment seeme1 to be a dmrad:eristic feature of the "sore loser" or the "'poor sport" Meanwhile, no such overnrching commitment is likely to he found in the case of opposing soldi.ers,, whose most ovenm:hiinig intent is presumably to be the sole smvivor or vidor when the conflid ends, Appeal to an overarchilng desire for mutuality a,lso enalbks us to distinguish rnses of genuine sharirng from cm,es of pu.nre aitir11.ism. Joh111 Raiwfo has convincingly argued that a grm:ip of pure altrrnistr, would not be concerned *wHh 91-uestflons of jusHo:t, si.rnce i:n order frnr such quesHons to arfsc-~ "'at least one perso11 mus1: want to do something other Ht,Ht whatev(cJ' ,•vmyone else wai111t'J to do" (I 972: 189), Because pure alltmisl:s want rnnlly to fo!fill olbcr people',s interesfa, they will never have th'2 niq uisite wa111t5, Hut sharin 1j agents 1'77 will be concerned witlh such questions, bernrnse their desire lo foiffll otlhc,r people's 1inte1rests does not 1immedfat.ely ov,emide or outweigh tlhei.r destn' to fol.fill their own. More imporfontly, their overardhi11g desire for muhmiity me,um 1:haL they will! ,~!so want to brin1; their own iotercesfa "in tune"* with the interests of others. Because of the 1imporlan1ee of 11111otivational feaihires, I shaU lhencefmth conh:~nd that the prmdJical desire or "Willi to Shan/' boHl! things am:l experie11ce11 wHh other people is the distinguislhiing mark of genuim~ sharing. Tlh.e 1/\!ill to Slhme is charncterized, firnt and foremost by a11 owrm*chi11g desi.re for mutua1lnty, and because of this desire,. concern. for self and concern for othern are "fiHered l:hrough" one another such !:hat the agent fa nwved to ad i..11 ways that expx<ess and foifiH both typos of concern <11: tlie verry smTIP time. In order to se1ve as an idoai'I of mrnml cha1md:e1r, lt: must be psydwlogi.cally possible for rngonls to cultivaite and act from the WiU Ito Share..185 lll11t some people migM suspect that the desfre for 1n11hmHty is one that arises only for age11t1, who happen to enjoy the experience of drning th1n1g:; together, and hence tlrnt it is not a desire we rnn expect alll agenih, lo possess,. However, there is every rea1son to suspect drn1l: experileintial sharing "1is a human good rooted in the sod~1lity of our ndm*es" (Sher.man, 1997: 2:66)c To aclknowledge tbis does not .req11ire us to aidopt a corn:eption1 of rmmrrn naiturrP that is fixed or value .. :free, hut only l:o recognize that "fi11di11g pleasl! rP in the -185RQ.G11U from §2.6 lhaU; d(,~morr:rnlrf11Li.ng that a 1notivat:ional idnal is psychologlrnHy por-m.H0fo is on.e of lwn ways. to d.ofond. iL 'l11e of:bf}r is tn show that Lhn id.eaT; gnmnds plausibh: d.er.ivalivo cknin1s abou.l tl~e other typ*or:1 of judgm.nnbi t.hal we .make, wbi.ch \Nill ho t.lilc~ Lask of Chapter Fivn. 178 mutmdity of shared projects fa not simply a contiñ;emt end, like enjoying carpentTy or dance or musk" Rail:her, ii: is ,rn end that stems from "'psychoiogirnl facts about lmmm1 beings that are pernfrltent amll that bridg,' local dilffei*ences, of bbste a11nd tnle1111:11 (Ibid.))86 The psychologictlli facts I have in mind are already evident in early ch1ildhood. Consider the difference there would be in the aidiivity of the young playmates, I described <11:mve if the one with the sports car "'crrashe1:II in flame" and the one w1ith the fi,e-fr1Kk "came speedirng to the rescue,," When we imagine 1:hfo new sce111arfo,. it seems m m:11 more a,ppropriate to d<E!so'i!Je their activity as genuinely shared (im,tead of "playing cmrs" side by side, they are now "play11ng craslh and rescue" together), And the most olbv1imrn explanation for thfo seems to He in the fact that eadh of the d1Hdre111 hfns 1.mdergone some 1110w taiki11g a muid1 more a,d1lve i11tere~,t in one another. This is especiiiJly evident in the case of the child with the fire .. ,truck, for while the spods--car driver might have crnshed quite by accident OF without any exp Ii cit regard to whether IJh.e other child would notice this,, Une forem1111 has not mdy noticed but has also res.ponded to the fimt child ''s adivity. 01111y as the r,)sc1u* scene gels played out will we be ablle to determine~ whether H1efr en!';ap;em,0 nt is in fad mutuail,. buit let's 1~ssume tlhat the children continue to stagf: incre1rn11ngly ellabo.rale crash rund, rescue scenes, perhaips evon frel:J::liing more cars fron1 the toybox so they cain make the accidents mor,, exciting and tho H'S(:t.ms mon: ---------~--- ----186Thns kind of point is probably emphasized by Aristotle morn than any olher phiil.or,o_pher. Not onJly does Th.e fo1rirliot11.s.ly claim that 11:n.o ono wou.M choose to live \,vithou.L fri.011tfo1t (Niconiachean Ethics.' 1155a5); lh.c also contm1ds lh,al th.c vriry wis-nst rn-:n1011s, \Arbo an: lhe m.osL sc\J.f . r--mfificien.t among h1.1:nrnan bn:Unp,sr may l~w: T:x~tte:ir ablo lo engage In co-nLc:rnpfaUon (and hence achk:ve ar1 m11d11 w.isdo1n and. fU_:J1f.,s.u.ffl.ci.nncy as c:irx-~atun-\*fi likn us arc capable of) with th"ir follows ([hid.: t177a.:C\5). 179 complex. The imprnrhmt quesl:io11 to ask at this point is wh.11 molival:Ps them to pursue this more inleradive fmm of play (rather thmri retllming to more solil:a1ry m:frvily). How we atnswei* l:his questlon wilI depend somewhail: on the ai;c' of our i1rm1gi11ed playmates. Child--psyd1.ologistr, widely agree that prior to apprnximately age follr, most: d1Hdrren are unable to de,uly diffõre11tiate between theJir own menh1l stahis (beliefs, desires, emotions, needs,. etc) and the mental states of 01lhe1•s,187 Ho,wever, c.hui.ldren do exMbiit tlhe capacily fo1' empathy from a very eairly age: some psycl:mlogisl:s trracc~ this capacily to infancy, and nearly all. believr>, that: chikhren expe11'ience wlhait Piap;et caH0;d ''emotionail comtagim111 by at least tlhe aige of two. By 1e1rnpad:lhy,' Xmean the ability to share another's fee.ling, rrmt by p11tlJng oneself in the other's shoes and imagining what you (or "ainy pm'son") would foel if you (rnr "any pen;on") were really in that sihmtion, but much more diredly, by experiencing ain a,ffedn11e state of one's own flu1t fa Mg My similar to the affective sfate of the concrete other person witlh whom orrie is presently engaged)8 8 its rin o 1:-c* complex or higl1Jy developed forms, empathy may include the capa,dly for "perspedive-talkinp;," or ima,gin1ng oneself to be ill the other's sl1oes, so thait 187This fa borne out by chi1dt•c_n1s :ri:srponses to a SCQJtario in whicTh. (1) 0 1\1i:1xf1 S<W.H his rnolher aton; some goodies :in a U.rrt on the cnm1Jor1 (i.i) lVJ:a:nd thon hi:aver,; Chn room, a:nd du*dr1g h.is absn.1:,ce/' (m) tho n10Hui.r rnovmi the goodies to a new locati.on. \Nhmt :M:axi cCHnn.Qs back in to look. for the good]osr only o!dnrr child.rem. (foll.I'.' to-flve ~yearn of age and above) accura!.:el.y predid that he will look in t:h,, li.n (Hw location in which he himself saw the p,,oodie,; placed). Misla.kenly assu'.111:ing Hw.t Max[ 11.0.::, all lho informa.Uon that they then-me.Ives htr'l.m,. ?i•-yr:ar olds predict he wHI look in Hw nml\r *1.ocation. 1 ggThlis d.cfi.nition is bm~ed on a discum-1ion hy Eisnnherg who is carefuJ to disi.tngujnh !)mpatltY. --**-"au affoctivn state that stems fro.m. the! apprehension of anothee\; {:n.1ohonal Ntal.c. or condition and that "iH congrut:-r,L and qu:il,:* flimi.lar to Hue perceived slate of Hw oL}mir, n from fl)'JQr1:J2~.tm~ .... 11'a.n e.m.0U.ona1l! ñsr,ot1t~t': Nlemrrirtdng fron1 another's nrnolioni:111: staLe ore condition, lJ.1.aL .is not i.dcmticaJ to 111.e 0Hler1~ t:il1LOLion but consists of fo,,.ling.s of sor:ro-w or cone<-:rn for anol11er1s we!fa-re11 (1989) .. See also ,Ninrw (1987}, who discm1ems Lh(': hir1t.orica[ evolulion of Lhn tern1 'empathy, 1 Lhn usage: of w'!'.1kh is hy no n-uia.ns co.nsishm[, even ~.oday, 180 I one not on.ly feels what the otherr is foe.ling but also sef-s the worlld frorn the othe1r"s point of view (maldng it much moire likely thrut one's ompruthk responses will be diirEided towa!'d tlie same olJjeds that time other person's affective slates were originally d1irredrc~d towanl).1 89 And by adulthood, m,rx;I of us are ruble to inrnginatively pairrtidpate in the Jiv,,s and expedences oi people with whom we are I11ot presently, and perhrnps never have been nm ever wiH be engaged (iinch1ding disfan,t slrnngers and even fictimrn.l dmrnde!'s) to a, not insignificant, althm1gh less,~r, degree. Ilt.1t chilldren show evid(•nce of empathic aiw,11Jeness in foce•-to--fo.ce contexts long b1c•fore they have developed tlhis forilher capacity,. a111d long before ii makes sem:p lo descrilx• them as respo1nd1ini; t:o another's pleasure or dnsfress. I•'or example, infanfa as young as ll/110 ,foys o]ld frequently cry when lhey see miol:her child crying (and 1Nhen other possible rnus,0 s of their disfress havt: been n.tled out), and similady, tl1ey o,flen giggle and show ot:her sng11s oi' delight when they see anothe1r pernrnn smile. That is, they do not seem to be happy or sad because another person i.s happy or sad (or in rresprnnse to the other's psycholog:irnll state),, hul. seem to be foeling a facsimile of lhf' other's happiness m s,idness for themselves. Skc\phcs aloout the afriil'iiy of ainy pernon to genrninel:y flfrrnre ano1Ju•r"s foeH11gs som.et:imes suggest that such a11. aibi!Hy would requiire a mysk-tious, quasi--percepl:n11e m* special intuitive focudty with which to grnsp the other's mernl:llll s.tates. However, it has long been recognizul tlliail: dl.iklrc>n mimic first, '189t.h.:ts p:iroCf$S dooe require lhn ahHUy t.o distinguish 1:;nlf and oiJ1nr, so thal one can (J) rocoi~1ti.ze tJ.1.al. the otThor is-in a dHfeñnl s.it1.rn1t.:ion than oner-r,:If unJ r,m may be havin.g d.l.fforcmL exporicmcns tha:n o-r1<-mdf, a.nd (ii) aUcirn.pt lo mqx:dc-:rn:o the sKuaU:on: from Llw pempnclive of tJn.o ther, disti:nguishing the Ofknly), n$pm:ises: of th(! olhcr front 011.n 1s owri rti.-spOIIS.0$, psycholognsts now hypothesize Hmt mimicking arriother's smile or frow11 tr:iggers one's own emotional. centers, thereby n11.1sin!; om~ to ha11e what will often feel like a11 ,nll:hentic, first--person emotiom11l respons,~. lm otheir words, state (temporarily) nm "off..Jine" and simulate the <!mo1:i01n,al states of another (Goirdon 1996; cf. Goldman 1993; 1996))90 n is easy to see how some such capadfy might serve an, impoirtant le,nning fon,d:ion: facial mimi1cry (of a parent) would enruble ,1, young dlufrl to experience foar, foir exann.ple, e>ven wHhou1: any 1mdemtamHng; of Ure so11rce of the ,!anger, and by l:rracking 1:he parent's gaZ<? ba,ck toward l]he so11rce of the pas,~nt's (authenlbic) ,~nwtion, the child mi1~hl: evenhmHy come to mndemt1111d fhad: the source (say, a sl:mnge dog) is a foairf1.nl or threatening one_l91 In any event, this sort of capaidl:y does not rrequin' ainy mystel'lious faculties lbeyond those emotiorlfll mechanisms we already ki11ow \Ne possc~ss,. bi a,ddiUon, many of the adivihes ofyot.mg children are dufficuit: to explain w1ithout the assumption, of natuml empatlw,. An importrnnl: part of the emotional matu.ratnon process i.1wolv,?:S learning to distinguish betw,'!en the 190•nw truflh be.hind. the 1:i.knptic1s 1pos:ii.Uon. is thait ~1cc1n1ra.te ,'.inpnthk awareness is very diifficull Lo ad:1i.1eve among: ad1.1lt:01• since a1dulL9 U-:nd to ropl~(~ss facial expiressl.Orn; of crnoll:iom in tno,sJ situa.tions1 and ~dnce adh-dt. ht1.-li.ri:*fo tiibout w.hal the o[,her 11nn11st h(i'1 lhiin.klng* or foeling:r in.duding fal.r,;e bdiefo Lbat rem.dt fron1 w.i.shful On.inking on the part of lh(-': pnn;ol(1 atlcmrnpfing to nm.pathize, 11n.ay also distort Urw simulation pr-c,n:ss,. But there is evide:n.cx-: lhaL fr1da1l. expn:ss!.ons do b:i.ggn.r mrn1ofion.al centers mn;n in adu [t.R: vvilncsr; the fa;d thal sfrnpJy forcimg or1,e1*s face into a smile car1 help lo comba.L a1 ba.d mood Pven in IJH-'. nbNon.cn* of sometliing !';,muindy worth smiling about. And. if is nol.eworl.hy tbat. adulit,,, do not. typically repn-'BS fo1dal cxpn;Hsiorn, whe.11'.1 J..nl..en:icU.i::1g with young children. *.i9'1Later on. 1 ch.ild.ren a1vparr.-1r1t]y fo-aJ~n tom.::,-:* this process it11 tho rovo:rrse in order to fig11:1rn ot1t how lh.ey should fnd in unfo11nnitHt.1r s:ituaLions. A chi]d wfn.o 1mco-u:.ntoñ lli strangi': object for the fimt l:inu~ and has no id.e,1! how to -iread. will typically look arou*nd for sorn,-:onc whose gaze Jis diredod Low,trd llhfl1L sani.1n ohjecl. Empatbk awarnnnHs of that o[J1t:r _pen:mn1sm.(-~11lal states tiw:.n provtd.cm-U1.e diild wit:ln infornu1Uon about whnthe.r Lo be pleased, afraid, ,ik. Ul2 first-person,. a{fediVfi' res1ponses one has toward features of the exterm1l world (which frequently include sympathetic respom,es hJ one's e.rn11pathic aw,11.re1rwss of others), ,md the e1m,pai:lrnic responses one consdously or um:01nscio1wly 11rnl:.ches11 from other people. Pñdsely beca1rne they rnre not yd abfo to do this,. however, children who rure empathically aware of otltieirs freque1rntly ad iln ways that betray their "eg:ocentiric confusion" over who11e affedive slates they are experiencing. 1Nhen yo1.mg chiidren see otherc cl1:ildnm crying, for exa1:nple, they nm to their own parents for comJmt (sugi;est:ing Uiat they experilence the other's sadness as if H were their own). An,d in a parl:icul.ady charming amd oft-dted sort of example, a l:oddier wm sometin111es brhlg his oir hen* own mother to comfort a friend who i.s crying, even tlh.oug:h the friem:l's mol:lher (who is fomilirur to the tmldlerc)< is equally avrniialb]e, (In such cases, the toddler seems lo have rnl: least some reco1~nit1ion Hrnt 1:be friend is the rnn,e who fo primarily in rn;.,ed of comfoiriini;, bLJl: is not yet able to fo.lliy distingLJish the friend's "desire for Mom1rny11 from hils oir her own.)192 Returning to 011r playrnom, thfYrefore, we ciln fairly coniiden,tly conclude that unless our Jntemdive pl.aynrn.tes are over the rng0, of fo1.1r, a is probably inmpprnpriate to ascribe clearly other-regardi111g stafos, s11ch as synnpathy (oir mny authentic, frrnt person emotion that anises fo rresponse to om!s awareness of another pen,011,';; emoiiorn,) to them, However, it is safo fo mmmne tJmt Hll~Y rnre empathkally aware of one another, and l:lh.is enaJbles u1s to make sense of the evidence Hmt int:emdive play iB inde0,d 111on1ore lftm" for each l:llw chiMr,,n involved. Given their capaciiy for emp11thy, it: is e,1:sy lo see how the process of tracking; the ad:i11i!y (including the emol:ional responses) of l92For ad.diti.onal nvi.de.nce of' mn.pa.lhic capadl.fos in young childrnn a_n<l Lht~ir oh: in pnirno:naf and. !TIO!"llJi devdopmnnl, ~~,:o ISnn]amin (1988), Blum (1994.: ch. 9)1 EiBenb(~rg amd Scray,,rc (198'7), Flanagan (1993: pllssim), Hnffrr1a11 (1976), and Stnm (1985). 183 one ,mother gives each of them accer,s fo ,1 m11ch wider range or affedive experiences tfom either co1.1ld have on his own. Presumably, it won1ld have been the empathic awareness of the sprnrts car driver's s1J1rprise or dcl'ii;ht lhal motivated our ffremrnn's ,interest in, the cm.sh, ,rnd once hie came to the rescue, the spoirts car driver is likely to have rnugM the fireman's he1igh1em:!d inl:eresI and delight As their plrny conti11ues, this sort of process iS likely to repeat ilself, so that both children experllence mrnre enjoyment by r.!aying together than by engaging in more solitary puTsuits .. Hence, it is not smrprisini; to fond that young chJildren seem to especiallly delight in the symmelxy a.nd predicbllbi 1.nty of h1m--ts:k1iog (Piaget 1932; cf. Damon 1988: 32ft). Notke too how theirr etnpa.thic awaireness would lead our playmates lo be rnmtuailly respons1ive even before they are alble to deairly distinguish, psychologicall!y, between self ,n1d othell',. Suppose, for example, that 01.1r sports car cl.river bires with the crnsh and rescue scene am! begins to dr,ive rnway. If the fireman is dfaappol11ted by this, 1:he sporm--rnr driver wm presumably foel (,i facsimilie of) this disappointment ,.md haivsc: at least some ince11tive to engage the fireman i.11 some new v,ray,. if m1ly to dd himself of this empatlhk disappoinhne1nt. Of courne, he is unlikely to see lhfrnself as fryillg to satisfy Hte fireman's interest in c:on1ilr111iing the game: from tho sports car didver' s perspective, iJ may simply feel ais !:hough he himself has an interest (uun,vittingly 11m 11ght" from the fireman) that is being thwartfidL And of cmuse, his other inlerosts may simply ovei'ride th,it interest: he may he too bowed with Hno game to be sodously rn,ov,0 d by his c>m pat.hie awm*•~ne1,s of the other's desire to contin11e, In addiUon, even if he is m,oved by that empa!hk awareness to by out some new form of int.cracliw, play that might relieve his boredom while sliII sal:isfying the interest, he has caught from the ot.her chtld, 184 he may not be very successful at adrnal]y finding such an activity. Hut simiilas incenlives will presmnably be at work on fofi fireman's part, and as each trios to satisfy both hls (more) authentic amd his (more) virnri.onis i1r1terestF, and desires, the two children may evenhrnJly Mt on some n,ew form of inl<)radive play th,d results in their muh1al enjoy1ment. Of course, it is also possible Uml they will not Children are not always moved by lheh* empathic awareness, and while 11sha11rfrl1t; is m1e of the playfol rituals of d1ildhood that young children 1,ponl:cmeousfiy discover and enjoy" (Dmmm 1988: 37.), tlnefr inil:ial forays into shared ,1idivi.ly are errntk: and "mmrnl.ly more bound to the needs of the self tha111 thos,i, of the other" (Ibid.: 33) .. Nonetheless,. wlhat the presence of these e1npal:hkallly grounded in,cenUves fo shared activity does rmggest i.s fhat children who do engage in interactive play ,ffe motivated by a very distinctive kind of desire •*** the "desire for m11hrn1Hy" *** tlrn1 is neil:her exclusively i,elf* regaxding nor exClusively other-regairding, but lies i.n a kind of penumbra region somewhere in bdwee11. Ufa a desire be "in tli11e,,. with (an)other peirson(s) (cf. Greenspan 1989; Sten119815). Since I have allowed that the children involved in, the crash and rescue game need 110t have been caipalble of disti111g11isJh.ing H1eir own mental states from lhe mental states. of others, it 1111aiy no Ionger seem clear in what sense they can be faking a more ad:1ive .interest in om.! rnnother than they d.1id whil.e engrnged in mere pa1*c1,1Iel play. Each of them, we m1\ght say, is still 1i111st "playing cam," and while pmrt of the fun each is having turns oLJt, L111 this rnrw, to bP (vicarim.mly) caught, the,ir ad:Jivity m11gM sWJ seem l:oo egucentri.c or self• ori,~nted to count as gemnine sharing .. I want l:o allow that lhfo Jim.; of H1ought may be appropriate insofar as the chi1klren do not yd seem capable of fon .. blown agency, Bloweve1r, three points arc1 worth noting before we accept il oubight Ffrst, even if neither chiM can clearly think of himself as responding to the activill:y of the otheir, it is 1,t1ill the rnse rthat they are m uturnlly engagecL T!rwl i.s, even if both children are in ai stafo of egocenfric ccmfosion, unable to recor;nize how much of their enjoyment has been "caught" from anotJier chilld who 1is in fad sepa1rafo {Tom themselves, they are still attuned to orne anothPr's emotions and still responsive to one anoHne.rr's ad1,}93 SecomHy,. even if thci children arr*e unable to think of themseives as pl<1yiing wntlh one another, they are nmdenfobly doing something together: they simply could not be plaiying this kind of i~ame, could not be having this !kind of hm, wrnhouit the active padidpalimn of the othex'. This remains trne regardless of whdlier they can recognize or care about !his fad. Thirdlly, while it do,es se:em. ina,pproprialc to describe either child as achng 1fo1r thoi: sa1ke of foe other' or 'orn the other's behalf' (e,.g., as pfaying crash and rescue because the other wants 1.o),, ii seems equally inapp1ropriate to describe eithe:11* child as ading solldy for hfa own saike.194 ]1his is not simpiy beca1Jse their interaction is intuitJively much less self--oriented tlum when they were engaged ifl11 pam.llel play. Fm even if it makes sense to say that each child fa motivaled hy an ovo1rnrching personal desfre to have more fan, the very fact Hmt each fimls it "nwFe fon" to engage "19?rr hoJ11iovc. Na g<':1 (l 9''79) is 11'1 a]d.ng a si.mifoat point when he dcw;crihes soxtu11l aU.mdion as. arising through a fWil"k\r,J of .m11ltjply fterated 11*s.<-11rwi.ngs11 (RoJ.TW:O snnHes. Jultot,. Jul!iet senses R.om.no1*s. sens.Ing of her 1 Ron10:o s.e.nsos Ju li.ot rmnsing his so1'.1Hing of her, de.), ru1her tharr1..mult.tpl!.y mes-Led pl.ans or inltlntions. )?res1.u:na'k>ly,. Lhere iB r,;om.{', point aL vvh.icb ]Romeo knows that part of his sexual attrradion to Ji:.di.et stems. fron1 her sexual attl."ad.ion to him.1 and vi.cc V(1:rfm. Bu.i im Nagrd'fi exam.p•fo, Romc-'.*o a.nd.JuUet begin trac:ki.ng one 1.t1in.othor 1 0 111.over~ and. nxper.i(~*ll1dng Bextrn.l ottracL:iion long TtH~foro mu:h un ex_pHcit recog:nition. occu1*sr und long before o:ith,-1:1r of thorn has any c0:11c1*tile :i:nh\nU.ons ,,vi.th reBpnd Io lhP-oLhm* rwrson. 194R_r,:ca11 my discussfon of l1ovv truly *mutual Prr1.gag:f:.rnnnl d.iffors from boHb O-BOiHm and alt1*uis.rn, p .. 1715, above. Hl6 i11 intenu:tive play shows each of them to he moHvated ill a, very distindivc way, They may not yet be ah[P to rcico13:nize it, but when either child ads ,mt of H1e desire foir muhmlHy he is 1aol: 011ly motivated to secure his "own," rn,ore authentic enjoyment but is rnlso,. mt lem8t in, part, mol:!va,ted f:o senue the other: child's enjoyment as welt tt:'> Slb1a1dng and mrnmiiiil. «ia:•v efop:meiml: The foregoing s,uggests l:fr1at the desire for 1m1hmlity ir, one Htat aH lmman beings have psychoiogical access to, And it is fairly easy to see how the same sorts of focentives that rrnotivate our intemdive playmates to work out a nrntually enjoy,11blle cmsh atml rescue scene together rndighiL also rn10U11ak" them,. in sihmtions of scardty or inherent conflict of interest (that is,. in wJmt are lypka!ly corrns[dered Hie "drctmrnlances of justice") to work out a muhrn,lly agweeabie distribulfon, of things., Suppose, for example, that they tiire with the crash aml rescue scene rmd go to the toybox i11 search of new props, oriJy to discover that there is just one toy left. Assuming that each chJiid hms an empatlhk awareness of the other's desire lo pfay wRllll1 the toy as welil as a desire to get Ute toy for hlimself, the presence of a more overan:hing desire! for muh.mHly would give each of them. an i11ce1111:ive to find some way of satisfying both his (mme) aL1thentic and his (more) empalhlic desires mt the same tin1e (so that they co11ld continue playing the game toi~ether) .. And' if Ifos, mm*e overarching desire was effective, the process of trncking one ~,nol:her's 1*esponses as they sfrll.gg:]ied over who should get lhe toy miigM evenloal:ly lead tbe two chiJldren to hit on the sollu1ion of talk:ing b.1111s, Even if neither chilid paid much rnltention to the othell' once the tm*1r1Aaking pattern had been (established (that is, even if they did not seem to be shari,ng experiences in any rich sens,~), it does s,>,em appropriate to describe !:hem as sharing in this kiind 187 of case, mt1d I believe thir, is due to the: fad tlriat Hie dislTibulion of l:lt1e toy stems from, and indeed rrnmifesls !heir desire for muhlallity, ra1Jner tJha11 (as in the examrJle of pamUeI play presented in §42) the mere happensl,mc1) that there are plenly of toys fo go ruround. Sim1ilarly,. consider a diifore111t pail' of child.rein who arre 11sing a set of blocks to build a castle together, and suppose that ailHmugh lh,!ir pfay has been highly inleradhle for a fime, their goals for the castle !begin to diverge, such that H becomes increasingiy difficult for them to work out a der,ign for the castlie that they both Iike. Fn1sln1tion ,md a111ger might well be the result:. But if a more overardhing desire for mubrnIHy pre\/ails, they might eventi.mHy hit on the opUon of dividi,ng up the mnrnining bllocks so tlh,al: each could cwak one specific section of the castle to precis<dy her own specificaitiions .. Despite the foct that the resulting ,uctivity may Iook Hke pmrallel play to a more~ casm,I observer (after all, tJ1ey would end up bu.ilding their 0\,\/H sections ol thP c11stl,0 side by side), it .rrmnetheless seems appropdate, given what we know (ex hypothesi)i ,,bout tbte mothmlfoins behind thefr ad:iivity, l:o describe these two children as sharing Hie building !blocks .with orne anotJher. This is becaiuse their actions also seem fo rnfle:d an underlying desire for mutuality (manifested i11 their a,ttem.pts to find some way of continuing to build the rnsHo together). Notice that this kiind of sharing-* foll bfow11 distribulive sharing •*** is extremely unJik,~ly to occur 1rntiI after children beg,1in to develop Hw rnpadty to distingmish bdween thenwelves and othem,.195 /\. child in a state of <''goc,0c1n,hric onfllsion would pres11maibly be able to recogni:t,! thd the (empathic) disappoinlment or sadness which accompa11ies his (authentii,) 195put cmnothcr wayr *it mqiuiros r•mmc f~onsn of individual s.orrn;*1ralf~1i1ess as, yvt-:U_ru; an empal'bic conno*dion to H1e other porno.n's inlerr.Hls. [88 pleas111re when he has Hie onlly toy in foe play morn is really a farsirnile of the other chil.d's sadness at being u\eprlw~d of the toy, and so would lo,e ur1able to see that the !best way to get rid of ttrn1t dfoappoi.11im.ent is to share the toy with the other, The need to oveircome et;oce111t1ric ccmJfuslon ls perhaps even more m11mifost iin the example of tlte children bui.lding ai caistle together. This is because ru child who was unable to reforence her empathic desires to the adivity of her playmate would not be alo,]1e to represent the conflkt she fo experiencing m; a conflid: between the inl:erests of l'wo separaile beings. Hem*E•, she wot1ld not be able to see her playmate as having interests llrrnt rnn only foe sa1isfied by com.promising some of her more aul:heniic (or selfish) interesl:Ei, or to see that she hemeH hal, at least some de,;ire to sa1:isJy bier play1nate's, interests. Indeed, the desire for muhiality in, cmnlbim1tion, witlt egocenbic confmiion wcmld likely lead to precisely the sort of fmslTation that wo11ld prompt a chlild to destroy the whole project: it wonl(I feel rns if she was simply um.ible to buihll. a castle that meaained up l:o all of her exped~d:iornis no maUer hmv hard! she tried, But the ability 1:o refere111ce he1 self-•rega!"ding and ol:herrega.l'ding m,enh:11 states in 1±1.is way would lransfor1111 the desire to hll'ing ond 1; (more) auUJLentk interests "in hme" with the interests one has vicairiously "c,1ught" fmm ott11ers into a desire to woik out some fon:n of adivity that is muh.mliy agreeable (that is, into a full fledged desire for mrnhnaHlly). Witthout the asimmptfon of some such desire, it would be very diffkuH to expfain why a chilld in such drcumsmnces would either seek, or be saiUsfied with, a sollutim1. which Hrmloles her to continm, building the• cilstlP ,:og<>ther with 11 pl11yma.te. If more p11rely self-regarcHng desires were overrid!nr;, she would prest1mably lJry to force her pllaymate to conform lo her design for the rnstfo; altemai1J1vely, if her mme otbieJ• .. n,p;ardinf, desires were overriding, 1,he wo1]ld 139 pres11J.maibly j11,5t go along with her pl.c1ym,ale's castle des1ign. lfllllt if he!i' more overardrning d,~siire for muhrnhty prevrnils., i) compro.mise 1mh:ntion would presumably be Mghly atl:radive. Iirn ruppealJng 1:o such ii desire,, i1: might l:,o objected th11t I a,m positLmg (mental) en,titi,?s without necessity. l:h1t I di) not claim that the des.iire for wholly distinct from those involved im o!Jher forms of desi1re; my point is only thrut Hie desire fo1* muhnallHy is a form of desiring flmt is dfotinct from both (more) altruistic forms such m; benevolence aind sympalliy, and (more) egoistic form,s 11u1ch as prndence and self-g1m1:ificalio:rn. Many philosophers ~ml social scientists lhave contended that the seff-regmrding/ othier••regmrding (or ego.ism/ alfruisim,) dichotomy does not seem to exhaust the do1nmi11 of possible reasons for illdion,:1,96 or thi11t at U11e very least, sU1ch a dichotom,y is misleading insofar as it suggests that the two s,orts. of reasom, necessarily conflict.197 And a recent study c,mducb.~d by John Barresi, Carol Thompson and Chris Moore (] 997), offers al leasf some em pfricad <c'.onfirmatio11 that ,11 desfre for rn, uhrnHty does motivate early chikUmml iiidivi1y •* including Hmt which exh1ibits the (m,ore) disl:i'ibutive mode of sharing. J96 An narly expression of t}dr,. kfo.d of por~itio.lll 0;u1 he found in A.risI-.otJe1s vado11:rn d.:iscusNions oJ fri.nm:l1;;\hip a.nd civic Hdivill:y; consider also Rou.sswJ111:1s. noUon of ar.:liom; don<'. from" '''genornl will.''' Form,,ro recenl dtscm,sions, snn Adarrw (1\188), Badhwnr (199,\), Glum (1994: dw. '.I,, 7 a,nd 9), Gilbert (19g9), ffozlilL (1972; oxp, d1, 13); Mn11rnc, (19%); Tuomela (1988); and Sherm11,n (1991: ch, 4; '1993; 1997: d1. 5). See c1lso l:h" a1*licfos coll<>ci.eJ by Pend, Miller and Paul (1993). 197Tlrr.s da-!n1 is co:m:mon Lo B.ri1tifJh rnrw-raJ se.rme Llwory, aud HitJhop Butler n1ay put il bosl v.1hen he says that self.-.[ove and hnnnvolence nmrcc not to he oppo-sPd ltn:nt only to lw diMinguis.hed frmn. oach <1-t.h,~r11 (1726: Pre.fo.ce)1 adding that. '1H1eir :11111.1l'ua_.1 co:h.1c_i,Ji_r.m, so that vve: can sc.arco prom.ote one witJh.ouf. the olJ.1er!' is cquaHy a proof lhat 'WC! ~1\/erP ma,.fo for b-ot:h11 ('J726r IP.irst S(:*rmon, emphasiH m.:ine), 190 Whe,n children bel:ween Hire ages of i:hree years arn:l five--and-one--halt ye,,us of age were offered a choice betweelfl receiving Olfle sticker for themselves, or rreceivirng one slicker for scM and one for l:heiw irntrer11iewer, children across all aige--brnckels tended to prefer lbe shared rewain:l. This might he interpreted as a pmrely egoistic choice, s.ince if the children cm.1Mr11'l de11dy dosl:inguish between stickers for self and stickers fo1* others, focy mir;lil s1impiy h;;ive foH that more wars always beUeir .. However, when P,;iven the choke between two stickers for sellf, or orne fo1* self and one foi* the interviewer, most of the children stiH preferred the sbrured reward, and tfos iKu:lica1:eri !hat a dfob-ibution of the sfa:kers was in ,mne sense 11r1ore a.thmdiv~' or desirable,. Inu~restiri~;Iy, when given the choice between one sticker for self _f_l(1'1N1 m one for self and one for the irnterviewe1* fater, 0111ly the four and five year, olds (and mot three year-olds) conhm1ed to prefor l:he shared reward. This inclirntes that fourand five ye11r-0Ids (but not: U1ree ye11r-old,s) have the capacity to dfol:iñ;uish between prese111t and fot:nue--miented mental states (grntifi.cal:ion now vs. gratifirntrion lateil'}, a hypothesis which was confirmed by the finding that when given the choice between one sticker for self mow, and two stickers for seif fat(~ll', only the fourrund five-year olds (and not three year-olds) preferred the laUer, deferred but greater, Jt'ewm•d, This too couid bi0 inl:erprel:ed as a more ei;oistic choice based on egocenhk confusion: If unable to dE,ady distinguish bel:ween self mid other,. b11t able to distinguish belw,x,n past and f1.ulure, l:he r.:fo\Idren who chose tlhe 11sha,1ted ,,, n°wani migM sirn ply be thinking that more is better (,,ven i.f self-gmtrlfica,lion is delayed). By mnd large, however, the same older child.ren who profaned a distril:m1forn of stickers Irul:er to one slicker for self now also preforred a, dislTi bu lion of 191 stickers now to two stickers for self now,. Thus, ,1 distrHmtirnn of stickers still seems to be mrnre desirable in srnme se11se. In reporting these findings, Baressi et. all. odgin,ally lrtypofl-1,esized that the imaginal:ive capacity of four,, m:1cd five*-ye@rs olds to represent conWclts between (their own) present-oriented and ftrl:me .. owiented mental. states was the same capacity in1mllved! .in the capacity to d.istinguish between one's own me11tal states. and the menb1l stail:es of others, and hence that at least in th,'! case of thc)se older children, the preference for shared rewa,rds indicated the presence of an rnltn1istk desire to benefit tJh.e 1intenriewer .... or whrnt they called a "sympathetic desfre to share" ...... Umt was strong enorng.h to ovenide the (presumed), er;oisbk desire for more immediate gratification.*19 8 In correspondence, however, llfaJressi has indicated tlw1t at le11s.t some of the older children emphasized thid they were "playing stickers" with the inlnvlewer and may have !been moved by that fad (i.e., by the sense that they were doing something with the interviewer and a corresponding desire to keep everybody "in the game"), as much as by more p11rely altmfol:ic desires.19 9 The foregoing suggests Uh.at he desire fo1r n111hmllity may 11ndergird 11 great deal of what has trrndi.tioirnily been viewed as" othef,,regard!ing" acth1ity. Meanwhile,. there ii, also some evidence to suggest that the desire fo1* mulua.lifly provides cliildren who can distinguilsh derndy between self and other with their first "inbrinskally 1110.nil sense of ohl1iga1ion to share,." thereby 198H should he noted Chol: mme of LIi<' choices teated whdher lhe children would com_ple11e foer:go lil1 rev,,rard for self in o:irder to achieve a. _purely aJl;ru..ir•:;Uc reward (c.r,,,., choorH: lwo sfJckern for 1:he :inh-:*rvieY'lñr (and none for themsd.vcs) ,.~ather IL.an crne r-;ti:id.::.1-~r fo1: scif)r or '\t\d1.nlhe.r thny *wouldi prnfor a shanld rr~ward over an evPn p,rPat:er aggrezu.te *ircward for~ ridf (e.g., du>osc one for 1mlf and. orn-: for the ir1te:r-vfower ove:r t:hr-en Htickern for snH). 199Thn corTespondnn.cn wo.s bebi\/cX~TI Jt3arm:mi and M'i.duwl Sloto, who info:rm(~d Ban-!ssi of :1my inter*c;i:;l in 1:r1.utual.ily as th(-: hasi.R for mural pr.,ych-.ology, and then s.han:J hir-1 cm.sresponde.nce w*ith m.o. 1[92 engendel"illg their "earliest com:e1ms, over disl:rHmtive justice 1rnd fairness" (Damon 1988: ch. 3; cf,, IBl11m 1994: ch, 9; Eise11berg and Stirfliycr '1987; flilinag,m 1993: chs. 7~8; Kochrnnskfli 1997). That is, lhere are masom1 lo think that the the moll'atlly IJ,ost ways of interacting with our follows. Ao:::ord.ing to chfld .. psychologist WilHam Damon,, toddlers wili!l ocrnslonally offer to share their goodies (toys, candy, etc.) as a way of enttking other clhikliren to pfay with them, and they see1111 to view d1istrib1,ntilve r,lrnring as the "price of admission" to more enjoyatb!,e forms of soda! rnd:ivity.200 This kind of rndivity, which is still closely tied to the persorrnl desire to haive "monc fu11,11 app,~arn, to be pmrtly tllm result of 111ahual empathy, and parrtly 1he 1r*cs.uU of adult ,~ncmuage11nent.20J Sho1fly after tlhey discover that (experientfo.l), sharing ls indeed 11mr10re fun," however, children begin to display an exped:atkm H11at (distril:mtive) slurring will ocnn in any interpernonal context (that fo, they begin to view shaniJrrg as a norm for tmmain [int.erndion), <1nd by their fourth year of age,, d1Hdren allso begin lo engage dish'ibutiive sharing 011 occasion even when they di o not n,c;cess~rn'ily see this as the loest way ID have fan. When Hiey are asked why they engage in disbrilml:ive* sharing, such children typically give 11empi1il:hk11 (Chris wiH foel sad ifr J don't share my candy) and "pragmatic" (Mary won't platy with me anym.ore if I drn11t give heir a tmm) w,tionales, as well as bllafamHy self,,serving ones,, And what Dam.on finds especially striking abrn.d ch1ikln:m's ,*e,ipi:msc,s Io q-n1estiions about why 200Nnln that to do this ,-:.ffodively ñquin$ at. loast. some facility al', pmSf){lcU.vP taking-, li.rn_ order f;o flgurn out what other d1ildrP.n dl.esirt: or like, 2011t i,; probably noL coincidental th11,L parcmls; fmquently tdl children lhal lhey shm1ld1 s.hare bnca1use othtirwise thei1r sihl-ingr1 m1d playn1,ator,;. wfll] 11fooI sad. 11 193 they think they should s.l-1a1*e is that the urge to obey a,dult commands is c1:mspk1rnusl!y absent.I>-a fimlin!~ whkh runs nrn11fo1r to tho mmo traditirnnal ass11.mpUon that moral! development proceeds vfo th(J interrniliz!lltion of rul<>s laJidl down by external authority figures?0 2 Of co11rne, Damom'1; tiind.ings might be taken ais evid,~nce that the infomalization process occurs much earlier than w~,s previously re<1.liZfJd, such tbait the i:i.1renfa.l commands no longe1r figrnre 1inrto the child's active consclonrnness. Yet these same childroITT do make expllicit reference lo obeying authorily ir1 othe1r context<;, amd authorily figures do of course tell childre111 that they sl-Dould shmre .. Thus, if mo.rail umdershlnding really wero based on tile commamds of adult authoriti(,s, His certa1inly ve1ry difficult to underntand why H is only ini this com text 1:lrnt chHdlren foil to make exp Heit reference to such comma,nds. Moreover, w heni they are aisked what lhey would do if a parent Oll' 1,ther authority flgure told them not to share, even four--year--olds wiU often sa,y they wm1kl disobey because ru paurent who sa1id such ru thing would be "mean" or "wrong," and Hnfo is ce1rtainly not l:11e type of 11*esponse one would expect frorn a child wbose morn! undersl:anding was based solely on obedience to pare:nfol a1ul11con*ity, Hence, Damon condudes that wlhile "pan*ental advi.ce and prodding cerl:ainly help foster" dnildreni's comrrn.itment fo shairing, it is thc'ir naihiral desire foir interaction, combiined with 11U1e give and take of peer requestr,,. argLJn1enls, conflicts, and ads of generosity''' that prnvides the most immediate sp1u (1988: 43). Tlhe fad tl~flt d1Hdi'<'•n do not typically appeal to parental mies. nwa.11s that "l:he day-to--day cons1:n1dion of fairness standards in sodarl Hfo mur;t be• 2021n a .similL,r ,;tudy by Eisonborg (1%7), nol onn of the d1ildr,•n inlervfownd rt:forn'.*d !,o au.UuoriJati.ve; dictator-;. And Bee Flanagtrn1*~• cri.1J;tqun* of Piap;PL1s and KoMberg'Fi (rnfo--1:,a,md) accmml;s ofmoral deve[opmm,t (199:l: cl,. 7-8). 194 done by childrre1rn i11 collabornlfon1 wi1'1_ one anol:lber," (Ib1id,: El1.Y.<:?Jl!llPha_s:j~). Ami Damon fonds that when i:nem hem of a pl.rny,-grnup rnre confronted witl1: rn dnsl:dbutive conflict, you1nger or weaker chHdreni are ronmch more likeliy to appeal to stllndairds of benevol~nce 011* dis1:rihutioni according to need, wh,':reas older or st1ronger chHdnen are more llikely to appeal to consideralicms of merit or distri.bution baaed on age a,nd experience .. That Js, d1ildren 1:(~nd initially to appeal to stand,uds Hmt aure mosl likely fo, end up benefiUrng themseh1es. 2rn But the m1itual interaction among the memlbern of a play gmup ''forces each irruHvidual d1Hd to refrain from 1mad01med assertiorn, of self-interest" and prompts them to search fol' soh1l:iom; that are n1111:urnHy ,1,greea,llfo (H)kl.: 45),.2lH Ovc':rr* time, tl1eir strnl:egies become less self•*orientedi, so that by ag.e eleven (ff twelve, they not only display an exped:ation flrnt slhadn,g will oco1u in sihmtions of disi:Jributive conflid, lrmt m"<' also begi.nining fo a1:ticlilfate the judgrnent lliat they ought 1o sfoire with otl1en; even when Hlfa is not demanded .. Tha,t is,. lhey are beginning to feel a se1rnse of obHga1:Jim1 to share that tmniscends their desire to stay the good grnces of theill' playmates, and even extends towrnrrd sb'anf;ers. fo Damon's view, tbis .is a crncial step on lhe path fowa1rd autonomcms mornl agem:y, 205 and he belic\ves thal i.t is "predr,;ely 2:0(),By ag,-~ fhm/' dnildren hegi.n to appeal Lo Lbe n1.on-'. ahstrad noti10111 o.f nqt1.ahLy1 which lJH-\Y understand as strictly equ.al liñaflJ'.i11::nt1 buL v1.ril11in o o or tv,.ro yeam a.fl.or Lha.l concrnrn aris.os1 appoals to considerations of mer.ii. and benevofonce can afao be hnc1rd, 204oarnon himBr:lf is somewhat vagu.e ais l:.o whethnr Lhis ts duo prirm.arily to th,eir ailLruisUc desini to satisfy olhnr's inJer<-~shi, or by *vvhaL l! have called the deHire for rn.uluality. 200Not.e tha1L IJT:anct, ,,vho held a 11101~~ ru fo-,lnrnnd a1ccounL off moral deve.lopln.e.nl/' abo b(-'.*li<-:vnd. H1a1t around. the ago of tnn a d1ih.l1s 1:111.ora] consdo*1rnnes.fo u.1rtdnrgom1 11co1r1rnptd.e t:.rm1Hfor.ma!ion/l such l}ual~ *moral s:t1:rn<lards .no lon.gc~r a.ppet11JT' as mcLe.rnal [aws dc-rnanded by others, 11b11t ,rn Lhn outcomn of a free deds:i.on and wo1:lhy of .rmipc-:ct *ir1 tJw .m<-~trnure Lllll.l iL has enlisted mru.utnuJ conse:nt'1 (1932:: 65*, (~:rnpJwsi.s mine). Nancy Ei1B-(:*nhC\.rg also ffrr,ds l.h11fl. ch-ildrcm use, app,,als lo authority (and foar on: punishm,mt), t:o exp.lain their compli.anc" wilh adult rr:qucBIJ.'I, but Lend to explain. thoir con1,pliance with peer requnHlH hy 11ru1king rr;fo-renñ to the !lwir frieildship wilh th" other child CI 987: 27), and that d,ild:n,n who are told Lbat their moral behavior rPsulted .from_ nxtmr.nal G:iusmi are foss rnl:ia.hly m:.oral than ('.hi[d tPn who an: l9fj because they contain all the immediacy,. complexity,. and amloigllity of real life" fuat children's i,olutions to the problem oi' wha,t cour1,ts as fair shariing, tho111gh highly variablle, are rnllso highly effective at resolving or at least mi.ml.1n1izing in(i:erpersonal conflid (Ibid.: 43). His fm.ggestion, in othe1* words, is that to the extent that children do ,1,rticulate aind show a willingnesr; l:o adhere to familiar p1t1indples of jl!stke,. thii, is sometlting thaJ grows out of their uncler*lying commH1111ent o sh,1.ring (ratl1er Hrn.n the othe1* vvay aro1.rnd). The pidme of moml tfovelopment II have just been presenti.ng di1ffors importanlly from the pidn1re defended by Rawfa (1971: Pad III),. He contends Uwrt ,di human beings ha,ve a natural mpadly for "fellow-feeling" which motJiva1:es motaI activity. However, accorrding to his "First: Law" of nwrnl psychology, this capadty will only he reaHzed in a particular child when the "family institlltions" the chilld is raised ini are just and the parents 1111nc1nifostly express their !love frnr l:he child by cal'ing for Ms good" so that, i1111n!cogniz1inig their evident love of lhim II the dhild comes to Jove then1 in 1retmn (1971: §70; §75). This suggests Umt in Rawli,'s v1iew, a sense of justilce is c1 precondition of the follow-•faelinig that ulti.mrutely motivates agents fo ad rus morality demands. lrndeed, he Mmself notes Umt "the most striking foahn-e of [all t:hin•e of his psydwlogkal] Iaws (or tendencies} is lhatthefr form11fotion refers lo a1!1, instih1tiom1l setti1rng as beingjul'llll (Ibiid .. : 491). Hui as Susan Mon,,,. O]dn (1989) ll1as pointed out, it is fai* from, evident that Rawls's initial "assnmplfon" that family institutions are just (admittedly made for convenience's sake) is a h~rdbly pla11sible on(~,, Sin,c,,, many hmna11 beings do hav," a, fairly adh"' sens,• l.o!d thal they a:m ,.,. good. frk~n.ds-" o.r 1" good. fondly 111Em1 bets" ([bid,; 29) .. S:imiittd y /' [(ocharñka finds a di.rc,d col".relation lwt:vvocm the lnvo]s of mutuality b,-:bveen 1'111.oUtwrs and ch,ikk,;t1,. and the k~vols oJ power or com'don tJw1L rnothm"s find 1w.-c<issa,ry l.o control Lhnir ch*Hd.rcm's loehavior: child1:ert in _ptu*c:ntal refatUonships conslih1t.nd hy a bigh dPgrm~ of rnutualit:y r~xh(hil a tP''eatL<-:*1: t:a.ge.rness and rcti;diness ij;o internalize paro.nLa! goals and vcilu.es ('J.99'7: .. 103--S). 196 of fellow-feeHng 11onetheless, ][ sm1ped th11t, altho11gh a rnanifostly unjust or abusive familial setl:ing might be sufficient to exterminate such natural sentiments, Damon fo right to im:licat,,, th,1t the desire for muhm.Wy is the more furn:lamenbtl notirn1. As Okin puts it, "the development of a se11Be of jrnstice f;Jows from sh,11:ing the~ experiences of othees and becoming awan' of l:he poinl:s of vi,~w of others who are different i.n so.me respects from mllrr*selves, but with whom we clearly have some interests in COMmon" (1989: ch ll),. 4.6 The morn.li v"11li11e of mu1l:1UlalHy Of cou1rse, tlhr~ HkeJlihood that a desire for mutmility / commitment to sharing has temprnml pr!rnril:y in mornl development does n1ot yet show that mutualil:y/lshadng has nrnrmad:ive priority over alll olther idealls. Margamt Mlahler (1975), frnr exampl.e, has sugp;esk,d that somel:hilng HJ~e what J have called tho desire for mrnhialily is a developmenlrnl precursor to both altruism and selLf-sufficiency •-* rnpadbies which develop only ,ifter a chi:ld is albfo to distinguish dearly between lterself and others, but which then lake on a significa110? of 1:hefr own. A111d Dmuon' s daim that rocogr11rnfon of familiar prindplles of justice grows out of children' t1 1mdorrly1ng commihnent to slrrnring might simiiariy be taken to 1,how that rnrntu1re moral age11ts are ab.le to leave the,irr desire for muhmllil:y behind. In order to show that t:he VIIHl to Share serves ais tile basis of moral agency, therefore, it must he possible l:o show that olhf.:r fmms of motivation have mom! value 011Jy whe111 (or because) they cain be understood as expressions of an ar;enl' s desiire form utu.aUty.. In condudi1ng this chapter, therefo1re, l want to provide som,3 n,asons for th1inking that the desire for mutuality, and hence the ideal of sharing more ge11emUy, fa intrinsically admirable in its own night Thal will set the stage for me l:o demonstrate, in Clrrn.pter Eve,. that a t.heory lrirnsed on the Will l:o Showe 197 gmunds pfausilble derivative claims about the other types of moml judgmenls that we make, One treason to think the Will! to Share is morrillly bask that "1lw human good is fomull very largely in activil:ies whose point and value depend on t~,e parrti.dpation oi other people in a commrwn project" (Admns 1988: 300),206 More impoiriantly, such projod:s exis,t only becam;e people care abm1t them, and would lose 1±1,eir va,lue for everyone ff too few people exhibited the i.nterest in m1uhrnl engagement that makes them. possible. Arn:l it i.s Lmporhmt, in 11:his conlext, to nole thattho 1Nil1 to Share cannot be understood .in a conseq11emtialist fashion (i.e., as a, desire to prornlote the huma,n good),, without dlislorting its moraI sigrnifkance. As R.M. Adams has pointed out, there is an irn,portant sense 1in whkh age11ts who eng~,ge im rnd:iv1ilfos they themsellve1; enjoy with other people give more to those people than they could if they erngrnged iJ1 ructiiv1ities imply foir the other peopl.e's sakes. The agent's own, i11terested pa,rtidpalion 1in the muhmll endeavor is am, ess,~nlfaI JrMrl: of the benefit beimg confoned, and without that interest, the value of" doing it togeU1,~r'' would he fost. In a s,imilar vein, Nrunicy Sherman rms pointed out 1:hat "we simply do value shari.1ng, and value wlhat makes H: poss,ible in ourselves and othern" (1997: ch, S). Some ,~xamples may help fo fix fafa h1trnition. Consid(~r lhe r.Iifife1re11ce between a wealthy person who frc,91uer1tly stops frnr a drink iin ihc' local bar and picks up tlhe tab out of a sem,e of overflowing self~sufficiency or awar("ness of having enough l:o spare for others, and a persom in similm' 206 Adai1rn.s JJoinh: out that almm;t all work nowadays ta;kes the form of a ucomnwn projocl/" and a.lm.osl all human activi.trios depend on f)ktlls. and inler( 1.slB lha1t arti anrufni,d n.nly through. pa:trti.cipation in such prnjcd.s. Tfh.n acquis:iUon of langua:ge1 which is ll r:;han!d conc{~pti:ual r,;ch.ornn, is perharps t..b.0 n1o&t ohvi.ous exa11m11pfo. 198 econon1ic drcumsrances wlho fa motivalk~d by the fom of "hangin1; out' wilh the ol]hers and a desire to share the wealth.207 Simlilarly, com,ider the difforence between a devoited parent who spends every moJinenJ f1.1rthering the chihlrer{s autonom,om,ly chosen pursuits, and ,1 parent who ailso strives l:o find ways l:o slhmre in tlhe children's prefoned activities. To tlhe extent that we admilre the latter persons somewhat nwre, I suspect that it stem:, from the fod that theilr overarch1ing desi'rce for muhmW:y shines l:hu*ough. I do 11ot take l]his to mean that ge11mineiy sharing ,1gents utterly lack the sorts of molivaitions that are found within "cool" and "warm" agent-ba,sed views (motives that exemplify the 1more general separa,tencss/ connectedness tension),,. and in §SJ, II shaUI s,1y more abou1t the role and status of such motivc~s within the Will to Shiue .. But the desire for muh:11,tlil)I has normativ(? prioritly, in my view, because it enables the ge.rrninely sharing aigcnt to largely transcend Hie sepa1mteness/ con11ectedness t,~nsion altogether. As we fowe seen, the distinctive fõ1tu1re of shared achvily "is not respect for others, nor beneficence,. nor even conpermti011,. thorngh eatch may be hnporlant ht doing l:hnngs fogcther" (Sherman 1997: 271). Rather, it fa a, "refaxiñ; of one's own sem;e of bmmdaries and control . , , [and] ,Kknowledging a l,ense of union or merger with unother" (Ibid.). The truly sharing agent, iii: seems,. does no1 perceive hfa own concex*ns as being set in essential com pel:ition willh the nmcer11s of others, yet neil:ber does he perceive the needs of others ,1~, takinii~ souHe lkind of moral priorrily over his own. ]for wW11in the Will to Share, con1cern for self and conce.rn foll' ot.hern añ ,.,filtered through". one another s.n.teh that the agent is motivated to act in ways tllmt express cltl1l(1 folfill boU1 types of concern at the very same tirne. The fad thrnt tfrtis 1is smnethi11g we• 207n,is mcamplrc is dFawn from S1ote (19%). 199 valu1e intrh1skally helps fo explain the spedal value we attach to morrnl adivity, as well as the special force of moral daims: fo be mol:ival:ed by a Will to Sh11re is qrnlte liternlly to be mobiw1ted by a sense of somdhing bigger than oneseU. This brings out 11 final reason for s11speding that the Will lo Share is a, mol:ivalfonal ideal. Jior in addli tion to integrating both sid,~s of me separateness/ connectedness 1:e11sio11, H also seems t:o tra11scem:l it. As we have seen, the dis1indi.ve foahue of slmred activity "is not :respect foir 0H1ern, 11011* lJeneficence, nor even cooperation, tlmui;h each may be .i.mporl:lmt in doing things together" (Sherman 1997: 271). Rather, itis a "relaxing of one's own sense of bmmdari.,~s and control .. , l[and] a,dkllowfodging ~ spnse of 1mfo11 or merg<"r with another" (Ibid.) .. The b'uly shaving age1nt, it seemr,,. does not perceive his own concerns ai; being set in er,sential cmnpdiHoll with the concerns of others, yet neilther does he perceive file needs of ol:he1*s, a,s raking some kind of mornl pdor:iiy ove1* his own .. For will:hin the Willi to Share, concern for self and conce1rn fot oil.hem a.ire "filtered thnmgh'' one another such Hi.at the agent is m.otivated to act in ways Hmt express and foifil ll bo,th types of concern at the ve1y same time. 2()0 CHAPTEI{ :FIVE: l\'1ORAU'Jn! AS SHARING 111 Chapter !lour, we saw that the WHI to Sfo11re is psychOlogictllly possible for 111, to cullivale and Jive llp to, as wen as inl:Jim,i.cailly rudooirabfo in its own right:. This drnptei* provides addibonal supporrt for that latter cllaim, by developing and defending the ma1in ten,ets of an agen1t-based ethic of sharing in lhe, indivMurnl moral domain. In §SJ, I review the cel'Utm.1 feah]n,s of ii V\/ill to Sharre, and discuss what this core concept implies about evahialions of individual chairn.der. ln §S.2, I e)(tend thirl iITT,quiry to show wlrnl an ethic of sharing .implies about the righbrtess a,nd wmngness of specific (lypes of)i ructs. ¥ then take up some concerns about 1:he ability of s11ch am ethk lco provkle us with practical guidance, by rurtic111a1:ing the theory's most significrunt summmry rules (§5 . .3). lFlna,Hy, I highlight the ways i11 wilich sm:b an ethic helps to r,'solve and in s.onie cases, d.issolve ... the 1wo tern,ions that foel the contempomry Autonomy /Crul"ling Debate (§5.4),. S;l Sfolldng amll iillllillivl.idlm11A cha1r,nd~1r At the crnre of ,m ethic of slharing lies the concept of a wm to Share. Hence, the ffrst step in understimdi11.g wim.t imch a,n ethic implies is to get demr rubo11t he ferutrnres that constitute su.1clh a 1NH1. It is imporlant to remembeir, however, that H1e Will to Shaire is not being presented as a tmitary form of mol:iv,1tion, but as an ideal of morruI character lhal fa likely fo be re!alilzed in ii wide variety of ways, and that serves as a toudn,stnne against which other, more lirrdted (cooopk~xes), of molivatJrnrrn a,rr.0 to h0c asses1,c~d (d.§2 . .6, p. 93ff..).. 2()1 Thi:; cor!lstit11ent elem,~nts of the Will to Share rnn be divided inlo fomr main gm11ps. The fimt ind11des 1l10se baseli11e rnpadties l:hat make H possibfo to share in others' expel'liences,: most imprnrhmtiy, the capacil:y for empathy tfolt not m1ly makes agents aware of the interests and cm1cerns of otlne.r people, bul: gives the1m at least some moti.vation to ad 011 otheirs' bdrnJi,. as weil as the capacity for pernped:.ive-taknng that ena.bles mornI agents io dfatingmish thefr mowe a11.l:hentic or finrt, .. persm1 in1:erest-s, a11d concerns from those they have vicariously "eomghf' from 01Ji1ers, The lali:er capacity is what distinguishes (moll'e) mdnue forms of moral agency from, earlier atã;f'.S of moral developmneJ11t, for without it, an agent would be 1mable to effed:ively filtew his own concerns thrnugh hue co11cern for others. The second gnrnp of elements 1in1dw::les most,, if not !!U, of the !:rails that aire typically classified i11s "other,.reg1-1rding'" vfrlmes,, though theñ is 1110 n,ason to think that every shmring agent 208 must (or even could) posses,s all of these virtues to th.e same degree. The possesslonl of sucln tn1.1its foUowr, straightforwanlly from thee capacities Just m,enbioned, since am agent who is moved by empatfoc awa,reness of others will he disposed, for example, toward bene110Ience mid generosHy in rnppiropl'if!Ie cfrcm11wl:ar11,ces. Bul the sltmring agent wm ailso possess a wide vmdel:y of "seJf. .. eegarding" virtues as weU, and this co11istituf:es a third group of elernents within the Wiil to Share. Trnifa like pmdence and te11111pe1mnce, for example, are rn result of the sharing agent's healthy and rnccm*,Hng fo thiB view, entirely @.ppFopniil!fo sm115e of sdf,rel1iance ,md desire fo p111*1n1e h r more autonomously chosen [11terests and goals. 2081---Ieñ and. elsewhere, I u.se Che te.rrn:. '\;haring ag1!nt'r to mean an agenl v,.rhose itdivity rrrnnifes[.r,;: a gent1Ttn<: \/Viii to Share'.*, 202 Althorngh the V1l1ll to Share indl!dei;; both ollrwr,-regardlng and self,. regaxding vfrf:tnes, however, an ethk of sharing irn,ists that fit is a mistake to think of any of these traifa as being inlxLnsi1cally adm.irable in their own irighl., Put anotJ1.,c,r way, it denies fhrnt such traiits, are ethkaUy fnmdamental ~nd cm1 sen1e as 1:hP basis from which the good111ess of oth,,rr trails (and/ or ,11d1ions) ecm be derived,. Th,\ problem is not that eitheir self--regairding or other--reg;aniilng aU1itrndes are whol.ly inappropriate. Rather, 1:l:ie probJ,em fa that (1:nore) self.regarding attitudes must be tempeted by (1nore) other--regarding aUitl!des in order for lhei1r expression to co11nt as mornJlly vh:b101.w, An ethJ\c of sharing 1lm,1i1,ts, for exrnmplie, !hat benevolence is not a virl:lle where it foa,dis to lbe kinds of self-abnei;ation and/ or self-absorption fl:iat pl.ague "v,rarme1r" agentbrrned views,209 And similarly, l:ha1: moderation a1rnd,j or g,merosity are not virt11e1, where they Gtem solely from a sense of "srnpern,brnul,rnf' sf'IJ,, suffkieincy or awareness tha.t orne lhar, eJ11ough 1:o spare tlml: are typical of "cool"'' theories of virrue, To be truly i;enermrn, according to an ethic of shani.ng,, is to ad from a more ovennchi11.g desire fo "share the wealth,'''' and lo be benevolent is mot merely to want fo allevfote others' suffering:,. b11t to feeI a se1we of orne' s shared huma,rnif:y with them am:l hence lo act from tlnt!,t desire. But given what we have seen about the !>ne .. sidedness of theories lhat g.ive primacy fo eii:h(,!J" "sepa.iratene:,s" or "connectedness," this drnim doel, 11ot seem inapprnpK'iafo, Mean,whifo, an elthic of shrndng also endorses what we miglril: ca1ll th(i virtues of int~;i-dependence, including Hu~ Cilpacily for friendship, frm,t in other people, and 0H1e:1' manifesfof:iorn; of 1:hE) overnrching pradkal dPsire for 203 m111.hmHty. Thfa is 11 fomth gmllp of elements, aind in 11rrnny wrnys Hie most crucial, since it is the presence of such 1:mits thaI most deairly distinguishes agents who are dispoGed to genuine or foH-hlown shm'i11g from those who are disposed to 11ct i11 more ei~oistic or rnltmis.tk wruys .. The im pmtance of interactive tmit-s does not d imiiniish 1:lhe need for agents to crnltivate the other elements of a 1/\/illl ko Share, since w.ithou1: those other elements, the desire for nrntm1Hty would often be ineffoctive. lfoless onP is disposed to respond fo !both one's own amd other peopl.e' s .inlerests and cm11cems, ,me rnn never really apprec1iate the special vaiue of b1ring1ing those two sorts of inl:eireslts "in time . ." A11d 1Jnless 011e il, rnpa.llfo of pe1rspeclive•h11ldng as weU as empathy, one could not recognize that satisfying one's de1,ire for mndurnlitty often requires respond.i11g l:o t]1e interesl:s of another,. separate b * . 210 emg .. An ethic of sharing contends l:lmt all other moral values mre ,forivative from the overarching desire for mlltuality, lbemnnse ii is Umt desire tbal hlteg.iral:es alll the ele11nents of an agern1:' s drn.rndeir into a more unified Will Am:l h1 light of the overall mrgument off' this dlil,sedation,. it is pmlbably worth men,tioni11g that it does so w1itl10ut falling into the difficulltfos associated with Nd Noddings's "rel.atfo11al" view. As we saw h1 §2.7, Noddings mrnintains tln,ait the quaHly of an agenl's motivation dr;pends, not exdusively but also inot i1rmignifirnntly, on whether h,~r cairi11g is "apprehended by" fhe pernoJTT who iB being cared--for, and s,he ,uglnes Hn,at moral agents ffire under a ge111erral: olbiigation to conti11ue their aUempts art c,u•ing until! soJtl]e kind of "compfotion" occmn,. And as many critics have obJiec!:ed, tlhis nmkes her rethic umfoly 2l0For more on this point, mrnll !ho di1,cumiion at tho ,,nd of §4.J. 204 dependent on the actnrnl consequences th<1t occm long afte1r* the ag,Pnl: detennines how best lo respond. 211 But a11 ethic of sharing nernHy avof.ds 1:hiis problem, elm,: to its agenl:--based strndure. To see thfa, co111sider a n>.laJiom,hip between Marty and Chris. If CI1ris is mol.ival:ed IJy f,riendship, but Marly never responds, there is no re,1so11 for our ethirnl acSsessment of Chris fo lbe diminished. Nor musl: we: tiay tfoit Chris's action was wrong beJcause Mmty failed to appreh<i*m1d or cmnplde it Yet we rnn stiWI recogniz:e Hiat the1ir "relationship" (however brief) is for kiss good than it co Lil Id be, and so WE' c,rn still ad 11nil'e Chris for* making conl:imued efforts to engage Marcty in m 11lm1 I adivHy, wilhout lolam.ing or criticizing Chris if those attempts m*e unsucc,~ssfol An aigent .. based ethk of sllw.ri111g contends that lllf;ents w !Jo do not possess any one of the fom* elemenls mentioned i!n the preceding section are pmpedy cons[dored to bc1 niora lily Iackinr;, al lear,t in that r,*spcd. Mornl. plurnlisll:s mruy stffl susped lhrul this app.rnadilL will lbe unahle to account for tlw diw,rnity of chatradcr--lypes that most people find to be genuinely moral. 212 But t:hcre are at .lea1sl two reasoins to suspect that this fear is 1.mwarranl:ed, First, it is hnportant to recall that indivikhrnl virtues are not mere impulses or foehngs but motivational, states (d. §2.3,(i),), As such, 1:IH~Y dispose the agent who possesses 1hem to ad in specific ways when tbe relevant cfrcmmsta1rices arise, ,u1d since the Will to Shmre doubles back on the wodd in a way 1:hal. takes bol:h objective mo,d suhjective 213 foah.Jre9 into account, it 1is quite likely 2l!noth of th0:se cdf,ic-i.s1ncrn }wve also heo.n made of coJCH1<XJUenti.alisL v e'1⁄4rs,. th<-': IatLPr a:gairnsl 1\tdualist 11 as op_pmied to 11expedabilisf' ve.mions. 212*rJ,anki~ to Judy Lid1ti:enborg for pr(l$Si.ng n-w to lttke th.is cm1cenn m~rlous11y. 213B:ir whkh I 1n4i{m 1 f/feai.Luros of subjecLq,u 2()-5 that agenl:s in objectively ~,imifarr situalfons will m:anifest a genuine Wiil to Share ew~n while ,i,dilng ln maxl,edly dlfforent w~1ys. After aH, the needs and iwnterests of one sharirng ill gent may be considerably different from the needs a111d inl:erests of ~,nother.. Hence, each ag,ent's aUempt to bring hfo ow111 concerns "in tune" witlh the concern.s of fl thi1rd party may have a sulostantially diffenorDt result Indeed, since not just rnny two people ca11 see eye•-to,*eye in the way faat is necessary Io share a point of view, one agent might legibmrnt<0 iy fail! to faterrnct with a tlnird pa:rty,, wil:hout beln11y1lng ai deplorable lack of the Willi. to Share, s1imply beca11se the l:11110 of them hrn11e liltle or r1mlhi11g ln com,mon,,2H B11t a second t1hrnring rui;enrl who does possess Hre relevant Interests wolllld, of course, be mobvated to irnte1md: rnnd exp,'.rience the sense of m,utumHty Hmt f:he siluation is able to provide,, Since in at different 11et of ci.rcmnstam:es, the first agent might be tlhe one with tlle relevain! interests while the second agertt mig]1t lack them, Htere .is no reaison why an ethic of shiu.ing .is forced to say tl1at either agent's charadeT 1ls m,oraHy su pe1*ior, So Iong as both agents numifost a genuine Wm to Shair,• whenever the rele11aint cirrcumwtances arise,, we c,11n recognize both of theiir charaiders as g:enuinely mornL Secox1dly, H should be illcknowledged tlrmt the desire fo,* mutuality can he expressed in (1roughly) two dimensions tlhat are somewhat: irncompatliblie,, Thrc: "depth"' diinensio11 re'lluires an espedaHy rich kind of empatlnk engagement with ,l particular otlher pernon, and one thaR probaibly develops most folly during fairly Pxcl.usive and/ or extended human relationslrticps,, Stich rel.atiorn,hips do m:il necessrnrily have to be intimate, but since not. jLrnl any two 214Fo1* a clonelly relaL'"~d point, r,H:e also my cm,rm1.ents 0-1r1 the! n1crm1 difference between lying Lo 0U1.mrs, and. simpli:y .igno.dng thern1 begjinning on p. 2;n, 206 people rnn see" eye to eye"' in the way i:hat fo necessary to share a point of vliew, there will inevitably Ile limits on the express:ion of this foll'm of muitmi.Hty. The "lbreadtlll"'' dimension, on the other hand, seems to depend m.ore rnn l:he k1ind of imaginal:ive awareness lhat would em1ble an a,gent to "gel into" a wide variety of ad:ivilles with people who possess very disprnrnte (and even foreign) d1m*rnder traits, interests, needs and goals, or simply l*o experience rn "sens<': of shared 1ruummity"'215 with them. And 1\n fad, His not ernti11'<c!l,y dernr that even casual conl:ad is necessary to experien,ce thfa very hroad form of mutuality. for n,early everyorne laughs when ti.ckled, cries out when struck, fo frm,tn1tc~d when their proJeds and goa,Is mre thwarted, and longs fm ass1isrance or guidance, not fo mention simplly com,pani.miship, at least at some points during the courne of their lives. To be a ware of these facts is to recognize that (at leasl some) other people must surely be aware of tbeom, as well, and hence to share a kind of experience with them, aibeiJ 011.e Hrnt difforn from that of sbmdng a partkuimr poinit of view .. Since activity st.pm11:ring frmn both dimensions of experientiirnl shm*1in1~ will reflect an agent's overarching desire for and sense of 11rrntm111ity with his. foHows, I rnnnot see any lbi1s1is to think that 0c!ithe1r i§ superior or should be given ove:mll priorHy in the mrnra,I rnr ethical me (though in §S.2, II shall argue that it is wrong to "spedaliize"' solely in one dimension and disregard the other). And there is no reason to suppose !hat l:he two d1imensio11s will aiwillys conflict J\lonethcleiis, it appears to be psychologicrnlly impossible, at Jeasl: fol' most of us, to shilre in a veiiJI d,~,~P way with ,i broad range of pc"'opie, and h,;nce llh,~K*e wiH have lo be at lea,st some kinds of trade--offs between ther,111. 2l 5Uois term is borrowed from Kristen Ivlomne (1997),. who offore, empirical ev.idcn.cQ* connocling, lhn Hemm of sharPd hmnunil.y wHJ.11 *whal hain. fruditlor111Uy been called '"all.rufalfr1' heh,wior (1997),. 20'7 Given these cm1.sideira,tions, an ellhk of shrur:ing rnn and should aclrmwledge that achml persons rnay exhibit very difform1t "paUern,5 11 with m~ped to how these hvo dimensions mre lnlegmted within 01eir m1iique moral personaHtJies, wi1:hout il:s refllecling negatively on time quality of their ovemH chmrac!Brs,. Exfrem,ely em,pad:hic indiv1iduals will presumably be more easily m.oUvated hy the depth dimension, focusing their a,ttention primarfly oin the pa:rti.cl!laur other persons with whom tlhey are presenlly engaged. 216 And becam,e of this focus, they are lilely fo have sm,10iwhait less time rnnd energy 1:o engrnge in hmade1r shared purn11il:i,. More imag1inative imlividuals, by crnntrast, may be keenly aware of lheiir shmred huma,nity with all humrnn beings, and so less abRe to empathize deeply with the plight of a,ny parHcufar olher, The foneJt .umdl p!!Jre .nlltt:nnn.sfr ][l'Jl'!J bl<f'unn1,, There are rut lea1st h,vo personality types that an ethic of sh,ning does seem to cmulem,n, however; nrnnuelly,. 1:he "lone1*''' who prefers, for some reason, to engage in more soli!.ary pursuits,.217 and l11e "pure altmisf' who desilre[; to help other peop]le but not to int:erad with tfltem. Indeed, given my claim. thrnt the WiH fo Share is rnot.ed ill our nalurail sndabiJi!'y, such an ethic suggesl's that loners and pure a1ltn1iis.ts aire in some seins,i "inhmman" or "urmah1ml"' chamder !types. Yet ma,ny people nuiy find such ,1 negative assessment u11wa,rrnnted. After aU, there is a lkmg tnidltion of 1:11,orn,l HrniJITJdng in the West1:hat explidlly admires people who exhibit a high deg1*e:e of independe11ce and sellf-,mffideincy, and mm equally Iong tradition I.hat admires 2161\loto that 1:-li]lU1.0u.gl1 thr: deptb chmens"i.on "is. duiractordstic of dose pr.rso.nal rdali.01'.1Hlhivm, illneed not occtnR" soln].y :i-n confl:exllB of :inU:1:nacy, and so an a.gent w.ho rel.ies heavily on :ul wil1 nol 11ieG~Hsar:Hy bfl ohj<-ld:iotmhly pixrlia] toxf\1ard.s frJendls and fiffn Hy nrnmhc*rs. ln contexts wlw.re totuil. st:.rangern aee 11H1rown Logef11(1r/' somo poopfo an: no-ne-lhelesr~ abfo to 11reso:r1ate11 or 11c]id<11 w:ith othnm drBpit.e the lack of ftl sh.a.red hi.stm"y, 217chrisUne Swan.Lon ,l\,as the fJiñt l.o ct11lli t}dn objection to rny aUenHon. 208 benevolent or cairfmg individuak Altematively, lm1ers may rnlso be viewed as shy m* timid people who are nol: harming anybody, and so certa1i11Jly shouldn(l be criticized for their lack of gre1~arious11ess, and a ltmfalB may be viewed as mom! pa1*agons who do not, like tfo, rest of us, have any diffkt.dly in sacrificing their .more ,rnthentk concerns. As a result, the loner amd p11re altJruist problems may seem lo pose a seriious sh1mbUng bfock to lthfo approach. If we consider the issue carefully, however, I beli,~ve that an ethic of sharing grounds assessments about !loners and a.lltmists that ,ue fonr less cou111t~•r[ntuLitive tham they mrny at firnt seem,. Fm one thing, it does not cdlicin• the lonerr for his, possession of trrnits like frtdependence amd self-sufficiency, and neither does it crilkize the p1ue altruist fm his ability to f!mpathize with others and his desire fo satisfy theh' interests and needs. The proMem with both l:he loner's ,n1.d the put'e altruisl' s moti.vationaI til:a,tes stem,s from their Iack of the oth.~r elements l:hat conslil:1.1tk, a Wlll to Share•mnnely, !those fonns of inteirdlependence that flow frmn an oven11rching desire for mul:rnalfly. lSut it is simply undear tlrn,t this sort of criticism is inappmpriate. Indeed, if the ,1,rgmr11,0:rrifa of Chapter I11re,~ are corred, then an exdusive focus on ;~j!:h!tl'. the virtues of imlivid!u1al separateness .<?.r the virtues of interpernona I com1eded11ess res11lts in am objediona,bly one•-sided accmmt of !:he moral l:ifo,. and one that overlooks very real and recognizable hmnns. Bern1ise thtc!re arc ii nium lier of imporfont hunrnn goods that can rurise only in and thwugh reinttiorn,hips, a peJsrnrt who never intemcts with others is cutting; both himself and other people off from important sources of moral val11e .. ifll'caur,e Otis is a:, l:nie of the altruist as the self-sufficient moral age11t, it gives us a rc~ason to 2()9 quesbon wheHaer either fradlition should co11tinue to l~xerdse im mudn power over our morrul thinkinr;,, It fa afoo iinportunt fo note thaf: fo find a persom(s overilil motivational state lo be moraHy lackiirng is 1101: to insist that there is nothing at a.II l;o be admired about the person's charmcl:er. Consider !Bernard V\/illiams' s 110w famous example of the painter Ga11guin,, \Nilllarnw himself suggests lhat om* admirntiion of Gauguin's integrily and artistic genius is, a fo111,ctio11 of "nwral luck" since it t:mms ornt that Gauguin reailly did have tremendou1s artisbic talent,, we are prepared to overlook his ol:herwfae deploralble willlilllf;ness to des,"rt: lh.is family In order to pursue his art Stilil, H fa fair from dear that we do in fad judge C:au~;ui.ITT to be a morally admirable person all things consi.dered. Rather,. ii s,c,ems that we admire his artistic geni11s 1111,d !he in,tei;ril:y that led Mm to pm*s1.1e his inner caillilllg, in spite of the fad tha.1: we morally deplore hits willingness to desert his famHy iin rnrder to purnue hii1 art.218 Since the, Wffl to Share is presented only as an ideal of moral chaimder,. hm,vever, an ethic of shar.ing rn111 easily ador1ow ledge that although it is n11ornlly lacking, the loner" s or altr11ist' s m1errull dharncter ls nonetheless adrni1rable other ways. Of course, there n1,rny well be some people with extremely Limited empatlhk and/ or im,11ginrnti11e crnpadties -* that is, people for whom rn is simply impossible to share experiences with others (rnnd who ,u-e loners for that reason),, lnsofmr as s!llch agents falll short of~, wrn to Share,, an dhk of sharing is, commit.led to I.he view that their overrnJI! motivatiolllal stak is fox less good H:mn it could be,. Yet it can st!ll lairgely accommodal:e: the view that many l.oners am shy rnr timid people, and perhaps more properly pitied than 218tnd,md, if Mi<:bacl Sloi:,, Is corn,ct (1989: ch, 4), the admirabi!ity of lrnilu like a:rt:.ist:ic ge.1ni.us and extirenH\ i111togrrn.y rnay nven be linked. with ci tcmdnncy to pro:rnpL imJrrornl aids. 210 mornUy critici:z,ed. As we have seen, the judgment that an age11t lacks ,morally vall!able motivrntions does not entail the forl:her judgment thid he is to be lblamecl or puni.slhed for this fad (recall §2.:J.(Ui)). And as we have also seen, a person who is orn1tble to share experie11ces will be rnt off from an imnpmtant source of monil valu<~, Once we recognize this, illl ethic of shmring implies that, iratJher than sh1llnnirng such loners,, the rest of us ought to str[ve to find some way of engaging them in moire l11term:live pursuits. 219 Similarly, there may be> some people whose a.11th,e11,bc,, lirnt person desires just are to help others (consider, for exampl'ci, the stereotype of the ]9S0's wifo a111d mnother),. His difficuH to know for sun*e what an ethic of sharing should say in this soirt of case. ][f we are prepared 1:o heat such persons'' all:rnistk desires as autheni:k expre1,sions of self, then it seenrn possiblie frnr an ethic of shmring to accommodate the il11tu1iti.m1 that they aire i111deed moral paragons: bemuse tl1eiir "own" inte1resl:s ~,re a.Aways and only "in tune" with the interests of others, tJ1ey appear to be exe1npfarn of the WHI to Sha.re And pe1rhaps there are some people whose authentk i111h>.resl.s take this form. My sm,pidmi,, however, is that most such persons aire in fad lacking a sense of self, and hence tfod it is impossible forr them. to genuinely share their m,vn lives and expeiriences wuHn others. fo this case, their moliva,tiona,1 staite is olovuously less than folly admimb]p,.220 Buit here again, there is no reason lo saiy Hi.,d s11ch persons ought fo be blaimed oir criticized for theill" rc:hairaders.221 2l9Thor-w; v,rho firnd t'hfo da.i.rn .objodionably palnrm1lislic !s1hou1ld comdd<-:*r lo th(\ai.q~m11.ent on p. 224ff., when-~ [ po.int out th.at th(-: idea] oJ sharring B01ls powerful HmcifLs on. whal we can do to achfovn it. 220caletcm (]99~) r,:ivc;s furllwr reason,; Lo think that pure alt.ruism is not m,walily admirabln, 22]1t.may very ,,vnll 1-ni, t1is fon:rinisls have insfat.ed, ilw1t won'1P1r1 who nxhibff putc t1J.lnri~1n of llils so:r:t do so because they an\ subfod to objNtionah.Jy ihniting social rolPs. 2n Am:l since their inabillity to expell'i~mce mutuality cuts Otem off from some of the most coveted human values, an ethic of slhairing implies that thi' 1cest of us ought to stnive to find ways of infornetini; with them. 'Jl'o be sure, admowllf!df;tn;; that the loner's or pure aJtrnis!'s mohvidions may .in som,e case.5 be umderntmndahlle 01r at llernst not wholly depfo1raihle is fair firom acknowledging Hrnl such pe1rnons are piropen*ly ad.mired, so Hwse who are influ1enced by "cooler'' and "wa,n1n,er'''' theories of 11.i1rtue are still. likely to find am ethic of ,,haring lacking on l:his point But those who are bothered by the" one-sidedness"' of sud1 accouinl's are unlikely to be distmrbed,. and in the end, we may have fo ,icknowledge a, dash of baseline inhiiUons. Mieanwhi]e, the pi*oblems do not seem severe enough to warrant giving; up on ,rn dhic of shmring alltogdh, 0 r,, since to find these diameter fypes morally deplorn}Jle 1is not yet to say 1:hat such charnd,~rs will always m inevih11bly act wrongly. As we have seen, even persons who lilck all the elements of a IN.iU to Share mig;M s!:iII (choose to) perform ads that arre at leaisl minimally morally permissible, insofar as those aict:s foil to exhibit: l!:lltc persons'* depllorabl.e motiv11lfons (reci!l.1 §2.3(ii)),222 Before conduding that am ethic of sl:wl"ing is impfornsible,, therefor,i, we need to thinik about ifo implications reg11rdi11g the ri~;hl:ne,;s aITJd wrongness ot ind iv11dm1I adB. U if. easy to see what rm ethiic of shmfog implies about adiom; in an abstmd and geneml sense: right acl:s are !those which exhibH or ma,nifost ain a1;ent's Will to Share, whil,e wmng ads awe those which exhibit or ma11ifes1: the agent's lack of sm:lh ,~ Will But n:rnny acts a,re not easily or i1mmediately 222sec §5.2 for further discussion of how an dhic of s;huring r,valual:cr, Lhc lonm✓s aind pm:--e a..lt:ruiHt's ads. 212 Mnges on the partkularn of l:he case. This fe,1hn-e is not 1mique to an dhk of sh,uing: aill nrnral theor1ies J"f.!gJUfre a fairly nua1Ked interpretatiorn of the1ir basic ideas amid fonm1l sfruchue before we cirn truly mulen,tandl their 1:;bt223 And as with oth,~r th,~rnrnes, there is room for pmp()nents of an ethk of sl*rnri1111; to disagree albout its implications i.in ail least some cm,es. Im this sed1ion, I shall not be parhculariy concerned 1:o ñt1olve such intmtl1eoretic dispu1res, Omugh I will try to indicrure when and wlr1y they are Hkeiy to arise. mrise. Mly nrn1in aim 1is to show how an etl\k of sharing proceeds in h,u-d cases,. rund hence to illuminate th,~ daims ,11hout aidion 1:hait are central to any ethic that tl"eats sharing as our 1111os1: «Yvernrcbiing et.Meal ideal. A good place to heg:in is with examples in which two or m.ore a1gents il.i'e sharing with one runo01er,. and yet seem to be engaged i.11 ma1nifesHy immoral ructs. Such exam1ples n1rt1ge from the mi.Idly d istmrlbing, such a,; when a pair of children slhmre a strange foscimatnon in the activity of pulHng the legs off of ai grnsshopper,224 to the truly afonning, such as when gangsters work toi;etl1cer fo, defo1nd their territory aim.I oblifornlx~ thefr corn1pehUon. In both of these rnses, !he agents 1invol,ved nrny eng:age in a great deal: of sharing with one another, and nndeed, IJh.e ti1dlll of" doing it hJf;ethet''' may eve11 enhance their motivation to perform the imnmml ach .And ff run etfoc of shadng was forced to endorse these kinds of activity, it1; appropriateness would certafal1y he questiona,blle. When we ex&mine !:he details mort• closely, howevex, I 22~1 .. 'or *m:.o.re on l;l,is point, recall rny C}mptor Two d.iscm~r.;ion of hov1.1 Ll.10 forrnaJ t)1l:rucLn.-Tiro of agrnt--baGcd <-\*{Ji.ics coniparx.~s with d.eonLol.ogical mtd. cormoqut:nHa1li.st vimNs (p. 94fL, abov<!). 22.tllThan.ks lo Sarr1 Kerstein for tbiH ex11rn:pfo.. 213 believe we can plausibly say that agents inivolved in such aclivnt:y are 1110, i111 fad exhi.biting a genrni111e 11\THJ to Sl:rnse. In tl1.e grasshopper case, it is imporl:,:rnt 1:o dlistiinguieh betw(e("n (1) each chnld's interndion with the grnsshoppeI' (rnnd• the molivrntions lhal. prompl this intemdion), and (2:) each child's interaction with the other dhildl (and a1gai111, tbte moti11atim1s that pmmpt this), The most distm*bing thing about the chiidrnn''s 111ctilvily obviously stems from (1), and what makes it so dishirbing., I think, is ea,ch child's abilily lo dfalrum:e himself from the inffller Hfo his "victim" (th(e grasshoppc~r);, Tlhis k.ifflld of dfafoncing clearly betrays a lack of mu1hmlify, since ,11 dtikl who shared the gmsshorperr's distress would d("!lrly have a motivation to stop the 1:rnrl:mre, U might be argued that the children must be "sharing the grm,slhopperr!'s expeI*iem:e''' in smne sense, since pmt of their fascinrntion may very well Ile in the awareness that they are causing the girn.sshoppe1( s suffering.225 And perhaps tJ1ey do have som.e vrugue awareness of this sort. ShH, it is not re£1Hy appropriate to say l:lrnl either child genminely r,hares the grasshopper's experience. At lbest, each chHd i1, treating the grnsshopper' s distress ais what Adri,1n Piper calls a "surface ofo,jed:" of consciousness wl1uile ttreating his own fasdna.tion with the acti11rny as a "depth object:' (Piper ]991; cf. Nagel 1979). To say thatthe r:;rasshoppr~ir's distress is a "surfaco objed' fr, to say that the chi.Id ls unable to em.pathize with that distress or oven imagine whal: it is Iike to be the g.msshoppt1r at the time. This makes each child's achvify (with resped: to the grasshopper) objediomibly "solf.-absorhr•d:"* any 225NotP 1l11al ffwe wt~ro convinced ll1at the childnrn WP-re cornph~ldy oblivious to Ow possibility lhat their uvicl:iinrr/' wai, in dfatre:;ss ••w if~ for exarnpfo, Lhc;y vven-: rn of..ivalnd by n kind of purely scientific fasdnaUon ("look vvhat :IL dm!s when you take its fogs off''), any foiling on their part ,,voul!.d somY\ mor<~ cogniUve tJw1n moral 214 awarem~ss tha,t he maiy h,1,ve of the ~;n-aisshopper's distress is cfoady not bd11g filtered through lhis corisciot1sness .in the way tlmt it wolll.d be if U11,! ddld hrnd any d,~sixe to llririg his ow11 inteJrests "in l:tme" with the irnt<?:rests of hfa victim,. Thill kirnd of soJf .. almorplion may t,l:em from a Ia,~k of lhe irnrn1;inative rnp,Klitaes necessary to idenhfy the i;rasshopper 1 s suffe1ring as the experience of an independent being (aind hence to recognize llmt they mu1st stop puU1ing its legs off to nrn,ke the suffering go away), or ii: :may also i;h:m from a lack of tbe perspedive .. fa,k1ing capad.lfos Hmt make it possiblie to distinguish Hie experieITTces of other beings from fue experiences of the self. !Hut no maUer the cause, the cMidren are certainJy not exhibiting any desire fo,1• n11t1\:1:mH1y wHh the g;irassJlrnpper, and hence this aspect of their activity rnn be morally criticized. Of course, tmme people may 11ot be convinced that it is morally wrong to fo11rh1ñ inseds. And an tnteresling feature o•f the eth.ic of sharing is the way it can be used to explain the sec1lar character of mu jm!gments about Hie wrongness of causing suffering to creahaes of 11,uimrn sorts, fo the case of insects, or other cre,1h1res that experience hiltl:e or no memtal lifo, any sense of muttmlily that is possible to achieve w1ith them. will be 1mininml, rut best f.ndeed,. if child psycho.logists atre corred that the psydmlogncal lla1s1is of empathy is "facial mimicry," then it may be a.lm.ost impossible for Iwmans to sha1re experiences with insects and other creatures who Jack facial expirossiorn, of the sort thrnt we can pick 11 p, This does not necessarily mean IIrnt it i11 eve,r acceptable l:o ca,use gl'atuHous suHel'ing; as we have just se<m, the willhmrgm,ss to do so betmys a fad. ol lhe Win fo Sha11re toward one's victim. But it does at least suggest that where trad,i-offo are necessary, iii is probably worse Lo urnsc! tl1e suffering of crrea,tmre1, with a rich<!r menl:ail lifo, Since it is prnbably mrrnch 215 less difficult lo share the experiences of hi.ghe1* animals thal: ,*xhib11 nmre hmm1n-Hke diarnd:erisltics, His not so surprising tlhat crnelly towanls Hwn1 is lypkaHy believed to lbe even worse. MeanwhiJe, those who do view the to:rture of insed:s as dearly hn.mrnral c.111 lbe tmderstood ms endon,ing ain even bmader sense of slrmring *perhaps a sense of "1,hared creatmrehood" tha11 u~c• sense of shared! hmmmily I atrtinllated above,. H might a,lso be objech~d thrut the fad tb01l the children's activity is shared with one 01nother makes it aII tlhe worse. Afl:er all, people will do things together that l1rney would not do alo111e, and the clhild l'ein' s shared willi11igness fo treat the grasshopper's distress as a "surface objeclt"* ma,y even he the basis of ,i m ohrnl bond between l:hem. And isrt"t a11 ethic of sharin!~ forced to say that the chiildren(s shari.11g wir.h m1e another makes, their adivity morn.lly good in at least some 1respecf/ The a11swer to this 911.iestion, I l:bink, is yes: insofar as thefr shared ,1ctiv1ity exhibits a high degree of muhrnliity with resped i:o rnne another (claim (2), above),. a11 ethic of sharing does imply tl}mt each dhHd'r, h'eabtne11t of the other child is perfocl:lly acceptable,. But ii i.s m1,t dear to me lhat this is an impl.ausilole thing to say. After rull, H cedaiillly does nol: mean that what either child does to the grasshoppeJI' fa ooorallly accepl:able. And that is mosl: dearly where the prnblem lies. The i!divi.ly of gangsters cam, of course, he dealt with in 1much the same way. for 110 maUer how much experiential sh,idng goes 011 mnong the members of a particular gang, they dearly betray an tmwiHingness llo share t:eirritory with their victims, and ifo:,ir pirepairedness (or worne, more adivr> desi:re) lo harm or kill thefr iriva!s betrays a cmnplete fack of any desir:'e for mtituallHy m sense off shared humanity with them. Indeed,. the gangster' r, activity seems far wo1rse because they are uttedy unwilling to shm:e d!:her 216 i I I J I things OJ" experiences wltb thos(" who a,re not mem b,~rs of their r;roup,. No 1naUer how much tlhey enjoy m1.1h:mlity with their follow g,rngsh1rs,. thPy dispfay a truly d,~plorahle kim:J of seH-absorpti.0111 with respect 1:o Uieilt vidims, aliowi1111~ us to sa,y that th,~i.r activity is wrnni; for that ne~.son. Puil e11notheir way, their overall motivational slate lbelrays a doplomble lack of tbe (complete) Wm to Shillre. Once rngain, it m,aiy still seem tbat l:he kind of cdtids.m tJlrnt an ethic ol shar1ing is ablle to g,~nemte il'l this case ns. not .5everP enough .. For though it enables 11s to condemn the gangster's activlity as m.onlilly wrong due to its "specilidized" charade1;, 1it sti.11! acknowledges that the gangsters clfsplay a variety o/f admiJ'abJ.e traits s11ch as loyalty,. respEd,. amd trnst .,. with r,!gard to one another. Bui: at seems to me that this 1s a virhie ni1thell' than a criticism of the theory. After al.I,. the evidence that the iNHl to Share 1s rnoted in m,tuml sociabiHly (recall §4.3) hel.ps to explain why "gangster Hfo" rnn he appealiilg. And unic'S.S we diearl!y recognize this fad, H will be even m.ore difficult to keep the potenl:ia,lly dark side of sharing •** the fad that we <1re sometimes willing to do l:hfngs with other people HrnJ we would not do ourselves-** from taking too much control over our own or othe11' people's dmrm:ters. There may als,o be reasons to doubt whel.her the i~aingstern' tredme11t of one another i.s as adm.iraible m,1 it may al: first seem .. For one thing, when tJhe seif-•absorption of ead1 imlivid1ml. g,rng1,ter (with respeci to ou1Hiders} is shm'ed by aH foe 0U1ers, the srnfferfo.g of 111,eir vkti.ms mrny gd pushed farther rnnd farther toward the "surface" of eaieh gangstell"'s consciousm,ss, To the extent that they foc1rn more a11d more on bringing their interesfa "in tune''. wiU1 those of their follow g,mgsters, fherefore, even the deeper sense of nrnt.ualily threy experience witl11 resped ln one anotheF is taifrnted by 2'i'7 immorality .. And .it is also possilble Hmt they may i111 fact be exhilbiting what Piper calJls "vicmrim:ns possess1irnn''' rather l:him genu1i11e muh1.a1lil:y with their follows .. That is,. 1:he!y may tr,?-at !the intel!'ests aJ11d concerns of their fellow gan 1;sten, as depth objects of theilr own c,msc1lornsm'ss whilE' treating their own concems •-including any minimal senise of shared hmmunity with the members of rival ga11g11 that might otherwise prc~vent tJrnern1 from parhdpatinp; in ilie gang adivil:y •-as mere swcface ob)ledr;, ff this 1is what ill g;olng on, l:hey an! nol: really exhil:ilUng sharing even w1ithin their group, and hence there is reason to criticize the gangsters'' activlily with resped to one another as well as towa1rd meirnbeirs of rival 1proups. '][!mil'? Irnm~:1r .11lltdl 1p11t1rll'? .tl in1dlst pir1J1bl~,111rw, ire~1itsitei[ But now it mruy seem Hrn,I: we once agaiI1 have a problem deilling with lorne1rs ,ind aHruisls. Earlier, I suggested that ai111 ,~thic of sharing is n.ol required to evahmle those motivational staites as n1Uetly dieplombie, insofar as the loner or :i!Jtruist possessf~s at least some of the elements that constitule a \II/ ill to Share .. Ami I also pointed md thrnt am ethic of shrnring can ait least acknowledge Hmt much of their aictivit:y wHl be mornUy permissibl.e in the most minimilll sense, since not: every adion a loner or al!trnfat (d1ooses to) perform(s) will e)(hibit the laick of m n1tL1alit:y. Nonetheless, ,rn ethtk of slharing implies that it wiil be i.mpossible for Jonem and altruists to foiflH any more positive duties without fh'stchang.ing H1eir characters. AJ11d 11 niay seNn to many people that at least some loneirs manage to do better than that H this is l,1:11e, tJ1en it poses a real problem for an ethic ol sha.dng. Fox insofar as some Jo11ers a111d ailbuists do manage to ad rightly, it seems that something .\!th!'!: than the Will to Shiu*e nrnst grmmd the rightness of at least some types of ads. 218 Theñ are two kinds ot ca,ses in which this might sec1m to be tnie?26 Kn the ffrst, although run rui;ent tends to be a loner and hence to prefer moire soii.l:ary pursuits, he allso cares a,bout others and in addil:iion to not harmimg 1:h(em, at i<':illst smneUrnes tries to activdy help., lB,ecam,e, ex hypoilhesi, this agent lacks a desire fo1r eil:her deep or broad sharing, a11 efuk of shairirng is forced to insist that his actions are nol particularly good .. Bul: ,1gain,. !~iven what w10 have seen about Ute on(H;idedness of botl11 separateness .. , aml connedfon--based moral views,. .it is not dear thal. tlli.s judgment is entirely inappropriilte. Meanwhile, there fa no rem,m1 to think that imch ,rn, agent wHJ adively thwart the desire fow mutu1a]Hy when he acts from 1m1ore pui'ely altruistic desfres, so I do not think .111 ethic of slluuing must com:lernm l1is adivil:y as morn.Hy wrong. It cam aliow that his ad1; are mmally pernmissibfo, even though they illre not partic11fo,dy good. Iii. the second kind of cruse,. the "lone,/' prefers to engage in solil:ary adivHy, lmt :rmneU1e[ess tniea to overcome (and at least sometim1c's succeeds in overcoming) his fodk of naluml sociabi.lity iin order to reach out to other people. But here it fo not enhrely deair that the person is ruccurntely described as a lone[* afteI' a!L As noted in §2.S (p" '79ft), a1n e1:hic of sh&ring nm m:k11owledge th(~ vah.ne of acting fmm "a scmse of duty" --that is, tJhe val.ue oi recogrlizing that one 1111.oraUy 0111ght o do smnethfog. 0U1:er Hrnn what one is most naturally or directly motivated to do. Insofol" as the "loner" in this exam 1Ple its mol:ivated by the recognition that sharing is Olff most oven1rching ethical ideal, his rndions will at least 1\ndfred!y mrunif0st HrtP dc,sin° for mutualifiy l:hat, acconling to such an ethic, is srnffident to make hfa adlons 226Both cxa:.111JJl.mi we.rt\* su.ggeslnd to m.n by Ju.dy Lid:d.<-~11.herg. Thanks are also d1.w Lo Sam .l(erslnin foir hdping m.e to fo:irrrn.d.aln thfa objection morn dt-~arly. 2.19 riglht. Of cmnse:, lo see wlhether Olt' 11ot this is foe case we will ha111c to ilCP if it f. . • " ' < l ' ,. ,. ' 'f' • ,, I " con urms ,o mn ee1111c OJI s 1anng s mos. s.1g1u lGlih summmry nHes (de11,~loped [11 S.3). And an ethic of sharing d()("!ll imply that it would he IJeUer if 1:he loner weñ mon.ivall:ed more dirncHy lay a desi.ire for nmhrnHl:y .. StiH, it is at least not clear tbat a111 ethic of sharing will genernte conclusions that are totaHy count:er* .. /ntui ti11e. 227 The general point of these examples is that it fa n1r11porm11t to lbe cle,u* albout the i~rotmds of any particular agenfs motivation im onler to make a111 accun1te assessment of his or her rud:~. Suppose, for example, tha,t the persim in que:,tkm suffo1rn from 1:he sort of "egofotic crnnfosion" l:hat 1nakes it impossilble fo disth1gufoh hfa ow11 needs and interests from the needs and interests of o11heirs (d. §LIA, above),. Such a person m.ight welll fiw;:I\ i1 intoflerable to interad wHh other people, but his faih:lJJ'e may noneH1eless shc,m IE,ss from 11 !ruck of the desire for rnu1luaiiiy (he may sl11ce1rely want to find so.me way of satisfying all the needs and inll:erests he e,cperiences, including those he has vicariously "rnughll/f from otbem), tllurn from an imi bility to recognize thall he must adively reach 01.11: to other people in o:rder to achieve the desired result In this case, the pernon's failing is probably m.oi'e cognili11e than morn! (tlwui~h his overall mo,tlvalfonal stale stif:I won't be evaihrnted c1.s highly as Ori<' which eX(empHfies more mature forms of empatby),.228 Or suppose that a per~:on sim:e.ireiy wants to interact with others, but is unable to find anyone who is able fo shan, his idliosyncraUc inl:erests rundi corn::ems, and is Jed loy 22'7Simifor.Iy, a. Jpure alU'tii.st mig},t fry lo ,mgagf: in more inloeadive purHuilB, L,lkc Hu: *ion.er jusl d.faf:ussnd, sudii cqpe:rscm can also he said to act ri.ght:ly if hiil9 activity accord1~ with the sm:n:rnary rules ()f sharing. 228Frnr a .fascirw.Hn.g d:iscu.r-.mion of how :rrnaL1t11re o-mpat:b.y ls lfn.knd. ln moral a.clivily, ,we Dei.gh (1'l95),. 22!) frustration to pursue~ more soH1:illry Hfe.229 To the exfo11t that this frnwtratfrm stems fromn the loner's unwillingness to take S<'t'iously any other ind.ividnrnl''s point of view, H does not manifest a Will 1:o Share imd the a,i~ent's act,ions will be n1iticized as morilllly wrong. But to llhe exteni: that th,,: ageJrTI finds lhimsell sunoun,ded by others who arre completely u:nwilli.ng to take his internsh, serfo1.1s.iy, his frt:rn.l:Jmtion might be a direct manHesl:aUon of hfa sin,:ere desire for muturnlily, in which c.1se his adions will certainly fall above 1:llw threshold of moral pennissilbilnty. Still, ii: is perhaps not partkulady 1inle1reslting l:o show 1:hal an etlhk rnn, when suitrnbly interp1*e1")d, loe ,made to say p.la,usible things rnloou1: the rightness or wrongness of ads in pmrtiicula,* cases, 'I'o really he satisfactory, an drhirnl theory must a,lso be abl!e to provide LIS wil:h at least some guidance in slh1ations whe,re we are misure what to think or where omr intuitions corr11flkt, and to give us sorne insight into why we rnake the mornl judgments lhat we (lypically) do, Virh1e--ethirnl tJheorfos are sometimes critid:,..ed for overeslimrnting 1:lrie degree of psychic lw.rmony that most nwml1 ago11ts are able to achieve~ fm implying that the good on* viJr'luo11s person is str:aightfmwm:dly disposed to do Uw rig!nt thing in a pal'tkular set of ci1rc11mshrnces,2~0 But an a1;ent--based ,-Jhic se,,:ms to be partic1.1larly i.mma:me to tlhfo charge,, After all', we h~.V€' seen that 229For nvidcmce !Jhat fH)me of. lhfl m.osL solitary persona:.H.ty types are lh,me who in fod experi.e.11.ce a very pownd\il sense of shm*ed huwi:anily with thnfr foUows, see :Monro('. (19%: 200.ff). 230Thanks. t..o ]\Janey Sherman for rnrn.inding mn of this cdLicir,m. 22l the Willi to Share i.s constituted by fowr types oI elemen,1:G, and Hmt even Hs most distinguish1ing fea,hue "" the desire foll' mutuality •** has two dimensions that at least .110U11.etimes conflict Given these factors, it scem.s tbait eve1TT 1:lhe lbesl: mom! agents•-* lhosc who pos5ess a nrnrnplde Wm to Sha,rc wil:l ofl:cn be genuinely perplexed about what to do. The basic idea of an etlhk of sharing is that each agent s.hoU1ld filter h,,,r own, first person interests and concerns thnrngh the othe1r pe1rr,m{s 1inl:eires1:G and cm1ce1-ns (which she nm empatlhicaiHy pkk up), i1rn order to find srnr11He way. to express and foHill l1er both sorts of mofrvation at 1:he veiry sanne tinw, But there may be situations in which the filtering process is inconduisive, and theñ is no obvious w<1y for th,~ agent's more overarchillg desire for nrnhiaHty to be a,chieved, What should an agent do then? Th,~ first step, I thfok, 1is t:o check the accuracy of the .mol.:ivatirnns that: one fa having the most diffkulty brdnging "in time" with all the 1rest. By "checking the aiccurm:y,."* I mean refl.eding on whether tl1e motives am based oin a realistk ais:,essment of the sUuation (rnl:heir than wishfud thirnkinp; or mistaken infonnation, fon* example), 1md this meall1s 1:aiking paiins to ensure that she really does 1.mderstand what the other pel'eon is thinking and feding, as well as consi,foring more objective facts about the world" If she finds that any of her first person motivations were inappropriate (based on a mistaken 1.1ndersbrndh1g of the sitllation) she can wmk to revise them" And if she finds that the motives she has picked up from the otheir person are based 011 thal other's misfoken beHefo, she can at least altem pt to get the other to ,*evfae them. Still, the agent's ability fo adiievf! mutm1lity will depend, in no small meas1ire, on whethei' the oth,~r person is willing t.o make the necessary adjmitm.e1nt And if the other is not, H m,1y be shnply impossilbfo to s,tHsfy both 222 I bier own rund 1:he other'1, inl:eirests at the very same time,, Can an ethic of sharing help us deir,,rmino what an ag,ent should do in tb:is sihmtfon"/ At this point, it is difficult to provide ru detennimtl:e answeL Hui it is cerl:ainly not the case tlhat the aio;enl is forced to, alter all of her own, concerns !o bring them in line wilh the other. After all, if one a1gent sfrnply rndopfa th<-) others point of view withoute111dorsi111g it as her own, or if one siim,ply cm1,vinces Hie other to adopt he1* point of view witho11t the other being independently co11v[11c~~d of its apprropdateness,. they carmot truly share it. Recognizing th:is, the agent who is tmly motti11aled by mmhialHy wm ha11e a mon1l reason to gel: onit of rn Felalfom,lhip where genmin<' 1,lharing is impossibl!e. This does not of cmirse mean that sharing age11ts nmnot: try to influence• om• ano1:hels beliefs and a1ttih1des,. and sharing iigenfa may afoo need lo make adj1isl:Menls In their own inl:erests. Still,. it does mean !hat Ith.ere will he nahual limits on how "demanding"' sm::h an e!hk can be. Yet now it m.ay seem fhat an dhfr: of sh,mi11g ls a bH too fax,. a,nd i;ives agents too m,m::h !attitude in delnberatirng about wlhrd to do. After an,. agents are not only in110Ived in face .. fo .. fm::e relationships; eve1*y day we are forced to confront a pl111*aility of different points of view, and the task oi ]bringing all of those points of view into harmony vvilll cerfainly be-enormo1.mly diffkuit When it prnves i1nprn,sibfo, is U1ere a nm1°arbitrnry way for lhe agenl: to o::fodde which persons lo share with?' Fortunately,. the answer foyer;: an ethi, of sharing impHes thal we shornld be open to aU poinls of view, but it does. not Imply that !hey ~,r,, a!I equally good. JFor while> alfhm1gh 11111 ethk of sharing treats openness to other people ais the sta,rling point of mornl deliberation, ii: does not treat openness as an evalllaitive commitment Rather, H instruds m, to reflect on whether ihe points 1,i view of other people an• in keeping witln the 2.23 ideal of muhrndlity, And i11 a fasclnabng way, the Wfli to Share sets its own, internaHy imposed llmrns on wlmd can he done to ,nchieve its deepest: dc,mires and folfill its most Jheartfolt aims, This ts l:,ecat1se an agent who is genuinely motivated by the desire for m utualnty will lbe sirn ply unable Lo (ulfiH that clesire while inteimdirlg with som,~one whose motives and adim1s thwart. it Put anothex* wa,y, the sharing rngent will be utterly um,;rHling to do IM11gs that the other weirnon,. due to his hick of a desire for mutuality,. is perfectly willn11g to do. This makes H impossiUe fo bring that oth,,)r person's interests tin bme willh one's ow 11, but 1J~e sharing agent need not apologize for this, Because rrmtuality grounds the goodness of aH shared acbivil:y, the sharing Evgent hrns ill morn! reason m:it to contirnne iinteractiing with rcmol:her person who does not exhiloit a commlt1cne11t to mlltmllity as well.. She h11cS ai moral reason 11.ot to share the other's interests and aims. U is also foill'ly erusy to see how a genrnlnely r,haring aw"nt might expedence a sense of duty. For even if the fillering process yields ill foidy detenn.inate ,mswer wiith rei,ped to how the agent's des1ire for mutua.ltty can be achieved, U1e agent's more autonomous,. ffrst .. pe1*s01ri desiires might nonetheless he ve,'Y strnng and lead her to feel as if pulied in two ways at oinoe .. Altc?rnativeiy, the agent migM (lilke the "loine1r" mentioned above) recognize that he fa lacking in empathic awareness or rmburnl sociabilt!y, lout also recognize that theS<) al'e important 0001ml capacities rnnd sincerely wish l:o overcome that fact, lin these kinds of cases,. an ethic ol sftml'ing impHes l:hal ,111 agent 1moraUy ought to act in ways that :fulfill thi:1 tfrtc,ory's imost 111nporllrnl: summary r1:1les. Ilut before we om m,dershrnd the basis, for such n1les, we need fo be ciearer about how 1o resolve the conflict:,. tha,1: will im1vila bly ariN,* lbetvveen the depth and breadth dimem,ioins of shared activity. We need Io 224 k11ow, for examplle, what we should say about age11ts wllw,se activity manifosfo one dimension but nol: the other, since without some way of resolving thfa 911.1estion, ii: will be irnpossibie to sruy anythimg very cmtcrete about the mmal value of the acti(ms such agents perform. Although I have allowed that age11lts may exhibit very differP11t paUems with wespect to the wa,y deep and broad fo1rms of 111.utuality are in1:egrrdecl within their overall charad:er, I s1.1bm1il that it is always morally wrong fm an agent to act in ways that exlhibit only om~ form of mutuality at H~e fofali expem,c> of the other. Mly 1*easmis for sayinit this slem parrtlly from the i.ntllition that a "complete'' Will to Shm*e is always mon, admimble that1 an "im:ompiel:e'*' one, and partly from 1:111ore llleory-driven eonsidernlions aboul the types of actions l:hat H seems necessary for any plausibl!e moral! theory fo be able to condemrm.231 The Will of an agent who specializes entirely irn either deep or broad 1,hairing is less compl!ete than 1:h<o Will of an agent 1v ho irrntegrafr,s both dimensions info Iler distinctive moral: pernona,lity. Bui since boll1 dimEmsirnns are legitnma1:e forms of mutrnalily,. why should we suppose that a more complete Will is morn.Hymoñ admirable? The intuitive idea is that being cioser to the mo1rnl ideal is always better in some ae11se. And thfcs inrtmilion can be substantiated in part by llhe recognition !:hat bot]~ forms of sharing arre closely conn,~cted to many othc!I' core moral n.oticms. Evein Umse who may beHeve 11:lud goods like Iove and frie11.dship arre foxgely over1mkd nuwt al: least 231 R<>rn,Il from Chapter Two (p.93) that ageni:-•barwd ethirn may rely on the rromss of "reJfocU.ve qu.ilihl"ium1r in 01td:e-r* lo bring their j1.1dg1ne.nls aiboul Lho inlrins.k admirabilif:y of vc11doU1s m.oUvat:iona[ states in line with tltQfr cm-rn:idt~ñd. jt1dgT1raents ahem l th,c ri.ehLnrn.,.s or 'v'-rr011.gness of vuriiot1B types of ads. 221:i ackmlwledge 1:hat we alll depelld cn1da1lly 011 sud1 i111:ernctive 11,.1.foer, for our eady ffu.1r11ivrnl a d persrnriaIHy de11eliopme11t And ar, RM .. Adams has emphasized, almost allI work a,nd a gr,~at deal of pfoy in contemporary sod,:.1ty takes the fo•Jm of a shmred projed (1988). TJ11less we cultivate and exhibit the deepe11* kinds of sl:uuini;,. therefore, it will be imposslblie for those kinds of good11 lo ever he achievr"d .... either fo1* 011rselv(~s or other people .. And given time ixnportallce of such goods in human life and hum am society, [t seems ax*llJitrary to exclude them from the moml domain. At the same time, the se11se of shared hmnanity that l!ier, al the core of brm1d slha1'1ing seems to he irr,timately related to notions. like, equ1alily mnd the ba[,ic vd11e or inbrinsic worth of SIU human beings .. Rosal.ind Humithous,, (1993) has sngi~esl:ed that to have such a se1rnc~2:02 is not IH,Cc'ssarily to Hke or love or evell respect e,very other person, but it is "to l:Y.~,nt td' do so, and J!1encc to be "passionately inclined to trying to make out 11 Cat6'e for the.ir meriting such rnttih1des"' Cl 993: 65) .. It is aiso to lbe dis posed fo give othem the bemefit of the doubt, and when they still look flawed or wrnng:, to remember that one might "look eq11ally flawed or wroni; to them/' and perhaips to come "to Sc''" some point in their view" of oneself (l11id.). And even if that proves impossible, His still to acknowledge Hiat "we have [ad; least som,~] shaired experiences,. 11 com.mon Hfo," aind hence that "there g1,t111!: lbe some way in which they are not entirely despicable and worthless,. however frightfoJ, thc-y are" (Ibid.) .. Why does a sense of shared humanity lead an aigenl: to t:hink in this way? Becai1.1se such run agent J"e1cognizes Hrnt other people are, aifter all, "h 1• • "** 1 " (l*b'd ) J.1man oemgs, m,;e me , 1. , ,. 232Hur.~Ll:11ousn seA fbe lert1rts "fo.mily .... foel.i.11.p/1 arr1d ''bro1thed1.ood of man''1 to caplun: this nokio1t'l1 hut I Lh-ir1k shn would find Hie 11 n,en.tw of shared hmnunily"' Lo be c-iqullli1y ll_pL 2.26 Those who are influenced hy "separateness-based" moral views may be: indinedl to th1ink that the lbreadlHt dimension should always have total priority, insofar as it rnptrnres the notion that all persons aire possessed of basic mornl di~;nily. This may in fact be true in publk or instihutional mmal conlJ.C!Xfa. !But to say that the breadth dimensim1 always takes priorr1ity in even !he individual moral clomai.11 se,01ms to me to lbe a bit too stnmg. For one 1:hing, we have seen a gireat deaJI of evidence, in earllier chapters, suggesting that re11sonable people Cillll reasonably disagree ilbout the importance of deep, interpersonal rehitionships in human ]He. For another, it seems that 0111<' of the reasons that ad.I human beings have moral value is that each of us is tmique *** and it is the depth diimension that focuses on indiviid11aJis a,s the paitkulaur persons H1ey ruñ. Ewm if we rucknowledge* that it is moraUy b.;lter lo exhilbit a (mol'e) compl.eu! VI/ill to Share tbrmit;h one'*s actions, however, we might still wonder why exhibiting only o•ne of the dimensiom, of sharing is not good enough .. After ail, iln agent who does so may fail lo ad in sorr1e morally 1/illuabfo ways, but she will nonetheless foe exhibitlr1g some kind of desin*! fm mutrmHly. And i11deed, we have seen that an aigt!nt--based ethk has, ait least three opliorn, wh('n H comes fo the assessment of indivicluail ads (recalI p .. 95ff,). n can say Hmt such ,Kts are wrong u11less 1:hey totally appmxima,te the most overmrd1in3 tnotivational ideruL lBut it can also a11ow a.gents to foll somewhat shod of th(; ideal 1 defining some threshold point above w hic.h thefr actions remailrr m.oraUy peirmfasi!Jle (tholllgh pc~rhaps not partic1J!,uly improssiw', ,noble or "fine"), and it ca11 even do ilway with notions of dgll!ness ,ui,d wrm1,1r,ness altogether and simply assess rnctlons ms hetter or worse. So whalt is the hilsis for s,11ying that" specialized" moral activity is wrong? 227 WHh. resped to the three options j11st mentioned, I want to endorse tht\ "threshold" vers.ion. S1ince l have rul.reaidy argued that ma11ifosltations of the Will to Share wm be Mghly v,ufoble and depend on l:he mniq11w chrnrader of [111clividual agenls, il .i6 d011Mf1]l that the idea of "1:otalJy appi*oximat:ing"' the Will to Share will be entirely coherent And I do not qunl:e want to say that an ad:ion is wrong simply if H fails to rcrumdfest 011e clime11sim1 of sharing, si:nn' .I have aicknowledged thait there will sometimes be trnde--offs between the two .. However, I do think It is atppropriate to say that adivily is wrong when H actively thwrnrts either dime111>iot1 of sharing to do that is to m,rnifost a, ~~plorablly_ incompfol2 Will The problem with specializa1ion, when Lrnderstood in this way, is that it shows the moniil agent to be uUedy insensitive to at least some kim:ls of mo.ml considerations, The p1uely deep sharer, for exaimple, will D<\ vmy aU11ned to the i1nterests am! needs of those with wl10m she shares a partkular point o1f view, but will not ,~ven n,,;:ognize the i1nteresl'l, and needs of hurman beings nioFe generally, and he11ce wHl be prepared to run roughshod ovc'I' even the inos.t baisk moral concerns of \those people with whom she is not deeply engaged. The purely broad sharer, on the othex* hand, will he highly atluned to the interests am,l 1rneeds 11:hat she shares with human bein!~s genermlly, and I11deed, will treat every human lbe1in1g as simply one am,mg many. But this will make her olbiivfous to Hwse xnoral, inforests that can only lbe frnlfllled through deeper tormB of interad:ion --througlh expressions of love and friendship, for exam p]e_ZJ3 Of coin*se, it may frequently be possible to Std out of friendshjp without actively thwmrtin1g the needs a1mll interests of ---- ---***--*--2331 have in mind Llw kinds of cases tlwJ morn!. panial.ifltfl, emch as Blum (1980) and i3tockeir (1987), ,rn wel.l an care-dLddsL Hke l\loddings ("1984) and Baier (J:994) f1•c,cruc,v,lly entphar,;i:r,e. 228 sl:nmgers in ma1riy cases, and similarly, it may ofl:e111 be possible', fo 111anifmt cme'r, flense of slrmred humai1ity without slighling 1:he duties of friendshiip,. Hui there will also be cases im which 11:he expression of one dimension actively thwarts the expr.~ssion of the oilier, and it is at that point that oine crns.s,$ ilie thH!shol!dl and ads in ways !:hat are morally wrong,?:H Perhapr, !i:he best way to see why is to set out an ethic of shmring' s most significant summary niJ+!s. The s11mmiilllJ 1mlles of s!Oladng Tl.1.e summary ml.es 11:hat awe eT1don;ed by any age11t-bas,)d ethi.c do noll have independent moiral validity. But they do prov1ide 1m w1itlh a waiy of 1:understandlinr; tlw approprrialP11ess of adhen!nce to fomiliar moni,l comnwnds, m1eh as "be charitab!1e"' and "don'l: st.ea.I," by summarizing the~ types of aclli that a genuinely vilrtuous agent: (aITT agent who lived up to tbe theory's ildeaI of mon1I cha1mdeF) will lypically be motivated to perform. Hence, to th" exte11t that: sharing can b<ri shown to lie at: the core of sm:h day-to*-day mies, we will have even more reasrn1 to think that it 1really do(~S serve as our most overrnrching etfocal ideal.. The ba11,is for cfatinring llhat a particular command is ai s111m11,uy rule of shall'ing ii, the ability to dern,onstmte that ai failure to alb.ide by it would betrny <1, deplrnmble lack of the \Nill to Share*** 1:hat it would either exhibit the complete absence of 8-,I\l!. desire foir minhmHly, or 1:hal a woul1dl ad:1ively thwart one of the two dimensiofls of experienlia.ll sharing: .. This will almost c,,rh1inly 2:341 do n.ot be]tm,n I.hat l111is vliovv conf!i.ds 'vv:ilh 1illY oa:ll"lier commcr.onts ahouL l.hn variability of tho wrn t.o Sb1aror sinco the :requiremont of 11non•BpPciOil:i.zaLior{' 1s not a requfrr~mm1t t.o tmldhJt tb.i~ two dimensions fn -porfoctiy e1qu.nl 11n1ourr1ls, *MJd1aol Siote has defended this kind. of point by noting I.hat thn hiparl;il:e command lo "pfant com and plant cot1o:rr:( could. not he fulfilfod. sJi11c11p]y by planting11 an 1.umsu.a11y l.:i.rge amount of corn_,,, Yot neither does 1t seem nece~sairy to pfont n-qual nu.mho:rs of coir.n and cotton seeds; il woul.d hP enough to "rialant.'.t!g_~IQ)'m and_£9J:ton in non-nngl.igi,hle 1:1xnounLrl1 (1992: *109),. Si.t:1Til.arly> ti:he rnquirnn.1.ent tlhat one c!xhihil boU1 deep amd lH*oad f~haring Jis mna.n1 lo aI!cn,v I.or some foeway. 229 be frue in the case of the mies a1gc1.i11st kiliing, forture, and other fonim, of violence, since no one would desire to share the pain and sufforing of anolJ~er. lirldeed, the res1:rictions on violence wm be pmrtict:1larly i,l:ll'ingent, since even in contexts where an agent might foul some j1rntifkaition in kiUinp;, it is exbremely unUkely thrnt Hie process of filtering the other person's interests t[uorngh this justifirn1fon would result .in a 1nolb1va1fon to kill!. A puss1ible exception here is killing in self-deforn,e. Thill is because ,my ar;ent with a healthy seH--concept and normal sense of self--preserva1fon will find it i1:npossib!e to hiring his or h,,r own interests "in time" with those of an aUacker, no matl:er how strong the pradical desire for nrtultmiJil.y may he. This does not, of cours(e, imply that moral agents .mrny ,stnike INith d1c!adly force whenever th1ceatened; prr*e1mmably the desire fot m11hnali1y would lead !:hem to use no more force than Jis necessary to reb11H the atl:ackerr*, Andi ideillly, the sharing agent woulid hope to achieve a foll blown sense of mutnrnHty with the: attilcker, since this would make the attacker less likely to co11U,1ne as a threat Nonetheless, s1ince tlie aU,icke.r must s11rely be a 1:mmifostly u11shad111g ind.ividuaI (and be viofal:Jin.g the summmcy rule against violence), this is a situatl:ion in which it is slrid:ly impossihk" for the seJJ.-defondel" lo share his aUa,cker' s point of viiew. H he resorts to violence in ordeJ" to defend himsellt this seems justified by hits coimmitrnent l:o the idem! of muhrnlily. More generally, an ethic of shal"ing implies that ads of agvession are typic,1,lly wr,mi;, Thomas Nagel once made !he interesting suggestfon that nearly aH ads of aggression stein from a desire for muhmMy: having sc1H1,'rPd at the hands of anotlier, we 11at1.1rally want Hte other to experience our suffeiing for hhn m hersellf, and by lm;hi111g out al: the other (1979: 46), B1.1t whil.e dosely r,dat.ed to m11turnI.1ity in ,1, way 1:hrut mruy help to expfain the 230 prevalence of retri}mUve urges among human beings, I befãve that relalial:ory aggñssion .is in fod a distortion of the Will to Share, Suffering may b,, easier to take when one knows !hat one is not alone, hut causing ,mother person to suffor doe5 not in foctmrnke one*s own suffering go awrny. And an agornt who desfre:, to slmre a111other's experience will wantto cause as Mtle suifering as possibl1e. The~ ideal of shanring om also be us,id to grnund rules again,st lying aind oth,~r forms of manipulaUmi as mon1lly wrong. For one thing, it is impos,sible to sharre a point of view wil:h m11other pernon unless we are rPspom;1ive to altitudes that m.'e autlhentically theirs, rnnd this mParn, that anyone moUvruted by a Will to Shmre will! want to be sure tha,t i;ther peoplie have foll imfonnation. For another,. lyi111g: to another person is a way of aissertl11g 0111P's own power over them•*mannpul.,1ting theh* beliefs in order 1:o i;et them, to serve on,' s own interesls •-a11d this is dearly a "oiie**sidecr' act of the sm*t Hmt the i«:!Pal of sh<1ri111g is mP,mt to condPm 11. Perhaps thP best way lo SPP th1is ill by considerin9.; the difforem:P between lyi1ng to a p,~rson and simplly ignrnning them, 235 IntuiJively, we tend to tfonk that ignoring a p,"rnon does 110! make it Jimpossible to share wUh them irrn the fohue. Bud lying to a person does malP it Pxtremely 1.mHkely that foture sharin!~ wil:h thPm wiJll occur. I believe this is because ign01:ing a P"''son m'«.id not na:essarily manifosl: a depfomble Will to Share" After all, i't may not be possible to slmte expe1ience~, with them in any deep way, f;i11en one's own and the othPr s pa.rticufar inlercests, And so long as ijhcy do not havP a111y pressing needs or inierests, U1c emprnthk rnwareness of whkh wouJd movP a s}mring aggnt to respond, ignorin 1; them will not he!ray a deploriihle lack of fl 23'' ',.)Thanks to Michael Slote for ronl.lnding mn about LhiH point. 23J sens<?, of shared h11manity. Ignoring som(>.one, in otherr words,. does not actively thwart the 1id(?1al of sharin1g, (~Ven if it a.!so d0($ not adi11ely r!xhibit either dimensions of the desire for m1.1trnalily .. To lie 1o a, penmn, however, ts fo treat one's own intexr!sh, and conc,irms as clr;arly havi111g rnmch more* signific,mcc~ than the oth,~1✓ s, acnd this does bebray ,1 ,foplornble lack of mutL11alily in both experiential dimensions .. The depth d1i.mension its thwarled becaUJse the liar seeks to manipulalte (imther than, share) the 0Hne1r pernon'r,. particUlar poi11t of view,. and the breadth dimens.i.on 1is thwarted by the agemfs oNivimrnness to rnr fa,ilu.11re to be moved by,._ the ol:her peirson' s naitmml desire to fornu1Ia,trt and express authentic ,interests ,u1d goaJ!s,.236 Similar comments aipply in 1:he rnse of a, summarry rule agai1inst stealing .. For here agffin, to take something awa,y from another is cle,uly to treait the other inte1*ests as having little,, or no nrnml weight, ,md one's own interesl:s as having priority .. And here again, it seems extre.mely unlikely that, havinf; stolen from another, ii: will be possible to engage H1e1111 :in sharing at some futur,i po.int In sayinr; this, I do not mean to suggest l:hal U is i mprn,sib[e, or Lmwarranted,. for* agents to forgive and forget. And indeed, an ethic of sharing can even be seen to gmund a sUJmmary rrnle of forgiveness. 13ecause it [ncorporal:es certain 11atlues of intc;rpcrsona,l cmmedcdness, such an ethic acknowledges our ordinary human frailties,. indmling our dependency aind neediness. And ii also encourages i11teradfon as a form of morn! learning .. H.ence,. insofar as a previously 1msharing ,1g,mt shows him m herself to havE, cultivated a desire for mutl!ality,. there is no reason to bear a grudge a8ainst her rnr refuse to internet in the fn1bue .. Notice, however, thal this does not make 236 I take, Chis to he a foa him of bm,ic h 1mrnni ly. 232 a previous act of lying or st.eaHng Jess wrong (that action stm manifosted a deplorn ble lack of the Will to Sh1ire). lt only acknow ledg,~s fo,it it is possibfo for individuals to d11ange thefr dmrader. The' id(~al of 1,haring also seems to grm.md a number of mme positive rules,. In Chapter foul",. we saw that l:he emp,ithic a-wareness which e11,afoles w; to share in otl~ers' experiences prnvides us with a powerfol incentive to promote Htefr good, at least insofar as this is possible without cli.sregarding 01u own good as well. Lfonce, while such an eth1ic does not imply that we must maximi?,.,e l:nnna11 welfare, it does, for example:, deady ground a du1:y of easy rescue. Similarly, the desfre foll' m11tualily would seem to pmmpt a display of i;rntitude in :response to assisl:ance from ofhers,. and of loyalty toward those wifu witom one is iwnvolved in shared pmjeds of va11"ious. orls .. That is because a failllre to exhi foH these q ml!IHies bellrnys a kind of parasitism or wHlingm~ss to rece1ive help from others, wHlhout any correspondfr1gwillin1;ness to shari:-' the bmrdens of sodal llivinr;. 5A Dfae«)Rwing Hñ At1l:rnrnomy/Cilldng Debmte Since this disserll:ll!tion begall"l with an analysis of the coi1tempmmry debal-r" lhal grew out of Carol GiHigan's work, I want lo conclude by showin 1~ how an agent--based ethic of sharing helps, to resolve,..,. and in soine rns,os, even dissolve•-the tensions that lie at the core of the Aulonomy /Cari,ng debate .. As we saw in Chapter One, aul:on(uny**lmsed v1iews tendi to poetn1y the cn1cirnl mmml task ais finding sonie sort of reason to ad:, whilie the ethks of care see mom.lity as lying i.n a kind of sensitiv1il-y 1.o hmnamity. Benrnse an ethic oJ sharing is not grounded in moml prindples, it may seem that H skies primarily with the ethks of care on fbls score. Ancl ii I am correct th,d the Will to Share fa grounded in nahini1l human sooiabilily, then Hie reasons for ading 233 mon1Uy al"e, in a ceda1in sense, already l:lhe1re,. Hut whi.le truly sh.nin11 agenl-s 1,vill mitrnrally feel ,md be moved by the interests of other people,. lhis does not mean th.ey wiH ilrnmecliately act solely on others' behalf. It sin1ply implies thail tbey will be fon:ed to Hiink rnbo11I the g,rmmds for acting in a pairticufar way. l!J.ecautie concern for self and concern for others must be filrered thro1.1gli 0I1e anoH1er in rnrder foll' the gen11ineiy shairing agent to detem1i:tle what she should do in ainy partkulair coinlext, the seairch for i:noral masons wlll also b0; an eveir*-presemt fosk And ift is here thait tl'n, presencP of an oven1rchinr; ok:si ire for mut11allity appearrn to be cmdaL ]for such a des.ire divorces moral aige11ts frorn ,~ too, heavy attadiment to either their ow11 or other people's interests, maldl'ti~; it significantly more Iikely tba1t tlhe a1gents will find the best way of folfnHing both sorts of interests (insofar as possible) at the very same l:ime .. Th.~ ideal of sharing afoo u1nderscoires the care•-Ptbical ideai l:hat the' emotions aire a conslihu1:ive medi.um of morail reflection mid form a crndal component of genuinely moral response, inasmud1 as the caprucity for empa,l:hy serves as at precondition for shaning experiences. But si1nce the desire for mut11ality serves as a kind of overairching desi.ire tlmt one's own 1iinteresh; aind crnncerns be birought: 1in hme with the in1err-es1:s and concems of others, the ideal of sharing 1,1fao illcknowledges the importance of some kind of regufotive~ motive, of the sort that autonomy,,.hased views typkally endo11•9e. Cornsid1• 1r Marcia Barnn' s suggestion l:haJ the motive of d nily be conceived as a filter tb1*ough whkh all our otfõr motives must pruss (1984). Her idea seems to be thait v,IJithacnt som," such filter, thell'e would h,, r10 way to reimlw, the im-rnilabl,, conflid:s that arise between the interesls of separate persons. And although I haive suggested thal genuinely sharing agents do not lypicaJly perceive lheir own aind othe1*s' concerns as b,,ing set in fondmmental compd'.l'tim1, Lhfa doer; 234 not moarn that their is no sort of regufotive rnotive a,t work fo fad,. it sef"ms to be preds(~Jly beca11so they possess a more overarching desire for nu1tual!Hy that shari1111~ agents a1re motivated to exprei,,s and folffH both sorts of concern at Hrie very r.arne time.23'7 Barbam Herman has objected to the idea Utat momlity be com:eiw\d ms the expression of an overrarch1ing desfre, s11ggesting that tfos devalues the moral agenlt's caprucity for ru11tonomorns rn.l:ionality (]993: ch. 10). Part of her corn:em seems to lw that the pairndigmatic case of morall adJivity is one in whkh ,m a,gent is tempted lo make a spedal exception for lrni1ll!11seif, ,md hence tbrut a desfre-batsed model wi.11 be unabfo to explain why we often think we ought not to do wlrrnt we most strong.iy desire. Hut we !have seen thaJ the sem;,e olf duly ecu1 be captrnred [n agent-based terms (§2..6), and since we have seen that an agent who fo, constantf;y nifleding on mm-a] primdples will at leas! sometimes display run objectionable kind of delachmeint frmn other people, it fo not obvfo11s that a more principle-based acrmrnt .is apprnprfote .. IVlleanwhile, the desire for mut11mlity •-conceived as run ove1mrching practical alli1:nde, does keep agents from making special exceptions designed to fmcl:her U1eirr owr1 conce.rns. Herma.n ,ilso suggests that desires mt.1st be "norm.aliZ<~d" into rn deliberailive field before we rnn treat their expressi()n as r,,cogrnilzably moral. 237Baron also *insfr.lls rn1al the duty rnoLivP servni:Y t1a1s a limitJng con(HU.on and. al lht~ sa:me tilrne as an impntu~i to Llllink aho-ut orrrn1s co.nd11d:1 to apprair,e one'r-. gmdn, lo 6(! conGdous of 011nsnl[ as a uolf.-d,d.erm l.nlng be-li.1ng, and som.ctin:Hm tt;o give o:nn lhn strength one needs l;o do ,vhaL ono se4;s one n!al.!y s..ho-uld do 11' (1984: 59). As fo1r as [ cun snp1 lh(: d.1-:sire ror rrrntuaJ.ity can serve aU of these fuT1ctio:1i1H, though it donf~ tend to chi.~,e:mph.aBi;;,n the imporl:am.c(: of "self--detenninaUon.n H wo take f•%1..irim.rnJy the itd.<1.a lhat t-:ven ou.:r diriUncUvo pm*so:naHties are r:,1haped1 1n no Filmrnali meas-uñ1. by our imtor:'acti.onfl. wit.h othon;, a:11.d. then oven lhJ~ devdop,rn.enl and pnrsuJL of 011r "own" conception of the good ,,.,1m. ho an activity we~ e.ngu go in wHh 0U1crs. 23.S Her concern Sc'3⁄4~ms lob,, that we are too ohS1crnre to, one another to succossfolly 1.mdernl:tmd,. ld alone pmrsl!e, each other's good, and be11ce Hmt we nc!ed independent moral principles to gmide us as we aUempt to 1mden,l:andl botb om* ow11 motives and othe1rs'. Bul: llS Jlrii, M1.1rdochhas emphasize,d, wh, 0 n human bein;_;s become mutt11i1l obj<•d'l of one another's alfonHon or have coxnmon obj,~ds of attentlon to define thei1r focus, they are frnrced to elaborate a common vocabullan11 that ernaibles them to overcome the difficulty in underslanding eaich 0U111c'rs' point~. of view (1970:33). Meai n while, sinn" the dlesi1re for m111tm1lil;y set9 il:s own, inleun.ailly imposed limits on what earn lbe done to acilieve its aims (recall p .. 22.41, above),. it see1ms to s,1:rve precisely tlw soll't of regufative fundfo11 that defend em of autonomy-lbased views 81l.bril!nite to mornl principles. D,"fernders of more ,rnhmomy based views are also likeJy to object that an etlhk of shiming canu1,ot ]place emougii emphasis on individ LI.al sepa,mteness to explain thr~ bask level of ".rt,sped:" Hmt fo due fo aU persons sirnpl,y 1l11 virrt11e of 1:hefr basic humanity. Hut Robin Dilfon has pointed to an "inl:rr'igui:ng similarity" between !:hie (kaml:ian) nolion oI nespect: and more connection-* bas,~d notions of care (1992), and an ethic of sharfmg seems able to capture the best ellements of both, The trick fo to notice Hmt whil,e the formal rol,?. of res.ped is "to keep iri the forefront of moral consdommess Hie attHud,, of vallling pe,*sons for theh* own sake and so to .remind n.rn of the reasons why we siimikl freal pemons as mornllily obliges'*' (Ibid.: 1 H, note 11), the prndicaJ content of iresped iH determined lby what those reasons rnrc taken to be,. And whlile Kantians fond to focus on cerfoin rnodes of h1m1trn sepa1ratenes:, in pmrtkular, 01u capacity for rational! autonomy •-"it is certratinly possibie to idcnhi.fy 0U1er foahues of human beings ar, tlhe [most] mmmlly sigI1ifinmf' 236 (libid.: 133). Most obvio11sly, rn 11s possible to focus on our "fondamlmtal pairUculillrity aml i.nterdepemlence,"' as well ,1,s our vulnerability to fortune, mu need for assistance from others, and "the way our good iis slw1ped by our relailionshipi;'' (Ibid .. : 11!5). By focusing on these latter foatiues, Dilfon devellop1'1 a concer!. of "carre•1*espect'' which is an atl:.ih1de responsive to human connededness. To exhihH care-resped towmrd another 1*equires "not so much refraining from i11berfe1*ence, as recognizing omr power l:o make and umnake ,!ach otheras persons, exercising this power wisely, and carefully partic1ipal:ing in their realizntnon of their selves amd theil' end1{' (Ibid.: 116). Caire .. respect also fact that she is a person w H:h her own conception of the good, and for this reason, it includes a Jjmern,ion of cherishiñ; the oUh.er's 1.1niqu.e quahitiE'[; that many fim.1 Iacking in the kanUan view. 238 Although cal'e-respecl is aiffodively laden, howevrer, it does not lose the sense of co1:mnonality and 1~qurnl 11alL1e of persons that kamh,ms want to f.'lmphasix,e, fo1* we are all interdependent in the ways c11re .. 1*e1,pecl focuses on. And IilKe tile kantian notion, it is not II ldndi of e1111Juation i*espect,2'.W Precisely beca1we it foc1.1ses on mu int.erdepe1nd,?ncy and vn.1h1e1*abilily, care-resped encourages agents to be slow to jm.ige and generous in their evaluations of others,. Therrci is a kincl of tension be1:vveen Jkantian respect, which regards each p,~rson as jm,t as valuabfo as every other, and cam-*respect, which rega rrds 1:hfa particular individ 11al as special. ]But l:his 1:ensfon fa ij familfar element oi 2'18 A similar point: is made hy Friedman (1996: B7). 239RccaU_ Darwall'G-('_[97'7) disLinction bolwoon 1'1,,e,*ognilion r(!Hpe:cC and '1c*vahu1Uon n:spncL" 23'7 ordirnuy morn I experience. Hence, DiHm1 treats lrnnban respect: and mñ*resped as tile two end points on a spedn1m of penn issible attitudes we nuiy legitimad:elly tale up fowm*d 0111) another .in vmrfous circmrn,l:amces, Given the two dimern,icms of (experiential! sharing, lhern seems to be room for botlhi prndkal. rnttiitudes within the wm to Share, amd hence mom fm a bask .level of resped once that notion is 1mderstood broadly enough to 1indude both Ute sepandeness and cmmed:edness aspeds of hmna1.11 living .. caring-based ethics, however, it does not incorporate all of the aspeds of either view. ]for example, it does not incorpornte the ca,re-el:hical notJ1on of "1rnotiviltiom11l d1ispfaceme11t," and it does not incoi'porate !he mdonomy"•hased claim that morii!.I deliberation ideally involves the impartial review of mornl. principles iimd rules. More generally, it insists tbirnt neither the va1.lues. of im:l.ividu1.al s.epa rnteness nor Ute values of interperno111al con11ed,~d11ess are mornUy basic TheiI* moral sigrnifica1ice, accordlng lo am e1:hk of sharing, depends on !:heir being incrnl'pomted within the Will fo Shrnre, and tempered by 1:lh.e overarchinf 5 desire for nrmhmlil:y that is the distindive foatnue of su1ch ,i Will. Uecamse we have seen reasons for rejeding a baselilu! commitment to either set of valrnes, however, Hte fad that an ethic of sfouin,g fo not quite able to synthesize Gmigan' s two rn1oral orient1tions does not se,,m to ]b,, a s1:riki' ,,11gainst it Mme importantly, since the value of mutualily i:ranscende l:he separateness/ connectedness tension altogether, an cUtic of sharing provides us witlt a new "way r,f U1i11king" about moralHy that at least mcrri.ls cuefof: considerntion. 238 ' 1:. Rf:lFJERllNCJU& Adams, Rolbert Merrihew .. '1988,. Common Projects and Morn,l Virtue. ]In French, et. al Annas, Julia. 1993. The Morali~/ ~f lcl'appiness. Oxford/New Yorlk: Oxford lJ:n.iver1srity Peerrn. Auerbach, J11dy, and et. al 1985. Commentlry on Gilligan's "In a Difforent Voke". Peminist Sh1dies 'I l (Spring): *.149-62 .. Baier, Annette. 1985. 1⁄4!hat do !Nomen 1⁄4!ant in a Mora! Thecwy? Reprinted as Chapt.c,1* I in Morral Pr~iudices (1994a) . .......... 1991. Progress of the Sent-iments. Cambrridge, MA: Halt'Vard University Press. •***** .. 1994a. Moral Prejudices. Essays on EH!ics. Camb1ridge, .M,A: Hmrvmrd UniversHy Press. •*****. 1994\h. The Need for More than Justke. Chapter Two in Bader (1994a) Biilrnn.,. Marcia .. 1984. On the Alleged Mom! Reptlf,'llHlllC,) of Acting from Duty. Journal of Philosophy 81 ( 41): 48--66, Banes,i, John, 1md Chris Moore. 1996. Interna.l Relations and Social Umlerntanding .. Behavioral and llnijn Sciences 19: 107-54\. lfanrest,. John, Caro.I Thompson, an<t'II Chrlis. Moore, 1997 .. The Development of Future-{)riented Prmfonce and AHnu.ism L11 Preschoollern, s;:;9,gilli,l:j11t• Development 12 (2): *J99ff. !Baxter, Donald L.M. 1990. H1.11.ne on Virh1e, Beau1ty, Composites, and Secomlary Q11alities. Padfic Phtlosoplh.irnl Q1rnrterly TL 103--118. Becker, Lawrenc(i C., and Chairfotte B. llecker, eds. 1992 .. An Encyclopedi.a of Ethics, 2 vols. Garland l'ress. Benhabib, Seyla, 1987. The Generalized and the Concrete Otl1,ir. In Kitt:ay and JVIPyers. Be1rgrrrnnn, fl:'it.hjof .. 1985. Nietzsche'" Critique of the Modality of Morn! Codes .. Intemationiill Studies in PhUosopl1!Y. XVH: 99.:116. Ilium, La 1N1*e11ee, 1,980. Friendship, Altruism and Jdoral#y, Bor,ton/ London: Tfo1.1tfodge arnd Kegam Paul ***•-**. 1994 ... Moral Perception and Pr,r,rl:icu.larity. Carnbridge/New York: Camlbridgc Univermity Press .. l'ira1L111an, M.ichiilel K 11992, Sharer.I Cooperative Adlivi1y. I'hillosophicad Revi,•W 101 (2): 32'7-*41. , ........ _,1993. Shared Intenl:ion .. Elhics HM (1): 97-111 239 Calhoun, Cheshire. 1988. J11stice,, Case, Ge~nder Blas .. fo.!!JCil1al of Philosophy 85: 451,-63. Canno.ld, Leslie, Peter Singer, lffoiga KLJhse,, and Lori Grmen,. 199S,. What is ithe J11sl:iice-Care Debate .Rt~Jly_ Aboun In French et at (1995),. Cud, Claudia. l990. Gender and Morral Ludk, fo l1llan1agan and Rorrty. Ca,rd, Claudiru, ed. 1991. Feminist Ethics. Lm,vrence, lI<B: Univen.ity Press of Kansai,. Chodomw, Nancy,. 1978. 11ie Reproduci'ion. ofMofhering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender. Berkeiey: Univers[l:y of Callifoñirn Press. Cottingham, John. *i 996. JPart.iahty and tile Viirll]es. fo Crisp,. Crisp, Roger, ed. 1996. How Should One Live? Essays cm the Virtues. Oxford/New York:: Oxford Universi1y Press. Damon,. WHlfam. 1988. The /\/Jara! Child. Nurturing Children's Natural Moral Growth. Especially C!rn1pter 3,. "L,,,aurning Aloon.1t Ji]stice Through Sharing." New York: The Free P11,:ss.. Dancy, Jonruthan. 1992. Caring About Justice. Philosophy 67 {Odober): 147--466. Davion, Victoria. 1993 .. Autonomy, Integril:y and Ouse. SodaJ The1lr\l .. §!L19. Practice 19 (2),: 161--82 .. Deigh, John. 1995. Empathy rnncl Universaliza.bility. Ellhks 105 (July): 743-63,. Dillon, Robin. 1992. R,~spect and Care: Toward Moral Integral:ion. Canadia11, fo1unal! of Philosophy 7.2 (March): 105--31. Driver,. ]!ulia,. 1995,. Monkey1in1; with M0Uve1,: Agent 0 1Basing Virtue Ethics. Ubl!ifas 7 (2): 281-88. Eisenberg, Nancy. 198'?. Self At!:Jributions, Soda] fotc>,r,Ktion, rnnd MrnrnI Development. In lvfora/ Development l:hrough Social lntem:cticm, edited by W. Krnrtines ancl J. Gewirtz. New York: Will.ey Press . ........... 1989*. Empathy and Sympathy. In Child Development Today and Tomorrow, edited lo>y W, Damon. Sain Francisco: Jossey-Bm,ll. Eisenbell'g, Nancy,. atnd JanetStrnyer, eds. l9!l7. Emp11Jhy and its Development. Cambridgl): Crnmhridge University Px*ess. IFlain.agan, OwNt '1991. Varieties of Moral Personalil:1J. Carrnbridge, MA: Hrn.1"1/ard lhiivernity Press .. Flanagan, Owen,. and Katluyn Jackson. 198'?. Jur,l:ice, Care ,rnd Gicmderr: the Koh!berg .. Gilligan Debate Revisited. Ethics 97: 622--37 .. Flalilagan, Owen, rnnd Amelie 0. Rorty, eds. '1990. fdentily, Chararler and lv!oraliiy: Essays frr Moral Psychology. Ctimbridge, MA: MIT Press. 240 I ! t i IFoot, Philippa .. 198S, lHilitui.ainism and the Virhies .. M_ind 94: 196 .. 209. ]French, P.A,, T .. IE. Uehling and FL K. iNett:stelitl, eds, 1988 .. Elhical Theory: Chamder and Virtue. Notre Dame: Notre ll)ame Univernity Pi'ess .. ........... , 1995 . .Moral Concepts .. Notre Dame: University of Notre Daimc~ Press. IFriedmain, Marilyn. 1993, TNhaf are Friends For? Ithaca, ]\TY: Cornell Universilly Press. Galstrnn, \IVilliam .. 1987. f ustice and ihe Hi,.man Good. Chicago: University of Chirngo Press . .......... 1991. Liberal Purposes. Goods, Virtues and Diversity in fhe Liberal Slate. Crumbrid1;e/New York: Cambrk!ge University Press . ...... , .... 1993. CoimwpoHl:an AHmism. In Pant et ruL Garcia,. J.L.A 1990. The Primacy of the Virtuous. Phifosophia XX: 69--9'fi . .......... , 1992. Th,~ Right and the Good, Phitlosophia XXI: 235--56. Gauthier, David. 1986. Morals by Agreement. Oxford/New York: Oxford lJn[ve1*sily Press. Gilbe1-t, Margmret 1989. On Soda! Facts. New York Rm1tledge ainid Keg,rn Paul. ........... 19941. Sodalily as rn Plhiilosophicillly Sign:ificru11t Category. l<?.!!Xll!!I .. of;,g,;fo! Philosophy 25 (3),: t5--25, GiHig1m, Can,L 1982 .. In a TJiffereni: Voice. Psychological Theory and Women's Development.. ]\Tew ed,. Ca,m bridge, MA: I-l[mvan:1 University Press . ........... 1984. Conq11fataidor and the Dark Conlinent: Reffoctions mi t}i,e Psychology of Love. Daedelus 0!13 . ........... Ii 986 .. Reply to Critics .. §ig1~J! ll: 324-333 .. ........... *1987 .. l\iloral Orienfatirnn and Morn] Development. In K.ilfay & Meyeirs. ,., ........ 1988, Ado!esoenl: Deve.lopmenl Reconsidered. In GiHigan d. aL ......... ,,, 1993, LeUer to Reaidem, Prefoc(~ to the New Edition of in a Different Voice. Crumbridg,', MA: Harvard U1riivews.il:y Press. **10.9, . LI , I' D'f' . Tl . . (' . . •. . JC, 1:* . *1109'' ............. , *"* :,, 1. eann,g ne I Ierem:e: . *1,eonzmg .. ,onnec,1on ... '.!Y.l'.~.J-~ " ,J. Gillig,m, Cami, Janie Vidoria 1!\lrnrd,. Jill McLean Taylor, aind Hetty Ha.rdige, eds, 1988,. Mapping the Moral Domain, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Oniversi:ty Press. Goldman, Alvin. 1993. Ethics aind Cognitive Science, IitMrn 103 (2): 337-60. Greenspan, Stanley 11989 .. The Development <i /:he Ego. Madison, CT: Internaitionrul Universilies Press . .. ,. ...... 199:i. Selflessness and Loss of Self .. fo Paul, et al. 241 HarcHng,, Sandm. 198'7. The Curfous CoindrJem:e of lt'eminille aind Afrkall1 MornJiti,~s. In Kittay &: Meyers. Heid, Vircginia. 1984!. Rights and Goods. lusNfj1i11g Social Action. New York: The: I:1rree Prress,, ............ _ 1987. Femirnism ,md Morn! Themy. In KiUay & Meyers . .......... _ 1993 .. feminist. Morality: Transforming CuUure,, Society and Polilics .. Cforngo: Chicago Uinivernity Press .. ........... _ 1995. The Meshing of Care ,md Just1ice. Hyf}ãfa 10 (2): 128--32 . ............ _ 1995-*96. Justiic,~ &: l.JWity. 1Nho Cares'/ Phillosophkall Exdmngie. 26: 2'J .. '.J9. He1r111rnn, lfarbai!"a. 1993 .. The Practice of Moral /udgment. Carmbddge, MA: Hmrvard 1J1lllive1rsity Press .. HiU, ]Ir., Thom,m; E. *t987 .. The Importance of A11tm1om.y. fo Kittay &: Meyerrs . ......... 1991 .. Aulcmomy and Self•Respect. Crumbriidge/1\lew Yo!f'k: Cambridge Univcrnil:y Press. Hoagfand, Saurm .. 1991. Some Thoughts Abmit Caring. In Cal'd. Hobbes, Thomas. 1651 .. Leviathan. Hoffman, Martin, 1976,. Empathy, Role Taking,. Guilt, and the Developmerd of Altru.istic Motivations. In Moral Deoelopmenl and Beha'Oior, edited ltiy I. Lickona .. New York: Holt, Rinelmrt a,nd Winston HoHam:l, Nancy. 1993 .. The Opinions of Men and Woimc!in: Towa1rd a Different Configuration of Mrnral Voices, fournall of Social l'hilosopl:!y 241 (Spring): 65• 80 .. Houston, Ha1rban1. 1987. Resc11iñ; iNom,rnly 'ilirhies: Some Dangern of Morad Reclamation. In Science,. /\!Joralil-lf and Fem.inisf Theory, Supplemenfali Volmne of 1:he Cau~adfam 1£ .. ll,~I!t"l of l'hilrnmpl:iy, edited by M. Hanen and I(. Nielsen. Hmme,. David. 1'74!0. A Treatise of Human Nature .. Edited by L.A. Sdhy, .. Bigge. Vol. 1978. New York: Clarendon. Hursthon.1se,. Rosalind, 1991. Vi.rt11e Theory and Abmhcm. PhJiloso1r,hy!!I1.Q Public Affairn 20: 223--46 .. ........... , l 993. Slote rn1 Self, .. S1.1ffidency. Jourrrml of Social Plnik,,so12,hy 2.4! (2) . ........... _ 1995, Applying Virtue Ethics. In Virtues and Reasons. Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, edited by R. Hursthow;e, G. Lawy•ence and VV. Quinn: Clarendon Press . ........... 1996, Noll'malive Virtue Ethics. In Crisp. 242 Hutdieson, }1rands. 1725. lrnquiiry Into tl'rte Original ol' Our: Ideas of Ueauty and Virtue. In Collected \Narks of Francis f-{utcheson, Hiklesheim: George Olms Verlags.b11chhandlung. Jaggar, Allis<rn. 1992, lFeminfat EH1ics. In IS.ecker &: llecker. Jollrn,shrn, D. Kay. 1988, .Adolescenl:s' solutions to Dilemmas in lFabies: Two Moral Od~mtations ..... Two Prohlelln Sol.ving Sb-al•~r;les. Lil Gilligam, et ,1L Kamt, lmrmrnuel. 1785. Groundwarkfor !he Me/:aphysics oflVIorals. ,. ........ l 797 .. The Doclrine ~f Virtue .. J,Gttay, Eva Feder, and Dfona T. l\llleyeirs, eds, 1987. INomen and Moral Theory. Tol:1:owa, NJ: ]-towman ,md L1iUlefield, Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1981. Essays rm Moral Development. VoL *t The l'hilosophy olf MomI Develop1:111.ent. New York Harper&: Row .. ,. ....... 1984 .. Essays on Mcrra/ Development. Vol 2,. The Psychology of Mornl Development New Yoll'k: lHlarper & Row. IKorngaaJl'd, Christine. 1992. Cnmting It.he !Kingdom ofl2nds: Redprodty aIJd Respons,ibility im Personal Relations. Phillosophkal Pernp~_c;ti.Y_('.~ 6 (E thJ\rn):305-332 . ... ,. ..... 1993. The I~easons We Cm1 Share. Social Philosophy and Policy 1 () (1 ):24--51. Kmeger-Mappes, Joy. 19-94. The Ethic of Care vis, .. a, .. vis tlhe EH1k of Rights:: A Problem for Contemi:,orn.ry Moral Theory. Jt!YJJ.'i:!J}!1. 9 (Summer)!:108•-31 .. KymHckai, WHL 1989. liberalism, Cormnunity and Culture .. Oxfoll'd/1\fow Ymk: Oxford University Pll'ess, Larrnbee, Mary Jeanne, ed. 1993. An Ethic of Care: Feminist and .Interdisciplinary Perspecl"ives, Boston: Routledge & Keg;a11 Pa,ul. League, Kathleen. 1993. lndivkhrnlism, Class and the Sihrntirn1 of Caire: An ]Essay on Carol Gilligan. Jo1m1al of Social Phil.osophy_ 21 (3):69 .. ,79. Lioyd, Genevieve. 1984,. The Man ~f Reri,on. "Male" and II Female" i:n: Western Philosophy. M.in.11.eapolls: University of Mirmesota. Press. Long, A. A., and D. Sedley. 1987. The Hellenisfic Philosophers. CaJinbiridge/1'\lew York: C,unbr[dge Unhiersity Press. Lyuns, Nona Plessnell". 1988. Two Perspedives: On Self, Relationships, and MoraHl:y, In Gilligan, et. al M!.ii!.dntyre, Alasdair. 1981. Afler Virf;ue. A Study in Moral Theory. 2111d ed. Noll"<' Dame: Uni.versity of Notre Dame Press .. ........... 1988. Whose /u.slice? fl\lhich R.ati.onality? Notre Dame: U11111versiity of Nohre Dame Press. 243 Mahler, Mal'grnret S,,, with Fired Pine: and Anni Uergm,m. 19'75. The P~ychological Birth ~f the Human Infant. Symbiosis and .Individuation,, J\TY: lfasic ISooks, Manslbridge, Jane,. a,nd Susan M. Okim. 1993. Feminism,. In A Companion lo Contemporary Political Philosophy, edited hy P. Peltit and K Goodin: !Basil HlackweH. Ma,rtineau, Hernry. *rn9l. Types of Ethical 'f1reory ..31rd <"d. 2 vols. May, Lanr*y, and MarUyn IFriedm,m. 1996. i'lfind and Morals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Meyers,. Dhma 1'. 1987. The SodaLized Individual aind Inidividuai Autmmmy. In KiUay &: Meyc~irs. Monroe, Kr.isten Renwick. 1996. The .Heart ~f Altruism. Percepi'ions of rl Common Hu.m.ani~,-Prim:eton: Princeton Univern.ity 1P1rei;s, Moody**Ad,l!ms, Michelle M. "l99l, Ge)n(leir and the Complexity of Mmml Voicer,. In Card. MIUrdoch, Ids. 19'70. The Sovereignty of Good, Hoston: Rm1tledge and Kegan Pau1L Mllrphy,. Jeffrie, a111dl .Jean Ffampton. 1988. Forgiveness und Me:rcy. Cam.bridge/ New York: Cambridge Unive:rsity Press. Naigel., Thomas. 1979. Sexual Pe1versions. In Morl'al Queslions, edited by T. Nagel:: Cambrildg,~ University Press. Nietzsche, Fx*iedrich. 1886. Beyond Good and EvU . .......... 1887 .. Toyful INisdom. Nod dings, Nel 1984. Caring. A Feminine Aprrroach to E/:hics and Moral Edumtion. Berkekey, CA: Universily of California, l'ress .. •******, 1990, Feminist !Fearn in E1focs. fournal of Social Philosophy 21 (},ail/Winter): 25-33. •*****-. 1990. A Response. I:l:Y.J!!!HI! 5: 10--15. Nunner--\Ninkler,. Gertmde, 1984l. Two Moralibes?' A Critical Discussion of an Bhic of Ca,re mrtd ResponsibilHy Versus and Ethic of Rights amd ]lu.wti.ce. fo Mora.lify, Moral Behavior arirl 'l~'oral Developmenl'.,. edited by VV, Km*ti nes and J. Gewfrlz.. New York: Wiley. Nussl:mum, Martha,, 1985. The DiscermJ1emt of Perception: An Axi.5totelian Conception of Private and 1P1.11bHc Rrntionamy. f!'.Qu:g_E?,9.i!:lgs of tlte lBostortfic!:!'fI Colloquium. in Andemt l'hifosophy l: 151--201 . ........ "Ii 986. The Fragili~ of Goodness. Lu.ck and Tragedy in Greek Elhics,. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. 244 ******•* .. 1988.. Non .. •Relatlive Vil'hies .. In Elhica! Theory: Character and Virtue, edited by P.A. }1nmch, 'f. E.. UehliI1g and H .. K Wel:tstein: Nol:re Dame Univemity Press" ........ , 1990,. Love's !<nc1wledge: Essays on Philosophy and Ulerrtiare. Oxford/N,)w York: Oxfm*d Univernity Press .. ........... , 1993. Equity and Meircy. Philosophy and P1.1blic Affairs 22 .. .......... 1995. 'Jhe T1ierapy of Desire. Prlncelon: 1'1rim:eton University Pn!ss. Nussbaum, Martha, and Nancy Sherman .. 1991 .. Diafog11c on Love's KnouJ!erlge. foternatilonale Zei1:schr'llt fur P]lilosopll ie 5:12 ::2.ll0-238 .. Oakley, .Justin. 1992 .. Morality and the Emo/ions .. New York/Londcm: Routledge .. Okin, S1.1san Moller .. 1987. Justice and Gender. Phnlosopl1y and Public AffaiI~ 16: 42:-72. ............. 1989a. Ju.slice, Gender, and the .Family. Ne1,v York: Ba,s11c Books . ......... 1989b. Reason and Feelting in 'lhinldng aboutJn.nstke .. Etlhics 99 Oanuarry),: 2:2:949. *-***--.. 1994 .. Political. Libernlfam, Justice aindi Gend<c)f. Ethics 1()5:23 .. 412 .. Paiu.l, Ellen Frankel,. IFll'ed D, Miller, and Jeffrey Paulr eds .. 1993, Altruism. Nt-'W York Cambridge Univeirnity Press. Pettit, Philip. 1993. The Common Mind.: An Essay 011 Psychology, Society and. Polffics. Oxford/New York: Oxford Univemity Press. Piaget Jean .. 1932: .. The Moral Judgment of the Chil'd .. New Yoirk: The Free I'1ress .. Piper, Adrian. ]991, Impartiaiity, Compassion aml Modail fo11agina1:io11. Ethics HH (4):'?26-S7. Puka,. Bill. 1990. Tlhe Liberation of Caring; A Different Voice for Gilligan's "D.'f tV * 11 ., .. [ * " , .. ("I) 5f:l .,,., ll :eren. OJCe •.. c ypa .. !o!a ;)' .. : ***o, ... Putman, Daniel. 1991. Reldi.onal Ethics and Virtue Theory .. .M.<st!1'.J2hiloso11h:11. 22 (Jully):2:31-38. Rad1els, James. 1993. What Woul.d a Satisfadory Mo:rall Tlrteory be Llke. Iri The El.ements of Mara! Philosophy. New York: McGraw Hill. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: HairvaTrd University Press. Ross, W. D. 1930 .. The Right rmll the Good. Oxford: Oxford UnivernH:y Press. Ruddick,. Sara. 1989. Maternal Thinking. Tcrwarrl a Politics of' Peace: HaHanl.im• Books. Schneewirid, Jerome. 1986. Acts and Agents .. Chapter 8 in Sidgwick's l'Jhics rmd Vicl:orlan lVforal Philosophy: Clarrendori Press, 245 I I l Sd1war:wnbaich,. Sybnl A. 1996. On Civic FriEindship. Ei'hics 107 (1): 97.:J28. Schweder, Richard A., Manomoh,m Mahaqpaln11, mrrd )mm G. Miller. "N8'7. C11lhue and Morn! Deveiopme11t. fo The Emergence of.Mara/Uy in Young Children, edlitcid by J. Kaga11 aind S. Lmm lb. Skier, Georii;e.198'7. Othe1rVoices, Olber Roo1ns? Women's Psychology and Mor11I Theory .. In Kil:tay & .Meyers .. Sherm.mn, Nancy, *t 988. Conunnn aindl Uncom.1mo11 Virh1e. In JFre11.ch, et all . ............ , l989 .. The Fabric o,fCharacter, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, ............ 1990. The Place of Emotiom, in K,rntian Mora.lily .. In ]Flanagan am1 Rorly . ............. 1993. The Virtlles of Common Pursuit.. Phi.llosophy and Phenomeno .. fogical *1:, * 1 ,,.,,. (2)* 277' ()() ,t~SeitUCJ 1)1.,J .• ~* . ""77 • ............. , 1993, Wise Maxims/Wise Judging,. Monist 76: 41-65. ,. ........ 1994!. The Rofo of Emotions in Arisloteiian Virtm,. 1Proceedillf~~gf_the.113c,~to111 .Ar*ea Collo91uln1m in Arn,dent PhillosoJP.]hY, 9: 1 <13 . .......... , 1997 ... Making a NecessihJ of Virlue. Aristotelian and Kantian Virtue. Oxford/New York: Oxford Uni.ve1*sHy Press. Sidgwick, Henry. 1907. 'I11e Jvieilwds of Ethics. 71:h ed. I1uli.a111apolis/Cambridge: Hackett Pubhshing Company. Slote, Midmel. *1992.. From Morality to Virtue .. Oxford/New York: Oxford Universily Press. , ......... , 1993 .. Virtue Ethics and Democrailic Villh.1es. Journal of Social Plrn.ilo.•~J:1>JPhY 2:4, (2')• I" ry17* .. ,)-,:)' . ............ ]994 .. G()m},i; and Virtues. New York: Claremlon Press . ........... 1996, 1Jtili1:arianism ,md Viirt1.1e. In Crisp . .... , ... 1995, Agent-Based Virtue Etlrnks. Ln Jre11ch, et aL (1995),. Smart, J. J. C 1961. A.n Outline of 11 System of Utili.tarian Ethics. Caml:nidg,•: Cil!mbridge Urniversity Press. Smith, Adam. 1759. Theory ~f' Mara/ Sentiments. VoL 1976, Glasgow Editicm of the Works and Con*espomlerice ofAdam Smith. Oxford/New York: Oxford Univernity Press. Snare, 1Fn11nCJis. 'l 991!. Marais, Motivation and Convention. Cam b,l'iclge: Camhiriclge UnivernHy Press. Stern, Daniel. 198S .. The lnterpen,onal 11\iorld cif the Infant. New York: Bask Books. Stocker, IVlichaieL 1987 .. Dulty and firiendship: A Synthesis of GiUigan's Conbcast1ive Morn! Concepts,. In Kit!ay and Meye1rs. 246 .......... 1987. Emotional Thm1r;hts. Amedcan Philosoglr.!i!~~!i'.JJn.§,rt~11:Jy 24: 59-69. Tronto, Jornn. :198'7. Womein's Morality: Heyond (:;ender Difference to a Theoiry of Care. Reprinted in Larrn,bee (1993) . .......... 1993. M(rral Boundaries. A PolUiml Argument for the Ethics ~f Care .. New York/London: Rolltledge, Tl!omela, Raimo and Kamrlo Miller .. 1938,. We--l.1i1Ltentions. l:'hi.losophinil Stmtic,s. 53: 36789. INrnlker, Lawrence J. 1984. Sex Differences in the Development of Mora.! Reasoning: a Clrifa:al Review. Reprinted in Larnibee ( 1993) .. Walker, Margauret Urban. *1989. '\,Vha,t Does the Different Voice Say: GiJIHgm11s Won1en and Mornll Philosophy. Journal of Value Jlniq~!.!I:'i. 23 (JL111e): ]23-34. WillJiams, l!le1mmrcl. * J.9'73. Emotions. Im Problems of the Self: Cmnbridge Univeirsity P:resfJ . .......... 1973. Persons, Charatdeir amd Mornl1ity. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 197J.J980: Camhridge Onivemity Press .. .... ,. ... 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, l\t11A: Hanrnrd Univernity Press. Wingfield,. Lindy, and Helen I--iaste. 1987. Comtectedne,s a1:1d Separa 1:einess: Cognitive Slyle or MonlLI Orientation? Jommal of Mom] Education J6 (3}: 214 ... 225. Wispe, Lauren. 1i987. Hisfory of tlne Concept of Empa,thy. Jin Empathy and il:s Development, edll'ed by N. Eisenberg and J. Strnyer, Cambridge: Cambddge Uin]v(~rsJ\ty Pr(~ss,, \i\lolf, Sus,m. *rn79. Morn! Saints. [our111S1l of Plh.iloso12hY. 79: 419-39. Wood, AUen. 199*t Unsociable Sodahility: Tlt.e• Anlhropologicrnl Basis of KanUm11. Ethics .. PhifosopJn.kal Topg,;:~ 19 (Sprini~): 325•5L Zimrrnr1einnan, Midiael. 1985. Shar.ing Responsibillify. Annerirnn IPl)ljJQ:~2:10.hii::i!I Quarterly 22 (April): 115--22.